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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the Governance, Management and Administration of Governments' 
property assets. By examining the developments in the United Kingdom (UK) and United 
States of America (USA), this thesis demonstrates why and how an integrated and strategic 
approach to the management of these assets is an important and crucial element of public 
administration. The thesis examines the concepts and theory behind the property management 
discipline and shows that it is as much of an art than a science, with its practice being 
extensively influenced by context and human behaviour. This data and information is used to 
develop a hypothesis for a ‘leading’ practice model for the management of government 
property. 
 
Innovations in property management policy and practice introduced by the UK and USA 
governments since the early 2000s to improve property asset efficiency and effectiveness are 
being touted as world’s ‘leading’ practice, as is their development of performance ‘measuring 
instruments’. 
 
This assumption that a world’s ‘leading’ practice exists is tested through case studies into the 
UK and USA governments. Determining the position of the Australian public sector’s asset 
management capacity and capability against this standard is tested by applying the ‘National 
Assessment Framework’s Asset Management Maturity Assessment Model’ to a number of 
Australian public sector government jurisdictions. These measurements are analysed, and 
compared to an understanding of performance derived from a qualitative analysis of 
information and data obtained from the literature review, case studies, and the author’s 
professional experience. 
 
Studies are conducted into the Australian public sector to identify gaps between the existing 
status of the management of property and the ‘leading’ practice model. These gaps are 
analysed and the barriers to such a practice identified. The thesis develops an understanding 
of any organisational behavioural issues that influence asset management policy, governance, 
and capacity to undertake and respond to change. 
 
Until the early part of the last decade, governments across the world had typically not 
understood the importance of real property to the provision of public services and to 
government financial sustainability. Beyond a number of papers and edited publications 
describing the experiences of individual jurisdictions, there is a lack of detailed and evidence-
based research into the strategic management of government property assets. Little research 
exists for the Australian public sector. 
 
This thesis is intended to provide a platform for the research continuum in an area where little 
formal study has been undertaken. The significance of this thesis is that it provides a 
knowledge base for the Australian public sector to improve the management of its property 
assets (and other asset classes), which have an estimated value of some $325 billion.  
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“Because all things are interconnected, you must know 
each one, and how each one affects and effects every 
other.” 
 
“Strategy is the means by which all actions are 
coordinated and all resources allocated.” 
 
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. 
Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” 
 
 
 
(Sun-tzu, 6th cent. BC) 
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1 Introduction 
 
If asked whether their property strategies and plans maximise the efficiency and effectiveness 
of their government’s property assets, many property managers will answer by saying, ‘of 
course they do’. But the question is too complex to be answered in pure property terms alone. 
  
Maximising efficiency and effectiveness goes beyond the implementation of property strategies 
and property management plans. When viewed in the light of whole-of-government business 
and administration, property asset strategies, when integrated with human resources, 
business, service and financial planning, should have considerable influence over, and 
contribution to policy outcomes; financial sustainability; public services; the environment; 
quality of community life; economic activity; and the health, welfare, education and safety of a 
community, region or nation.  
 
The emphasis on should imply that property assets do not always provide the optimum support 
to government business and service objectives, whether this support is measured by financial, 
economic, sustainability, social or suitability criteria.  
 
This may be because of a lack of property planning or poor property asset management 
processes, but there are deeper influences at work that are at the core of public sector 
governance and of the public sector psyche that seem to ignore or minimise the significance 
and role of property as a ‘resource’, and as a factor of public service production.  
 
These influences serve to inhibit the establishment of well-informed and expert property 
functions within governments, and are the principal causes of inefficiency and ineffectiveness 
in the value of property’s contribution to policy, financial and service outcomes. 
1.1 The Property Asset Management Problem 
The nature and use of government real property assets is diverse and varied. 
 
The author has estimated the value of property assets in the Australian public sector at some 
$325 billion (see Table 1.1). 
 
Government Property Asset Value ($b) Total Asset Value ($b) 
Commonwealth 21.52 293.74 
New South Wales 78.60 249.56 
Queensland 56.94 189.86 
Victoria 53.64 119.61 
South Australia 19.78 44.49 
Western Australia 31.37 112.72 
Tasmania 5.24 16.66 
Australian Capital Territory 9.04 19.45 
Northern Territory 3.36 5.33 
Local Government1 45.30 302.00 
Total 324.79 1353.42 
Table 1.1: Asset Values – Non Financial Public Sector2 
                                                       
1 Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013).  
2 Source: Analysis of respective governments’ Budget Papers 2009/10 and Agency/ Departmental Annual Reports 
2008/9. It should be noted that the value of property assets has been extrapolated from the published data, as 
property asset values are not reported as individual items. 
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The only sources of published information are budget papers and the financial statements 
contained in annual reports. The author was unable to find any published source giving 
information on the public sector’s property assets, their management or performance. 
 
The estimates of value have therefore been extrapolated from the author’s review of the 
2009/10 budget papers and 2008/09 Annual Reports of the Commonwealth and State 
Governments, all of their departments and agencies, and public non-financial organisations. 
 
This exercise revealed a major issue in the management of government property: a lack of 
asset information, knowledge, performance, reporting and, hence, accountability.  
 
Property assets are not recorded and reported as a separate asset category, or by asset class. 
Property is consolidated under a single ‘Land and Buildings’ heading, which does not refer to 
an asset inventory, and shields asset type, method of valuation and asset inclusions and 
exclusions. Very little information is provided in the notes to financial statements. 
 
Information on property condition and expenditure is similarly obscure. 
 
Despite the importance of real property in terms of value, to the provision of public services 
and the cost of their annual upkeep and holding, there is limited transparency and 
accountability for the management of these assets.  
 
The Australian public sector does not manage its property assets as strategic government 
resources or with any over-arching policy and governance at any level of government: federal, 
state or local. Management responsibility is fragmented and uncoordinated, and spread across 
the spectrum of bureaucracies and levels of government without coherent policies, strategies, 
procedures or standards (Seymour-Jones, 2009b). 
 
This situation continues notwithstanding that the Australian public sector has attempted a 
variety of reforms to the way it manages its property assets over the past thirty years.  
However, these reforms have mostly been ad hoc and uncoordinated and have not always 
been motivated by the desire to improve public services. They have sometimes been as a 
result of compromise arrangements over control and the interests of individual stakeholders 
(Ibid.). 
 
Despite efforts of reform and an international reputation to the contrary, the state of the 
management of Australia’s public property (and other) assets remains more akin to an 
administrative and operational function, rather than the management that would be expected of 
strategic government resources with a value in excess of $325 billion, and an annual 
maintenance expenditure of $6.5 billion. 
 
This means that some twenty-four per cent of the nation’s total Non-Financial Public Sector 
(NFPS)3 asset value and some ninety per cent of the property assets applied to the health, 
education and social wellbeing of Australians are without strong whole-of-government asset 
management policies, governance, strategies and effective management programmes (Ibid.). 
The consequences of this continue to be evidenced by regularly reported asset failures in 
schools and hospitals, and public utilities and infrastructure that have resulted in loss of life, 
personal injury, and financial wastage across the country. 
 
                                                       
3 The NFPS comprises the General Government Sector (government entities that provide non-market goods and 
services primarily financed by taxes, e.g. hospitals and roads) and Public Non-Financial Corporations (providers of 
goods and services mostly financed through sales to consumers, e.g. state rail authorities and local transport 
operations). 
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All levels of government therefore face common clear and present dangers that threaten their 
financial sustainability, capacity to sustain the provision of public services, and the fabric, 
condition, efficiency and effectiveness of their property portfolios (Seymour-Jones, 2014a).  
1.2 The Strategic Property Asset Management Context 
‘Property Asset Management’ relates to the holistic and integrated strategic planning and 
management of property as a whole-of-government corporate and business resource. This 
makes it is a subset of ‘Resources Management’, as are human capital and resources, plant 
and machinery, and information and communications technology (ICT).  
 
This is distinct from Property Management, Facility Management, Engineering and 
Maintenance. These are subsets of Property Asset Management, and tools for the 
implementation of an organisation’s Property Asset Management strategy through individual 
asset, facility and workplace plans and programmes. 
 
It will be seen that the management of property assets is not commonly appreciated within the 
Australian public sector as a strategic business and corporate resources function, with the sub-
disciplines being mistaken as providing the strategic management of these assets. 
 
For clarity, and for the avoidance of confusion, ‘Property Asset Management’ will be referred to 
as ‘Strategic Property Asset Management’ and is considered to be included in the collective 
term of ‘Asset Management’.  
 
This thesis puts Strategic Property Asset Management into context, explains the distinctions, 
provides definitions for the separate disciplines, and identifies their place in the Resource 
Management hierarchy. 
1.3 Thesis Background and Significance 
The author is a Fellow of The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. He has managed and 
advised upon the management of real property assets in the Asia Pacific region across the 
public and private sectors for some 35 years. 
 
The author has witnessed attitudes towards the management of property that range from an 
administrative and janitorial function to treating property assets as strategic corporate 
resources.  
 
He has spent the last decade specialising in the management of property assets in the 
Australian public sector.  
 
This began at the New South Wales (NSW) Government where he acted as a consultant and 
in a senior management capacity between 2004 and 2007. He has also advised and consulted 
to the State Governments of South Australia (SA) and Western Australia (WA), the Local 
Government Professionals (NSW), the Municipal Council of Woollahra in NSW, and the Cities 
of Canning, Wanneroo and Albany, the Town of Port Hedland, and the Shires of West Arthur, 
Wagin, Lake Grace, Merredin, Pingelly, Goomalling, Gnowangerup, East Fremantle, Corrigin, 
Williams, York, Halls Creek, and the Pilbara, Wheatbelt East, and Southern Link Regional 
Organisations of Councils in WA. 
 
His experience at NSW State Government prompted him to specialise in the management of 
public sector property assets, and encouraged him to examine the management of 
government property in greater depth, both in Australia and in an international context. 
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The author wishes to emphasise that where an opinion is expressed in this thesis, it is based 
primarily on the author’s research, underpinned by professional detachment, and supported by 
the author’s extensive industry involvement. 
  
Initial ‘informal’ research into the Australian public sector revealed how little the management 
of property and its importance to the achievement of financial and service outcomes are 
understood in the public sector.  It also revealed the lack of knowledge and research that 
exists into the management of public sector assets (ibid.). 
 
These deficiencies exist across national and international jurisdictions.  
 
“This (the management of government property assets) is a topic that, surprisingly, has not 
attracted sufficient attention of scholars and researchers, despite the importance of deploying 
the full range of government real property assets, in both mature and emerging economies, to 
achieve strategic public policy objectives” (Kaganova, McKellar, & Peterson, 2006a). 
 
“Given the enormity of the challenge in addressing the topic of public property asset 
management from an international perspective, further investigation, research and practical 
experimentation are much needed” (Ibid, p. ix.). 
 
This thesis seeks to narrow these knowledge gaps. 
 
Francis Conway’s paper, presented in Chapter 2 of Kaganova and McKellar’s edited book, 
exemplifies these needs with regard to the Australian public sector, particularly the Australian 
Federal Government (Conway, 2006).  
 
The author agrees with much of Conway’s paper. The Australian public sector had been 
addressing policies and frameworks in the management of its property assets for perhaps 20 - 
25 years before Strategic Property Asset Management assumed its level of importance in the 
USA, UK and elsewhere.  
 
It is partly for this reason that the Australian Federal Government is upheld as a leader in the 
era of the New Public Management paradigm and for the management of its property assets 
(Conway, 2006; Kaganova et al., 2006a; Male, 2006). The Labor Government (2007-2010) 
under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd had ambitions to reform the Australian Public Service to be 
the ‘world’s best’, and to promote a culture of ‘best practice’ (Australian Government, 2010).  
 
Australian jurisdictions have also been highlighted by the RICS as leaders in Strategic 
Property Asset Management reform (Jones and White, ibid. ch.12, pp. 71-76). 
 
Contrary to these views and efforts of reform and to promote excellence, this thesis’s research 
and the analysis of the gaps between the leading practice identified from this thesis’s case 
studies, and the level of asset management maturity exhibited by the Australian public sector, 
provides sufficient reason to question the reputations ascribed to Australia’s management of its 
property assets. This indicates that data and information used to form these conclusions have 
been collected from a distance and based upon the Australian public sector’s self-satisficing 
view of itself, rather than from any in-depth study and analysis of its asset management 
practices and outcomes. 
 
Notwithstanding this, there is little doubt that the Australian public sector has influenced asset 
management practices in the developed world, notably the adoption of strategic asset 
management policies, frameworks and processes. However, Australian governments have 
lacked either an understanding of the wider strategic significance of assets and their 
management in a whole-of-government context; or the will, courage and leadership to integrate 
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them into the management of government business; or a combination of both. Indeed, there is 
clear evidence to show that Australian governments have actively fragmented property asset 
management responsibility to such an extent that they now have scant knowledge of, and 
information about their portfolios. 
 
The significance of this thesis is that it addresses the management of government property 
assets from a holistic all-of-government policy, financial, economic and community 
perspective. This is done by assembling and consolidating current knowledge; providing 
empirical evidence gained from the author’s experience and observations; and proposing a 
basis for the adoption, implementation and continuing improvement of the management of 
public property as an essential contributor to government outcomes, effectiveness, efficiency 
and productivity.  
 
This thesis shows that Strategic Property Asset Management is one of the most important of 
government corporate activities. It is government’s business fulcrum that connects community 
aspirations, corporate objectives, financial imperatives and service levels (Lyons, 2004b). It 
determines business, financial and service sustainability. It deals with the current state of 
governments and shapes their future state (UK Audit Commission, 2009). This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. 
 
                                                                     
Figure 1.1: The Central Role of  Strategic Asset Management 
 
Furthermore, this thesis establishes an important direct contextual relationship between the 
acceptance and adoption of a ‘leading’ practice in the management of government property 
and the public sector’s approach to, and reluctance to embrace and implement reform. 
1.4 Theses Purpose and Aim 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to close the awareness, research and knowledge gaps in 
the management of government property by: 
 
§ If such leading practices exist, to propose a leading practice and process for the 
management of government property assets as strategic resources and integrate 
strategic asset management into the corporate planning and reporting regime; 
 
§ Examining the reasons why the Australian public sector has not been successful in 
adopting good practice; and  
 
§ Providing a basis for its application in the Australian public sector through the 
involvement of academia (further research and formal learning), professional and 
public sector institutions, asset management practitioners, and public sector 
managers. 
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In so doing, this thesis will: 
 
§ Confirm the importance of property assets to the conduct of government business and 
provision of public services;  
 
§ Prove the absolute need to manage these assets as strategic corporate resources;  
 
§ Identify the gaps between leading practice and the barriers to their implementation by 
Australian jurisdictions at all levels of government; 
 
§ Identify the leadership and organisational requirements, political will and action 
required to address the issues from a whole-of-public sector perspective; 
 
§ Address the challenges to public sector culture, thinking and organisation to 
acknowledge current shortcomings; accept public property as ‘government’ resources 
rather than the possessions of departmental fiefdoms and ‘free goods’; and to 
understand the need for specialist skills and capacity in their management; and 
 
§ Lay out an academic, practical and professional basis and direction for continuing 
research, building a body of knowledge and the development of asset management 
educational programmes in public administration. 
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2 Research Method 
The research method of this thesis reflects the paucity of research and literature into the 
management of government assets, and responds to the call by Kaganova, McKellar and 
Peterson for “further investigation, research and practical experimentation” (Kaganova, 
McKellar and Peterson, op. cit., p. ix).  
2.1 Qualitative Study 
Thus, this is necessarily a qualitative study that seeks to develop and consolidate a ‘leading 
practice’ hypothesis for the strategic management of government property assets; propose a 
model to enable the implementation of this practice in the Australian public sector; provide a 
body of knowledge as a basis for further research and on-going development of this model; 
and consider the need for education programmes in Asset Management as a professional 
public administration discipline. 
 
The evidence, data and findings and conclusions, upon which the hypothesis for a leading 
practice model might be based, are largely derived from a series of case studies and reviews 
of asset management practices adopted by the following international and Australian 
jurisdictions: 
 
§ The United Kingdom Central Government (UK Government); 
 
§ The United States of America Federal Government (US Government);  
 
§ The Commonwealth Government of Australia (Australian Government); 
 
§ New South Wales State Government (NSW Government); and 
 
§ Local Government in Australia. 
 
These case studies form the foundation of this thesis. Given the lack of knowledge and 
appreciation of Strategic Property Asset Management in the Australian public sector, it is 
important to present them in detail, as this may represent the first body of evidence and 
knowledge that has been assembled and consolidated for the strategic management of not 
only government property, but also public assets generally. It was this wider application for the 
strategic management of government assets that was adopted by Lyons in his report for the 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (Lyons, op. cit.).  
 
The detailed case studies are contained in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. 
2.2 Data and Information 
Information and data has been obtained through: 
2.2.1 Literature Reviews 
These reviews cover professional and academic literature; journal articles and papers; 
independent reports from organisations that include the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Australian Centre for Excellence in Local 
Government (ACELG), The Urban Institute Centre on International Development and 
Governance, The UK National School of Government, and the Australian Procurement and 
Construction Council (APCC); government and non-government organisation (NGO) 
publications and reports, audits, budget papers and annual reports and legislation; and 
conference papers, presentations and proceedings. 
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Notwithstanding the lack of in-depth investigation into Strategic Property Asset Management 
as a function of public administration, a number of papers and articles have been published in 
recent years showing that aspects of Asset Management are being acknowledged by 
jurisdictions as diverse as Botswana (Moseki, 2011), Malaysia (Abdullah, Abdul Razak, & 
Pakir, 2011), Indonesia (Hasbi Hanis, 2011), and Sweden (Andersson & Soderberg, 2011). 
 
Papers such as these, although valuable in recording some of the operational and technical 
aspects of managing government property in particular jurisdictions (e.g. Property and Facility 
Management), do not address the management of property as a whole-of-government 
strategic resource. 
 
Likewise, there is an abundance of instructional literature concerned with the professional and 
technical skills and techniques associated with Property and Facility Management. This thesis 
will not review these in detail, but will refer to them in their context as tools for the 
implementation of organisational asset management strategies. 
2.2.2 Author’s Publications and Unpublished Articles and Papers 
Prior and subsequent to the commencement of this thesis, the author has undertaken research 
on behalf of the University of Sydney and ACELG. He is also author of a number of published 
and unpublished papers and articles and speaks regularly at industry conferences. These are 
included in this thesis either in whole or in part. 
 
He has also been a guest lecturer to postgraduate students at the Universities of Sydney and 
New South Wales, and has conducted instructional training in Strategic Asset Management on 
behalf of the Institute of Public Works Engineers Australasia.  
2.2.3 Australian Public Sector Asset Data 
In addition to information obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, estimates of the 
value of public sector property assets have been extrapolated from a review of the 2009/10 
budget papers and 2008/09 Annual Reports of the Commonwealth and State Governments, all 
of their departments and agencies, and public non-financial organisations. This was an 
intensive exercise carried out over a three-month period in 2010. 
2.2.4 Empirical Evidence and Traditional Property Management Theory 
Personal experience and observation are central to this thesis: experience of 35 years in the 
management of property assets in the private, public and consulting sectors; and observation 
of how Strategic Property Asset Management has developed both professionally and as a 
business tool, and how it has been applied in the public sector. 
 
This thesis also pays considerable attention to traditional property management theory and the 
theoretical development of property management concepts. These are given equal 
consideration in the development of a ‘leading’ practice model. 
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3 The Importance of Public Sector Property and its 
Management  
Governments are asset rich and depend upon a large variety of assets to provide public 
services and for their own administration (Carter, 2013).  
 
Property is one of the public sector’s largest categories of assets and is the base asset from 
which all government activity is conducted. It is the second highest operating cost after human 
resources. 
 
Government business covers all aspects of human activity, which is reflected in the 
characteristics and nature of public sector property portfolios, whether national, state, regional 
or local governments.  
 
Government property portfolios are similar to corporate portfolios in that they reflect the 
production of an organisation’s goods and services, and support the conduct of the 
organisation’s business and business processes.  
 
The business of government is to provide public services, including health, housing, education, 
social services and welfare, community services and activities, interest group support, tourism, 
transport and utility infrastructure and services, law and order, emergency services, 
conservation and heritage, social and economic planning and development, scientific research, 
and national defence.  
 
The use and occupation of these properties is covered by all manners of holding and 
agreement – ownership, lease, tenancy, licence, and through the powers of compulsory 
acquisition and entry. 
 
Given its purpose and use and nature, government property is largely held for strategic 
reasons and purposes. This means that there are seldom markets for government property, 
and property decisions are often subject to contextual and political influences rather than being 
made from a pure property perspective. Portfolios, stakeholders and issues are complex and 
specialised, are subject to competing priorities and limited financial resources. 
 
This compounds the long lead times inherent in bringing property decisions to fruition, and puts 
a much greater emphasis on the need for property strategy and planning to be integrated with 
policy and service objectives. 
 
Nevertheless, the public sector is in all respects a property business. It is in both the ‘property 
business’, which includes the design, finance, development, construction, marketing and 
management of land and buildings; and ‘business property’, which refers to its workplaces and 
from which it delivers services (Apgar, 2009).  
 
The size and value of government property portfolios represent a considerable proportion of a 
nation’s wealth and balance sheet health. Governments therefore have the capacity to 
influence economic activity and move property markets.  
 
In 2008, the book value of the UK government’s property assets was estimated at £370 billion, 
which represented some £6,000 worth of assets for every UK resident (Bichard, Carter (Lord), 
Grimstone, Jay, & Read, 2009). Also, every £1 spent by the public sector in construction 
contributes £3 to economic activity (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 2010). In 
Australia the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments occupy over 4 million square 
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metres of leased office accommodation; have an annual rental bill of some $1 billion; and have 
all the major landlords in common (Government Property Group, 2007). 
 
The proper and strategic management of these assets can both implement change in service 
delivery models and promote that change by challenging the traditional role of property and the 
accepted conventional wisdom of its management (Howarth, 2006). It therefore follows that 
property should play a lead role in a government’s internal level of productivity and efficiency, 
its financial sustainability and ability to meet changing community expectations. 
 
Decisions relating to location, nature and type of property, and form of tenure and holding, will 
affect a government’s capacity to provide efficient and effective public services. The strategic 
management of these assets will release latent or ‘lazy’ capital for investment into community 
services and infrastructure (Jones & White, 2008). 
 
Property affects and impacts upon all government policies and decisions, which means that it 
represents political, strategic, operational, financial and legal risks that could potentially 
threaten a government’s capacity to function. 
 
Whilst some Australian government jurisdictions display a level of appreciation for the 
importance of their property assets, the Australian public sector as a whole either remains 
ignorant of, or is disinterested in the management of its property asset base, which is viewed 
by departments and agencies as a ‘free good’ and with a sense of individual territorial 
entitlement. It also exposes governments to the multitude of risks inherent in those described 
in the preceding paragraph. 
 
This is true at all levels of government: federal, state and local. The Australian public sector 
does not treat property assets as strategic public resources that should be managed for the 
public good. The financial significance alone of Australia’s real property assets is characterised 
by the following: 
 
§ In 2009/10, the value of Australia’s NFPS assets is estimated to be in the region of 
$1.353 trillion. Some $325 billion (twenty-four per cent) of this is property. See table 
1.1. (Details for each government are shown in Appendix 3.1); 
 
§ The annual maintenance expenditure for the year 2009/10 in respect of these assets is 
estimated at nearly $6.5 billion. (Refer to Appendix 3.1); 
 
§ Analysis of this financial data has revealed that the proportion of the value of property 
assets to total assets of frontline government agencies, such as Health, Education, 
and Social and Community Services, typically exceeds ninety per cent; 
 
§ The Commonwealth and State Governments occupy over 4 million square metres of 
commercial office accommodation alone; have an annual rental bill of some $1 billion; 
and have all the major landlords in common (Government Property Group, op. cit.). 
 
These statistics support the earlier evidence that ‘corporate’ property is often the second or 
third largest operating cost of a business or public authority and can represent up to ninety per 
cent of an organisation’s total fixed assets on balance sheet (Omar & Heywood, 2010). 
 
Property assets and their management as corporate resources are therefore crucially 
significant to governments. They have a direct bearing and impact on long-term financial 
planning and sustainability, and on the capacity to deliver public services and infrastructure. 
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4 Strategic Property Asset Management: the path to a 
public administration professional discipline 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter shows that strategic management of government property is a function of the 
long-term planning and management of organisational resources. It is to do with government 
reform, integrated planning and reporting, and financial and service sustainability issues.  
 
As referred to earlier, the origins and nomenclature of Strategic Property Asset Management 
have created misunderstanding and led to it being confused with, for example, Property 
Management, Facility Management, Maintenance Management, and Infrastructure 
Management. These are all part of the Asset Management family, but are subsets of Strategic 
Property Asset Management (Howarth, op. cit.). 
 
Practitioners in these disciplines sometimes compound the confusion by describing 
themselves as ‘Asset Managers’ or ‘Strategic Asset Managers’.  
 
This confusion is one of the principal reasons behind Australia’s lack of understanding and 
progress in the management of its public sector property assets as corporate resources. 
Property asset strategy is often considered as the maintenance and upkeep of individual 
assets, and seen to be the responsibility of Public Works, Technical or Engineering functions. 
 
The Corporate Real Estate (CRE) discipline, which was developed in the private corporate 
sector, is the closest relative to the strategic management of government property assets. 
 
Given the lack of research in, and understanding of the management of government property, 
and in order to understand its relevance to the public sector, the following sections examine 
the principles of the management of property, their origins as a professional discipline, and 
influence in the development of Strategic Property Asset Management as an integral part of 
business planning and delivery of outcomes.  
 
Specifically, this chapter examines and provides definitions for Property Management, CRE, 
Facility Management, and Strategic Property Asset Management 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the influences of property management in the development of Strategic 
Property Asset Management.  
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4.2  Property Management: The English Civil War, Thorncroft and 
Arnison 
4.2.1 The English Civil War 
CRE and Strategic Property Asset Management have their origins in the management of 
landed estates and of individual property assets. 
 
The strategic management of property as a commercial and social resource can be traced to 
the effects of the heavy taxes imposed upon landowners following the English Civil War. This 
gave rise to a level of professionalism and a business-like approach to the management of real 
property for more efficient use, rental returns and preservation of individual prestige (Thirsk, 
1985).  
4.2.2 Thorncroft 
The modern day principles of Estate Management, which have changed little since the 17th 
century, were defined by Michael Thorncroft in his book, ‘Principles of Estate Management’ 
(Thorncroft, 1965). He defined Estate Management as,  
 
“The direction and supervision of an interest in landed property with the aim of securing the 
maximum return; this return need not always be financial, but may be in terms of social benefit, 
status, prestige, political power or some other group or group of goals.” (Ibid, p.3.) 
 
Thorncroft added,  
 
“Management embraces both direction or the overall control of policy, and supervision entails 
its implementation”; and  
 
“The meaning given to estate is also wide and includes any interest in landed property giving 
rise to a measure of control”. (Ibid, p.3.) 
 
Thorncroft’s definition contained three important elements, the significance of which is evident 
throughout this thesis:  
 
§ The maximum return need not be financial; 
 
§ ‘Management’ is defined as direction or control of policy; 
 
§ ‘Supervision’ is the implementation of direction and policy. 
 
The idea of ‘return’ being something other than financial might be seen as an early reference 
to ‘triple-bottom line’ measures; and recognition that the management of property is 
undertaken at two distinct levels, i.e. as a strategic resource, and at an operational and 
technical level. 
 
It has already been seen that little research has been conducted into the management of 
government property (Kaganova, McKellar and Peterson, op. cit.). 
 
This situation has not changed in fifty years as Thorncroft, writing in 1965, noted, “The 
principles of estate management cannot be presented as a simple set of rules, partly because 
there has been too little research and methodical analysis of experience to formulate more 
than elementary generalisations….” (Thorncroft, op. cit., p.3). Additionally, Thorncroft’s view 
was that to present estate management in such way would oversimplify the complex problems 
inherent in it. Professional technical, legal and management knowledge and skills are not 
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enough alone, but need to be supplemented by good judgement, imagination and practical 
experience. 
 
Howarth echoes Thorncroft’s principles in his research report for the UK Government’s Office 
of Government Commerce (Howarth op.cit.). Howarth’s description of the skills and 
competencies required for asset management and their scarcity in government (data 
management, asset performance management, strategic business planning, financial 
management, leadership, and an appreciation for the economic tools that ensure good 
financial decision-making) (ibid, pp. 23-25.), is an example of how little progress has been 
made by the UK public sector in the forty years between Thorncroft and Howarth’s writings.  
 
Whilst Thorncroft considered the management of property and businesses in like terms, and 
with shared skills and characteristics, he stopped short of fully appreciating the management of 
property assets as an integral part of the management of an organisation’s total resources. He 
saw business management, i.e. the principles by which an organisation or department are 
managed, being separate and distinct from the specialist and technical skills of estate 
management. This is quite probably a reflection of the times, when the emphasis of business 
management was concentrated on reducing costs and achieving higher production through 
economies of scale. 
 
However, Thorncroft did describe the fundamental activities of estate management as 
forecasting (decisions about the future); planning (the means of, and the availability of the 
means to achieve objectives); leadership; co-ordination (integration of effort and resources); 
and control (supervision and control of policy implementation).  
 
These align closely with both the management of any enterprise and the present-day business 
processes for public sector Strategic Property Asset Management and their organisational 
requirements and enabling activities. These processes and activities are listed in Table 4.1 
(Jones and White, op. cit.) and will be considered in detail in proposing the elements of leading 
practice. 
 
 
 
Although brief, Thorncroft includes a chapter in his book covering the management of public 
estates (Thorncroft, op. cit., Ch.13, pp. 349 - 367).  Apart from ownership, he identified that 
public estates share little in common. They are diverse in size, character, management 
organisation and policy objectives. They also vary in their extent of public control and 
accountability. 
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These observations are examples of the little change that has occurred in the management of 
government property in the fifty years between Thorncroft, Howarth, Lyons, Male and 
Kaganova et al, the latter noting that the management of public property is typically “highly 
fragmented with each category falling within a different jurisdiction or bureaucracy, or even 
with different policies and procedures within a given bureaucracy.” (Op. cit., p. 1.). 
4.2.3 Arnison 
Whilst Thorncroft acknowledged a social aspect to property, his principles for estate 
management concentrated on its legal and financial issues.  
 
An important dimension has been added to Thorncroft’s social concept, which has also been 
incorporated into Howarth’s thinking (Howarth, op. cit.). This deals with the reasons that drive 
people to acquire property, and their psychological attitude towards its ownership. It considers 
the territorial traits of individuals, their relationships with others in respect to the ownership and 
occupation of property, and argues that relationship management should be the first principle 
of estate management (Arnison, 1988). 
 
Arnison gave full recognition to Thorncroft’s work, but considered that Thorncroft took a largely 
economic and legal view of property with only passing references to social issues and none to 
the psychological and behavioural aspects of property ownership.  
 
Arnison argued that property is a “social institution’ along with the family, religion and the rule 
of law, which together control the conduct of society, bind communities and are the pre-
requisites for all other social activities, including commerce and politics, and the determination 
of personal happiness and success. The latter is manifested in the family unit and freedom 
from fear, which are nurtured by having ‘a place of one’s own’.  
 
Strains on personal relationships are often a result of ‘domestic’ threats and intrusion into 
one’s personal space, which are reflected in the maxim coined by Sir Edward Coke (1552-
1634), “For a man’s house is his castle, et domus sua cuique tutissimum refugium” (One’s 
home is the safest refuge of all) (Titelman, 1996). 
 
This proposes that the emotions of individuals warrant the same attention and understanding 
by property managers, as do legal considerations and financial performance.  
 
It will not be difficult to accept that behavioural characteristics apply equally to the attitude 
adopted towards property by the public sector. Property is commonly regarded as a ‘free good’ 
and any attempt to introduce organisational governance, policy and control over it threatens 
the power and authority of individuals and traditional departmental fiefdoms, which maintain a 
sense of perennial entitlement and ‘ownership’ over property.  
 
This has been seen in the New South Wales Government, which, influenced by the New Public 
Management Paradigm in the 1990s, introduced a number of new ‘operational mechanisms’ 
driven by perceived changes in community expectations and technological advances.  
 
These new mechanisms required senior public sector managers to think beyond traditional 
agency boundaries and adopt a whole-of-government or ‘cluster’ approach to service delivery 
and decision-making. This meant that department and agency heads would have to open their 
doors and allow others into their hitherto long-held ‘exclusive domains and stand back from so-
called turf wars’ (Kruk & Bastaja, 2002).  
 
Quite apart from the territorial threats that this presented, the change in thinking proved to be 
an almost insurmountable challenge for the NSW public sector in that it would also demand 
greater transparency of government process and accountability on behalf of public servants. 
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(This will be examined further when the New Public Management Paradigm is considered later 
in this thesis). 
 
The implications for the management of government property in NSW would prove to be 
‘almost revolutionary’, a phrase also used to describe the reform of property asset 
management in the US Federal Government (Venable, 2005). 
 
Arnison’s primary principle for estate management is that it is ‘about people’ and their social 
behaviour. It therefore needs to reflect that no individual is entirely rational about property 
rights; and the innate territorial nature of individuals and groups, who will put up fierce 
resistance and hold long-lasting resentment when ‘their space’ is threatened by exclusion, 
separation or authoritarian behaviour. This is very relevant for the public sector where habitual 
‘occupation’ often assumes the rights of ‘ownership’. 
 
As the Strategic Property Asset Management discipline has matured, Thorncroft’s definition 
has retained its relevance. It refers to the raison d’être of property; the desired strategic 
outcomes; performance indicators and measurement; and the organisational governance and 
implementation of strategies to achieve outcomes.  
 
The addition of Arnison’s psychological and behavioural principles has provided a valuable 
social dimension to Thorncroft’s commercial and legal principles. Taken together, they form the 
basis for all levels of the property management hierarchy and process.  
4.3 Property Management: a professional discipline 
4.3.1 ‘Professions’, ‘the Professional’, and ‘Professionalism’ 
“It seems evident that many of the most important features of our society are to a considerable 
extent dependent on the smooth functioning of the professions. Both the pursuit and the 
application of science and liberal learning are predominantly carried out in a professional 
context. Their results have become so closely inter-woven in the fabric of modern society that 
it is difficult to imagine how it could get along without basic structural changes if they were 
seriously impaired.” (Parsons, 1954) in (Ulrich, 2011). 
 
There are libraries of literature on the concept of ‘the profession’ and ‘professionalism’, their 
place as institutions, and standing in a societal perspective. 
 
It is not the societal view of ‘professionalism’ that concerns this thesis, but rather that there is 
an emerging profession, perhaps as an off-shoot of the property profession, upon which the 
operation of government and the sustainable provision of services are “to a considerable 
extent dependent”. The terms ‘professions’ and ‘professional’ are used to denote those with 
specialist knowledge in an area that requires a high degree of training and continuing practice 
(Ulrich, op. cit.). 
 
This leads to standards of professionalism, and the notion of ‘good’ practice that is applied to 
it. ‘Good’ practice should not only cover the practices or methodologies based on the most 
recent “application of science and liberal learning”, but it should also include the quest for 
continuing improvement and new knowledge within a profession, and by the individual 
members of that profession. 
 
In the absence of a truly professional approach to the strategic management of assets in the 
Australian public sectors, the term ‘good’ practice is often interpreted as, and replaced by, 
‘best’ practice, which, in the author’s public sector experience, has become a finite concept or 
recognition of achievement.  
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The author contends that this has narrowed the meaning of ‘good’ practice, which implies a 
path to good outcomes, to mere procedure (prescriptive methodologies, or ‘the how’), without 
process (the transformation of inputs to outputs and outcomes, or ‘the what’ and ‘the why’), i.e. 
managerial and bureaucratic focus on professional input, rather than ‘good’ practice facilitating 
service objectives and good outcomes. 
 
This brings the OECD’s disaggregated model for managing government performance into play, 
and links the strategic management of government assets to the need for specialist 
professional expertise (refer to Section 5.3). 
 
A further result of the Australian public sector’s pre-occupation for an asset management ‘best’ 
practice is a growing fascination with, and reliance on ‘standards’ and certification by 
international bodies, which is seen as having scored the ‘best’ practice goal. 
 
It would appear logical, therefore, that the provision of public services should be “to a 
considerable extent dependent on the smooth functioning of” the professional strategic 
management of government resources and assets.  
 
This is supported by the finding from this thesis’s case studies that the strategic management 
of assets must be formally considered and acknowledged, by the public services of all levels of 
government, as a specialist professional corporate business planning function, rather than a 
series of professional technical activities. 
4.3.2 The Property Management Profession 
Property Management practice and governance differs across international borders. In the 
United Kingdom, ‘Property’ is considered as a profession in the same way as law, architecture 
and medicine, for example. 
 
Property has its own governing body, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). The 
history of the RICS can be traced back to 1792, with the Royal Charter being granted in 1881. 
  
The RICS regulates and promotes the property profession, maintains educational and 
professional standards, protects clients and consumers through a strict code of ethics, and 
seeks to be impartial in its advice, analysis and guidance. It currently has nearly 120,000 
accredited professional members across the world (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 
2014). 
 
Property Management is associated with the management of land and buildings on behalf of 
owners and investors to obtain the maximum financial return.  
 
The RICS describes Property Management as “the activity that ensures that land and buildings 
matters are dealt with so that they operate efficiently and effectively. In effect, it delivers the 
strategic asset management objectives for land and buildings.4 It is sometimes referred to 
as ‘operational’ and is the activity of undertaking the professional/technical work necessary to 
ensure that property is in the condition desired, in the form and layout and location desired and 
supplied with the services required, together with related activities such as the construction or 
acquisition of new property, the valuation of property, dealing with landlord and tenant and 
rating matters, all at an optimum and affordable cost. It also involves offering advice to 
decision-makers on the best ways of doing this. It has a customer orientation.” (Jones and 
White, op. cit.). 
 
                                                       
4 Bold emphasis added by the author. 
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Whilst the RICS has a sizeable presence and membership in the Oceania region, of which 
Australia is part, Australia does not recognise ‘property’ as a profession in the same way as 
the UK. Although there are a number of organisations such as the Australian Property Institute, 
which mainly concentrates on the practice of property valuation, and which has a reciprocity 
agreement with General Practice Division of the RICS, there is little by the way of promotion 
and regulation of property as a true profession, either nationally or by the individual states and 
territories. In addition, and perhaps as a consequence, property in this sense receives little 
attention by the tertiary education institutions, with only a very few offering bachelor degrees in 
a full property curriculum. 
 
This is not dissimilar to Howarth’s findings of the UK public sector, where he identified gaps 
between the non-business strategic roles assumed by public sector property professionals, 
and the lack of understanding of property asset performance on behalf of senior managers 
who have come from a government policy or operations background. Howarth noted that the 
latter largely view property “as a passive respondent to the business rather than as a 
contributor to future thinking.” (Howarth, op.cit, p.5). Howarth cited Professor Meziane Lasfer 
of the Cass Business School, “It is ironic that in Business Schools the management of property 
is rarely covered. Managers may think that since property management was not covered in 
their MBA course, there is no need to treat it as a cost asset and should not be discussed in 
the boardroom.” (Ibid.)5. 
 
The disconnect between an effective national sponsorship of property as a profession and the 
lack of academic opportunity is a major cause of the inefficient and ineffective management of 
Australia’s public sector asset base. 
4.4 Corporate Real Estate: building organisational value 
CRE evolved in the USA as a response to wide-ranging changes in business environments in 
the 1980s and 1990s by developing traditional property skills and principles, and integrating 
them into the strategic corporate planning and management function.   
 
Despite the tyranny of distance presented by the Atlantic Ocean, there are clear linkages 
between the principles of Thorncroft and Arnison and the development of the CRE discipline.  
 
These linkages are the management of an interest in property; the direction and control of 
policy towards the use and management of property; the implementation of that direction and 
policy; the suitability of property to and for its intended use; and management of the social and 
behavioural aspects of individuals associated with property ownership and occupation. 
 
In the case of corporate business property the primary measure of ‘maximum return’ is almost 
always financial, or at least financially based, whereas ‘corporate’ property decisions in other 
more socially-oriented sectors, particularly government, are very often subject to non-financial 
contextual influences (OECD, 2007)6. As envisaged by Thorncroft, this means their maximum 
return may be measured against indicators with a higher priority than financial economy or 
commercial profit, for example, the achievement of social, welfare and environment policies 
and objectives. 
 
Although CRE is most commonly associated with private sector business property, the CRE 
management model also extends the strategic management and provision of services to all 
types of property, which are occupied by a multitude of users for a multitude of purposes under 
all means of ownership and tenure, which need not necessarily be places of work and 
production.  
                                                       
5 Cass Website accessed by Howarth on 12 October 2005. 
6 The measurement of government outcomes is considered in Chapter 5. 
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In addition to business property such as office, retail and industrial premises,  ‘corporate’ 
property can also include educational, health, recreational and sports, religious, agricultural, 
exploration and utilities facilities, research and development installations, entertainment, ports 
and transportation infrastructure, and telecommunications. 
 
It uses Property Management and Facility Management as tools to implement and enable 
organisational property strategies that support the provision of services. 
 
The corporate real estate model is as important and relevant to the public sector, non-
government, and not-for-profit, religious and charitable organisations as it is to private sector 
institutions, enterprises and businesses.  
 
With regard to government property, the model extends further to infrastructure, defence and 
security, emergency services, policing, justice and correctional facilities, civic and community 
centres, and land banks. 
 
By positioning property as a strategic corporate resource, CRE integrates its planning and 
management into the corporate business process so that it directly contributes to productivity, 
financial sustainability and business and social outcomes. CRE is also increasingly being 
employed by corporates as a means of achieving their corporate environmental objectives and 
responsibilities.  
 
Under-management of property, or merely managing, administering and maintaining an 
existing owned portfolio of individual facilities and properties, does not release the true 
underlying benefits or value that managing property as a strategic resource brings to an 
organisation. 
 
The preface to ‘Strategic Management of the Fifth Resource: Corporate Real Estate’ recorded 
that, in 1981 and 1987, members of the Industrial Development Research Foundation (IDRF) 
based at Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) examined how 
corporations were treating and managing their property portfolios. 
 
This research showed that property was corporate America’s last under-managed resource. 
“Real Property Assets are not necessarily managed poorly due to faulty judgement but rather, 
in many cases, because they are not managed to their full potential. The concern is with lost 
opportunities due to actions not taken.” (Joroff, Louargand, Lambert, & Becker, 1993). 
 
It was found that the roles of the four corporate strategic resources of capital, people, 
technology and information were being transformed to support businesses as corporate 
resources to a much greater extent than they had previously been managed (Ibid.). For 
example, the management of people was changing from a recruitment, payroll and locational 
function to the management of staff as ‘human resources and intellectual capital’ to be 
nurtured and developed for the mutual benefit of the individual and the organisation. 
 
As a result of this finding, the IDRF undertook research into the potential of property 
representing a ‘fifth corporate resource’. At the time (1993), the IDRF concluded that a 
corporate’s real property (land, buildings and work environments) is “a powerful resource 
whose strategic value is just emerging.” (Ibid, p.11). This led to the establishment of the ‘CRE 
2000 Program’, which was to integrate the management of “this fifth strategic resource into 
broader corporate thinking.” 
 
It is interesting to note that the contextual environment in which the CRE 2000 Program 
research was carried out bears two similarities to that of this thesis.  
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Firstly, corporate America was already rethinking its property functions, which provided the 
IDRF research programme with a laboratory that contained a variety of ready-made and 
tested, and on-going corporate experiments; the field had “already reached a pivotal point in its 
development.” The development of the strategic management of government property in 
Australia, although not yet at such a pivotal point, does mean that the findings and conclusions 
of this thesis are largely evidence-based on current and evolving practices. 
 
Secondly, the objective of the CRE 2000 Program was to record and position these 
experiences and on-going developments so that they would promote further learning, 
discussion and change. This is one of the aims of this thesis. 
 
The IDRF research found that an increasing number of property executives were joining the 
senior management and leadership echelons of businesses, thus providing evidence of a 
growing understanding and awareness by corporate leadership that the treatment of property 
as a strategic corporate resource needed to become a practical reality. Also, property 
executives had begun to realise that their business is not ‘property’, “but the business of the 
business.” (Ibid, p. 21). 
 
The role of property executives has therefore transformed from technical administrators to 
business strategists who work with business units and senior management to improve and 
enhance the performance of the organisation.  
 
The IDRF identified five stages (Taskmaster, Controller, Dealmaker, Intrapreneur 7 , and 
Business Strategist) in the transformation towards CRE development. Figure 4.2, adapted from 
the IDRF research, illustrates these stages together with their associated competencies (Ibid, 
p. 27). 
 
CRE has three principal objectives: 
 
§ To align the organisation’s property portfolio with corporate and business objectives; 
 
§ The maintenance of asset values and the management of leases; and 
 
§ Customer (organisational and occupier) satisfaction, project delivery and execution of 
transactions. 
 
Figure 4.3 describes the activities necessary to achieve these objectives and their place in the 
CRE hierarchy (CoreNet Global, 2005). 
 
                                                       
7 Intrapreneur: a corporate executive who develops new enterprises within the organisation. 
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Figure 4.2: Stages of CRE Development  
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Research for this thesis has so far not revealed any single industry-recognised definition for 
CRE. However, the following is offered as a result of practice and research,  
 
“Corporate Real Estate is the activity that aligns real estate strategy with business strategy, 
linking real estate decisions to corporate strategy to support and enhance the organisation’s 
business objectives. CRE seeks to add value to a business by viewing real estate as a 
resource and business investment, and exploring the use of the workplace as a means to 
improve productivity.” 
 
The author has been closely involved with the establishment or management of CRE 
departments and services at three global banks, all of which were in advanced stages of 
organisational and capacity and capability development at the time the IDRF research was 
being conducted; and all experienced the developmental progression shown in Figure 4.2 and 
shared the objectives and means of their achievement in Figure 4.3. 
 
Some of this experience is described in Box 1. 
 
 
Box 1: CRE Observations and Experiences 
 
1. HSBC 
 
Until the early 1980s, HSBC’s head office corporate property services were provided through 
the bank’s internal Property Department. Services were limited to technical and professional 
functions, i.e. architectural and design, project management, engineering, maintenance and 
repair, contract management, sales and acquisitions and leasing. 
 
These services were largely reactive to the ad hoc operational needs of the bank, with few 
planning and reporting requirements.  
 
Technical and professional advice and support was provided to the bank’s regional offices in 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 
 
The Property Department was administered and managed by professional banking staff, 
assisted by technical specialists. 
 
From the 1980s HSBC’s property services requirements grew in line with the bank’s growth 
and expansion as a major global financial institution; the re-development of its corporate 
headquarters building in Hong Kong, which has become an international architectural and 
engineering icon; and the rapid advances and changes in banking service delivery models, 
customer expectations, technology and communications. 
 
HSBC transformed the Property Department into a separate legal entity, which took strategic 
responsibility for the planning and management of the bank’s worldwide property portfolio and 
property needs. A senior property professional was appointed as its Managing Director, who 
was directly accountable to the bank’s Board of Directors. 
 
2. Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) 
 
The transformation of the management of SCB property onto a strategic CRE footing was 
driven more by its perilous financial position in the early 1990s rather than through any 
progressive management policy. 
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The bank’s capital and deposit ratios had fallen to levels that were threatening the bank’s 
survival. The Bank of England required it to improve the condition of its balance sheet and 
management practices. A number of ‘white knight’ investors from Hong Kong provided 
substantial injections of capital into the bank. 
 
Property was a significant item of operating cost, and the bank had extensive capital invested 
in its property holdings. 
 
Like HSBC, the bank’s internal property services were limited to technical support functions, 
which were provided by a large Property and Works Department. This department was 
dissolved and the services provided through an outsourced facility manager. A new global 
CRE function was established to rationalise property holdings and be responsible for the 
development of property strategies and plans in consultation with business units as part of the 
bank’s corporate planning regime. 
 
3. Bank of America  
 
Bank of America (BA) was at the forefront of corporate America’s CRE ‘revolution’ through the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
By the 1990s, BA had outsourced its entire property services functions in America to a single 
facility management service provider. Its internal head office CRE function in Chicago had 
been distilled to such a degree that its mission was entirely strategic and value enhancing to 
support and provide innovation to banking operations and services. 
 
This model was extended globally with facility management contracts being awarded for Asia, 
Europe and the Middle East and Africa regional operations. 
 
This meant that the management and provision of BA’s global property needs were outsourced 
to three facility management organisations, which the bank considered as ‘best of breed’ and 
‘business partners’. 
 
The BA global head of real estate reported directly to the bank’s President. 
 
 
4.5 Facility Management: people, work and place 
In 1982 the United States Library of Congress defined Facility Management as, ‘the practice of 
co-ordinating the physical workplace with the people and work of the organisation; it integrates 
the principles of business administration, architecture, and the behavioural and engineering 
sciences.’ (Rondeau, Brown, & Lapides, 1995). 
 
The International Facility Management Association defines facility management as a 
profession that encompasses multiple disciplines to ensure functionality of the built 
environment by integrating people, place, process and technology. (International Facility 
Management Association, 2014) 
 
In recognition of the confusion caused by the numerous and different local and international 
definitions of facility management, the Facility Management Association of Australia (FMAA) 
does not currently offer a definition as it is working with, inter alia, Standards Australia and the 
International Standards Organisation to create a single facility management definition (Facility 
Management Association of Australia, 2014).  
 
Like CRE, Facility Management formally emerged as a professional discipline in the 1980s.  
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As described in the preceding section, CRE deals with the strategic management of an 
organisation’s property needs by linking it with the organisation’s business strategy. 
 
Facility Management is associated with the terminology of the recession of the 1990s, for 
example, ‘reengineering’, ‘downsizing’, ‘restructuring’ and ‘outsourcing’. It is to do with the 
design and management of physical space (the workplace) in relation to people (employees) 
and work processes. It is not concerned with the management of facilities for profit, as a 
property manager would be, but rather its mission is to provide quality, cost-effective services 
to in-house ‘customers’ in support of their business plans (Rondeau et al, op.cit). 
 
Facility Management is therefore more tactical in nature than CRE in that it supports and 
provides services to business units in relation to specific premises and facilities. This includes 
the direct provision, procurement and management of the following functions and services: 
 
§ Short (annual) and long-term facility planning; 
 
§ Facility financial budgeting and management; 
 
§ Interior space planning, specifications, and installation and space management; 
 
§ Architectural and engineering design; 
 
§ Furniture, fixtures and fittings; 
 
§ Management of construction, renovations, refurbishments, relocations and fit-outs; 
 
§ Operation, maintenance and repair of plant and machinery, building fabric, car parks, 
grounds, campuses and precincts; 
 
§ Utilities and telecommunications; 
 
§ Security; 
 
§ Cleaning; and  
 
§ Administrative support services such as catering, records management, fleet and 
transportation, travel and accommodation, mail services and document distribution. 
4.6 Property Management, Corporate Real Estate and Facility 
Management 
It was explained at the beginning of this chapter that Strategic Property Asset Management, 
Property Management, CRE and Facility Management are often confused and mistaken for 
each other.  
 
The preceding sections have shown a commonality between Property Management, CRE and 
Facility Management in that they all deal with the built environment and are customer 
orientated. Their functions also crossover, and are often inter-dependent in the management 
and provision of services to a building, facility or workplace. 
 
Practitioners claiming a hierarchical ascendency of one discipline over another sometimes 
exacerbate this confusion. This is particularly evident in the interpretation and application of 
the word ‘strategy’ in the property and business contexts with tactical measures being 
mistaken for strategies. This situation exists more between CRE and Facility Management, 
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where lines of function and responsibility can be blurred as they merge along the continuum 
(see figure 4.4). 
 
Although CRE and Facility Management are both customer-orientated and have similar 
missions and objectives, they operate at different levels of an organisation. 
 
CRE looks to contribute to corporate performance by developing strategies and standards that 
treat property as a corporate resource and shape portfolios that contribute to production and 
business performance. It is therefore ‘strategic’ in both a property and business context. 
 
Facility Management is operational and ‘tactical’ in nature in that it deals with workplace 
functionality, and provides workplace solutions and property services to implement the 
organisation’s CRE strategy.  
 
CoreNet Global, the USA-based organisation that represents and promotes CRE and CRE 
executives and managers, presents the difference between CRE and Facility Management in a 
‘top-down’ (CRE) and ‘bottom-up’ (Facility Management) context. This is illustrated in Figure 
4.4 (CoreNet Global, op. cit.). 
 
 
4.7 Strategic Property Asset Management in the Public Sector 
The introduction to this thesis set Strategic Property Asset Management in the context of a 
whole-of-organisation corporate management activity and as a subset of Resources 
Management.  
 
This section will examine the role of Strategic Property Asset Management within an 
organisation and show how, although it is to do with property, it is set aside from the 
management, technical and transactional activities of Property Management, Facility 
Management and, to some extent, CRE. 
 
Strategic Property Asset Management can and should be viewed as the public sector’s version 
of CRE, but which has perhaps been more widely integrated into the strategic planning and 
financial management process than its private sector counterpart. 
 
There are a growing number of governments across the developed world, including the USA, 
Mexico, Canada, the Scandinavian nations, Germany and New Zealand that have 
implemented far-reaching reforms in the management of their assets. In many cases, these 
reforms would have been based on the models developed by the UK and USA governments, 
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both of which are presented as case studies in this thesis for the determination of leading 
practices. 
 
This thesis uses the experience of the UK government to provide a definition and description of 
Strategic Asset Management and its application to property as this is the most extensively 
documented, and is considered to represent the closest parallel to Australia’s reform journey 
(Seymour-Jones, op. cit.) 
 
Misconceptions and lack of understanding are common themes that are at the core of this 
thesis.  
 
It is the corporate and whole-of-organisation context with which the strategic management of 
assets is concerned (Lyons, op. cit.). This is neither properly understood, nor does it receive 
the necessary recognition and attention (Howarth, 2006).  
 
There is a common misconception and belief in government that Strategic Property Asset 
Management is engineering, maintenance, and property or facility management. These are 
technical and operational subsets of Strategic Property Asset Management that implement an 
organisation’s Asset Management Strategy (Male, 2006). 
 
Howarth (op. cit.) put the distinction very succinctly when he wrote “There are therefore 
differences between the property management view of assets and the asset management view 
of property.”  
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, successive governments in the UK had under-invested in 
infrastructure, particularly in the national road network. In seeking alternative and new sources 
of capital, the Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned Sir Michael Lyons in 2004 to assess 
the possibility of achieving £30 billion from asset disposals and £760 million per annum in 
savings by 2013 through better asset management. Lyons concluded that these targets were 
achievable (Lyons, op. cit.)8. 
 
Lyons (ibid.) said that “…. good asset management planning must complement an 
organisation’s strategic or business planning”. He also positioned responsibility for Asset 
Management with the Finance Director and for it to be regularly reported at board level. 
Significantly, this has formed the basis for the subsequent reform of asset management 
throughout the UK public sector and the development of a routemap to asset management 
excellence (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2006). 
 
Lyons defined Asset Management, as “a key part of business planning, which connects, at a 
strategic level, decisions about an organisation’s business needs, the deployment of its assets, 
and its future business needs.” (Lyons, op. cit.). 
 
Professor Stephen Male of Leeds University (Male, op. cit.) expanded on the Lyons definition 
of Asset Management by describing it as:  
 
“A subset of Resource Management, and is the effective and efficient direction and utilisation 
of assets, both tangible and intangible, to sustain the business.  This definition covers all asset 
classes including production, facilities, fleet assets and IT infrastructure, for example. This 
definition encapsulates the processes of: 
 
 
                                                       
8 The UK government reports annually to parliament on the performance of the management of its assets through the 
report series, The State of the Estate (UK Office of Government Commerce 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). 
Analysis of these reports reveals reductions in annual operating costs of £1.61 billion over the years 2007 – 2012. 
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§ Planning 
 
§ Prioritisation 
 
§ Deployment 
 
§ Performance targets and KPIs 
 
§ The management of strategic risks to the asset base.” 
 
In summary, Strategic Property Asset Management is: 
 
§ An activity that sees assets as key strategic resources; 
 
§ Involved with business, corporate and organisational objectives; 
 
§ Concerned with both non-financial as well as financial matters; 
 
§ Connected with the operational management of individual assets and asset categories; 
 
§ Concerned with service delivery and whole-of-asset life; 
 
§ Involved with planning on a medium and long term basis; and 
 
§ A corporate activity and not solely the province of property, engineering, construction 
and facilities professionals. 
 
In concurring with the views of Lyons and Male, Howarth (Howarth, op. cit.) identified and 
recommended the following necessary skills for asset management: 
 
§ Data Management (asset registers; data accuracy; type, scope and analysis of data); 
 
§ Performance Management (KPIs, performance measurement and benchmarking; 
contract management; stakeholder management); 
 
§ Strategic Business Planning (business and service drivers and strategic thinking; 
asset strategy and management plans; risk management and project and programme 
management; sustainability); 
 
§ Financial Management (resource accounting; operating and capital budgets; whole-
of-life costing; business case preparation and options analysis); and 
 
§ Leadership (capacity and capability building; change management; management of 
professional staff, contractors and consultants) 
 
Howarth’s recommendations were made against the need to embed “asset management 
awareness and associated skills across government” focusing “on ensuring that asset 
management becomes an intrinsic component of mainstream strategic thinking and financial 
management”. 
 
Howarth’s report included research into the professional skills already existing in government 
that were related to asset management, for example property management, facility 
management and finance.  He found that these existed to a degree of experience and 
competence at a “tactical level” with managers seeing property as a “strategic function”, but 
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few understanding it as a means of “optimising the use of assets to benefit the service”. He 
also identified a noticeable lack of awareness of the strategic value of property assets at senior 
management level (ibid.). 
 
It will be seen that Australia’s lack of progress in developing asset management capacity and 
capability closely resembles the lack of asset management awareness experienced by the UK 
government in the 2000s. 
 
Although largely concerned with property assets, Lyons (op. cit.) applied his thinking to all 
categories of assets, roads, infrastructure and intangible, as did Male (op. cit.). Lyons, Male, 
Howarth and the Office of Government Commerce9 (OGC) consulted the property profession 
and the finance sector widely in their research and for the development of a routemap towards 
excellence.  
 
In addition to calling for a robust asset management and planning framework, Lyons (op. cit.) 
recommended that asset management skills and expertise be expanded and improved within 
the public sector. The property profession was used a base for the development and 
improvement of these skills.  
 
The RICS had already been involved with local government in the management of property 
assets and was seen to represent a practice benchmark for other major asset categories.  
 
The RICS has published RICS Public Sector Property Asset Management Guidelines: A guide 
to best practice for its professional members (Jones and White, ibid).  (The author of this thesis 
was consulted on these guidelines and presented them on behalf of the RICS at their official 
launch in Australia).  
  
As an offshoot to the guidelines, the RICS has also published a series of best practice 
guidelines for use in the management of local government assets (Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors, 2009). 
 
Howarth in particular, called for asset management to be recognised and treated as a 
profession in the public sector by recommending that it be developed through the 
government’s Professional Skills in Government programme and be included in the training 
and development for “all” staff (Howarth, ibid.). 
 
The objective was to widen the awareness of asset management as a strategic corporate 
resource among senior managers, and to encourage strategic thinking amongst existing 
professional staff. One result of this has been the senior appointment of a whole-of-
government ‘Head of Asset Management Profession’. The UK Audit Commission noted in its 
2009 report on strategic asset management in local government that not investing in 
professional asset management skills and capacity is a ‘false economy’ (UK Audit 
Commission, ibid). 
4.8 Strategic Property Asset Management Definition 
The examination of the property asset-related professional and management disciplines in this 
chapter has explained the roles of each of them, identified their differences and positioned 
them in the Strategic Property Asset Management context. This has Strategic Property Asset 
Management at the core from which all planning and implementation activity is derived. This is 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
                                                       
9  Until 2010 the OGC was an independent agency within HM Treasury responsible for government efficiency, 
procurement, property, programmes and projects, and sustainability. 
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The following is offered as a single definition for Strategic Property Asset Management.  
 
“Strategic Property Asset Management is a whole-of-organisation business activity that 
recognises property assets (land and buildings) as key strategic organisational resources. 
Together with Human Resources, Intellectual Capital, and Information and Communications 
Technology, Strategic Property Asset Management is an integral part of the corporate planning 
and reporting process. It seeks to ensure that the property asset base, which underpins and 
enables an organisation’s ability and capacity to achieve its goals and objectives, is optimally 
structured financially, functionally, and technically to support that ability and capacity. 
 
“It sets the organisational framework, policy and management strategy under which the 
management of an organisation’s property asset base is governed.” 
 
This definition embodies the principles of Lyons, Male and Howarth; it recognises Strategic 
Property Asset Management as a discrete element of Resources Management; and it 
acknowledges the importance and significance of property assets to corporate financial, 
business and organisational sustainability.  
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5 Measurement of Performance in the Public Sector 
5.1 The Public Service’s Contract with the Community  
The Executive Branches of all tiers of government should consider themselves as a ‘service 
industry’, perhaps the largest or most important member of the services sector, providing the 
widest range of services including, law and order, national security, economic management, 
infrastructure, education, health, recreation, information, and community wellbeing. 
 
Not because of any political mandate given to governments of the day, public sector 
administration, the civil service, which is the permanent and professional branch of 
government, is responsible for not only providing the “frank and fearless advice” to its political 
masters, but also ensuring the provision and management of services to the public in the most 
appropriate and efficient manner. 
 
Incumbent governments, although not always adhering to them, effectively have ‘contracts’ to 
enact their policies from mandates gained through the electoral process. It should follow, 
therefore, that the Executive Branch of government has similar ‘contractual’, if not moral 
obligations to the public for their performance.  
 
The Values and Code of Conduct of the Australian Public Sector (APS) state, “ Employees of 
the APS occupy a position of trust. They are entrusted by the Government and community to 
undertake important work on their behalf. With this trust comes a high level of responsibility, 
which should be matched by the highest standards of ethical behaviour from each APS 
employee.”  (Australian Public Service Commission, 2016a) 
 
The Australian Public Service Commission puts acting with integrity “at the heart of proffering 
frank and fearless advice; merit-based selection; independent and evidenced-based decision-
making; efficient and effective resource management; ensuring trust among stakeholders; and, 
openness and transparency.” (Australian Public Service Commission, 2016b). 
 
Although framed in the contexts of integrity and ethical behaviour, these should be considered 
as the basis of the APS ‘contract’ with the public that it serves. Because of this, the 
performance of the public service should be measured against levels of service and 
management, as would all service providers under the terms of their contracts. 
 
Like any other public sector resource, such as people or monetary capital, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the investment in property as a means of service delivery, and its deployment, 
use, utilisation, and management must be properly understood and measured. If it is not, 
governments and government agencies will only have a blurred and incomplete picture of their 
performance, financially, in service provision, and the management of themselves as corporate 
and business entities. 
 
This would affect the ability of the public service to give the frank and fearless advice, make 
independent and evidence-based decisions, and manage resources efficiently and effectively, 
ensure trust among stakeholders, and be open and transparent. In effect, it would breach the 
‘contracts’ between itself and both the government and the public.   
 
It is often the case that the public service’s ‘contract’ to effectively manage property, one of its 
principal ‘resources’, as it is obliged to do under its integrity principles, is “a custom more 
honoured in the breach than in the observance”. 10  
 
                                                       
10 Hamlet, Act 1, scene 4, line 16. William Shakespeare (c1600) adapted in Yes Prime Minister, The Key (TV Episode 
1986) 
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The author has observed the measurement of property management outcomes by the 
Australian Public Sector in all tiers of government. Concern for a lack (and in some case 
absence) of performance management in the form of meaningful indicators, measures and 
benchmarks or targets that are linked not only to asset performance, but also to the delivery of 
services that they support, led the author to research the measurement of outcomes generally 
in the public sector. 
 
Of the factors that influence the monitoring of performance in the public sector, three have had 
(and have) a significant effect on the extent to which, and how governments measure 
performance. These are organisational culture and characteristics, empirical evaluation, and 
the availability of relevant and reliable data. All are inextricably linked, but are considered 
separately in the following sections. 
 
Add to this, the press for reform, and demand for greater efficiency and transparency in 
governments across the world in the late-1980s through to the mid-1990s resulted in what 
became known as the New Public Management Paradigm. For reasons that include public 
sector culture, lack of data and performance measurement, this paradigm turned to paradox 
(Figure 5.1). This phenomenon is considered in section 5.4. 
 
 
5.2 Organisational Characteristics 
The individuals responsible for its leadership and management define the characteristics of an 
organisation. Those characteristics that relate to culture, values, structure and governance 
dictate the way an organisation makes decisions; views, conducts and manages its business; 
responds to, accepts and implements innovation and change both internally and externally; 
and communicates within itself and with outside parties and stakeholders. 
 
The following organisational characteristics and their effect on the management of property in 
the public sector are observed to be: (also refer to Table 4.1 above) 
 
§ The machinery and structure of government; 
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§ Capacity, skills, expertise; 
 
§ Inter and intra-government, external and stakeholder communications and 
relationships; 
 
§ Roles, responsibilities, processes, procedures; and 
 
§ Governance and the notions of quality, performance, accountability and transparency 
in the management process and production of public services. 
 
Research for this thesis did not reveal any literature that links governance and management 
practices and, by extension, culture and organisational behaviour to the management of 
property assets per se. However, related publications, particularly (Kruk & Bastaja, 2002), 
(Kaganova, McKellar, & Peterson, 2006b), (C Hood & Peters, 2004), (Male, 2006) and (DEGW 
& CoreNet Global, 2004), together with personal experience provide strong evidence that this 
is the case. 
 
Thorncroft’s definition effectively provides a governance model for real property. He envisaged 
that management encompasses the direction and control of policy; and supervision is the 
implementation of policy. 
 
This bears a close relationship to definitions for public governance which have been collated 
by Hill and Lynn (Hill & Lynn, 2004), who have cited definitions as “the general exercise of 
authority” (Michalski, Miller, & Stevens, 2001), where authority refers to systems of 
accountability and control; and “administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable 
the provision of publicly supported goods and services” (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001). 
 
Hill and Lynn suggest that policy-makers, public managers, and professionals should ask 
questions of “less general political interest” concerning how public governance and 
management contribute to outcomes (Hill & Lynn, 2004).  
 
It is significant that Hill and Lynn include ‘professionals’, as it expressly acknowledges their 
importance in public governance and management. This importance has been recognised in 
the USA, which, under Executive Order 13327, appoints professional Senior Real Property 
Officers to each federal agency; and in the UK, which has appointed a Chartered Surveyor as 
Head of Profession for Property Asset Management. The UK Audit Commission notes that not 
investing in skills and capacity in relation to property professionals is “a false economy” (UK 
Audit Commission, 2009). 
 
With some exceptions, this research and the author’s experience have not uncovered a 
propensity for public administrations to take an introspective look at themselves, and ask the 
questions posed by Hill and Lynn. Indeed, there may well be an embedded reluctance to do so 
(Kruk & Bastaja, 2002). This leads to questions over structural management issues that might 
relate to, inter alia, the machinery of government, leadership, processes and systems, human 
resources, skills, capacity and expertise, and training and development. Research into the 
New Public Management Paradigm and managing change in the public sector (OECD, 2010), 
(C Hood & Peters, 2004), (Huerta Melchor, 2008), (Peteri, 2008) and (Schick, 2002), and how 
it has been implemented by governments over the past 15 to 20 years may provide answers to 
these questions. 
 
Those governments that have asked questions have implemented strategic asset 
management reform programmes. The US Federal and UK Central governments publish 
material that describes the drivers behind this reform (United States General Accounting 
Office, 2003), (Lyons, 2004b), and the governance and administrative arrangements adopted 
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in its implementation ("EO 13327," EO 13327 2004) and (UK Office of Government Commerce, 
2006). In the UK, the need to raise alternative forms of capital for investment in infrastructure 
was a prime driver for change.  
 
The USA and UK governments also provide information on the progress, outcomes and 
benefits accruing from the changes in governance and Strategic Property Asset Management 
practices. Research for this thesis has uncovered similarities in the issues faced by these 
governments, their approach to Strategic Property Asset Management reform and 
implementation of change, and the ensuing results. These are summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Common Property Asset Management Themes – USA and UK Governments 
 
In 2009, the Australian Commonwealth Government embarked on a programme of reform in 
the Australian Public Service (APS) to “build the world’s best public service”. Following a report 
by KPMG (KPMG, 2009), the government issued a consultative document (Australian 
Government, 2009b), from which followed a definitive reform programme (Australian 
Government, 2010). The University of Sydney submitted a response to the consultative 
document, which was largely based on the author’s research into the management of 
Australian public sector property assets (Leifer & Seymour-Jones, 2009b). This reform 
programme should have had the potential to have a significant bearing on the management of 
real property, but it did not survive the change in leadership of the Labor Party, and hence 
Prime Minister, in 2010.  
 
Anecdotally, there is a belief that reforming the public service did not sit well with, nor receive 
the support of key senior members of the Australian Public Service, which was responsible for 
the reform’s demise following the removal of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister. This goes to the 
heart of public sector culture and its attitude towards performance, improvement, change, and 
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maintenance of the status quo. This is a prime example of the analysis of the public sector by 
Kruk and Bastaja (op.cit.). 
 
Much of the literature into Australian public sector Strategic Property Asset Management is 
limited to government practices, guidelines and regulations, with scant research material in 
evidence. Two examples of the latter are a brief commentary accompanying the RICS 
guidelines (Bowyer, Gillies, Walton, & Warren, 2008) and a review of federal asset 
management in Australia contained in Kaganova and McKellar’s edited book (Conway, 2006). 
 
However, Table 5.2 summarises the findings of the author’s research and direct professional 
experience in the public sector for the Australian Commonwealth and the New South Wales 
State Governments. This information shows that the Australian public sector has followed a 
decentralised and ad hoc approach to Strategic Property Asset Management and its 
governance, with little attention being given to managing and measuring its performance  
 
Table 5.2: Australia: Decentralised and Semi-integrated Strategic Property Asset 
Management Models 
 
These findings indicate that the organisational characteristics of the Australian public sector 
are consistent with the “turf war” mentality suggested by Kruk and Bastaja. Successive audit 
reports over a period of more than ten years have been critical of the management of these 
governments’ property assets (Australian National Audit Office, 2001), (Australian National 
Audit Office, 2002), (Australian National Audit Office, 2003), (NSW Government, 2005), (NSW 
Government, 2009) and (NSW Commission of Audit, 2012). 
 
Research for this thesis has therefore established a direct and significant link between public 
governance, the management of property, government policy outcomes and, in turn, the extent 
to which government performs in the provision of public services. 
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5.3 Empirical Evaluation 
The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) strengthen and 
validate the conclusion of the preceding paragraph through its series of working papers on 
Public Governance.  
 
In examining the measurement of government performance, the OECD, in its Working Paper 
on Public Governance No. 1, Towards Better Measurement of Government, said that, because 
of the size and significance of the public sector, it is a major contributor to growth and social 
welfare. Measurement of government performance therefore matters (OECD, 2007). In terms 
of the extent of the public sector’s interest, use and activity in property as a factor in the 
production of public services and welfare, its significance to the economy was established in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
The OECD working paper exposed a “persistent problem” with recommendations for public 
management reform (and, in the author’s experience, implementation of reform). The OECD 
noted that reforms are rarely based on empirical evaluations, and are based more on policy 
fads than evidence, and with pre-occupation and excessive claims of “best practice”.  
 
The OECD’s research found an over-all very limited availability of data in all areas of its 
analysis of public management reforms, a situation that it described as “a troubling concern”. 
 
In considering a framework for the measurement of government performance, the OECD 
“disaggregates” the public sector production process into six categories: revenues; and, as 
shown collectively in Figure 5.2, inputs (factors of production, which would include property); 
public sector processes, which are dependent upon organisational structure, governance, skills 
and expertise to manage production activity; the derived outputs; resulting outcomes, which 
will be subject to constraints or antecedents that contextualise government efficiency and 
effectiveness (Ibid). Much of the terminology used in this process mirrors that of Hill and Lynn’s 
definitions for public governance. 
 
Figure 5.2: Disaggregated Public Sector Production Process (OECD 2007) 
 
This model is intended for use in the macro-assessment of efficiency and effectiveness for 
comparison between OECD member governments on consistent units of analysis. Currently, 
the processes encompass budget practices and procedures, human resources, internal and 
external reporting, e-government readiness, and the role of the centre of government. Where 
the units of analysis are not clear or are inconsistent, they can be used as simple 
measurement categories that can be compared across jurisdiction and time. Given that real 
property, together with human resources, is the strongest common denominator across all 
government activity, this process can be directly related and applied to property assets in a 
number of areas: 
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§ As an input that contributes to government outcomes; 
 
§ As an input that requires governance, control and management processes; 
 
§ As an asset, the performance, efficiency and effectiveness of which in relation to the 
achievement of government objectives, is measurable, manageable and reportable; 
and 
 
§ For intra and inter-government benchmarking of the above. 
 
The OECD found that governments appear to limit their assessments of efficiency and 
effectiveness by relating only the harder elements of the input category directly to the 
outcomes, and to view these solely in a budgetary context. This leads to incomplete and 
unreliable data and information, which by-pass structural problems, and upon which isolated 
management decisions are made.  
 
Decisions, therefore, can preclude assessments of the larger strategic picture, and can affect 
policies and performance of whole-of-government importance.  
 
The disaggregated view of the process enables the analysis of each input to include the role 
played by public administration policy, structure, governance and management in its 
contribution to the production process. It also recognises outputs as a distinct category, 
separating them from outcomes, which are in turn subject to constraints and parameters 
before they are put into context.  
 
The model would seem to provide support for, and a tool by which Hill and Lynn’s notion that 
public administrations need to ask questions as to how public governance and management 
contribute to governmental outcomes. It also exposes the issues of accountability and 
transparency in public administration to greater scrutiny. 
 
Although the cycle and processes involved in the management of government property assets 
will be presented and discussed in detail later in this thesis, it is a convenient point to show the 
relevance of the OECD’s disaggregated approach to the Strategic Property Asset 
Management cycle and its organisational dependencies, as put forward by the RICS (Jones & 
White op.cit.). This is shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Asset Management Cycle, Processes and Supporting Organisational 
Requirements 
 
A process for measuring the performance of property assets and their management already 
exists. This process fits the disaggregated framework for the assessment of government 
performance. 
 
The principles of professional public sector Strategic Property Asset Management practice 
formally place the assessment and reporting of performance, and consequential actions for 
change and improvement, in the asset management process. This is not just measuring how 
individual properties are performing in terms of operational costs, for example, but also the 
success (or otherwise) of the overall Asset Management Framework, including strategies and 
plans, service delivery models, people, and aspects of the management of the organisation as 
a whole. 
 
Performance measurement is undertaken for each stage of the process, and for each of the 
supporting organisational elements. This enables a full range of assessment beyond merely 
relating the harder elements of the input category to the outcomes, and assessing them in a 
budgetary context only. 
 
Table 5.3, constructed by the author, shows how the performance of asset management might 
be assessed through the OECD disaggregated model. However, any measurement of the 
performance of the asset base and its system of management will be dependent upon, and 
only as good as the quality of the government’s service and business planning, which in turn 
relies upon accurate and reliable data and information (Ref. section 5.4). 
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DISAGGREGATED ELEMENTS 
PERFORMANCE OF THE ASSET 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE ASSET 
PORTFOLIO 
Inputs 
 
§ Government Business and Service 
Objectives 
§ Methods of Service Delivery 
§ Levels of Service 
§ Data and Information 
Public Sector Processes 
 
§ Structural and Management 
Arrangements 
 
 
 
§ Leadership 
§ Culture 
§ Governance and Structure 
§ Roles & Responsibilities 
§ Systems, Processes and Procedures 
§ Resources, Capacity and Capability 
 
§ Activities 
 
§ Analysis 
§ Asset and Financial Planning 
§ Asset Programming 
§ Asset Delivery and Management 
§ Performance Measurement and 
Evaluation 
§ Change and Improvement 
Outputs § Asset Management Policy 
§ Asset Management Strategy 
§ Asset Plans 
Outcomes § Composition and condition of asset base 
§ Effectiveness of the asset base to support 
provision of public services 
Context – Antecedents and Constraints § Machinery of government 
§ Skills capacity and capability 
§ External and internal factors 
§ Public sector culture 
Table 5.3: Assessing Asset Management through the OECD Disaggregated Model 
 
In examining the performance measurement activity by 33 of its member countries, the OECD 
found the following (Table 5.4) (OECD op.cit.): 
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AREA AUSTRALIA OTHER MEMBERS 
Government Ministry / 
Body responsible for 
conducting evaluations 
§ Ministry of Finance 
§ Responsible Ministry, 
Department or Agency 
17 members also include the 
National Audit Body and/or the 
legislature 
Types of evaluations 
conducted and the 
basis of evaluation 
 
§ Type 
 
 
 
 
§ Basis 
 
 
 
 
 
On-going programmes only 
 
 
 
 
Ad hoc only 
 
 
 
 
23 members also conducted 
post-programme, new 
initiatives, sectoral, and/or 
spending reviews  
 
In addition to ad hoc, 13 
members conducted reviews 
on a systematic basis 
Use of evaluations by / 
for: 
 
§ Ministry of Finance 
§ Departmental 
budgeting 
§ Cabinet 
§ Legislation debate 
§ Strategic & budget 
setting 
 
 
 
Rarely 
Rarely 
 
Rarely 
Never 
Often 
 
 
 
 
Often / always: 9 members 
Often / always: 9 members 
 
Often / always: 6 members 
Often / always: 2 members 
Often / always: 15 members 
 
Use of evaluation 
findings in negotiations 
with Ministry of Finance 
Rarely Rarely: 10 members 
Often: 12 members 
Always: 2 members 
Follow-up on 
Evaluations 
 
§ Formal follow-up 
processes in place 
 
 
§ Evaluation function / 
processes audited by 
supreme audit body 
 
§ Evaluations audited 
by supreme audit 
body 
 
 
 
For some evaluations only 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
A few 
 
 
 
All evaluations: 3 members 
Some / a few: 20 members 
No: 3 members 
 
Yes: 16 members 
No: 10 members 
 
 
All evaluations: 1 member 
Some / a few evaluations: 15 
members 
No: 9 members 
Table 5.4: Summary of Performance Evaluation Regimes in OECD Member Countries 
 
The OECD looked at the roles and responsibilities in the performance management systems of 
these member states. It found that Australia does not assign such roles and responsibilities 
within either Ministries or Departments, to the National Audit Body, the legislature, or to any 
external institution. In comparison, 22 other members assigned these roles and responsibilities 
to at least one these bodies. 
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5.4 The Collection, Management and Use of Data 
5.4.1 The Need for Information and Data 
Lonti and Woods built upon the OECD’s Working Paper by explaining the need to identify core 
data in relation to public sector efficiency (Lonti & Woods, 2008). Lonti and Woods put forward 
three principal reasons for the collection of core data: 
 
1. To enable governments to compare institutional arrangements and performance; 
2. To identify possible causes of variances in performance; and 
3. To facilitate detailed analysis of the effectiveness of public sector reforms. 
 
The second and, particularly the third reasons are relevant to the management of government 
property. 
 
Performance variances would relate to monitoring the performance of property asset strategies 
and plans against objectives and targets, the performance of individual assets, and the 
effectiveness of the management framework governing their management. This relates to the 
‘Performance’ element of the Asset Management Cycle shown in Figure 5.3 above. 
 
Data for the measurement of the effectiveness of public sector reform is essential in the 
context of the management of government property. This thesis has shown the importance and 
significance of public sector property, not only to the management of government business and 
provision of public services and infrastructure, but also to property markets and national 
economic activity.  
 
All tiers of Government in Australia have undertaken reforms in the way they manage, and how 
they govern the management of their assets. These are the subjects of the Case Study into the 
Australian Public Sectors contained in Appendix 3. 
 
There is little data available to assist in evaluating performance in either of these areas, other 
than that collected by individual public entities for internal asset management purposes. Few 
efforts have been observed to evaluate the effectiveness of asset management reform. 
 
These observations are in line with Lonti and Woods, who found that most data collected in the 
public sector, is on an ad hoc and irregular basis.  They consequently proposed that core sets 
of data be collected regularly, and that the data collected be appropriate and reliable to allow 
identification of trends and evaluate performance effectiveness and efficiency 
 
Maintaining consistency with the Disaggregated Measurement Model, Lonti and Woods 
proposed that core data be collected by reference to the elements of the model.  
 
With increasing pressure on governments to improve public sector efficiency and effectiveness 
whist controlling expenditure, and the increasing public expectations for more and better 
services, it is important to be able to measure the performance of government agencies in 
terms of business, financial and service delivery performance. In so doing, governments will 
have the ability to measure the achievement of their objectives, and base policy, financial, 
organisational and service decisions on good information. 
 
In the age of the technical ability to collect, collate, assimilate, analyse, and disseminate data 
in real time, governments are facing considerable demands for information, and transparency 
in the conduct of doing business. Data and information therefore have an important role in 
breaking down public service walls, and improving the accountability of both the public service 
and the political branches of government. 
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Notwithstanding this, Lonti and Woods said that studies into measuring public sector efficiency 
are “bedevilled by weak data” (Lonti & Woods, op. cit., p. 19). 
 
This conclusion is certainly supported by this thesis, but there are further reasons in addition to 
the weakness of data that impede the measurement of efficiency.  
 
In one of its series of ‘Insights’ articles for the Oil and Gas Industry, the consulting firm, 
McKinsey & Company, identified a number of causes of information shortfalls or “leakages” 
that occur when capturing data and moving them to where strategic and operational decisions 
are made (Martinotti, Nolten, & Steinsbo, 2016). 
 
McKinsey & Company matched these leakage types with the elements of the data 
management process. Figure 5.4, reproduced from the ‘Insights’ article, illustrates the funnel 
effects of this. 
 
Figure 5.4: McKinsey & Company’s Data Leakage Funnel 
 
This has many similarities with the Australian public sector. Irrespective of the level of quantity, 
quality, appropriateness, or reliability of data, data must still be processed into relevant 
information. It has been seen that governments have trouble in establishing and maintaining 
central repositories for data, or moving data across their systems networks. They are also not 
good at the consistent collection and aggregation of data, turning data into meaningful 
analyses and information, and, when they have information, they struggle to turn it into action 
and outcomes.  
5.4.2 Property Asset Data and Information in Australian Public Sectors 
Given that most government activities and services are conducted from real property, the 
performance of property assets, how they are used and managed, and the system of their 
management are crucial to the performance of government agencies. Knowledge of these 
assets from all perspectives (condition, suitability, functionality, amenity, and financial) is 
fundamental to assessing agency performance. 
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However, there is paucity of data and information in relation to property (and most asset 
classes) in all tiers of government in Australia (Leifer & Seymour-Jones, 2010).  As noted by 
Leifer and Seymour-Jones, the Commonwealth Government’s Department of Finance and 
Deregulation (DFD) establish reporting standards in relation to property office accommodation 
that other Federal Government departments are required to follow. The data categories 
maintained by the DFD were listed as follows: 
 
“The property file is a Microsoft® Excel spreadsheet with data recorded against each of the 
following data elements for each property … 
 
E01: Lease identifier 
E02: Building identifier 
E03: Street number/Building name 
E04: Street name 
E05: Suburb 
E06: State/Territory 
E07: Postcode 
E08: Net Lettable Area 
E09: Leased-out Area 
E10: Total non-office area 
E11: Workpoints 
E12: Occupied workpoints 
E13: Lease start date 
E14: Lease end date 
E15: Heritage status 
E16: Building grade 
E17: Agency comments”. 
 
Leifer and Seymour-Jones went on to surmise that this level of data aggregation might be 
adequate for the oversight role of the DFD, but noted that the document, “Guide to the 
Australian Government Property Data Collection” fails to expand on the list, and classify or 
derive information from the list (Australian Government, 2009a).  
 
In their conclusion, Leifer and Seymour-Jones emphasised the need for Property Management 
Information Systems in the public sector, together with a commitment towards its maintenance 
and ability to facilitate a life-cycle approach, rather than merely the maintenance of an “asset 
register to satisfy the need to report” (Leifer and Seymour-Jones op.cit.). 
 
Australian governments show no consistency in the appreciation of the need for property asset 
data, policies for data collection, management and use, and selection of systems. There is 
much evidence, however, that the management of asset data is systems-led, based on what a 
system can do, rather than what is required from a system by the user. 
 
Similarly, there is no evidence that governments in Australia share data, or co-operate in its 
analysis. Collectively, the State Governments are responsible for the management of over four 
million square meters of office space with a total combined annual rental turnover of $1 billion. 
They have all the major landlords in common, and yet they have not sought to cooperate to 
exploit the enormously powerful influence that they would undoubtedly wield within their office 
leasing markets (Government Property Group, 2007).  
 
This situation works to the detriment of all tiers of government, and to individual jurisdictions. 
The situation exists despite a call from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 2006 
for “nationally consistent frameworks” to protect financial sustainability by managing 
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infrastructure through effective asset management and financial planning. (Seymour-Jones, 
2014a) Seemingly, this bore the hallmarks of the Australian Federal and State Governments 
having learned from the UK Government’s Strategic Property Asset Management Reform 
Programme. (Refer to Appendix 1).  
 
However, these frameworks, and hence the possibility of correspondingly consistent 
frameworks for the management of property data, did not materialise. This thesis ascribes this 
failure to a combination of the public sector’s lack of understanding of asset management, its 
culture and organisational characteristics, the desire to avoid examination and the potential for 
increased accountability and transparency, and ingrained attitudes of turf-protection. 
5.4.3 Typical Standard Core Strategic Property Asset Management Data and 
Information Requirements 
The typical standard core data sets for measuring and reporting on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the management of government property, as identified by this thesis, are set out in 
Table 5.5. It is interesting, but of no surprise, that they can be easily distributed within an 
adaptation of the disaggregated public sector production process. 
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5.5 Measuring Public Sector Reform 
Much of this chapter has been concerned with the measurement of performance in terms of 
services, their quality, and the efficiency and effectiveness of their delivery. The third of Lonti 
and Woods reasons for the collection of core data is to facilitate detailed analysis of the 
effectiveness of public sector reforms. 
 
This section looks at how the public sector views reform, why and how it implements reform, 
and if and how the outcomes of reform are measured, particularly with regard to the 
management of government property. 
 
It was noted in the previous section that the Australian Commonwealth Public Sector might be 
averse to disturbing the status quo of its organisational composition. Given the innate 
characteristics of public administrations generally, it is quite possible that this might be 
because of the level of examination that the public service would necessarily have had to 
undergo for it to be transformed into “the world’s best public service”. Equally, it might purely 
have been too much of a threatening ‘turf’ issue.  
 
It is also quite possible that it was a reaction to the manner in which, what would have 
amounted to wholesale reform of the public service was to be carried out; and the level and 
extent of internal engagement, consultation and communication undertaken by the government 
to explain the basis and rationale behind the reform to the APS. 
 
The management of government property in Australia has been subject to numerous changes 
in organisational responsibility and function over the past three decades. For example, is it a 
public works function; and should it be centrally managed, and if so, by which government 
department? 
 
In the midst of these organisational and functional debates, there have also been attempts, 
across all government sectors in Australia, to change the traditional thinking of the 
management of property and provision of property services from the operational activities of 
‘property management’ and ‘facility management’, to a higher more strategic business 
resource management approach. This would require a revolutionary change in thinking, new 
skills, and large-scale reform in how property should be treated and managed as a strategic 
resource, and as a factor of service production and business support. 
 
The author has observed these reforms in the state governments of New South Wales and 
Western Australia, and in the local government sectors of those states. The outcomes of these 
reforms have, in the main, not been successful; neither have their respective governments 
sought to measure or account for them. 
 
The case studies in Appendix 3 describe the roads to reform of these governments, and their 
outcomes. However, there are common threads that provide the reasons for their varying lack 
of success. 
 
Apart from, or in addition to, the public sector’s apparent reluctance to accept change, the 
author ascribes this lack of success to the “surprises and paradoxical effects” that have arisen 
from the features of the New Public Management reform paradigm (C Hood & Peters, 2004). 
5.5.1 New Public Management  
5.5.1.1 The Paradigm 
There is an abundance of literature on the theory and development of New Public 
Management (NPM). However, the extent of its consideration for this thesis is confined to the 
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identification of its principles, the reasons for public sector reform, and why it resulted in 
“surprises and paradoxical effects”. 
 
These will then be related to the outcomes of the efforts to reform the management of property 
in the Australian public sectors. 
 
The adoption of NPM principles became fashionable with governments in many countries in 
the final two decades of the twentieth century. In essence, NPM was an attempt to break with, 
or at least correct the weaknesses of the traditional form of bureaucratic public administration 
(O'Flynn, 2007). O’Flynn cited Stoker’s description of NPM as encompassing “a critique of 
monopolistic forms of service provision and an argument for a wider range of service providers 
and a more market-oriented approach to management” (Stoker, 2006). 
 
Hood set out the key components of NPM as (C. Hood, 1991): 
 
§ Hands-on professional management; 
 
§ Explicit standards and measures of performance; 
 
§ Greater emphasis on output controls; 
 
§ Disaggregation of units in the public sector; 
 
§ Greater competition in the public sector; 
 
§ Private sector styles of management practice; and 
 
§ Greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. 
 
Writing in 2006, Kaganova, McKellar and Peterson (Kaganova et al) identified NPM as one of 
the major drivers behind reforms in the management of property assets (op.cit. pp. 6-7). 
Although saying that there was no formal definition for NPM, they identified the following as the 
“most commonly identified elements”, which are in line with those of Hood: 
 
▪ Improved financial efficiency and cost effectiveness; 
 
▪ Performance monitoring and incentives; 
 
▪ Application of private sector management approaches; 
 
▪ Decentralisation and reduced bureaucracy;  
 
▪ Greater managerial authority in financial management; and 
 
▪ Greater accountability and transparency. 
 
Kaganova et al cited a literature review by Glore in 2001 that placed the United Kingdom, 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden as the most advanced 
implementers of NPM 11 . It was, however suggested that the reforms in property asset 
management in these countries were as a result of more general changes in public 
administration and the role of the public sector, and that countries that were just starting 
property management reform viewed it as part of wider change programmes in the public 
sector. 
                                                       
11Glore, E. (2001). Has Canada Adopted the New public Management? Public Management Review 3(1): 121-130. 
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It is quite probable that this may have been the case in these countries. Indeed, this thesis 
does not put forward NPM as a driver for reform in either the UK or USA. It does, however, 
now show that there are very strong connections with property asset management reform in 
the Australian public sectors and the elements of NPM. Furthermore, the intervening years 
have allowed the outcomes of these reforms to be reviewed and assessed. It will be shown 
that they display the paradoxical effects of the NPM paradigm, which provide many of the 
reasons for Australia’s lack of success in implementing good practices in property asset 
management. (See Sections 5.5.3 and 7.1.5). 
 
The characteristics of NPM were the concentration on results and managerial responsibility 
rather than administrative activity and the following of instructions; the economic principles of 
choice, contracting, competition, and corporate management; modern human resources and 
organisational management practices; and the importance of service delivery to the public.  
 
Stoker summarised this as, “to dismantle the bureaucratic pillar of traditional public 
administration. Out with the large, multipurpose hierarchical bureaucracies, and in with the 
lean, flat, autonomous organisations drawn from the public and private spheres and steered by 
a tight central leadership corps.” (Stoker, op.cit. p. 46). 
 
In Australia, O’Flynn noted that the NPM reforms of the 1980s “were heavily focused on 
internal reforms and corporate management. New practices included, corporate planning 
based on central goals; programme budgeting, management improvement programmes, 
contract employment for managers, central auditing, and performance monitoring of 
individuals. The key aims were to empower public servants and increase managerial quality.” 
(O’Flynn, op.cit. p. 354). 
 
As NPM gained in dominance in Australia, the notions of ‘competition’ and ‘contracts’ 
increased in importance. This related to the public sector competing with the private sector in 
the provision of services. Much was outsourced on the basis that the private sector could 
perform with greater efficiency and effectiveness, and that government was taking more of a 
view of itself as a ‘facilitator’ of services. The use of contracts between government 
departments became common to define and govern relationships. 
 
In the New South Wales Government, the Alliance Agreement between Treasury and the 
Department of Commerce for the management of the Crown Property Portfolio, and the 
subsequent outsourcing of the non-strategic property management functions of the portfolio by 
the Department of Commerce to a private sector service provider, are excellent examples of 
this, as are the unintended effects that ensued.12 
 
A further example in the New South Wales Government was the establishment of a business 
services unit, NSW Businesslink, which offered data management, human resources 
management, accounting, and property and facility management services to government 
departments and agencies. This was in addition to the functions of the Department of 
Commerce, particularly as government’s de facto property manager. The effect of this was to 
pit government agencies in competition with each other as well as with the private sector. 
These internal conflicting roles are considered in Appendix 3. 
5.5.1.2 The Paradox 
In their article, ‘The Middle Ageing of New Public Management: Into the Age of Paradox?’, 
Hood and Peters analysed the “surprises and paradoxes associated with recent and 
contemporary public reforms”. They concluded that exploring the features of NPM reforms that 
                                                       
12 Refer to Section 7.1.4 
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may have contributed to these paradoxical effects would help in understanding public sector 
reform (Hood & Peters, op, cit., p. 267). 
 
Hood and Peters support evidence that the paradigm had turned to paradox in that reform can 
result in “cultural clashes or blind spots”, which “include paradoxes of organisational resistance 
to pressures for second tier change, variants on institutional self-reproduction paradoxes, and 
related ‘triumph of hope over experience’ paradoxes in which learning from error is somehow 
repressed”. Furthermore, it was observed that there is a tendency, common to both developed 
and developing countries, for one culture’s broad vision for change to be translated into 
something quite different when it passes to another level of the organisation or a different 
cultural environment. Hood and Peters referred to this as a “two-level cultural and social 
paradox” (Ibid. p. 272-273). 
 
Examples of these unintended effects and cultural surprises are: 
 
§ Competition with the private sector and misplaced policy leading to significant 
monetary losses; 
 
§ The blurring rather than the intended greater delineation of management 
responsibilities in areas where the type of public service activity and/or its results are 
not easily identifiable or measurable; 
 
§ Measurement and benchmarking of outputs to an extent that it weakens the credibility 
of such exercises. There is also a danger that measuring performance can result in 
conformity rather than improvement and innovation; 
 
§ The retention and, in some cases the extension, of process controls by bureaucracies, 
which results in increased regulation and red tape, and decreased efficiency; 
 
§ Repeated introductions of the same reform, notwithstanding earlier failures13, quite 
possibly because of the influence of the interests of consultants in presenting the same 
ideas and advice in new packaging and jargon; 
 
§ Surprises when an unerring belief and trust in new information technology systems do 
not produce lower operating costs and greater service quality, despite previous 
experience to the contrary; 
 
§ Surprises when an unquestioning belief and trust in “best practice” status ascribed to 
standards, processes and procedures; and a quest for recognition through certification 
by accrediting organisations, is found to be misplaced; 
 
§ The continuance of ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to reform; and 
 
§ The introduction of reforms based on minimal research and evidence-based learning. 
5.5.2 Change in the Public Sector 
Change is “context-dependent” (Huerta Melchor, op. cit. p. 9). Huerta Melchor noted that public 
sector reforms are complex, often unpopular, resisted, risky, and require time to produce 
results and show their benefits. This thesis has already shown that the likelihood of the latter 
being evidenced is small, due to the limited measurement and reporting of performance and 
results. 
                                                       
13 This serves as a reminder of Albert Einstein’s view of insanity as, “doing the same thing over and over again and 
expecting different results.”  
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Huerta Melchor identifies eight factors that lead to resistance to change in the public sector 
(Ibid, p. 16): 
 
§ Lack of coherence of the reform and its relationship with other initiatives can result in 
confusion and opposition, i.e. reform for reform’s sake; 
 
§ Fear and uncertainty; 
 
§ Negative implications perceived by individuals and groups; 
 
§ A failure to explain the rationale behind the reform to all affected and touched by it, i.e. 
winning hearts and minds; 
 
§ Forced and imposed of change; 
 
§ Different interpretations of the change by people at different levels of the organisation, 
i.e. the “two-level cultural and social paradox” of Hood and Peters; 
 
§ Not considering the effect of the reform on people in the change process; and 
 
§ Insufficient information and communication causes uncertainty and distrust. 
 
Drawing upon Huerta Melchor’s paper, Charbit and Vammalle identified the reform challenges 
faced by public administrations, and put forward possible policy tools to address them. These 
are reproduced in Table 5.6 (Charbit & Vammalle, 2010). 
 
Key Challenges Possible Policy Tools 
§ Bridging information gaps and 
developing a clear roadmap with 
measurable intermediary targets and 
final out comes 
§ Creating support for the reform: 
citizens and civil servants 
§ Building on leadership and political 
commitment to the reform 
§ Overcoming resistance to change and 
creating ownership feeling for reforms 
§ Capacity and knowledge 
§ Avoiding policy reversals 
§ Evaluating reform and assessing 
success 
§ Independent systems of expertise 
and preliminary evaluations 
§ International organisations 
§ Debates and consultation strategies 
§ Seize the moment: take advantage of 
crises 
§ Intermediation bodies (unions, 
associations etc.) 
§ Experimentation 
§ Training and public administration 
schools 
§ Communication 
§ Evaluation mechanisms 
§ Independent and permanent 
institutions 
Table 5.6: Public Sector Reform Challenges and Policy Tools 
5.5.3 The NPM Paradigm and Property Management Reform 
Reform of the management of public sector property by Australian governments bears many of 
the hallmarks of the NPM paradigm and paradox, and of the issues faced in introducing 
change in the public sector. 
 
This thesis offers the adoption of the principles of NPM by the Australian public sectors as the 
basis for reforming the management of public property assets, and the ways in which they 
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were implemented, as reasons and explanations for the resulting “surprises and paradoxical 
effects” that have been observed in practice by the author. 
 
It will be seen that these surprises and paradoxical effects stem from a lack of understanding 
of the importance of property to governments, and the many roles property plays in all aspects 
of national, regional, and local sustainability, as a strategic resource essential to the efficient 
and effective operation of all areas of government.  
 
The reasons for this relate to context, i.e. organisational culture, the lack of information and 
data, and the lack of performance measurement, all of which can be attributed to viewing 
property as a free good with perpetual and unalienable rights of occupation and control, and as 
a permanent operational necessity.  
 
These are the very real barriers to transforming the management of property from a passive 
bureaucratic process, to actively managing it as one of the three traditional classical factors of 
economic production to obtain Thorncroft’s “maximum return”. In this context, NPM also sought 
to introduce the fourth factor of production, entrepreneurship (or ‘intrapreneurship’, as 
identified by the IDRF in its CRE 2000 Programme, as one of the advanced stages of 
development towards full CRE maturity. Ref. Section 4.4) 
5.6 Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
The finding and conclusions of the measure of public sector performance are summarised in 
Box 2. 
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Box 2: Measurement of Performance in the Public Sector: Summary of Key Findings and 
Conclusions 
 
§ The public sector has implied service level obligations with their communities. 
 
§ Performance in efficiency and effectiveness must be measured, and measured against 
levels of service and management, and not solely in budgetary terms. This blurs 
assessments of the broader strategic issues.  
§ A disaggregated process enables the assessment of the softer elements, e.g. policy, 
structure, and governance; separates outputs from outcomes; and considers contextual 
influences. 
§ Performance measurement is dependent upon organisational culture, information and 
data, empirical evaluation, and governance. 
§ Public sectors often have ‘protectionist’ and territorial cultures; collect data on an irregular 
and ad hoc basis; assess the harder input elements; measure in monetary terms; and 
have varying policy provisions and governance requirements over performance 
measurement and reporting.  
§ Australia compares poorly to other OECD countries in all aspects of performance 
measurement. 
§ Property and its management are major inputs to service delivery. 
§ The Australian public sectors do not measure the performance of these inputs. 
§ The Asset Management cycle and processes provide the basis for disaggregation of the 
elements, which would contribute to the measurement of the efficient and effective 
delivery of service outcomes. 
§ Reform is often resisted in the public sector, and their outcomes rarely analysed or 
measured. 
§ Attempts to reform the management of property assets by all tiers of government in 
Australia have been consistent with the principles of NPM.   
§ Reasons for their lack of success are also consistent with the characteristics of the NPM 
paradox, and the problems of introducing change in the public sector. 
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6 The Search for a Leading Practice in Public Sector 
Strategic Property Asset Management - Case 
Studies: United Kingdom Central Government and 
Federal Government of the United States of America  
6.1 Introduction 
It has been established that the public sector is often confused over the meaning of Strategic 
Property Asset Management and under-estimates its importance to the provision of public 
services, infrastructure and a government’s financial and fiscal standing. It has also been 
shown that, because of the limited research and documented experimentation, there is a 
‘knowledge gap’ in the practice of Strategic Property Asset Management, whether good 
practice or otherwise. 
 
This and the following chapters seek to narrow the ‘knowledge gap’ and propose a leading 
practice for the strategic management of government property through case studies into the 
UK and USA. Detailed versions of these are contained in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the case studies undertaken on a number of Australian jurisdictions, 
namely the Australian Commonwealth Government, the Government of New South Wales, and 
the Local Government Sector. These case studies are contained in Appendix 3.  
 
The preceding chapter provided a definition for Strategic Property Asset Management through 
research undertaken into reviews and reports sponsored by the UK Central Government and 
from subsequent practice guidance published by the RICS. This definition provides the base 
proposition upon which the identification of a leading practice is founded. 
6.2 The Need for a Strategic Approach 
The drivers for a strategic approach to the management of their property assets were common 
to the governments of both the USA and UK.  
 
These drivers revolved around a general malaise in the management of property leading to 
disrepair and large renewal and replacement funding requirements; changing service delivery 
models; fragmented control; and a need for asset inventories and an understanding of the 
asset base, its use and functions, and whether it offers value for money and contributes to the 
public purse.  
 
The UK and US Governments began to understand the importance of their property assets 
during the 1990s, but it was not until the early part of the 2000s decade that real and 
significant changes were introduced. These changes were remarkably similar in principle, and 
occurred almost simultaneously for like reasons. 
6.3 Case Study: UK Government 
6.3.1 Research method 
§ The research for this case study has covered a wide and detailed range of literature in 
the form of independent and academic studies and reports, professional standards and 
guidelines, government strategies, policies and procedures, government reports and 
audits, journal articles and conference proceedings.  
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§ This research has identified four principal studies and events, which provide a clear 
and chronologically traceable path to the development of Strategic Property Asset 
Management in the UK public sector. They provide the core of this case study, and are 
supported and supplemented by a number subsequent reports, events and recorded 
outcomes.  
 
§ Using the Lyons Report (see following sections) as the origin for this development, 
figure 6.1 illustrates the places occupied by the four studies and events in the UK’s 
path to adopting and implementing a strategic approach to the management of 
property. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: UK Government – path to Strategic Property Asset Management 
6.3.2 Drivers of Asset Management Reform 
In mid-2004, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, commissioned Sir Michael 
Lyons to conduct a study into the management of public sector assets. Lyons submitted his 
report, Towards Better Management of Public Sector Assets (the Lyons Report), to the 
Chancellor in December 2004 (Lyons, ibid.).  
 
Although Sir Michael was asked how asset management might be improved to contribute to 
the Government’s objectives of securing asset sales of £30 billion and to achieve efficiency 
savings, there were a number of fundamental and underlying drivers for the study that were 
prompted by a period of change in which public services were evolving and being delivered in 
a new context of public expectation.  
 
This change was characterised by increased public demand in the scope, efficiency and 
quality of services; an increasing focus on improving efficiency and value for money; the 
continual development of new technologies; the need to redress what was seen by the 
government to have been a past under-investment in infrastructure; and the clustering of public 
services and new ways of their delivery. The latter was forcing change in the association of 
services with particular types of buildings, when and how services were delivered, and when 
they were available (Lyons, ibid, p.15.) 
 
Lyons noted that the public sector asset base, which had a value of £658 billion, was the 
foundation upon which public services depends. The asset base, therefore, should continually 
develop to reflect and support the evolution of the public service. Additionally, the emerging 
trends represented a need and opportunity to re-consider what constituted a public service, 
how it delivers public value, and how the management of public assets should respond to 
support public service delivery models. 
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With particular reference to the government’s objective of redressing the imbalance in 
infrastructure investment, Lyons saw asset management as having an integral role in this. He 
identified a number of alternative sources of capital through the identification and sale of 
surplus assets; involving the private sector in asset ownership and management; managing 
assets to realise their real, underlying and hidden value; and the proper and full utilisation of 
retained assets. 
6.3.3 The Lyons Report: a foundation for leading practice  
6.3.3.1 The Chancellor’s Brief 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned Sir Michael Lyons “to conduct a brief study 
into the management of public sector assets and how that might be improved to contribute to 
the Government’s objective of securing £30 billion of asset sales and achieving further 
efficiency savings.” (Lyons, 2004a). 
6.3.3.2 Benefits of a Broad Approach 
Notwithstanding what may have been considered as a fairly narrow brief, Lyons took a broad 
approach to his examination of asset management to ensure as wide as possible contribution 
to greater efficiency. He therefore gave additional scope and value to his remit by considering 
the following five areas, which he saw as essential elements of the study: 
 
§ Lyons sought to contextualise the £30 billion disposal target in terms of what it meant, 
its importance, how it related to Government’s aims and objectives, and whether it 
related to any wider economic and social objectives, e.g. social housing; 
 
§ Quantify the efficiency gain by looking at the scale of the existing asset base and the 
potential for disposals; the potential for efficiency gains from improved management of 
retained assets; and how further benefits might accrue from more private sector 
participation; 
 
§ Assess whether incentives encourage good asset management; 
 
§ Determine whether the public sector has the right skills, systems, practices and 
capacity, and whether they are effectively deployed; 
 
§ Assess whether the public sector co-ordinates and co-operates across jurisdictional 
and administrative boundaries. 
 
Although the primary focus was on the management of land and property, Lyons also 
considered intangible assets such as intellectual property, the radio spectrum and government 
shareholdings. He looked at government in its fullest context, which included general 
government, Non-Departmental Public Bodies, local authorities, public corporations, and 
private assets supported by government funds. 
 
In so doing, Lyons highlighted two things: the significance of land and buildings and their 
management as strategic government resources: and the need to take account of the 
contextual settings of their use and importance in the provision of public services, i.e. 
government policy, inter and intra government co-operation, and the machinery of government 
through which policy is delivered. 
 
Lyons shaped his report and proposals for the improvement of public sector asset 
management with the foresight and understanding that they would have wider policy 
implications in their implementation. They were designed to complement established 
government policy objectives that impact the management of assets. 
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It is not so much the concern of this case study that The Lyons Report concluded that the 
Government’s asset sales and efficiency targets could be met, but rather the asset 
management conditions necessary to achieve them.  
 
Lyons identified two degrees of asset management: “good” and “better” asset management 
(Lyons 2004b, p.29), which this thesis proposes as the leading authority that has led to the 
management of government property assets in a true strategic sense. 
6.3.3.3 Good Asset Management and Better Asset Management: the move to Strategic 
Property Asset Management 
Good Asset Management improves the delivery of government services by aligning the asset 
base with an organisation’s goals and objectives. 
 
Better Asset Management releases resources, generates revenue and improves value-for 
money.  
 
With regard to real tangible assets, Lyons concluded that, to estimate realistic quantifiable 
benefits of improved asset management, entails the analysis of: 
 
§ The characteristics of the asset base and the likely potential for future asset disposals; 
and 
 
§ The likelihood of further efficiency savings and economic benefits through better asset 
management of retained assets. 
  
In addition to these quantitative benefits, Lyons also describes potential qualitative benefits 
from better asset management in the form service improvements and the transfer of risk. 
 
Lyons concluded that “readily attainable gains” would be achieved through: 
 
§ A co-ordinated approach to asset management planning across government, 
especially when departments are rationalising their asset bases as part of efficiency or 
locational reviews; 
 
§ Mandatory recording of vacant space and accommodation needs in a centralised 
database; 
 
§ Government standards in areas such as space use and design; and 
 
§ A system of governance overseen at the highest levels of government. 
6.3.3.4 Key Findings and Recommendations of the Lyons Report 
6.3.3.4.1 Findings 
Whilst Lyons found encouraging signs across government, particularly in the areas of on-going 
asset management-related reform and at the local government level, his report made it clear 
that much improvement was needed to managing assets as strategic organisational resources. 
Lyons described asset management as “a key part of business planning, which connects, at a 
strategic level, decisions about its business needs, the deployment of assets, and its future 
investment needs.” (Ibid, p.6.). 
 
Lyons provided evidence of a lack of “strategic profile” in asset management in that: 
 
§ Asset management was not fully integrated with strategic planning for resource 
allocation, investment needs and the Government’s efficiency programme; 
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§ There was little involvement in asset planning at central government and departmental 
board levels; 
 
§ There was an inconsistent approach to the treatment and management of assets 
across the public sector; 
 
§ There were few examples of inter-departmental co-operation; 
 
§ On-going maintenance of assets was not receiving sufficient attention; 
 
§ There was a dearth of asset management expertise; and 
 
§ Opportunities were not being explored to extract the maximum value from assets 
through the involvement of the private sector. 
6.3.3.4.2 Recommendations 
Lyons framed his recommendations in three categories, for which he saw important roles for 
the Treasury, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Office of Government 
Commerce. These categories were: 
 
§ Creating a rigorous asset management and planning framework; 
 
§ Delivery of efficiency gains; and 
 
§ Deployment of asset management expertise. 
 
Table 6.1 summarises these recommendations. 
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6.3.3.5 Outcome of the Lyons Report 
Consistent with the recommendations of the Lyons Report, the role of the OGC was extended 
to include the integrated management of the Central Civil Government Estate. The OGC 
subsequently commissioned a research project into the management of the CCGE, the 
principal elements of which were the Leeds Report and the Howarth Report. These are 
considered in the following sections. 
6.3.4 OGC Research Project: University of Leeds – Improving Property Asset 
Management in the Central Civil Government Estate (“the Leeds Report” 
or “Leeds”)  
6.3.4.1 Introduction 
The Leeds Report was commissioned by the OGC to provide a framework for improving 
property asset management across the CCGE (Male, op. cit.). It is the foundation on which the 
management of the CCGE has been managed since 2006. As such, it is an essential resource 
in defining a leading practice for Strategic Property Asset Management. 
 
Leeds built upon the principles of the Lyons Report, and proposed a programme and 
methodology for the implementation of the Lyons recommendations. It also provided a 
validation to the Lyons conclusion that the operational savings and capital targets would be 
achievable with the adoption of the Lyons recommendations. However, Leeds emphasised that 
the successful implementation of the Lyons recommendations would depend upon co-
ordinated action and co-operation between key stakeholders, led by the Treasury, and 
assisted by the OGC. OGC’s role would be to “embed enhanced property asset management 
in central civil government.” (Ibid, p.25). 
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The Leeds research indicated a clear relationship between property assets, business strategy, 
service delivery, finance, information technology, and organisational change. 
6.3.4.2 Scope and Objectives of the Report 
Its terms of reference were: 
 
§ To provide a baseline assessment of the current status and practice of property asset 
management in central civil government, and the development of a blueprint for 
excellence in managing the estate; 
 
§ To suggest a central governance structure, including the Office of Prime Minister, the 
Cabinet Office and Treasury, that sets a property asset management policy framework 
across the civil estate; and 
 
§ To provide an estimate of the potential efficiency gains achievable if the report’s 
recommendations were to be adopted. 
 
The objectives of the study were: 
 
§ To provide an assessment of the existing asset base and ‘Property Asset 
Management’ practices in the CCGE; 
 
§ To provide a vision for excellence in ‘Property Asset Management’; 
 
§ To construct a maturity matrix of ‘good practice’ in Property Asset Management; 
 
§ To estimate potential efficiency gains from better management of the property 
portfolio; and 
 
§ To provide options for intervention strategies by Government. 
6.3.4.3 Research Approach 
The approach adopted by Leeds to the study was framed and guided by the following 
principles: 
 
§ Leeds placed ‘Property Asset Management’ within a hierarchy of strategic and 
operational management functions under Strategic Resource Management, as shown 
in Figure 6.2; 
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Figure 6.2: Strategic Resource Management Hierarchy 
 
§ Leeds saw ‘Property Asset Management’ as “a structured, holistic and integrating 
approach for aligning and managing over time service delivery requirements and the 
performance of property assets to meet business objectives and drivers within a 
central government organisation”;   
 
§ Property assets were defined as land and buildings and infrastructure, used by an 
organisation regardless of tenure, which exist to enable and support service delivery. 
 
§ Property Asset Management involves the management of assets across their useful 
lives, from identification of need, to design and construction, operations and 
maintenance, and disposal. This process encompasses two interacting components of 
management: 
 
− Strategic: medium to long-term assessment of organisational property needs; 
and 
− Operational: on-going short-term management of individual assets. 
 
Recognising the importance of property as a strategic resource in terms of both its value and in 
the production of public services, Leeds considered that its management must be strategic in 
nature, and integrated with the management of all other resources, i.e. human resources, 
information and communications technology, and finance.  
 
As such, the management of property (and all other resources) must give recognition to the 
context of the public sector, including its complexity, and the structure and machinery of 
government. 
 
Leeds, therefore, approached its study by analysing the CCGE by reference to the areas and 
sectors of government in which it is comprised.  
Government property was divided into two categories, ‘operational’ (property that supports and 
enables service delivery); and ‘administrative’ (property that supports the machinery of 
government, such as office accommodation). 
6.3.4.4 Research method 
The methodology employed comprised interviews; reviews of literature and government 
reports; workshops; interaction and sharing with other OGC projects; industry consultation and 
expert advice; and the experience and knowledge of the research team. 
 
 
Strategic       
Resource 
Management 
Strategic Asset 
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(SAM) 
Property Asset Management 
- Strategic 
- Operational 
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6.3.4.5 Findings of the Leeds Report 
6.3.4.5.1 The CCGE and Structure of Government 
Leeds found the Government’s structure to be complex, decentralised and diverse.  
 
Leeds identified nine organisational models that delivered government outcomes. These 
comprised 910 public bodies under the control of 23 government departments. 
 
A significant proportion of the CCGE was found to be outside the control of government 
departments, but within the control of executive agencies. This fragmented government 
structure reflected an equally fragmented, decentralised and non-strategic approach to 
Property Asset Management. 
6.3.4.5.2 Excellence in Property Asset Management 
Leeds defined the characteristics of Strategic Property Asset Management, developed 
frameworks for its practice and process, proposed standards to measure an organisation’s 
capacity and capability maturity in the management of property assets as strategic resources, 
identified the required skills, framed a generic Property Asset Management Plan template, and 
defined characteristics for organisational and governance arrangements. 
6.3.4.5.3 Criteria and Processes 
Leeds put forward the following criteria within a ‘top-down’ policy framework, and a ‘bottom-up’ 
needs approach as prerequisites for excellence: 
 
§ Top-Down 
− Leadership 
− Governance 
− Policy 
− Structure 
− Roles and Responsibilities 
 
§ Bottom-Up 
− Strategy Implementation 
− Organisational Performance 
− Asset Performance: Effectiveness 
− Asset Performance: Efficiency 
− Service Performance: Delivery Enhancement 
− Audit and Review 
 
The top-down elements set the governance and policy framework. The bottom-up elements 
provide information on portfolio performance, and how it contributes to service delivery 
requirements. 
 
These would be linked through strong communication and a robust reporting regime. 
 
Leeds set down the following criteria to be considered when developing a Property Asset 
Management Framework: 
 
§ The organisation’s strategic direction and associated business strategy; 
 
§ Property Management activity, i.e. investment, maintenance, disposal, acquisition, 
renewal and refurbishment, and land issues; 
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§ Programming and Project Management; and 
 
§ Management of both organisational and technological change. 
 
Furthermore, Leeds said that ‘good’ Property Asset Management must comprise treating 
property as corporate resources; managing property on a whole-of-life basis, and against 
service levels; measuring performance; assessing and managing risk associated with asset 
failure; and continuous improvement. 
6.3.4.5.4 Strategic Property Asset Management Outcomes, Integration Principles, and 
Benefits 
Table 6.2 summarises the Leeds Report’s key desired outcomes, integration principles, and 
benefits that the strategic management of property would be expected to provide. 
 
Outcomes § Improved stakeholder satisfaction 
§ Clear management and assessment methodologies 
§ Regulatory compliance 
§ Improved corporate management and governance 
arrangements 
Integration Principles § Acceptance of strategic planning for property as an 
essential part of organisational resources planning 
§ Budgets include full costs of property operation and 
maintenance 
§ Integration with whole-of-government policy frameworks 
§ Consideration of non-asset solutions 
Benefits § Better management of the asset base 
§ Improved accountability 
§ Measurement and reporting of performance 
§ Inter-departmental / agency, and jurisdiction benchmarking 
§ Informed management of risk 
§ Improved financial efficiency 
Table 6.2: Property Asset Management Outcomes, Integration Principles, and Benefits 
6.3.4.5.5 Property Asset Management ‘Best’ Practice 
In looking for a vision for excellence in Property Asset Management, Leeds developed the 
following two frameworks through which it presented a proposition for ‘best’ practice: 
 
1.  Corporate Planning Framework 
This framework places the management of property assets into the corporate planning 
process, which comprises strategic, tactical, and operational level of planning. Figure 6.3 
illustrates this framework. 
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Figure 6.3: The Corporate Planning Process 
 
Leeds listed asset knowledge, property asset management organisational capabilities, and 
having corporate objectives for property asset management as essential to ‘best’ practice. 
 
2. Strategic Property Asset Management Framework 
This framework, shown in Figure 6.4, is designed to support and enable the strategic planning 
for property assets within the Corporate Planning Framework. It governs the development of 
property strategy and the delivery of assets through the three levels of planning, i.e. strategic, 
tactical, and operational. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Property Asset Management Framework 
 
Leeds provided for performance audits and reviews at all stages of the framework, the results 
of which would be channelled into the improvement planning process. 
Strategic 
Planning 
•  Business Strategy & Objectives 
•  Service Level Strategy 
Tactical 
Planning 
•  Human Resources 
•  Information & Communications Technology 
•  Property Assets  
Operational 
Planning 
•  Asset Management Solutions 
Strategic 
Planning 
•  Corporate Business and Services Goals and Objectives 
•  Corporate Property Asset Management Strategy 
•  Service Level Strategy 
Tactical 
Planning 
•  Property Asset Management Plans 
•  Improvement Planning   
Operational 
Planning 
•  Implementational Plans  
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6.3.4.5.6 Assessing ‘Excellence’ in Strategic Property Asset Management 
Leeds saw the heterogeneous nature of property portfolios as a key issue in designing the 
extent of an organisation’s property asset management function, and the shape of its structure. 
There would therefore not be one single solution to suit all situations.        
 
Recognising this, Leeds put forward the following guidelines to assist organisations to 
determine appropriate levels or standards of property asset management that suit their 
particular situations: 
 
§ The extent of regulatory compliance required; 
 
§ Deficiencies in levels of service provided through the portfolio measured against 
customer satisfaction; 
 
§ The nature of the property portfolio; 
 
§  Consequences of the occurrence of assessed risks; and 
 
§ The level of skills required to manage the portfolio. 
 
Leeds also proposed a series of generic steps in the management process for government 
property.  
 
This process, shown in Figure 6.5, subordinates the strategic and operational management of 
property to services, methods of service delivery, levels of service, and effect on service 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
Leeds developed a Property Asset Management Maturity Matrix to enable government 
organisations to assess their property asset management capacity and capability. The matrix 
contains the following set of seven factors against which an organisation can be measured: 
 
§ Property Assessment Management Policy; 
Figure 6.5 Property Asset Management Process 
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§ Roles and Responsibilities; 
 
§ Communication; 
 
§ Asset Management Planning; 
 
§ Asset Acquisition and Disposal; 
 
§ Operations and Maintenance; and 
 
§ Performance Review. 
 
The matrix provides five levels of transition towards excellence for each of the factors: 
Unawareness, Awareness, Knowledge, Competence, and Excellence. Descriptions are 
provided for each of the factors and their corresponding levels of transition. 
 
The full matrix is contained in Section 3.2.7.2 of Appendix 1. 
 
Note: An adaptation of this matrix was adopted by the RICS, and included in its ‘Public Sector 
Asset Management Guidelines’ for professional practitioners (Jones and White, op.cit. p.42). 
6.3.4.5.7 Property Asset Management Skills 
Leeds identified strategic business planning, leadership, performance management, financial 
management, data management, an appreciation of property and its contribution to business 
planning, and an understanding of the economic and analytical tools required to ensure good 
decision-making as the essential skills for Property Asset Management. 
 
These recognise Property Asset Management as a strategic resource management function, 
and represent an extension or departure from the traditional professional property skills 
normally associated with the management of property. 
6.3.4.5.8 Generic Asset Management Template 
The template developed by Leeds contains eight sections, Introduction, Aims and Objectives, 
Roles and Responsibilities; service Delivery Objectives, Current Assets, Options Appraisals, 
Programming, and Review and Challenge. Table 6.3 provides an outline of the template. 
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Plan Sections Content 
1. Introduction A description of the context within which the plan is prepared 
and how it links with corporate business and strategy. 
2. Aims & Objectives A description of the organisation’s mission and the strategic 
property asset management goals. 
3. Roles & 
Responsibilities 
PAM’s organisational and governance arrangements. 
 
4. Service Delivery 
Objectives 
The organisation’s service delivery needs together with 
forecasts for future property needs to meet service demand. 
5. Current Assets An assessment of the existing property portfolio and its 
performance. 
6. Options Appraisal Identification of priorities with a summary of financial 
implications of future property needs, including options for non-
property asset solutions. 
7. Programming Plans for the implementation of acquisitions, disposals and 
maintenance strategies, which take project management, 
procurement and supply chain considerations into account.  
8. Review & Challenge Review and evaluation of the performance of the entire property 
asset management process and system. 
Table 6.3: Generic Property Asset Management Plan Template 
 
Note: The RICS developed a similar template for its professional practitioners. This is 
reproduced at Table 6.4 (Jones and White, op.cit. p.12). 
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Table 6.4: Content of An Asset Management Plan (including the Asset Strategy) (Jones 
and White, op.cit. p.12) 
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6.3.4.5.9 Organisational and Governance Characteristics 
Given the complexity and fragmented nature of the CCGE, Leeds acknowledged the 
challenges of changing or reforming the approach of managing property from a technical and 
operational function, to the strategic management of a whole-of-government resource that is 
integrated with the corporate business, strategic planning, and reporting process. 
 
Good and appropriate governance models and organisation structures are essential to meeting 
these challenges. 
 
For the CCGE, Leeds proposed the establishment of a Property Asset Management Board 
within each government department. This board would be responsible and accountable to the 
department’s Senior Executive Board, through which property and fiscal matters would be 
reported to Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Treasury, and the OGC.  
 
These boards would co-ordinate the strategic and operational aspects of managing property 
across the department’s member agencies. They would have a policy function for the strategic 
management of property, and be responsible for ensuring the implementation of policy and 
strategy decisions. 
6.3.4.6 Output of the Leeds Report: A ‘Blueprint’ for a Routemap to Excellence 
Implementing such a routemap would represent significant change and reform across central 
government, and throughout government departments and agencies. 
 
Leeds identified the following factors as being essential considerations for the planning and 
development of this routemap: 
 
§ Sponsorship and commitment at the very highest levels of government from the Prime 
Minister’s Office and Treasury; 
 
§ Understanding the two levels at which the CCGE should be managed, Strategic (at 
the management Board and Property Asset Management Board levels); and 
Operational (at the estates level and below); 
 
§ Organisational capability at all levels from the Executive and Property Asset 
Management Boards through the organisation; 
 
§ Individual capabilities; 
 
§ The CCGE is managed through a decentralised structure of government and 
fragmented departmental system; 
 
§ A period of engagement, communication, information, planning, resourcing, and 
transitioning would be required for the creation of a roadmap project, and governance 
arrangement encompassing the whole-of-government for the management and 
implementation of the project; and 
 
§ Acceptance that a period of possibly up to eight years may be required before strategic 
thinking in the management of property becomes the accepted norm.  
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6.3.5 OGC Research Project: “Improving Asset Management in Government 
Departments – A report on improving the capability and capacity of 
managing property assets in central civil government” (“the Howarth 
Report”, or “Howarth”) 
This was the second of the research projects commissioned by the OGC, and was conducted 
at the same time as the Leeds study. The Howarth and Leeds Reports were published within 
two months of each other in 2006. 
 
Both Howarth and Leeds relied upon each other to a considerable extent, which exemplifies 
the co-ordinated and committed approach of the OGC. 
 
Howarth’s task was to investigate the existing level of asset management expertise and 
capability within the CCGE; and to recommend a strategy for improvement. 
6.3.5.1 Findings of the Howarth Report 
The Howarth Report consolidated its findings into the following three areas: 
6.3.5.1.1 Organisational Change 
It is clear that Howarth agreed with Lyons and Leeds in that strategic asset management is a 
structured, holistic, and integrating approach to aligning property assets to business and 
service objectives. 
 
In the context of the organisation, Howarth said that asset management is about how property 
assets provide opportunities for organisational change, as much as how organisational change 
affects and effects property assets. 
 
This shifts the management of property from an operationally reactive function, to a proactive 
strategic role with an increasing focus on outputs and benefits as opposed to inputs and costs. 
6.3.5.1.2 Skills and Capabilities 
Howarth’s investigation into the property and facility management skills in the CCGE revealed 
the following principal findings: 
 
§ Despite finding good experience and skills at the tactical and operational levels of 
managing property, the numbers of suitable property management staff were 
considerably less than a decade earlier; 
 
§ The diversity of estate management models and management structures concentrated 
the more experienced and qualified staff in the larger portfolios; 
 
§ Managers viewed property management as a strategic function in property terms only, 
without recognising its value in the provision of services, and realisation of government 
objectives; 
 
§ A lack of awareness on behalf of senior departmental and agency managers, and of 
property professionals of the value that a strategic approach would bring. 
6.3.5.1.3 Property Asset Management in Government 
Howarth found that support services, the category within which many senior managers view 
property, are not sufficiently important to be considered in in decision-making for future 
business needs. This is despite property being the second largest expenditure item behind 
human resources. 
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Howarth summed this up by saying, “There are therefore differences between the property 
management view of assets and the asset management view of property” (Howarth, op.cit. 
p.12). 
6.3.5.2 Howarth’s Recommendations 
The recommendations of the Howarth Report were presented within the following two themes: 
6.3.5.2.1 Property Assets as Strategic Resources 
 
§ Raise awareness of property as strategic resource among senior civil service 
management through their development programme; 
 
§ Property Asset Management be recognised as a professional competency within the 
Professional Skills in Government Framework; and 
 
§ The appointment of a Head of Asset Management within central government as a 
champion for professional asset management, in the same way as heads for other 
professions are appointed. 
6.3.5.2.2 Development of Asset Management Skills and Competencies 
Howarth recommended that the OGC formally identify strategic asset management skills and 
competencies, and develop training programmes. Howarth recommended that the OGC 
concentrate on the following broad areas: 
 
§ Data management and analysis; 
 
§ Management of performance; 
 
§ Strategic business planning; 
 
§ Financial management; and 
 
§ Leadership. 
6.3.6 The Office of Government Commerce: High Performing Property – 
Routemap to asset management excellence 
The OGC launched its routemap to asset management excellence, ‘High Performing Property’, 
in late 2006 (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2006). This was based on the 
recommendations of the Leeds and Howarth reports, and set the framework and direction for 
improving strategic asset management in the CCGE over a six to seven year programme. 
6.3.6.1 Target Outcomes 
The target outcomes of the programme were: 
 
§ A rationalised fit-for-purpose portfolio; 
 
§ Property Asset Management is to be accepted and managed as a strategic element of 
business and service delivery; 
 
§ Performance information and data are to be the foundations for improvement through 
the setting and adoption of relevant benchmarks and standards; 
 
§ Improved stewardship and accountability for portfolio management and performance; 
 
§ Twenty per cent annual efficiency savings; and 
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§ £1 billion to £1.5 billion in property expenditure savings by March 2013. 
6.3.6.2 Key Routemap Directions 
Consistent with the recommendations of Leeds and Howarth, the routemap defined the 
following four key areas of direction:  
 
§ Leadership and Integration; 
 
§ Benchmarking and Standards; 
 
§ Skills and Capacity; and 
 
§ Review and Challenge. 
 
Together with their associated objectives and individual actions, these are set out in Table 6.5. 
 
Key Direction Objectives Actions 
Leadership & 
Integration 
§ Integration of Property Asset 
Management with strategic 
business delivery 
§ Sponsored and led at 
Executive Board level 
§ Defined standards and 
benchmarks 
§ Integrated and co-ordinated 
property strategies to deliver 
government-wide policies 
In the Centre of 
Government 
In Government 
Organisations 
§ Set standards 
§ Integrate 
departmental 
strategies with 
government-wide 
initiatives 
§ Confirm governance 
arrangements 
§ Nominate Board level 
sponsor 
§ Establish Property 
Asset Management 
boards 
§ Link property assets 
to service delivery 
Benchmarks & 
Standards 
§ Property Asset Management 
capability measured against 
the Capability and Maturity 
Matrix 
§ Set workspace and building 
operation efficiency and 
effectiveness benchmarks 
§ Establish government-wide 
benchmarking 
§ Strong, strategic central co-
ordination of the portfolio 
Standards Tools 
§ Develop standards 
for Asset 
Management 
Strategies 
§ Develop Maturity 
Matrix 
§ Set delivery 
standards and 
benchmarks 
§ Set performance and 
delivery standards 
§ Establish 
benchmarking 
§ Maintain 
government-wide 
database 
§ Central government 
co-ordination 
§ Good practice 
guidance and 
support 
Skills & 
Capability 
§ Include Property Asset 
Management in Government 
Professional Skills 
programme 
§ Recognise Property Asset 
Management as a 
government profession 
In the Centre of 
Government 
In Government 
Organisations 
§ Recognise and 
support Property 
Asset Management 
as a core skill for 
senior civil servants 
§ Obtain maximum 
capability 
§ Promote career path 
development 
Review & 
Challenge 
§ Monitor and challenge 
performance at the centre 
and in departments and 
organisations through 
standards and benchmarks, 
and audits (internal and by 
National Audit Office) 
§ Challenge levels of 
performance 
§ Support from 
National Audit Office 
§ Annual performance 
reports 
§ Use of KPIs and 
performance 
monitoring 
§ Internal auditing 
Table 6.5: High Performing Property – Key Directions, Objectives and Actions 
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6.3.6.3 Government-Wide Property Database: e-PIMS 
The provision and management of a central database for property was a key action specified 
by ‘High Performing Property’. 
 
In 2005, all Central Civil Departments were mandated to use the electronic Property 
Information Mapping Service (e-PIMS) to provide a central register of all property operations 
and land interests. 
 
Through the OGC, individual departments were given access to e-PIMS to allow cross-
departmental searching for vacant space and demand for space over the whole CCGE. Since 
2009, government departments occupying CCGE property have been required to record their 
property information on e-PIMS for all property owned, used, controlled, occupied, or planned 
for occupation. 
 
e-PIMS acts the central register of all government property holdings, including projections of 
future property needs, vacant and future properties. It allows government departments to 
manage their own portfolios and property transactions, and is designed to support the efficient 
management of the CCGE across the whole-of-government. 
 
e-PIMS holds historic and current information to a high degree of detail for the following 
categories of property: 
 
§ All freehold and leasehold office properties occupied or controlled by departments, 
irrespective of whether the property is actually used or occupied; 
 
§ Any properties occupied or managed under Private Finance Initiative contracts; 
 
§ All other owned and/or used properties such as, hostels, depots and laboratories; 
 
§ Surplus, sublet or vacant properties; 
 
§ Undeveloped land; 
 
§ Serviced or temporary offices; and 
 
§ All forward commitments to property. 
 
The database is structured in departmental clusters and families. 
 
Using data from e-PIMS, the Government Property Unit’s Benchmarking Service measures the 
portfolio’s performance against benchmarking and standards criteria used in the private sector. 
The OGC’s annual report to Parliament includes the results of the CCGE’s performance. (See 
section 6.3.7 below). 
6.3.7 Outcomes of Property Asset Management Reform in the UK Government 
Central Civil Government Estate 
Under the Climate Change Act 2008, the Government is required to report annually to 
Parliament on progress made in improving the efficiency and environmental sustainability of 
the CCGE. This report, ‘The State of the Estate’, covers the following four priority areas: 
 
§ Reductions in the size of the overall estate; 
 
§ Increases in efficiency of the use of administrative offices; 
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§ Improvements to the environmental sustainability of buildings; and 
 
§ Ensuring new property acquisitions are within the top quartile of energy performance.  
 
The following have been identified as key results of the UK Government’s reform programme: 
6.3.7.1 Departmental Accountability 
Improved accountability for the management of property was reported in the 2012 ‘State of the 
Estate’ report. 
 
“The importance of effective property asset management in this varied landscape is now well 
established with board-level property champions in departments accountable to permanent 
secretaries for Property Asset Management across the department and its arm’s-length 
bodies. Property Asset Management boards (or their equivalent) have responsibility for leading 
integrated strategic management across the total property portfolio in a department” (UK Office 
of Government Commerce, 2013a). 
6.3.7.2 Performance Outcomes 
These are recorded against efficiency and economic criteria, and sustainability, and have been 
extracted from ‘The State of the Estate’ reports (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). 
6.3.7.2.1 Efficiency and Economic Outcomes 
Table 6.6 summarises the efficiency and economic benefits derived from the OGC’s ‘High 
Performing Property reform programme between 2007 and 2012.  
 
Key Indicator 2007/08 2012 Change 
Size of the CCGE (m2 million) 12.05 9.22 - 2.83 (23.5%) 
Number of Holdings 7,935 5,583 - 2,353 (29.7%) 
Operating Cost p.a. (£ billion) 3.55 2.64 - 1.61 (38.2%) 
Vacancy Factor (%) 2.4 3.00 + 0.6 (25%)14 
Cost per Full Time Equivalent (FTE) p.a. (£) 4,536 5,324 + 788 (17.3%)15 
Av. Area (m2) per FTE (Government 
Standard = 10 m2 – 12 m2) 
14.5 13.0 - 1.5 (10.4%) 
Table 6.6: CCGE Efficiency and Economics Outcomes (2007 – 2012) 
Perhaps of most significance is the annual savings in operating cost of £1.61 billion. This figure 
exceeds the original target of £1 billion to £1.5 billion by £0.14 billion to £0.61 billion. 
6.3.7.2.2 Sustainability Outcomes 
Sustainability outcomes are summarised in Table 6.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
14 Increase due to interim effects of rationalisation movements within the portfolio. 
15 Rise due to increasing property costs, staff reduction lag times, and disposal of vacant space. 
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Key Indicator Outcome (2012) 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions § Reduced by 12% from 2009/10 baseline 
§ £40 million in energy and fuel cost savings 
Reduction in Waste § £4.7 million savings since 2009/10 
Water Consumption § Reduced by 3% since 2010/11 
§ £4.2 million in savings 
Energy Performance § 44%  (4 out of 9) of buildings added to the CCGE 
procured from within the top quartile range 
Table 6.7: CCGE Sustainability Outcomes (2012) 
6.3.8 On-going Organisational and Governance Development and Reform 
In 2010, responsibility for the OGC was transferred to the Cabinet Office as part of the 
government’s Efficiency and Reform Group (ERG), which has a mandate to ensure that 
departments co-operate in the reduction of waste, and in improving accountability. 
 
The ERG is accountable to an Efficiency Board, which is chaired by the Minister for the 
Cabinet Office. 
 
Property functions have been combined into one unit, the Government Property Unit (GPU). 
As part of the ERG, the GPU reports to the EPG’s Minister and Chief Secretary. 
 
The GPU has central oversight of policy and strategy for all government land and property, and 
works in collaboration across government. It also operates the Benchmarking Service. 
6.4 Case Study: USA Federal Government – the path to Property Asset 
Management Reform (2003 – 2015) 
6.4.1 Introduction 
This case study has been composed from a review of literature in the form of independent and 
academic studies and reports, professional standards and guidelines, government strategies, 
policies and procedures, reports and audits, journal articles, conference proceedings and 
discussions with staff of the U.S. Government General Services Administration’s (GSA) Office 
of Government-Wide Policy, and the GSA’s Public Buildings Service Division. Appendix 2 
contains this case study in detail. Figure 6.6 summarises the chronology of the development of 
the management of US federal government property since 2003. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Management of US Federal Government Property Since 2003 
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6.4.2 The Federal Real Property Portfolio 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defined real property as facilities; land; and 
anything constructed on, growing on, or attached to the land. 
 
In analysing the portfolio, the GAO relied upon data supplied by the GSA, which it described as 
“unreliable and of limited usefulness”. The GSA represented the only available source for 
property data. 
 
The worldwide portfolio is diverse and complex, and was defined to include military bases, 
office buildings, embassies, prisons, courthouses, hospitals, schools, stores, housing, border 
stations, and parks. In 2003, this was estimated to comprise some 333 million square metres 
of built area. It was also estimated that the federal government owned approximately 636 
million acres of land, which represented twenty-five per cent of the county’s total acreage. 
6.4.3 Federal Real Property: a “high-risk” 
In January 2003 the GAO added Federal Real Property (FRP) to its series of High-Risk Areas 
to Government (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003)16. 
 
In a letter to the President of The Senate, and Speaker of the House of Representatives 
designating FRP as a high-risk area, the Comptroller General of the United States gave the 
following “long-standing problems” as the reasons for designating FRP as a high-risk area 
(Comptroller General of the United States, 2003): 
 
§ Excess and underutilised property; 
 
§ Deteriorating facilities; 
 
§ Lack of property data, and its reliability; 
 
§ A predominance of high-cost leased property; and 
 
§ The persistent problems of competing stakeholder interests, budgetary disincentives, 
poor capital planning, and a lack of a strategic government-wide focus on property 
issues. 
 
The GAO saw these factors as having multi-million dollar cost implications, and the potential to 
seriously threaten the ability of government agencies to accomplish their missions. It also 
recognised that redressing the situation would require “high-level attention and effective 
leadership by both Congress and the administration” (US General Accounting Office, op.cit. 
pp. 2-3). 
 
The issues were considered to be of such a scale that a comprehensive and government-wide 
transformation strategy should be put in place to deal with them. It was thought that this should 
include consultation with the private sector, as it should learn from the lessons and leading 
practices of both public and private sector property reforms. 
 
The GAO said property should be regarded as a valuable resource in the same way as capital, 
people, and information and technology. Furthermore, the GAO called for a new approach to 
the management of federal property in that it should respond to the delivery of services, 
technology, public expectations, sharing opportunities, and security. 
                                                       
16 The GAO is an independent authority, known as “the congressional watchdog”. The GAO works for the United 
States Congress by supporting it in the improvement of performance and accountability of the federal government. 
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The deficiencies in the management of the federal property portfolio, including “material 
weaknesses” in financial systems, information and data, and reporting, were the reasons put 
forward by the GAO in 2003 for not being able to certify the US Government’s consolidated 
financial statements for five consecutive years, 1997 – 2001 (Ibid. p. 27) 17. 
 
The GAO described the management of federal real property as reflecting “the business model 
and technological environment of the 1950s”, which had failed to respond to the size and 
objectives of government, changes in technology, working environments, services and their 
delivery models, the post-2001 security environment, and how government interacts and 
communicates with the public. 
6.4.4 Financial Implications 
The GAO’s report examined the financial implications that the state of the management of the 
portfolio was having on the government. The following are examples of the GAO’s findings: 
 
§ The Department of Defence alone was spending up to $4 billion per annum on 
maintaining eight million square metres of surplus property;  
 
§ Together, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Energy were 
spending over $100 million per annum to maintain and secure more than 1200 
properties that were either surplus or vacant, and which did not have plans for their 
future use or disposal; 
 
§ The value of maintenance backlogs in the Departments of Defence, the Interior, and 
State, and in the GSA portfolio was estimated to exceed $180 billion. 
 
This was affecting properties of national significance, health and safety, employee recruitment 
and attention, productivity, and government’s public image. 
6.4.5 Reforming the Management of the Federal Real Property Portfolio 
6.4.5.1 The President’s Management Agenda 
The issue of the management of the Federal Real Property Portfolio (FRPP) was added to the 
President’s Management Agenda (PMA) in January 200418. 
 
The PMA considered the following six core activities as necessary for the effective 
management of the federal government’s resources: 
 
§ Improved financial reporting; 
 
§ Financial systems; 
 
§ Asset management; 
 
§ Grants management 
 
§ Audit requirements; and 
 
§ Strengthening internal controls. 
 
                                                       
17 This situation was on-going at the time this research was completed. 
18 The PMA was established in 2001 within the Office of Management and Budget as a framework for improving 
financial performance, and giving direction for achieving the President’s improvement goals. 
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The management of the FRPP was placed at the highest level of the PMA under President 
George W. Bush. This policy has continued throughout the two terms of President Barack 
Obama. 
6.4.5.2 Executive Order 13327 – Federal Real Property Asset Management 
Within three months of the management of the FRPP being place on the PMA, President 
George W. Bush signed Executive Order (EO) 13227.  
 
By establishing the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC), EO 13227 provided the policy 
setting, and governance direction for the future management of the FRPP. 
 
EO 13227 also established the position of Agency Senior Real Property Officer (SRPO), and 
defined the role of the GSA in supporting the FRPP. 
6.4.5.3 Federal Real Property Council 
The FRPC was established as part of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide 
guidance to government agencies on the development of asset management plans, and to 
assist in facilitating their success. 
 
The FRPC was assigned the following functions: 
 
§ Assist SRPOs to develop and implement agency asset management plans; 
 
§ In conjunction with the GSA, to establish performance measures to determine the 
effectiveness of federal real property management; and 
 
§ Act as a ‘clearing house” for property asset management best practices. 
6.4.5.4 Senior Real Property Officers 
SRPOs were to be assigned to all executive branch departments and agencies.  
 
The position of SRPO is a senior professional position requiring extensive experience and 
skills in the strategic management of property. 
 
The principal roles of the SRPOs are to develop and implement asset management plans of 
their assigned agencies, ensure property assets support the agency’s strategic goals and 
objectives, and ensure they are managed on the principles of the FRPC. 
6.4.5.5 General Services Administration 
The GSA is responsible for supporting government agencies in implementing EO 13227, and 
providing support to the FRPC. 
 
The GSA provides guidance on real property issues, publishes performance measures and 
standards, maintains the federal government’s property database; and manages the uniform 
reporting of property information across government. 
6.4.6 Results and Outcomes 
The FRPC publishes annual reports on the management of the portfolio. Table 6.8, compiled 
from an analysis or these reports, provides an overview of the changes in the portfolio between 
2005 and 2013. (These changes pertain to both government-owned property and property 
leased from the private sector). (Federal Real Property Council, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
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In summary, the following changes to the portfolio have occurred between 2005 and 2013: 
 
§ The number of federal buildings and structures has reduced by 105,000; 
 
§ Area occupied has reduced by 26 million square metres (seven per cent); 
 
§ Over 183,000 assets have been disposed, releasing a value of $6.7 billion, and 
reducing annual costs by $2.05 billion; 
 
§ In total, annual operating costs across the portfolio increased by 15.4 per cent 
between 2009 and 2013. 
 
Notwithstanding this apparent progress, the reform programme has not produced the level of 
results expected. In addition, concerns remain over the reliability of the data used in compiling 
these metrics.  
 
Federal Real Property remains a high-risk area of government business. Successive GAO 
reviews have noted a lack of progress in improving the management of the portfolio (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2005, 2007, 2014, 2015). In its 2015 report, the GAO 
reported that the federal government “continues to face long-standing challenges in managing 
its real property”.  
 
The GAO particularly identified unreliable data, and the manipulation and interpretation of data 
by agencies as key reasons for the accuracy and consistency of the portfolio remaining 
suspect, and the reporting of inaccurate inventory and outcome information. 
                                                       
19 Costs for Structures not included/reported 
20 By all methods of ‘disposal’ 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Variance 
Nos. Federal 
Buildings & 
Structures 
976,000 1.014m 922,000 896,000 911,000 889,400 834,700 847,184 871,127 -104,873 
Area (m2) 
Buildings & 
Structures 
380m  390m  361m  355m  360m  366m  357m 356m 354m -26m 
Annual 
Operating Costs 
(US$) 
- - $47.3b $19.7b19 $29.3b $30.8b $32.2b $33.0b $33.8b 
+15.4% 
since 
2009 
Asset Disposals 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Nos. Disposed 
Assets20 - 22,816 35,131 24,682 19,460 14,881 21,264 23,663 21,464 183,361 
Annual 
Operating Costs 
of Disposed 
Assets (US$) 
- $186m $420m $120m $149m $327m $224m $216m $411m $2.053b 
Value of Assets 
Disposed & 
Leases 
Terminated 
(US$) 
$1.5b $1.4b $1.5b $134m $50m $57.3m $43.5m $100m $1.9b $6.684b 
Table 6.8: Changes in Federal Real Property Profile 2005 - 2013 
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7 Case Study: The Australian Public Sectors 
7.1.1 Introduction 
This case study is based on a series of the author’s published and unpublished papers and 
research (Leifer & Seymour-Jones, 2009a, 2010, 2012; Seymour-Jones, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 
2009b, 2014a, 2014b). These have been compiled from the author’s personal experience, a 
review of literature in the form of independent and academic studies and reports, professional 
standards and guidelines, government strategies, policies and procedures, reports and audits, 
journal articles, and conference proceedings. 
 
Appendix 3 contains a detailed account of the development of property asset management 
(and the management of other asset classes) between the early 1980s and 2016 for the 
federal, state and local levels of government in Australia.  
7.1.2 The Australian Public Sector Overview 
7.1.2.1 Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments 
Notwithstanding the similarity between issues and pressures, the Australian Commonwealth, 
and State and Territory Governments have apparently not only paid little attention to the 
changes and development of Strategic Asset Management practices of other major OECD 
jurisdictions, and the lessons learned from them, but have also evolved their property asset 
management policies and methodologies in isolation of their own jurisdictions and 
experiences.  
 
There is, however, an irony in that, since 2006, state and territory governments have sought to 
impose practice regulation and standards over the management of local government assets.  
 
There has been little or no collaboration or communication between the state governments 
despite their often-common political complexions, and the presence of organisations such as 
the Australian Procurement and Construction Council, which facilitates programmes for the 
Government Property Group (See Section 7.1.2.1.4). The intellectualisation of the role and 
significance of property assets in Australia has been minimal. 
 
The Commonwealth Government opted-out of the Government Property Group and pursued 
its own direction entirely. There seems to be a notion within the Commonwealth Government 
that, because a large proportion of property assets were sold in the late 1990s, there is little 
need for strong over-arching asset management governance and policy and asset 
management strategies, other than those provided through a ‘framework’ and guidelines. 
 
There are a number of observations and comparisons to be made in the way each government 
has approached the management of its property assets, but it is the area of high-level asset 
management governance, policy and strategy that is of the most significance. 
7.1.2.1.1 Asset Management Governance and Policy 
Research published in 2004 by DEGW in association with CoreNet Global showed that 
seventy-two per cent of Australian Corporations do not have a rigorous formal strategic 
process for the management of property assets; and that it is the public sector that has the 
lowest level of engagement with management and the highest level of ad hoc planning (DEGW 
& CoreNet Global, 2004). 
 
Senior bureaucrats have been responsible for the development of asset management policy, 
which, for most of Australia’s public sector, now includes some form of process guidelines. 
However, process cannot be considered as policy, and the gaps between policy and the 
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development of property asset management strategies, their implementation, management, 
and the achievement of results remain as wide as ever. There are three main reasons for this: 
 
§ Asset management policy is often made because it is seen as something akin to a 
necessary evil that is part of modern business practice. It is there because it should be 
there and, in an age of increasing voter demand for better services and value for 
money, public administrations need to project an image of efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
The management of property assets, as a specific function within Total Asset 
Management (TAM) policy and process, is largely confined to office and associated 
non-operational assets. Schools, hospitals etc. are considered as specialised assets, 
and are included within the general TAM programme. However, for example, the NSW 
TAM programme only requires a specific property plan for office accommodation. 
 
The results of a search of the federal, state and territory government websites for Total 
Asset Management / Asset Management Policy / Strategic Asset Management are 
shown in Table 7.121. 
 
Government Policy 
2009 2016 
Commonwealth Refers to NSW Government TAM 
policy 
No reference to TAM 
Commonwealth Property 
Management Framework 
New South Wales Detailed policy manuals issued by 
NSW Treasury 
Detailed policy manuals issued by 
NSW Treasury 
Queensland Building Policy; and Framework 
for Management of Government 
Office Accommodation issued by 
Dept. of Public Works. 
TAM Plan Framework under 
Department of Infrastructure, 
Local Government and Planning 
Victoria Asset Management Policy – Dept. 
of Treasury and Finance 
No Policy Statement 
Asset Management Series 
describing AM principles and 
framework 
South Australia No information Premier and Cabinet Circular 114 
Government Real Property 
Management Policy, October 
2010 
Western Australia Strategic Asset Management 
Framework issued by Dept. of 
Treasury and Finance 
Strategic Asset Management 
Framework issued by Dept. of 
Treasury and Finance 
Tasmania Developing Strategic Asset 
Management Plans – Dept. of 
Treasury and Finance 
Developing Strategic Asset 
Management Plans – Dept. of 
Treasury and Finance 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
No information No information 
Northern Territory No information No information 
Table 7.1: Government Asset Management Policy 
 
With the possible exception of New South Wales and Queensland, these publications 
represent a series of asset management processes, which are backed by general 
                                                       
21 Websites accessed during November 2009 and again on 30 October 2016. 
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statements and theoretical explanations of asset management practice. However, all 
share the following characteristics: 
 
- They are seemingly restricted to a very limited category of property assets, i.e. 
office and associated corporate accommodation. In New South Wales for 
example, the value of owned assets in this category is no more than $500 million 
against a total value of real property assets of $78.6 billion. Thus, the great bulk of 
property asset portfolios may not be subject to rigorous management practices. 
 
- There is little in the way of whole-of-government policy, effective governance, 
implementation and enforcement. 
 
- They invariably originate from within government treasuries and departments of 
finance, are described as guidelines, and have a variety of oversight committees. 
 
- It is difficult to obtain information on the success of these guidelines, the work of 
the committees, and the performance of asset management strategies.  
 
§ Policy is often affected by public sector politics. Organisational and governance issues 
are frequently subject to negotiation and compromise with the result that responsibility 
and accountability rarely lies with a single entity, and is blurred and undefined.  
 
§ Mid-level career civil servants with limited strategic vision, professionalism, exposure 
to developing industry techniques; and management, business and organisational 
skills are often responsible for the management of property portfolios. These, together 
with the political environment, and inappropriate organisational and reporting 
structures, have led to inaction, resistance to change and protection of personal 
fiefdoms. The prospect of improvement and change represents threat rather than 
opportunity.  
 
As a consequence, few processes have been put in place by the policy-makers to ensure or 
require that policy be translated into whole-of-government and individual agency strategies, 
and for results to be monitored and reported. The real opportunities for gains in efficiency and 
effectiveness are almost always missed. 
7.1.2.1.2 Asset Management Planning, Asset Performance and Risks 
The ad hoc approach by the Australian public sector to the management of property assets, 
and the absence of a strong policy and well-thought out and managed strategies to support 
policy, exposes governments to a number of potentially serious risks, namely: 
 
§ Higher operating costs and maintenance backlogs, which may require additional funds 
or capital expenditure to rectify; 
 
§ Property that is not the best fit for the purpose for which it is used (non-aligned with 
business and service objectives) in terms of for example: location, access, size, 
efficiency, services, technical specification, condition, image and branding; 
 
§ Costly and wasted opportunities in co-location of public services; 
 
§ Poor quality accommodation impacts upon the performance, recruitment and retention 
of staff; 
 
§ Inaccurate asset inventories, incomplete data, poor systems and data management 
have resulted in excessive and unnecessary expenditure.  
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Poor information inhibits the ability to plan, and forces agencies into hasty and 
inappropriate property decisions. This is often the case with regard to lease details that 
have not been recorded, inaccurately recorded or mismanaged. This greatly increases 
the risk of missing critical dates such as lease expiries, rent reviews and options, or 
even the opportunity for carpet replacement and other commercial obligations of 
landlords. 
 
There are examples of property, whether owned or leased, which has simply not been 
recorded in any asset inventory or property management system. Similarly, there have 
been instances of property details that have not been removed from system records 
following disposal or vacation upon lease expiry. This has led to expenditure on 
utilities, for example, continuing to be made on premises in which government no 
longer has any obligation or interest. It can also mean that on-going budget funding will 
be allocated to such phantom properties. 
 
§ Insufficient and inefficient use of capital: failure to invest when required and the 
retention of vacant, under-utilised and inappropriate assets; and unnecessary 
acquisition of property assets. This also results in wasted expenditure on operational 
management and maintenance; 
 
§ Inefficient sourcing and procurement of skills, capacity, property, and construction and 
property support services; 
 
§ Inappropriate governance and lack of financial control, transparency and 
accountability; and 
 
§ An inability to formulate and implement meaningful and long-term financial, economic, 
social, and environmental sustainability policies and programmes. 
 
Evidence of these outcomes is presented in the case studies contained in the appendices. 
7.1.2.1.3  Capacity and Capability Development 
Both central government departments and front-line agencies have been reluctant to seek the 
advice of consultants, industry, or learning institutions regarding the formulation and 
implementation of property asset management policy, relevant organisational structures, or 
property strategies.  
 
The use of private sector advice and experience has been limited to operational and tactical 
management activities, i.e. out-tasking.  
 
Nevertheless, where this advice has been sought, mostly by the local government sector, it 
has generally been provided in the form of policy and strategy documents prepared by a 
consultant, as the required outputs or deliverables under contract scopes of services, and 
within short contract timelines. In New South Wales and Western Australia, there is plenty of 
evidence that these have been prepared as generic documents, and not related to the needs 
and circumstances of individual councils. There has therefore been little in the way of any 
lasting or on-going development of organisational capacity and capability. 
 
There is increasing evidence that the political, social, financial and accountability pressures 
that governments now face mean that the public is less influenced by political dogma or 
ideology; but rather by how effectively and efficiently governments manage themselves, and 
deliver and manage services to their communities, not just through new infrastructure, but also 
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through the smart management of existing assets. (In other words, how wisely taxes are spent 
and value-for-money accountability).  
 
This requires a change in the traditional capacity of, and capabilities within public 
administrations. No longer can the combination of the career civil service ‘all-rounder’ and 
‘generalist’ management approach, and ‘time served’, prevail as the criteria for advancement. 
Neither, too should the NPM system of placing private sector ‘expertise’ into senior public 
sector positions be considered as a panacea to bridging the public sector’s capacity and 
capability gaps. 
 
Collectively, capacity and capability is merely one of many facets in reforming the 
management of government assets from operational and technical functions, to a whole-of-
organisation activity integrated with the strategic planning and management of resources. It will 
require leadership from within public service administrations to promote this as an 
administrative necessity (rather than as a political issue), which will require a number of 
electoral cycles to accept and embed. 
 
Learning from the examples set by the US and UK governments, these pressures should be 
used to spike the interest of public sector leaders, and to stimulate change in the management 
of government property, and all other asset classes. 
7.1.2.1.4 The Australian Procurement and Construction Council (APCC) and the 
Government Property Group 
Given the right mandate, authority and resources, the APCC would have considerable 
potential to influence this change. 
 
Since its establishment in 1967, the APCC has been the foremost voice responsible for 
promoting good procurement, construction and asset management policy for the Australian, 
State and Territory governments, and the New Zealand Government. The APCC reports to the 
Australian Procurement and Construction Ministerial Council (APCMC), comprising Ministers 
with direct responsibilities for procurement and construction matters. The APCMC is part of the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Ministerial Council. 
 
The APCC describes itself: 
 
 “As a national reference point for both government and industry on best practices, principles 
and emerging issues in procurement, construction and asset management disciplines.” 
 
“The APCC collective maximises opportunities to leverage off one another and provides 
leadership in these disciplines to improve and implement new and evolving procurement 
practices in ways that will deliver service benefits to the Australian and New 
Zealand communities. 
 
“The APCC forum is a catalyst for knowledge sharing, intelligence gathering and has the 
information networks to draw on for innovative business solutions for jurisdictions to deliver 
expected targets, savings and outcomes. The APCC collective continues to strengthen 
relationships with government partners and other stakeholders to promote a consistent and 
coordinated national approach to government procurement.” (Australian Procurement & 
Construction Council, 2014). 
 
As part of its asset management role, the APCC facilitates the work of The Government 
Property Group (GPG).  
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Membership of the GPG is composed of representatives from the property management area 
of all state governments with the exception of Tasmania, which it is believed to have foregone 
its membership for cost reasons.  The Commonwealth Government has chosen not to be 
represented in this group. 
 
The GPG seeks to provide national leadership on government property matters. However, 
despite the committed efforts of the APCC, the GPG membership has produced little in the 
way of national leadership on any property matter. For example, collectively the GPG 
members are responsible for the management of over four million square meters of office 
space with a total combined annual rental turnover of $1 billion. They have all the major 
landlords in common, and yet they have not sought to co-operate to exploit the enormously 
powerful influence that they would undoubtedly wield within their office leasing markets.22  
 
One exception to this is in the area of sustainability for which, in September 2007, the APCMC 
asked the GPG to develop a National Framework for Sustainable Government Office Buildings 
in liaison with the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE). As a result of the lack of 
action and communication between member representatives, the APCC together with the 
representatives of the Government of Queensland have had to motivate and drive the 
production of this framework within the GPG. 
 
The APCC is a highly respected organisation with an international reputation, and the GPG 
should be excellently placed to raise the awareness of the significance of property asset 
management at the very highest levels of the Commonwealth and State Governments.  
 
However, until all governments are prepared to address the issue of asset management at 
policy and strategic levels, and the GPG includes the participation of the Commonwealth 
Government, this group will continue to fail in the provision of national leadership on 
government property matters. 
7.1.2.1.5 Public Sector Real Property Financial Indicators 
Asset value and expenditure on maintenance are the only financial indicators available that are 
common to all governments across the Australian public sector.  
 
The level and detail of this core data and information does not support any meaningful 
performance measurement, analysis, and reporting regime for asset efficiency, return on 
investment, cost-in-use, condition (and renewal and replacement intervention points), and, by 
extension, the effectiveness of assets in the provision of services for which they are employed, 
and the subsequent effect on levels of service and government’s ability to deliver them.  
7.1.2.1.5.1 Asset Values (including Local Government Sector) 
Table 7.2 summarises the value of real property assets for each government’s non-financial 
public sector. Details for each government are presented at Appendix 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
22 The author led the NSW State Government delegation at the 2007 GPG Annual Conference in Darwin, NT. 
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Government Value of Real 
Property Assets 
$000 
Value of Total 
Assets 
$000 
Notional 
Allocation of 
Maintenance 
Expenditure (2% of 
Value)23 $000 
Commonwealth 21,516,943 293,740,000 430,000 
New South Wales  78,600,424 249,560,000 3,856,00024 
Queensland 56,937,905 189,860,000 1,138,758 
Victoria 53,640,000 119,610,000 1,072,800 
South Australia 19,781,000 44,490,000 395,620 
Western Australia 31,372,904 112,720,000 627,458 
Tasmania 5,235,000 16,660,000 104,700 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
9,043,284 19,450,000 180,866 
Northern Territory 3,363,059 5,330,000 67,261 
Local Government  45,300,00025 302,000,000 6,040,000 
Total 324,790,519 1,353,420,000 9,627,463 
Table 7.2: Australian Public Sector – Summary of Real Property Assets & Maintenance 
Expenditure (Non-Financial Public Sector)26 
 
This information was obtained through extensive and concentrated research, which examined 
both the consolidated 2009-2010 Budget Papers and Financial Statements for the 
Commonwealth, State, and Territory Governments and each of their individual departments, 
agencies, and authorities; the Australian Bureau of Statistics; and the 2007-2008 Annual 
Reports of all individual government agencies for supplemental information.  
 
Information for the Local Government Sector was obtained through the author’s research 
paper presented at the 2014 Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government Research 
Forum (Seymour-Jones, 2014a). 
 
As far as possible, every effort has been made to analyse each government’s data on a 
consistent basis such that the ascribed values reflect those for corporate, strategic and 
operating land and buildings. Adjustments, exclusions and inclusions include: 
 
§ Information for land and building values is presented in aggregate together with values 
for plant and equipment. It is not possible to isolate this data in any further detail; and 
 
§ Where it is clear that asset values are heavily weighted against land and buildings, e.g. 
infrastructure, roads, resource assets, ports, vehicles, rolling stock etc., these 
agencies and authorities have been omitted. 
 
It is estimated that the resulting value of $324.791 billion represents some twenty-four per cent 
of the total asset value of the nation’s Non-Financial Public Sector. 
 
The proportion of the value of the real property assets of frontline government agencies, such 
as Health, Education, Housing, and Community and Social Services, to their total asset value 
is typically in excess of ninety per cent. 
 
                                                       
23 Analysis of NSW expenditure used as a basis.  
24 Actual budgeted expenditure. 
25 Estimated at fifteen per cent of total asset value based on typical proportion of real property asset and infrastructure 
asset values. 
26 Source: respective governments’ Budget Papers 2009-10, and Annual Reports 2007-08. 
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It is reasonable to conclude that approximately one quarter of the nation’s total NFPS asset 
value and some ninety per cent of the property assets applied to the health, education and 
social wellbeing of Australians are without strong over-arching asset management policies, 
strategies and effective management programmes, beyond the processes and guidelines 
identified in Section 7.1.2.1.1. 
7.1.2.1.5.2 Maintenance Expenditure 
Table 7.2 also contains an estimate of the expenditure each government makes on the 
maintenance of these assets.  
 
New South Wales reported a lump sum figure for maintenance expenditure in its 2009-10 
Budget Papers of approximately $3.9 billion, which represents some 2.7 per cent of the value 
of the New South Wales real property assets. However, this figure was not reported in any 
further detail, with no information on how the expenditure was distributed either across the 
asset base, in relation to expenditure type, or whether it was planned or reactive maintenance.  
 
In the absence of any identifiable comparable data, a figure of two per cent has been used as 
a basis to apply notional maintenance expenditure across the remainder of the public sector. 
This more closely reflects the public sector’s general tendency to under-spend on 
maintenance. 
 
Notwithstanding compliance with accounting standards, reporting of the detail of maintenance 
expenditure is minimal. No information was found for any Australian jurisdiction beyond that 
presented by New South Wales.  
 
Experience of previous efforts to obtain this detail from within the New South Wales 
Government has shown that maintenance expenditure items are not reported or analysed. 
Additionally, it is believed that it is the practice of government treasuries and finance 
departments to apply Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases as a process for the 
determination of agencies’ annual maintenance budgets. 
 
This leads to the following conclusions: 
 
§ Up to $4 billion of public money was to be expended by the NSW Government on 
maintenance in 2009-10 without full and proper transparency and accountability; 
 
§ There are no strong over-arching asset management policies, maintenance strategies 
and effective management programmes in place (beyond guidelines) to manage 
expenditure on the maintenance of approximately twenty-four per cent of the nation’s 
total NFPS asset value, and some ninety per cent of the property assets applied to the 
health, education and social wellbeing of Australians; 
 
§ Funds are being allocated to and expended on the maintenance of under-utilised 
and/or vacant assets; 
 
§ There are significant maintenance backlogs, the rectification of which would require 
substantial additional funding and the allocation of capital expenditure; 
 
§ Little attention is given to lifecycle costing and maintenance planning; 
 
§ The ability to implement truly effective and sustainable environmental management 
practices in government buildings is seriously compromised; and 
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§ The management of risk is impaired, with the health and safety of public sector 
employees and visitors to government property potentially put in jeopardy. 
 
Although not the subject of a detailed case study for this thesis, Box 3 contains aspects of 
research undertaken by the author into the management of property by the State Government 
of Western Australia. 
Box 3: State Government of Western Australia – Property Metrics 
 
In 2011/12, the state government estimated the following in relation to its property assets: 
 
§ Replacement Cost: $25 billion 
§ Annual Maintenance Costs: $300 million 
§ Proportion of Maintenance Costs 
- Planned: $120 million (40%) 
- Reactive/Breakdown: $180 million (60%) 
§ Value of Maintenance Backlog: $1.2 billion, growing at $110 million per annum 
  
An analysis of these figures is shown in Table 7.3 below. 
 
 $ Per capita 
of WA 
Population 
% of WA 
Gross State 
Product 
% of WA 
NFPC Net 
Asset Value 
% of 
Replacement 
Cost 
Replacement Cost: 
$25 billion 12,500 13 23 - 
Annual Maintenance: 
$300 million 136 0.15 - 1.2 
Maintenance 
Backlog: $1.2 billion 600 0.5 5 4.8 
Table 7.3 Government of Western Australia – Property Metrics 
 
These figures give strong indication of a deteriorating property asset base, and an increasing 
financial liability on the state. They also pose threats to public services and the government’s 
ability to maintain levels of service. 
 
Commitment to maintenance at 1.2 per cent of replacement cost is well below the industry 
benchmark of 2% - 2.5%. The level of the backlog reflects this. 
  
There is a $60 million gap between planned ($120 m) and reactive ($180 m) maintenance.  
 
The industry benchmark for this ratio is planned maintenance (65%) to reactive maintenance 
(35%), which would change the expenditure profile to $90 million in favour of planned 
maintenance. This would significantly improve the value of maintenance expenditure, and 
decrease the rate at which the backlog is growing. 
 
This situation indicates a lack of financial management and prudent management of asset-
related risks. 
 
It is interesting to note that it was in September 2013 when Standard & Poor’s Global reduced 
its credit rating for Western Australia form AAA to AA+. Moody’s Investor Service followed in 
August 2014 by lowering its rating from AAA to AA1. Moody’s further revised its rating down to 
AA2 in February 2016.  
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7.1.2.1.5.3 Other Property Expenditure 
Expenditure in respect of operating leases for real property is aggregated within the General 
Operating Expenditure of the public sector’s financial statements, and it has not been possible 
to isolate property rental and lease costs. 
 
However, the Commonwealth Government reported that a sum of $2.232 billion was to be 
expended on operating leases during 2009 - 2010. This figure will relate to all types of leases, 
including property, plant and equipment, vehicles etc. 
 
Expenditure on property leases will be significant, as the Australian Procurement and 
Construction Council has recorded, through its work with the Government Property Group that, 
for offices alone, the public sector occupies some 4 million square metres of rented 
accommodation at an annual rental cost of approximately $1 billion (Government Property 
Group, 2007). 
 
In 2007 the Crown Property Portfolio of the New South Wales Government held some two 
hundred office leases with private sector landlords in sixty-five buildings at an annual rental of 
approximately $160 million. (See Section 7.1.4.1). 
 
Similarly, there is no information relating to the costs incurred in the procurement of 
outsourced property advice and services, and property and facility management contracts. 
7.1.2.2 Local Government Sector 
The asset management issues identified through this thesis at the local government level of 
the public sector very much mirror those of the Commonwealth and State Governments, which 
stem from a lack of property knowledge and a poor understanding of the strategic and 
operational importance of property, and other asset classes, in the provision of public services. 
 
The Local Government Sector is considered in depth in Section 7.1.5. 
7.1.3 The Australian Commonwealth Government – a chequered history 
7.1.3.1 Overview 
The Commonwealth Government’s history in the management of its property assets is 
probably the most chequered of the Australian governments. Its malaise is characterised by a 
general indifference towards property assets at senior levels of government, lack of expertise 
and experience, a dearth of asset data and information, an absence of governance and 
accountability, and poor decision-making.  
Currently, the Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s outlooks for Western Australia are “stable” and 
“negative” respectively (Western Australian Treasury Corporation, 
http://www.watc.wa.gov.au/home/investors/institutional-investors/credit-ratings.html accessed 
20 November 2016). 
 
A further item to note is the value of the backlog of the Local Government Sector in Western 
Australia. Although research for this thesis can find no foundation for the figure, the State 
Government’s Department of Local Government and Communities has estimated the value of 
the backlog across all asset classes at $1.8 billion (Announced by the Minister for Local 
Government and Communities at the Institute of Public Works Engineers Australasia, Western 
Australia State Annual Conference, 9 March, 2016).  
 
When this is aggregated with the State Government’s maintenance backlog, which is for 
property assets only, it results in a combined exposure of at least $3 billion in renewal and 
replacement requirements just to the existing asset base. 
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Appendix 3 provides a detailed account of the various stages in the development of the 
Commonwealth’s attitude towards the management of its property assets.  
 
These models have see-sawed from shared responsibility between agencies and a central 
authority in the 1970s, to a centralised model in the early 1980s, to decentralisation and 
commercialisation (user-pay arrangements) to the mid-1990s, to property divestment and 
management deregulation in the late-1990s, and the current role of the Department of Finance 
(Finance). 
 
This thesis has found no material evidence that these changes were made in the context of 
any serious attempts at reform, but rather changes being made on whims and the 
management fashions of the day (for example, NPM), and ultimately in the late 1990s, the 
government’s expression of a preference not to own property.  
 
It will be shown in the following section that the criteria set by the government for the 
ownership of property were heavily biased towards producing leasing outcomes. 
 
This policy has effectively outsourced and exposed the provision of office accommodation and 
other ‘generic’ property requirements to the property market. In this respect, the changes made 
through the 1980s and 1990s seem to reflect the tenets of Thatcherism, and the principles of 
NPM, with its resultant cultural clashes, blind spots and unintended effects. 
 
There is evidence that the attitude of indifference has continued to prevail into the second 
decade of this century. During 2009, the author conducted formal research on behalf of the 
University of Sydney (the University) into the management of property assets in the Australian 
public sectors. On 28 January 2010, the author, together with Dr. David Leifer from the 
University, presented the findings of the author’s research into the management of the 
Commonwealth’s property assets to senior members of Finance’s Commonwealth Property 
Review Branch. This presentation included a review of leading practices that were being 
developed internationally.  
 
It was hoped that the government might find value in this research in relation to its on-going 
review of the management of property across Commonwealth departments, and the Prime 
Minister’s desire to reform the Australian Public Service into the world’s best (Australian 
Government, 2009b, 2010). In the event, minimal interest was taken in the University’s 
research, which was not pursued any further.  
 
Much of the evidence of the Commonwealth’s approach to managing its property portfolio is 
provided through audits carried out by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO). These 
have been critical of Finance in particular, and of the system of property management in 
general. Given Finance’s on-going property management functions, the latter criticisms can 
also be seen as being directed at Finance. 
7.1.3.2 Department of Finance – disposal of the domestic estate 
Finance was responsible for the disposal of the Commonwealth’s domestic estate, principally 
office accommodation having a value of $1.254 billion.  
 
Finance was severely criticised by the ANAO for its advice leading-up to the sales, the conduct 
of the disposal programme, and the terms upon which sale and leaseback transactions were 
agreed (Australian National Audit Office, 2002).  
 
The ANAO brought particular attention to the following: 
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§ The unrealistically high hurdle rate of return of fifteen per cent (against independent 
professional advice of eleven per cent as an upper level) as the rate of return required 
for ownership of a property to be retained. This “overwhelmingly favoured the 
divestment of property over retention.” (Ibid. p.12); 
 
§ Rents agreed in a number of leaseback arrangements were found to exceed market 
levels by between seven and seventeen per cent; 
 
§ The re-measurement by the purchaser of the building occupied by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade under leaseback arrangements showed a thirty-eight per 
cent increase in net lettable area. This resulted in an increased rental liability of $6.3 
million over the initial rental period; and 
 
§ The ANAO was concerned that the whole-of-lease-term costs in the sale and 
leaseback transactions could result in negative financial returns to the Commonwealth 
within the lease periods. 
 
The ANAO’s analysis of the sale and leaseback of the building housing the Australian 
Geological Survey Office Headquarters revealed a negative Net Present Value (NPV) 
of $95 million. The calculation provided to the Minister by Finance showed a positive 
NPV of $43 million. 
 
The recommendations for improvement made by the ANAO were dismissed by Finance 
without explanation. 
7.1.3.3 Department of Finance – property management 
Since the disposal of the domestic estate, Finance has been the central government agency 
responsible for the ownership and management of the residue of this portfolio, (excluding 
Department of Defence (Defence) property), which is estimated to represent a mere five per 
cent of the value of the Commonwealth’s property-related assets.27 Figure 7.1 shows the 
distribution of these assets across the Commonwealth Government, which have an estimated 
value of nearly $20.5 billion. 
                           
Figure 7.1: Commonwealth Government Distribution of Property-Related Assets by 
Value 
 
                                                       
27  The term “property-related assets “ is used as it has not been possible to distinguish between leasehold 
improvements, (such as fit out, furniture and equipment), and land and buildings. 
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Management of the balance of Finance’s owned portfolio is undertaken through the 
department’s Property Branch. The portfolio includes commercial office buildings, law courts 
and other special purpose properties, heritage buildings, residential property, and vacant land. 
 
Government departments and agencies are not required to locate in Finance-owned property. 
The Property Branch operates as part of the property market, competing with private sector 
landlords and the agents that represent them. 
 
Within this environment, the Property Branch is required to achieve the following levels of 
performance: 
 
§ Achieve a commercial rate of return on the portfolio; 
 
§ Maintain the condition of the portfolio to industry standards; 
 
§ Meet the future needs of tenant agencies as agreed by Government; 
 
§ Contain its management costs within market benchmarks; 
 
§ Pay dividends from operations; and 
 
§ Make equity repayments to the Australian Government from any divestment of 
property. 
 
These criteria are open to wide interpretation but, in any event, given that the Property 
Branch’s market is limited to government departments, its ability to compete with private sector 
landlords, and achieve the required levels of portfolio performance is severely compromised 
and restricted.  
 
The combination of this and the absence of any real whole-of-government property 
governance and strategy, results in government-owned space remaining vacant whilst 
agencies pay rental (on average at ten per cent above market rates) to private sector landlords 
(see below).  
 
A somewhat fatalistic view of this was expressed to the author and Dr Leifer during their visit to 
the Property Branch in January 2010 in that Finance considers this situation as representing a 
successful outcome of allowing market forces to determine the right property solution. 
Whereas, in reality, it would appear that Finance is not achieving at least the first four of its 
property management performance objectives. 
 
There is a discernible belief within Finance that, because there are so few properties remaining 
in the Commonwealth’s ownership, and property asset management is devolved to individual 
agencies, any need for whole-of-government property asset strategies has diminished. This 
strongly indicates that leased properties are not considered as assets since they are 
operational in nature, and would not appear on the Commonwealth’s financial asset register.  
 
The flaws in this thinking have been long-exposed by the ANAO. 
 
In 2001, the ANAO conducted an audit into the Commonwealth’s Management of Leased 
Office Property (Australian National Audit Office, 2001). Forty-four agencies participated in the 
audit. These agencies occupied 1.7 million square metres of office accommodation, eighty-five 
per cent of which was located in metropolitan and city areas. Defence declined to take part in 
the audit.  
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The ANAO noted and reported the following  
 
§ Nationally, the Commonwealth is a significant occupier of leased office 
accommodation. It was estimated to occupy up to ten per cent of available leased 
office space in metropolitan Australia, and may well be the single largest occupier of 
leased office accommodation across the country; 
 
§ Each Commonwealth agency, irrespective of size or function, is responsible for 
managing its property. They are therefore required to address complex property lease 
issues, including strategic planning, lease negotiations, and contract management. 
 
More than seventy per cent of leases were for terms of less than five years, and many 
did not distinguish between net or gross rental terms. 
 
All agencies were paying rentals in excess of benchmark levels. The Commonwealth 
had the largest influence on the Australian Capital Territory market, but was paying ten 
per cent above market rates. 
 
Seventy-nine per cent of leases contained provisions for rent review. Ninety-four per 
cent of these precluded downward reviews. 
 
It is significant that it was Finance that considered the inclusion of upward only rent 
review clauses as standard commercial practice. Of the leases reviewed by this audit, 
thirty-seven per cent were for properties previously owned by the Commonwealth. All 
contained upward only rent reviews; and all were negotiated by Finance on the sale 
and leaseback arrangements from the sale of the domestic portfolio. 
 
§ Seventy-six per cent of agencies did not have a strategic property plan; 
 
§ After the cost of labour, property expenditure is the next largest single item of agency 
overheads.  
 
In the 1999–2000 financial year, the cost to the Commonwealth was in excess of $485 
million in rent and outgoings. 
 
§ The amount of space leased is generally above the benchmark range of fifteen to 
twenty five square metres per person.  
 
This indicated to the ANAO that some agencies might have been renting space in 
excess of their needs and/or utilising existing space inefficiently. The effects of this 
would be higher than necessary payments of rent and outgoings.  
 
The ANAO estimated that, during the 1999–2000 financial year, the agencies 
responding to the audit paid nearly $100 million in rent and outgoings for the above-
benchmark space held. This represented more than twenty per cent of the 
Commonwealth’s total annual rental cost. 
 
§ The deregulation and decontrol of the management of the Commonwealth’s property 
assets has had significant negative effects on the efficient and effective conduct of its 
financial affairs and business and, in consequence, the provision of public services.  
 
In 2003, the ANAO conducted a further audit into the management of Commonwealth property 
(Australian National Audit Office, 2003). The audit found that the Commonwealth had made 
little progress in property management. It made particular note of the following: 
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§ There was inadequate property planning and control to identify long-term property 
needs, and define property objectives and priorities; 
 
§ There was minimum consideration of property-related risks, and their affect on the 
delivery of services; 
 
§ A lack of formal property management policy and procedural documentation; 
 
§ There were no processes to measure and report upon property performance; 
 
§ There was very limited property data and information, and no basis for benchmarking 
with other organisations. 
 
There has been, therefore, a clear reluctance on behalf of Finance to go beyond its 
frameworks and guidelines to promote a robust and disciplined whole-of-government approach 
and governance over property ownership, allocation, occupation, and management. (Refer to 
Appendix 3 for the Commonwealth Government Property Framework). 
7.1.3.4 The Commonwealth’s Property Legacy 
The history of the Commonwealth’s lack of a strategic and transparent approach to the 
management of its property has left the federal government with the following legacy: 
 
§ An unsubstantiated all-of-government policy towards property ownership, and a 
severely diluted base of strategic property holdings; 
 
§ Inflexible property holdings resulting in reduced business and service provision agility; 
 
§ An inappropriate reliance upon and exposure to property leasing markets with a 
potential for landlords to cartel and manipulate the markets; 
 
§ An uncoordinated approach to the market though self-competition; 
 
§ Loss of resources and skills, which has resulted in an over-reliance on the private 
sector for the management and provision of property services. There is evidence to 
suggest that, in some cases, this reliance is almost total; 
 
§ Ill-defined roles and responsibilities, and lack of accountability; 
 
§ A multiplicity and duplication of systems, processes and procedures, and varying 
standards of management; 
 
§ Loss of a centralised database, and inaccurate asset registers; 
 
§ Asset registers that are not reconciled to financial systems; 
 
§ Non-transparent property dealings and financial loss; 
 
§ No formalisation and analysis of whole life costs in decision-making; 
 
§ No baseline cost and performance standards, nor monitoring of outcomes; 
 
§ Inadequate financial management and asset management systems; 
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§ Minimal reporting; and 
 
§ Poor documentation on asset acquisitions and disposals. 
7.1.3.5 Conclusion 
The approach by the Commonwealth Government to the management of its property assets 
shows a number of the characteristics of NPM, particularly the decentralisation of the 
management of property assets to individual departments and agencies to ‘let the managers 
manage’, and the attempt to apply private sector management practices.  
 
In the case of managing corporate property assets, the decentralisation of this function was 
contrary to the thinking of the time, when the principle of ‘Corporate Real Estate’ was taking 
hold on an international scale28. 
 
The fact that, in two of its audits, the ANAO found it necessary to provide definitions for 
‘property management’, both of which were in line with the thinking of the day, strongly 
indicates that the Commonwealth, represented by Finance, was either unaware of, or did not 
understand the changes that were occurring in the corporate sector at that time, i.e. the 
development of ‘Corporate Real Estate’ for the management of ‘the fifth resource’ as a central 
corporate business function (ANAO, 2001 op.cit. p. 28; ANAO, 2003 op. cit. p. 11.).        
 
The legacy, described in Section 7.1.3.4 above, represents the ‘unintended effects’ of the 
Commonwealth’s approach to the management of its property assets since the late 1990s.  
 
It was not until 2009/2010 that the Commonwealth Property Review Branch of Finance was 
charged with developing a Property Management Framework to improve the governance, 
planning and whole-of-government co-ordination of property management across agencies, 
and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of property management across government. 
 
This Framework was not released until late 2015 (Australian Government, 2016). Any 
effectiveness that this framework might have is yet to be tested. Nevertheless, it will most likely 
require strong leadership and some ‘frank and fearless’ advice for it to make any substantial 
difference to the current situation. 
  
However, an initial reading of the framework would suggest that it represents a consolidation of 
earlier processes and arrangements, without effectively addressing the key over-arching 
whole-of-government issues of strategy, governance, transparency, and accountability. 
7.1.4 New South Wales State Government: some good theory, not so good in 
practice 
This case study is an example of the effect of public sector organisational context, culture, 
influence, and conflict on attempts to introduce strategic whole-of-government reforms in the 
management of NSW Government property. 
7.1.4.1 Background: Specialist & Generic Property 
In 2011, the total value of the NSW Government’s Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS) 
property assets was in the region of $80 billion, annual maintenance expenditure was some 
$1.6 billion, and the annual cost of leased office accommodation was approximately $400 
million. 
 
Like the Commonwealth Government, the NSW Government broadly divides its property 
portfolio into two categories, generic and specialised. 
 
                                                       
28 Refer to Section 4.4 and Box 1 in Section 4.4 
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The management of the vast majority of these assets, mostly specialised property such as 
schools and hospitals, has not been subject to any effective form of over-arching governance, 
policy, control, strategy, or standards.  
 
The NSW generic portfolio comprises the following property types and uses: 
 
§ Offices; 
 
§ Warehouses; 
 
§ Depots; 
 
§ Car parks; and 
 
§ Certain categories of land. 
 
The value of this portfolio in 2011 amounted to some $640 million, which was less than one 
per cent of the total value of NFPS property assets.  
 
The generic portfolio was divided into two sub-categories, namely: 
 
§ Property or premises (owned or leased) occupied by a single government agency29; 
and 
 
§ Single properties (owned or leased) occupied by more than one department or agency 
(multi-occupied property). These properties came under the effective ownership and 
control of the Department of Treasury (Treasury) through the Crown Property Portfolio 
(CPP). (See Section 7.1.4.2.4). 
 
It is only the latter that have been subject to any attempt at management on a whole-of-
portfolio basis30. The management of the balance of the generic portfolio (until 2010/11) and all 
specialist property is devolved to the individual occupying agencies. However, agencies are 
still required to report to, and effectively obtain approval from Treasury for the planning for 
these properties as part of the budget process, via the requirements of Treasury’s Total Asset 
Management Framework (TAM). (See below and Appendix 3). 
7.1.4.2 Management of NSW Government Property – no ‘whole-of-government’ 
outcomes approach, and the power and influence of Treasury 
Since 1992, the management of government property has undergone a number of changes. 
 
As these have largely been limited to the narrow generic category of property, few have been 
adopted for any whole-of-government strategy-based reasons for reform that view property 
holistically as an organisational resource essential to the operation of government, and 
provision of public services.  
 
As a result, management of government property remains ad hoc, and fragmented in policy, 
governance, structure, and capacity and capability (DEGW & CoreNet Global, 2004).  
 
Appendix 3 traces these changes in detail. 
 
A dominant feature of these changes has been the power and influence of Treasury.  
                                                       
29 In 2007/08, this was estimated at 140,000 square metres of owned, and 660,000 square metres of leased office 
accommodation. 
30 Note: not ‘whole-of-government’. 
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With the exception of the establishment of the State Property Authority (SPA) in 2006 (see 
Section 7.1.4.3), Treasury has been the only body to initiate policy relating to the ownership 
and management of government property.  
 
Although the change process has sought to introduce good practices to the management of 
generic property on a ‘whole-of-portfolio’ basis, it has not been a process of reform. The 
interests of Treasury’s budget and financial planning functions have largely driven the 
changes. They have not gone to the essence of strategic asset management reform, and all 
that entails, on a ‘whole-of-government’ basis. 
 
The following sections describe the key actions taken by Treasury in relation to its control of 
government property, and their overall effects, between 1992 and 2002. 
7.1.4.2.1 Total Asset Management Framework 
In 1992, as part of the TAM Framework, Treasury introduced the following in relation to office 
accommodation occupied by government agencies: 
 
§ Agencies were required to include strategies for office accommodation, which were to 
form part of their annual TAM submissions; and 
 
§ A requirement for agencies to refer proposals for all new office leases and lease 
renewals to the Property Services Group of DPWS for approval. This was the first 
attempt to control space utilisation. 
 
Treasury introduced further requirements in 1997, which were aimed at introducing a 
disciplined practice into the management of office accommodation; achieving savings; 
promoting a centralised approach to office accommodation planning and property disposal; 
and concentrating agencies on the amount of space being used. These included: 
 
§ Setting an office space utilisation target of 18 m2 per person; 
 
§ Submission of facility plans for all new office leases to DPWS for approval; 
 
§ All disposals over $3 million to be handled by DPWS; and 
 
§ Submission of annual Office Accommodation Strategies to DPWS for review.  
7.1.4.2.2 Government Asset Management Committee 
In 1998 Treasury was instrumental in establishing the Government Asset Management 
Committee (GAMC). This was an attempt to exercise control over government-occupied office 
accommodation through the formation of a senior and high-level body whose terms of 
reference included providing advice to the Budget Sub-Committee of Cabinet. Inter alia, this 
advice included the appropriateness of agency asset management strategies, accommodation 
issues involving more than one agency, office accommodation strategies for metropolitan and 
regional areas, and major property investment decisions.  
 
Although the Director General of the Department of Premier and Cabinet acted as the chair of 
GAMC, it was effectively controlled by Treasury through the provision of the Secretariat and 
through a Senior Officer Sub-Committee, which considered all matters, and attached 
comments and recommendations, before they were referred to the committee. 
 
GAMC had no permanent, independent or professional executive officers that were expert in 
the management of assets; and took few policy initiatives of its own. In effect, it performed little 
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more than a review and rubber-stamping role, and showed a reluctance to enforce policy over 
government agencies. 
7.1.4.2.3 Office Accommodation Lease Negotiation and Management 
In 2002, Treasury extended its control over the management of government’s office portfolio 
by formalising a strategic asset management policy and governance framework for the multi-
occupied element of the generic portfolio (NSW Government, 2002).  
 
The framework, known as Premier’s Memorandum 02-09, included property management 
principles that agencies were required to comply with, and assigned roles and responsibilities 
for the management of this property category. These requirements were additional to the 
strategic planning requirements of TAM. 
 
The Government Leasing Service (GLS) was formed in the same year as a unit within State 
Property. The GLS was mandated to implement Premier’s Memorandum 02-09 by managing 
government office lease negotiations in ‘markets of most exposure’, principally Greater Sydney 
and the larger metropolitan areas of the state, such as Newcastle and Wollongong.  
 
However, the GLS role did not extend to the negotiation of head leases held by the CPP in 
these markets. As head lessee of multi-agency occupied premises leased in the same 
building, the CPP was mandated to manage their negotiations.  
 
Furthermore, Treasury also now required agencies to carry out lease versus own analysis for 
investment proposals, and submit business cases to GAMC (effectively Treasury) for approval 
in support of locating in core central business district locations. 
 
These measures were aimed at a more controlled management of leased office 
accommodation by co-locating agencies to enable lease rationalisation, and to test the viability 
for agencies to relocate to regional New South Wales. 
 
Somewhat naïvely, Treasury publically announced government’s preferred locations (south 
Sydney and Parramatta, for example) for agencies that needed to be in the Sydney 
Metropolitan area. Anecdotally, it was thought by the GLS that the public nomination of these 
locations alerted the markets to the coming demand for offices, which resulted in inflated 
rentals until supply could equalise the increased demand. 
7.1.4.3 Effects of Treasury’s Influence 
Notwithstanding the fragmented nature of the management of government property, the 
combination of the government-wide requirements of TAM that applied to all agency assets, 
and Treasury’s control of generic property through its influence over GAMC, Premier’s 
Memorandum 02-09 and the GLS; ownership of the CPP; and the terms of its Alliance 
Agreement with State Property (see below), effectively placed Treasury in control of policy and 
its implementation over all government property. 
 
Government was apparently happy for Treasury to develop this control and influence, which it 
has exercised for financial and budgetary purposes. Whilst essential from this efficiency 
perspective, it leaves little room for the management of property assets from the perspective of 
effectiveness, which is the real reason for their existence, i.e. how they are employed and 
managed as resources for the achievement of whole-of-government objectives and service 
outcomes.  
 
It is evident that, in the context of the management of government property resources at least, 
the ‘effectiveness’ element of the term ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ has become 
overshadowed by the ‘harder’ financial measures of the performance of assets, which 
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themselves have been limited to capital expenditure and related to occupation targets, such as 
area occupied by full time equivalents, and portfolio vacancy levels.  
 
As has been established throughout this thesis, there is paucity of property data. This is 
particularly so for the whole-of-life cost of government property beyond the initial capital costs 
of development and construction.  
 
It is the political nature of public sector financial management that its horizons are limited to the 
three or four year electoral cycles of government. As such, governments concentrate 
expenditure on infrastructure capital projects that attract the attention of the electorate, with 
little priority given to the on-going operational financial burdens that they create. These 
operational property management costs, which include maintenance, staffing, administration, 
utilities, outsourced contracting etc. are rarely assessed, managed or recorded in sufficient 
individual detail to be capable of measurement and reporting. 
 
Additionally, the author does not believe it frivolous or cynical to suggest that, to defend their 
budget allocations and property territories, agencies would not be happy to expose either the 
detail of their property operating costs, or the level of their asset management capacity and 
capability that any such analysis might reveal. It is not uncommon, across the public sector as 
a whole, for agencies to ‘manage’ their maintenance budgets to supplement other areas of 
expenditure, particularly in times of fiscal constraint when Treasurers call for ‘efficiency 
dividends’ without reducing services or their quality. 
 
For New South Wales, this raises two issues. The first is the cultural ‘turf’ issue (Kruk and 
Bastaja, op. cit.). The second concerns the OECD’s conclusion that governments limit their 
assessments of efficiency and effectiveness by viewing them solely in a budgetary context. 
(OECD, op. cit.).  
 
The NSW Government’s approach to managing its property assets is symptomatic of turf-
protection and the extension of influence. Treasury has the policy, financial and planning turf, 
whilst individual agencies retain a sufficient level of protective independence and control over 
the occupation and management of their property fiefdoms and functions.  
 
The decisions leading to this situation show few signs of having considered or assessed the 
larger property and government services picture. They will have had consequential negative 
“effects on policies and performance of whole-of-government importance” (ibid.), and the 
resulting fragmentation of responsibility will have led to a lack of property management 
transparency and accountability over some $80 billion of property assets. 
 
This is evidenced by Treasury’s TAM framework, which, although referring to “better planning 
and management of the State’s physical asset base”, and purporting to “focus on agencies’ 
results and services plans”, provides no means to monitor or evaluate property’s effectiveness 
and efficiency in supporting government’s results and services outcomes, either centrally or by 
individual agencies (NSW Government, 2006). 
 
Adopting a disaggregated view of the process, as proposed by the OECD (ibid.), would enable 
the NSW Government to carry out a wider evaluation of the performance of property in the 
delivery of services and achievement of government objectives. This goes to the root of the 
public sector’s raison d’être, which, however, does not seem to have been a priority for the 
NSW Government. 
 
The devolved and fragmented responsibility for the management of property in New South 
Wales allowed government agencies and entities to develop their own independent in-house 
property management organisations and technical skills. Examples of this are the large 
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property and facility management departments maintained by NSW Maritime, Roads and 
Transport Authority, Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, NSW Police, the Departments of 
Education and Health, and the Attorney General’s Department. All coveted their territorial and 
property management ‘empires’, and none were disposed to engage or consult with other 
areas of government in the management of their property portfolios. There was particular 
animosity between NSW Police and Treasury when Treasury, through SPA, attempted to 
exercise control over the management of the Police property portfolio in the early 2000s. 
 
It also resulted in the development of separate property-owning authorities, and property and 
facility management service providers from within central government agencies. These 
included: 
 
The Crown Property Portfolio 
In 2002, The NSW Treasury established the Crown Property Portfolio (CPP) under its 
ownership31. 
  
The CPP comprised government-owned office buildings, which were occupied by multi-
agencies. Occupation of these properties was on a landlord – tenant basis under Memoranda 
of Understanding between the CPP and tenant agencies.  
 
In addition, the CPP was the named leasing entity when government leased office premises in 
the open market for multi-agency occupation. Agencies also occupied these properties on the 
same Memorandum of Understanding arrangements, with the CPP as head lessee. 
 
At the time ownership of the CPP passed to the SPA32, and SPA assumed responsibility for the 
leased accommodation, the portfolio comprised 970,000 square metres and included the 
following: 
 
§ Commercial Property: 400,000 square metres 
 
§ Non-Commercial Property: 570,000 square metres 
 
§ Freehold Sites: 66 
 
§ Leasehold Sites: 49 
 
§ Head Leases: 200+ 
 
§ Annual Head Lease Rental: $160 million 
 
§ No. of Memoranda of Understanding: 475 
 
§ Value of Owned Property: $500 million 
 
§ Annual Operating Expenditure: $15 million 
 
§ Annual Capital Expenditure: $50 million 
 
Also included within the CPP was a portfolio of miscellaneous properties, which were classified 
as ‘strategic’. In effect, these were a hotchpotch of properties that were owned but not 
                                                       
31 The Crown Property Portfolio had no relationship with Crown Land. 
32 Although formed by Act of Parliament in December 2006, it was not until April 2008 when SPA’s mandate was finally 
settled through the issuance of Premier’s Memorandum M2008-06, which set out principles for the management of 
government property (NSW Government, 2008; "State Property Act," 2006). Ownership of the CPP portfolio, and head 
leases were transferred to SPA between 2009 and 2010. 
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occupied by government. Some were strategic holdings, such as the Sydney Opera House car 
parks, and the Sydney Fish Markets; some were considered as having ‘state (or political) 
significance’, for example Strickland House in the Vaucluse suburb of Sydney; and some were 
provided to not-for-profit organisations at concessional or peppercorn rentals. 
 
NSW Department of Commerce 
In 2002, the Department of Public Works and Services (DPWS) was dissolved.  
 
The DPWS consisted of three units: Projects, Facility Management, and State Property. 
Projects and Facility Management were service providers to government agencies offering 
alternatives to acquiring services from the private sector. 
 
These were absorbed into the newly formed Department of Commerce (DoC) where they were 
operated as separate businesses, and required to provide financial returns to the DoC, which 
in turn had financial targets to return to Treasury’s Consolidated Fund. 
 
Under some forceful and turf-war driven leadership, State Property took a life of its own within 
the DoC33. This resulted in State Property offering duplicate services in the areas of Project 
and Construction Management and Facility Management from within the same parent 
organisation. 
 
Under an Alliance Agreement with Treasury, the Corporate Real Estate division of State 
Property was responsible for the management of the CPP, including property and facility 
management, tenancy management, financial management (including receipt and payment of 
rentals), all leasing activity, management of new developments, project management, 
acquisitions and disposals.  
 
The Alliance Agreement also required State Property to maintain a Government Property 
Register for generic property, to advise Treasury on property management policy, to review the 
strategic office accommodation plans of government agencies and report upon them to 
Treasury, and to enforce Treasury’s property-related policies under TAM and Premier’s 
Memorandum M2002-09 (NSW Government, 2002).  
 
The multi-functional and often conflicting nature of the DoC’s responsibilities created confusion 
and conflict, not only for government as a whole but also within the DoC itself, its business 
unit, State Property, and within the Corporate Real Estate division of State Property (see 
Section 7.1.4.4 below).  
 
NSW Businesslink  
NSW Businesslink was established as a government-owned company in 2003 to offer shared 
services to government agencies in financial, information and communication technology, 
human resources, and property management to government agencies34. 
 
Table 7.4 illustrates the NSW Government’s fragmented approach to the management of its 
generic property from the 1990s to the early part of this decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
33 It was at this time that Robyn Kruk who, as Director General of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, and Annette 
Bastaja wrote about turf-war mentality in their paper, Emerging directions in public sector management in New South 
Wales (Kruk & Bastaja, 2002). 
34 NSW Bisinesslink was dissolved in 2013 as it could no longer be sustained as a financial going concern (NSW 
Auditor General, 2013). 
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Role, Responsibility, 
or Service 
NSW 
Treasury 
State 
Property / 
SPA 
DoC Agencies NSW 
Businesslink 
Asset Management 
Policy 
ü      
Policy & Strategy 
Advice  ü     
Policy 
Implementation & 
Enforcement 
ü  ü     
Property Ownership  ü   ü   
Property Strategies ü  ü   ü   
Strategy 
Implementation & 
Management 
 ü  ü  ü   
Facilities 
Management & 
Property Services 
 ü  ü  ü  ü  
Property 
Procurement 
 ü  ü  ü  ü  
Table 7.4: NSW Government Roles, Responsibilities & Services c.1992 – c.2012 
7.1.4.4 From State Property to the State Property Authority: a true reform? 
Superficially, because of the Alliance Agreement with Treasury, the fortunes of State Property 
would appear to have been aligned with, and dependent upon Treasury. The events leading to 
the establishment of SPA would show this to be the case, but not in the way intended by State 
Property. 
 
It was mentioned earlier that State Property had a strong leader in the early 2000s. It was the 
ambition of this individual for government to take a holistic approach to the management of 
property by proposing wholesale and far-reaching reforms to bring the ownership and 
management of all government property assets under a single authority, the State Property 
Authority, which was to be established from the existing State Property unit of the DoC.  
 
There were a number of factors that would influence the outcome of this reform: neither 
Treasury nor the Department of Premier and Cabinet had been sufficiently engaged to sponsor 
and support such a reform; the lack of organisational management, communication and 
change management skills at the most senior level of the Department of Commerce and State 
Property; State Property’s already existing internal conflicts; and State Property’s lack of 
corporate real estate and property management skills, systems, and processes and 
procedures. 
 
In essence, central government was neither ready for, nor disposed to consider such a far-
reaching reform 35 ; State Property did not possess the resources skills or expertise to 
implement it (see below): and State Property was in such a state of conflict and divided 
loyalties, which generated either opposition from within, or a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude by its 
senior management. 
                                                       
35  The author had arranged for Mr Chris Coneeney, Senior Real Property Officer at the US General Services 
Administration to conduct a Property Asset Management forum for the NSW Treasury directorate on 4 July 2005 
(Coneeney, 2005). Mr Coneeney described the US Federal Government’s path to reform, and the outcomes that were 
being produced. It was clear that there was little appreciation for how this might benefit the management of the NSW 
property portfolio. 
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7.1.4.4.1 State Property  
In 2004, State Property was organised in three divisions: Project Management, Ministerial 
Projects, and Corporate Real Estate (CRE). 
 
Project Management and Ministerial Projects were separately managed and resourced 
entities, but performed identical functions. This resulted in duplication of staff and systems; 
inconsistent processes and procedures and reporting; and inefficient use of office 
accommodation. It also created internal turf wars. 
 
It is the CRE division, and the influence exercised by Treasury over State Property through the 
Alliance Agreement, with which this section is primarily concerned. 
 
Although there were some attempts to broaden its government client base by offering services 
to other departments and agencies, CRE’s principal purpose was as a service provider to 
Treasury under the scope and terms of the Alliance Agreement. These included the provision 
of property and building management, and capital project management services to the CPP; 
management of the GLS; and Strategic Asset Management advice and oversight. 
 
CRE’s project management role was the cause of additional friction within State Property, and 
further management and resource inefficiencies and differences in processes. Because the 
parties to the Alliance Agreement were Treasury, as principal, and State Property (not CRE) as 
service provider, the Project Management division of State Property considered this to be an 
invasion of its territory.  
 
It was the combination of the deteriorating internal relationships, and its almost total 
dependence and reliance on Treasury for its raison d’être, that CRE became to see itself as a 
quasi or de facto department of Treasury, acting as its portfolio manager, policy adviser, 
compliance watchdog and, at times, arbiter and policeman over agencies’ property matters. 
This further enflamed the internal conflicts and turf wars within State Property. 
7.1.4.4.2 Corporate Real Estate Division 
Figure 7.2 illustrates CRE’s structure. It shows that, although CRE is part of State Property, its 
effective reporting line is to Treasury. Similarly, the Strategic Asset Management (SAM) 
section took its instructions from, and reported directly to Treasury. These three sections 
operated independently with little communication between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: CRE Structure   
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The Portfolio Management section managed the day-to-day operations of the CPP, including 
the management and negotiations of leases with the private sector as head lessee. With the 
exception of the payment and receipt of rentals, all property and building management 
functions were outsourced to a professional property management company. 
 
Notwithstanding this, CRE continued to maintain the full resources required for a large property 
management organisation. It maintained an information system for the CPP, and an equivalent 
staffing structure to ‘manage’ the outsource service provider. Figure 7.3 shows the extent of 
this duplication, which created considerable difficulties for the service provider. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Duplicate CPP Staffing Structure 
 
Two separately managed leasing responsibilities was further cause for friction within CRE, and 
confusion in the property market. Government could not present a unified leasing function to 
the market, and it was not uncommon for the GLS and CPP to compete with each other in the 
negotiation of leases. The GLS operated in a much wider market, had professional lease 
negotiators, and had a superior knowledge of market conditions. 
 
The role of the SAM section was to provide Treasury with policy advice, undertake regional 
locational studies, maintain the Government Property Register, and assess agency facility 
management plans and property locational business cases required by Treasury under TAM, 
and monitor, oversee, and enforce the provisions of Premier’s Memorandum 02-09. SAM had 
a direct relationship with, and reporting line to Treasury, which all but separated it structurally 
and organisationally from CRE and State Property. 
 
This was the organisational, relationship and cultural contexts within which State Property 
sought to initiate whole-of-government strategic property reforms. 
7.1.4.5 State Property Authority 
7.1.4.5.1 A Disturbed Beginning 
The eventual incarnation of SPA was a result of a struggle lasting some two years between the 
DoC and Treasury. This led to the departure from government of SPA’s original proposer, 
which resulted in the broader whole-of-government concepts of reform either being dropped 
completely, or being watered-down to apply to generic property only. 
 
SPA was formed by Act of Parliament in December 2006 ("State Property Act," 2006). The 
transfer of the CRE division, its staff and functions from State Property effected SPA’s 
formation.  
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There was a hiatus of nearly two years between formation and the appointment of a 
permanent Chief Executive Officer (CEO). SPA was managed by four interim CEO’s, including 
an official of Treasury, during this crucial period. 
 
Until a permanent CEO was appointed by Treasury, SPA’s new objectives and functions were 
to be performed and managed by the same management staff and resources without a 
Business Plan or Statement of Business Intent, a settled leadership and structure, and without 
any assessment of required skills and expertise, planning, change management and 
implementation programmes.  
 
A further complication was that, despite SPA’s enabling legislation, its operating policies, 
principles and mandate had not been agreed between the DoC and Treasury for the necessary 
approval by Cabinet. 
 
Notwithstanding these effects of the turf war between DoC and Treasury and SPA’s area of 
responsibility being limited to generic property, SPA’s objectives and functions, and eventual 
mandate and operating policies and principles, began to represent and resemble genuine 
aspects of strategic property asset management reform. 
7.1.4.5.2 Objectives and Functions 
The State Property Act 2006 (ibid) provided SPA with the following objectives and functions: 
 
Objectives: 
 
§ Improve operational efficiencies in the use of properties of government agencies, 
particularly generic properties (such as offices, warehouses, depots and car parks); 
 
§ Manage properties of government agencies in a way that supports the service delivery 
functions of those agencies;  
 
§ Provide advice and support within government on property matters; and  
 
§ Operate at least as efficiently as any comparable business, consistently with the 
principles of ecologically sustainable development and social responsibility for the 
community (including the indigenous community).  
 
For perhaps the first time the NSW Government had formally defined objectives for the 
management of its property assets that gave direction and had meaning and purpose. They 
coupled operational property efficiency with government service delivery outcomes, included a 
whole-of-government advisory role, and provided business, ecological, and social benchmark 
performance indicators. 
 
Functions: 
 
§ Hold, dispose, acquire property; 
 
§ Manage, maintain, improve & develop property; 
 
§ Arrange sharing of facilities; 
 
§ Advise the Treasurer on efficient use of property; 
 
§ Advice to the Treasurer on transfer of property to SPA and on budgeting measures; 
and 
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§ Advise the Treasurer as directed. 
 
These functions were clear and unambiguous. However, they did not refer to or clearly reflect 
or express the softer elements of SPA’s objectives, i.e. the support of service delivery, the 
wider advisory objective, and the ecological and social community principles.  
 
The advisory functions were defined in favour of Treasury, which ensured its continued level of 
influence and control over both property and the functioning of SPA, and the retention of a 
budgetary focus. 
7.1.4.5.3 Mandate 
SPA’s mandate was eventually released in April 2008 through Premier’s Memorandum M2008-
06 State Property Authority and Government Property Principles (NSW Government, 2008). 
 
The sphere of SPA’s mandate did not extend beyond that of State Property in that it was 
similarly limited to generic property. However, it was expanded to include all of the General 
Government Sector and Public Trading Enterprises. It did not include State Owned 
Corporations. 
 
It is particularly significant that the ownership and management of all government-owned office 
accommodation was to be vested in SPA. This included the CPP and all accommodation 
separately owned by individual government agencies. In addition, SPA would become the 
government’s sole entity to act as lessee for all office leases with private sector landlords. 
Existing office property leases were to be transferred into the name of SPA. 
 
SPA would undertake the negotiation and management of all lease negotiations, including 
lease renewal and rent reviews, for generic property in the Sydney Metropolitan Area, This 
would consolidate the previous dual leasing functions of CRE into a single leasing unit. 
 
Agencies would pay commercial rentals to SPA under Memoranda of Understanding and 
Service Level Agreements. 
 
SPA’s mandate strengthened the powers of the CRE strategic asset management functions in 
the following areas: 
 
§ SPA was to undertake reviews of all government agency generic property portfolios, 
and develop Property Strategy Implementation Plans in conjunction with agencies by 
201136;  
 
§ All acquisitions and disposals of generic property were to be endorsed by SPA; and 
 
§ SPA was nominated as government’s preferred agency to manage and conduct 
acquisitions and disposals. 
7.1.4.5.4 Property Data 
SPA continued with CRE’s responsibility to maintain a whole-of-government database for 
generic property, the Government Property Register. This was the sole central repository for all 
NSW Government property data. 
 
The collection and management of this data reflects the ‘data leakage’ characteristics 
described in Section 5.4.1.  
 
                                                       
36 The author developed the methodology for these reviews. 
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These deficiencies were exposed during the implementation of transferring ownership of 
agency property into SPA, and SPA replacing agencies as head lessee in respect of leased 
office accommodation.  
 
This entailed the transfer of a substantial portfolio from multiple agencies. It was estimated that 
the addition of these properties would increase the area under SPA’s management by some 
800,000 square metres, eighty per cent of which was leased from private landlords. 
 
The management of all aspects of the CPP property data, including for leases, inventory, 
financial and budgetary control, and operations and maintenance was of a high standard 
supported by appropriate systems. 
 
Conversely, the management and maintenance of the Government Property Register, which 
was carried out separately by CRE’s Strategic Asset Management section, was managed 
without the same rigour, quality and accuracy, on an independent and unrelated system. The 
rationale for separate systems was that, because the Government Property Register was the 
property of Treasury, its contents were confidential and restricted.  
 
Therefore, in addition to data that might be maintained by agencies, central government 
maintained two separate property databases. These were evidently the objects of information 
and data turf-protection caused by the internal conflicts and mistrust within one organisation.  
 
The Government Property Register relied upon the Office Accommodation Strategies 
submitted to Treasury by agencies as part of their TAM plans as the sole source of generic 
property data.  
 
The Portfolio Management and GLS areas of SPA were granted access to the Government 
Property Register to obtain data relating to the properties to be vested and transferred into 
SPA. This had dual purposes. Firstly as a due diligence exercise; and secondly, to determine 
the resources, planning and logistics requirements for the transfer of management of these 
properties into SPA. 
 
In terms of the accuracy of lease data, some sixty per cent of these records were found to be 
incorrect, out-of-date, or contain records of leases for properties no longer held by 
government. 
7.1.4.6 Outcomes of Reform 
The success or otherwise of these reforms is perhaps best measured by two reports of the 
NSW Auditor General in 2005 and 2009, and by the Interim Report of the NSW Commission of 
Audit into Public Sector Management in 2012. 
 
These reports are described in detail in Appendix 3. Summaries of their findings are presented 
below. 
7.1.4.6.1 NSW Auditor General Reports: “effective asset management is a key measure 
of the quality of management and stewardship of a government” 
In 2005, the NSW Auditor General examined NSW Treasury’s efforts to implement asset 
management reforms, improve asset management practices in the public sector, and the 
progress made by three sample agencies (the Department of Corrective Services, NSW Fire 
Brigades, and the Powerhouse Museum) towards the better management of their asset 
portfolios (NSW Government, 2005). 
 
The Audit Opinion stated, “effective asset management is a key measure of the quality of 
management and stewardship of a government” (ibid, p.2.).  
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Apart from holding considerable significance, in that it shows the importance of asset 
management is understood at such an influential level of the NSW Government, it also 
confirms that, in the view of the Auditor General, asset management effectiveness is capable 
of being measured. This supports the earlier conclusion in Chapter Five of this thesis that, with 
a robust service and business planning regime and good data, the performance of assets can 
and should be assessed as an indicator of whole-of-government performance. 
 
This audit concluded that, although progress had been made in strategic asset management, 
“a lot of room still exists for improvement” on behalf of both government agencies and 
Treasury (ibid.). The audit specifically identified the following necessary areas of improvement 
for agencies: 
 
§ Identify all assets that are critical to service delivery, and include them in their TAM 
plans; 
 
§ Specify the contribution that assets make to services; 
 
§ Develop performance standards to assess asset suitability, remaining useful life, and 
potential for disposal; 
 
§ Assess the risks that assets pose to service delivery, and how to manage those risks; 
and 
 
§ Implement asset management systems capable of providing and filtering information 
on asset condition, maintenance. Performance and useful life. 
 
The audit noted that Treasury has taken a one-size-fits-all approach to TAM, which 
overwhelms smaller agencies with fewer resources. The audit estimated that over thirty per 
cent of agencies have assets worth less than $10 million, but have the same planning and 
reporting requirements as those with large portfolios. 
 
The audit found that not all TAM plans contained an Asset Strategy. Those that had Asset 
Plans were not linked to corporate strategy or service standards, nor did they include all assets 
that were essential to service delivery.  
 
This shows that agencies consider their assets as operational fixtures rather than as strategic 
resources in the same manner as human, financial and technical resources. Asset 
Management, therefore, would be driven by technical and maintenance criteria, which would 
put the composition, appropriateness, functionality, sustainability, and efficiency and 
effectiveness of entire portfolios in doubt. 
 
Furthermore, it is not surprising that the audit found that asset performance standards had not 
been developed and that risks affecting asset performance had not been assessed; the impact 
of maintenance on asset and service performance had not been considered; agencies did they 
assess the impact on services if asset funding was not received; and asset management 
systems, data and information were inadequate. 
 
In relation to Treasury’s application and management of TAM, the audit found that the lack of 
quality in asset plans was affected by insufficient feedback from Treasury to agencies. Most 
agencies were found to be delinquent in meeting the deadlines for the submission of plans to 
Treasury. Treasury did not monitor the receipt of plans or report on their timeliness. 
These findings are disturbing for the following reasons: 
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§ Two of the three agencies, the Department of Corrective Services, and NSW Fire   
Brigades, are large organisations responsible for providing critical justice, protection 
and emergency services across the State, and are reliant on a multiple and complex 
range of assets, including substantial specialist property portfolios. 
 
Most of the property assets of these agencies would be specialist property, e.g. 
prisons and fire stations. Although they would not in any case be subject to the future 
policy of Premier’s Memorandum 08-06, they are subject to the requirements of 
Treasury’s TAM policy. 
 
This provides an insight into the public sector’s culture and attitude towards assets and 
their management, and the level of respect shown towards government’s whole-of-
government planning policies; and 
 
§ The lack of attention given by Treasury to the management of its own TAM process in 
terms of the receipt of plans, their review in relation to agency Results and Services 
Plans, and the lack of feedback to, and communication with agencies. 
 
The second of the NSW Auditor General audits was a Compliance Review Report into Total 
Asset Management. It was conducted in 2009 (NSW Government, 2009). 
 
In reviewing twelve major agencies with regard to their compliance with TAM, the Auditor 
General expressed concern that little progress had been made in the management of assets 
since its 2005 report.  
 
The audit concluded that Treasury’s ability to make informed decisions to plan the funding of 
statewide asset expenditures for the next ten years was significantly diminished by late, 
incomplete, poor quality and unreliable TAM submissions. Treasury had to adopt alternative, 
time-consuming measures to collect the required information from key agencies. 
 
The audit noted “wide-spread non-compliance” with TAM. The following were the key non-
compliance findings of this audit: 
 
§ Failure to submit the asset strategy as part of the proposed TAM; 
 
§ Failure to document how the agency identified and aligned investment strategies with 
relevant regional and sub regional strategies; 
 
§ Late submission of, or failure to submit business cases and strategic gateway reports; 
 
§ Estimating capital requirements by grouping broad expenditure categories rather than 
estimating expenditure on planned projects. 
 
§ Incorrect use of superseded table formats, resulting in the omission of important 
information, such as work in progress, location of capital projects and maintenance 
measures; 
 
§ Failure to provide required information because of difficulties in extracting and collating 
relevant data; 
 
§ Omission of information as it had been supplied elsewhere, or agencies felt the 
information requested was unimportant, not useful, or could be misconstrued. 
Agencies did not confirm this by seeking formal exemptions from complying with the 
reporting requirements. This included information on property disposals; 
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§ Failure to meet TAM submission deadlines; 
 
§ Failure to obtain Ministerial and CEO sign-offs to TAM submissions; 
 
Perhaps the finding of most concern was that the Government Asset Management Committee 
and State Property Authority were unable to unequivocally confirm whether all information 
requested from agencies in the TAM template had any material impact on strategic decision-
making. 
 
This should be viewed as a strong indication that government’s principal gateway for asset 
investment decisions and policy initiatives (GAMC) (and, by extension, Treasury), and 
government’s principal property advisor and reviewer of agency property strategies (SPA) did 
not fully understand the reasons for, or relevance of certain asset information requested from 
agencies. 
7.1.4.6.2 NSW Commission of Audit Interim Report – Public Sector Audit (2012) 
7.1.4.6.2.1 Summary 
This report was commissioned by the NSW Government in 2011 to develop a framework for 
the future of the NSW public sector. Dr Kerry Schott, a former Executive Director of Treasury 
and former Chief Executive of Sydney Water, led the audit (NSW Commission of Audit, 
2012).37 
 
The author considers this report to be remarkable for the reason that it was led by a previous 
principal policy-maker at Treasury with a responsibility for assets, which covered the eventual 
formation and structure of SPA.  Many of the principal issues of the Commission’s terms of 
reference had therefore already been formally brought to the attention of central government at 
least six to eight years prior to the Commission’s establishment. In addition, the Commission’s 
Advisory Board included senior members of the NSW Government who were in positions to 
recognise, and take action on the condition of the NSW public sector well before the 
commissioning of this report. In terms of property asset management, they were aware of the 
reports of the NSW Auditor General in 2005 and 2009 (op. cit. NSW Government 2005 and 
2009). Indeed, the Commission refers to the 2009 report of the NSW Auditor General.  
 
In addition to these, the NSW Auditor General’s Financial Report, 2011 stated the following 
(Audit Office of New South Wales, 2011): 
 
“I could not give an unqualified auditor’s opinion on the General Government and Total State 
Sector Accounts”; and 
 
“I am unable to obtain all the information I require to form an opinion on the value of land 
assets and any other related infrastructure that should be recognised in the financial 
statements. This is the eighth38 year the General Government and Total State Sector Accounts 
have been qualified because of this issue”. 
 
The Commission also made reference to this report.  
 
This, together with the independent findings from the research for this thesis, show that the 
NSW Government had been aware of the deficiencies in the management of the state’s 
assets, and the potential resulting cost to the NSW community, for nearly a decade. 
 
                                                       
37 Dr Schott attended the brief given by Mr Chris Coneeney to NSW Treasury on 4 July 2005. Ref. Section 8.1.4.4. 
38 Bold emphasis inserted by the author. 
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With regard to the lack of information raised by the Auditor General in 2011, it is noted that 
Treasury, through the DoC and its predecessors, was responsible for the maintenance of 
property asset information on the Government Property Register. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the author believes the Commission’s report to be of considerable 
significance, not just for its findings and recommendations, but also for the sense of clarity and 
urgency of its language. The introduction to report contains the following observations and 
statements (op.cit. p.5.): 
 
“It is not good news.” 
 
“Pockets of good practice         but far from excellent.” 
 
“This will hinder the achievement of the Government’s strategies.” 
 
“        the Commission is surprised at the low importance that has been attached to financial, 
people and asset management.” 
 
The report highlights government’s “indispensible” role in providing help and services;, the 
need for efficiency and government’s “duty of care” to ensure taxes paid by the community are 
spent wisely; much of government’s activity and services have a direct impact on the state’s 
economy and productivity; and all aspects of government require accountability. 
 
With regard to accountability, the report found “poor systems, poor clarity about roles, 
insufficient coordination and limited strategic foundations. All this hinders achievement of 
policy and inability to keep pace with societal change.” 
 
The report analysed the development of the structure of the NSW Government. It concluded 
that, with growing public expectation for integrated services, government agencies operating 
as independent organisations was no longer appropriate as it promoted duplication, confusion, 
lack of clarity, and an erosion of public confidence in government.  
 
Multiple independent government agencies also result in fragmentation and inefficiencies in 
terms of deployment and use of resources, terms of employment, and financial and legal 
accountabilities. 
 
In examining the role of central government agencies, the report identified the following as key 
roles for central agencies: 
 
§ The provision of “frank and fearless” advice on policy and strategy; 
 
§ Advice to cabinet on “trade-off” within financial limitations; 
 
§ Managing human resources as a single corporate entity; 
 
§ Co-ordinating government business across departmental boundaries; 
 
§ Measuring and reporting whole-of-government performance; and 
 
§ Enabling government to function. 
 
The Commission saw central agencies acting as a “hub” to improve learning and capacity by 
bringing key professional groups together to facilitate exchange of leading practices, identifying 
trends, and developing solutions to emerging issues. 
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Monitoring and reporting on sector-wide performance was seen as a key role for central 
agencies to ensure the consistency and accuracy of data and information that is common to 
the needs across government clusters.  
 
The report identified “natural custodians” of government-wide information, which, “should be 
seen as the ‘single source of truth’ for each category of information”. The report nominated the 
Department of Finance and Services as being responsible for managing the delivery of the 
asset management corporate enabler. 
7.1.4.6.2.2 Asset Management 
The report devoted a substantial chapter to the management of government assets, which 
bears much similarity to the United States General Accounting Office report to Congress in 
2003 when it placed Federal Real Property on the “High-Risk” list (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2003).   
 
Like the preceding reports of the NSW Auditor General (op. cit. NSW Government 2005 and 
2009) in particular relation to the management of property assets, the Commission found it 
necessary to articulate the accepted basic principles of asset management, which it defined 
as: 
 
§ Assets exist to support service delivery; 
 
§ Good asset planning should be based on current and future service needs, and 
whether these needs can be met by alternative non-asset solutions; 
 
§ Asset planning is to do with evaluating alternatives, the assessment of costs and 
benefits, risk, value for money, and whole-of-asset lives; 
 
§ Asset Management should be integrated into strategic and organisational planning; 
and 
 
§ Asset Management should be subject to appropriate governance structures, and 
accountability for its performance. 
 
The Commission concluded that the existing asset management frameworks, such as TAM, 
are “conceptually sound, but implementation is far from assured” (op. cit. p.103). In this 
respect, it cited that projects had been implemented “for their own sake”; projects had been 
supported on the basis of anecdotal evidence; new assets are provided without considering 
the existing asset base; and project evaluations are often shallow “box-ticking” exercises.  
 
A significant conclusion was that the quality of TAM plans and compliance with TAM policy had 
become “inconsistent”, and of limited value in compiling the State’s Budget. 
 
With regard to asset management governance and administration, the report noted the 
fragmented and confusing frameworks spread across central government agencies, including 
Treasury (TAM policy and guidelines), the Department of Finance and Services (GAMC and 
SPA, Public Works, and management of social housing), and Crown Lands. Similarly, there 
was no over-arching asset management policy statement to establish its objectives. 
 
The Commission noted that the maintenance of assets has a direct relationship to their 
performance and, in turn, to the quality of service delivered through them. It found evidence 
that maintenance is of a lesser priority in the general government and non-commercial Public 
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Trading Enterprise (PTE) sectors than investment in new assets or service delivery 
programmes. 
 
The Commission did not attempt to estimate the value of the resulting maintenance backlogs 
because it found too many variations in maintenance standards, approaches to performance 
and risk management monitoring and measurement, and asset management practices and 
capability within agencies (including systems, expertise, processes and data quality). However, 
it did comment that NSW Health, Housing NSW, NSW Police, and Education and 
Communities, which have large physical and property asset bases, are known historically to 
have significant maintenance backlogs. For example, in 2008 the value of backlogs in schools 
was estimated at $400 million. 
 
Asset utilisation and rationalisation were areas of concern for the Commission. The report 
referred to “various reviews” that had previously concluded that better use of under-utilised 
assets reduces waste, improves service efficiency and quality, and can release capital for 
investment in other areas.  
 
Allied to this, the Commission referred to the inability of agencies to make meaningful and 
informed asset decisions through the lack of understanding of their asset bases, inaccurate 
asset registers, and the lack of processes for identifying and recording assets and asset-
related information and data.  
7.1.4.6.2.3 Recommendations 
In summary, and in relation to the management of assets, the Commission made the following 
key recommendations: 
 
Actions for the Government 
 
§ Clarification of asset management leadership roles and responsibilities for Ministers, 
Directors General, and Chief Executives. Accountability to be secured through letters 
of Charter and performance agreements; 
 
§ Establish a specialised unit for the lease and sale of assets; 
 
§ Undertake formal training for Chief Financial Officers; 
 
§ Release an asset management policy statement with clear objectives, and governance 
and management arrangements across government; and 
 
§ Ensure the significance of asset maintenance in strategic planning. 
 
Actions for Central Agencies 
 
§ Establish forums of key professional groups, such as finance, human resources, and 
assets, to report to Executive Committees; 
 
§ Develop and establish an integrated reporting framework; 
 
§ Treasury to consider implementing capital charging to drive more efficient use of 
assets and capital; 
 
§ Promote cluster and ‘family’ agencies to co-operate on asset management; 
 
§ Undertake collaborative asset management benchmarking and evaluations in 
conjunction with external experts; 
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§ Establish maintenance-related Key Performance Indicators to be incorporated into 
TAM; 
 
§ Treasury to consider adequacy of agency Asset Maintenance Strategic Plan within the 
TAM process; 
 
§ Reviews of capital submissions to interrogate whole-of-costs and their funding 
sources; and 
 
§ Department of Finance and Services to be responsible for identification and recording 
of land and infrastructure assets. 
 
Actions for Clusters Directors General 
 
§ Establish senior management leadership groups; 
 
§ Review management support systems for asset management; 
 
§ Increase the efficacy of TAM; 
 
§ Ensure clusters and/or agencies have transparent asset management governance, 
systems and processes; and 
 
§ Focus on asset rationalisation. 
7.1.4.6.2.4 “Reform: Just do it!” 
Chapter 6 of the Commission’s Report is titled “Reform: just do it!”  
 
It cites John F. Kennedy, “There are costs and risks to a program of action, but they are far 
less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction.” 
 
This impassioned plea for quick action was accompanied by the following extracts from 
Section 6.1 of the report, “Reforms to begin now”: 
 
“The problems this report has uncovered are systemic”.   
 
“On the surface, processes and systems look functional, in practice, they are often only 
observed “on paper‟ and their intention is ignored.” 
 
“The Commission has been surprised at how consistently basic management practices have 
not been implemented”.   
 
“The time has come to stop commissioning reports from consultants. Reform must begin”. 
 
“The problems have developed over years, and a four or five-year period is needed to remedy 
the situation”.  
 
“In the past, many dedicated people have worked to deliver services by navigating through and 
around cumbersome structures and unnecessary barriers. They have made do with poor data, 
unclear reporting lines and ineffective systems”.  
 
The problems “also stem from a culture of risk aversion, insularity, adherence to procedure 
and powerlessness, even defeatism that has built up over time”. 
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“The Government has legislated a set of values – integrity, trust, service and accountability – 
and emphasising the value of the public service. Now what are needed are consistent 
messages that the Government is serious about this; and then a continued effort to give public 
sector workers the tools they need and to remove the barriers in their way”. 
7.1.4.7 Conclusion 
The findings of the NSW Commission of Audit in 2012 show that little has changed over some 
twenty years of ‘change’ and ‘reform’. It brings to mind the words of Jean-Baptiste Alphonse 
Karr in the January 1849 issue of his journal “Les Guêpes”39, “plus ça change, plus c'est la 
même chose”.40  
 
The call to “just do it” has an air of finality and despair about it. 
 
The Commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations all have a familiar thread 
about them, common to the jurisdictions, both international and national, examined as case 
studies for this thesis, and reflective of the public sector culture and psyche, organisational 
characteristics, approach to reform, aversion to accountability and innovation, and lack of 
performance measurement in anything other than a budgetary context. 
 
It was mentioned earlier that a number of those who led the report and sat on the 
Commission’s Advisory Board were, or continue to be, public servants at the highest level of 
the NSW Government, with responsibility for whole-of-government policy and reform initiatives. 
Additionally, the Director General of the NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet was writing 
in 2002 about “turf wars” and the need for public sector reform, ten years before this report 
(Kruk and Bastaja, op cit.). It is barely conceivable that such high levels of government would 
not have been aware of the work and research of the OECD and others, including their public 
service colleagues, into behaviour, New Public Management and reform, and performance 
measurement. 
 
In this connection, the Commission’s comments in the above extracts from Section 6.1 of the 
report can be interpreted as having been existing during the tenure of the Commission’s 
members as senior NSW public servants. The comment relating to stopping commissioning 
reports from consultants would seem to be an admission of this, as would the observation that 
“the problems have developed over years”. 
 
One conclusion, therefore, could be that the prospect of, and the public sector’s appetite for 
meaningful reform may be no closer, Karr’s epigram will hold true, and any change will merely 
be observed “on paper‟. 
7.1.4.8 Post-Research Note: The Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce 
In December 2012, the NSW Government adopted new property principles through Premier’s 
Memorandum M20-12 (M20-12), and renamed the State Property Authority to Property NSW 
(NSW Government, 2012a). These changes were made pursuant to the Property Asset 
Utilisation Taskforce (PAUT) Report, which was published in September 2012 (NSW 
Government, 2012b). 
 
PAUT’s aim was “to make recommendations for the optimisation of the utilisation, ownership 
and management of the State’s real property assets.” This has a very familiar ring about it, with 
effectively the same exercise having been carried out with the initial proposal for the SPA. 
 
                                                       
39 The Wasps 
40 The more it changes; the more it is the same thing. 
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The author’s research for this case study concluded prior to the publication of the PAUT report. 
It has therefore not been reviewed in detail, but its key finding and recommendations echo 
those of all previous reports and audits, without apparently offering anything new other than 
one important recommendation. This was to re-brand SPA into Property NSW, and staff it with 
“the highest quality property professionals”. 
 
In his covering letter enclosing the report to the Minister for Finance and Services, PAUT’s 
Chairman, Geoffrey Levy, AO, drew the Minister’s attention to the following: 
 
§ Government has accumulated a property portfolio that it cannot afford to maintain or 
protect; 
 
§ Assets are under-utilised or are no longer required or suitable for the provision of 
services; 
 
§ These put medium-term fiscal policy at risk; 
 
§ The opportunity and financial cost of under-utilised and surplus property “comes at the 
expense of an asset or service that is needed”; 
 
§ PAUT was unable to identify and categorise government’s owned and leased property 
due to the lack of “a usable, transparent or complete Property Asset Register”. 
Geoffrey Levy noted that “this lack of centralised information seriously inhibits any 
whole of government strategic asset planning”; 
 
§ The current framework of government “has created an insular, siloed and reactive 
mentality, which negates the ability for a whole of government approach to strategic 
asset management. A change in framework is required …. to drive appropriate 
sensible strategic decisions and behaviour”. 
 
§ Capital allocation should be made by Government and implemented by Treasury. The 
reverse is the case under the current framework. 
 
Geoffrey Levy concluded his comments with, “we cannot continue to manage our assets under 
the current system. That will surely lead to continued deterioration of our assets, impact the 
quality of government service delivery and leave a legacy we cannot fund for the next 
generation.” 
 
PAUT gave some consideration to the implementation of its recommendations through the 
brief action timeline, “After PAUT”, which is reproduced at Figure 8.4. This timeline was not 
accompanied by any implementation commentary or suggested change management 
framework and strategy. 
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Figure 7.4: “After PAUT” 
 
This post-research note is intended to provide a connection for further and continuing research 
into the reform of the management of property assets in the NSW Government. 
7.1.5 Australian Local Government Sector – led by the blind 
7.1.5.1 Introduction 
The ‘led by the blind’ description of asset management in Australian local government may 
appear to some as a little unfair, or even frivolous. Neither bias nor frivolity is intended. 
 
‘Led by the blind’, because of the extent of prescriptive control exercised on a national scale by 
the federal, and particularly the state and territory governments over local government’s 
planning and reporting process, especially since it has been clearly shown that the higher 
levels of government have such low standards of governance, management and reporting over 
their assets. Additionally, these impositions were introduced as ‘best’ practice reforms, but 
were not implemented on ‘good’ change management practices.  
 
Strategic asset management in local government has therefore been imposed through an Ill-
conceived ‘top – down’ policy, reminiscent of the New Public Management paradigm. 
 
Additionally, the author contends that, to-date, there have not been any meaningful moves 
towards strategic asset management as a result of ‘bottom-up’ innovation and thinking from 
within local government, and its regional associations and professional representative 
organisations.  
 
The author has made representations to a number of these associations and organisations 
across Australia. With the possible exception of the now defunct Australian Centre of 
Excellence for Local Government (ACELG), and the New South Wales branch of Local 
Government Professionals Australia, most profess their nodding-support but, in practice, have 
maintained a distant indifference towards the strategic management of assets within their 
Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) frameworks, preferring instead to leave the issue to 
the ‘top-down’ approach of the state governments.  
 
The author sees this reluctance to self-help as a result of the general lack of strategic asset 
management understanding at all levels of government, and its related institutions as a 
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resource management function; a continuing belief that strategic asset management relates to 
developing management ‘strategies’ (in effect, plans) for individual assets, i.e. operating, 
maintaining, and replacing existing assets from an almost purely technical perspective, without 
reference to the demand for services, financial constraints, and other influencing factors; and 
the innate public sector cultural resistance to change. 
 
Notwithstanding these barriers, it is the local government sector that shows the most potential 
for developing and adopting good asset management practices. Perhaps local government can 
open the eyes of the state and federal governments. There are signs, albeit very faint, that this 
could be the case. 
7.1.5.2 Local Government Reform in Australia 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the state governments undertook far-ranging reforms in the local 
government sector. These reforms required local governments to adopt performance 
measures similar to those of the private sector or, In other words, pursuit of New Public 
Management principles (Dollery & Lorenzo, 2008). 
 
Also in the 1990s and for reasons of efficiency and operational improvement, the state 
governments undertook a review of the benefits of council amalgamations. As a result, Victoria 
substantially reduced the number of its councils from 210 to 78, whilst reductions were also 
made in Queensland, Tasmania, and South Australia (Marshall, 2008). Minimal cost savings 
have been recorded since these forced mergers, which have caused much resentment, have 
been seen as a dilution of representative democracy, and have been the cause of widespread 
job losses (Ibid). 
 
A number of council amalgamations in some states have since de-merged, and reverted to 
their original compositions. 
 
Notwithstanding the apparent failure and certain unpopularity of amalgamations, Western 
Australia (WA) and NSW have both pursued council amalgamation policies in recent years. 
 
In WA, detailed plans for amalgamations were recommended by ‘the Robson Report’, which 
had been commissioned by the State Government. (Robson, 2012).  
 
The WA Government commenced a two-part programme in 2009. The way in which the 
reforms were presented to the local government sector, individual councils, and communities, 
resulted in strained relationships between these stakeholders and the state government, and 
its Department of Local Government and Communities (DLGC). These relationships continue 
amid an atmosphere of cynicism, mistrust, and lack of confidence in the state government’s 
ability to listen to, or understand the issues faced by its less resourced and poorer cousins. 
 
The amalgamation element of the reform in the country areas of the state, where there are 
over 100 local councils, some covering tens of thousands of square kilometres with 
populations of fewer than 1,000 people, was also unpopular with the National Party, the Liberal 
Party’s coalition partner in government41. This led to the withdrawal of the requirement for 
country councils to amalgamate. 
 
Opposition to forced council amalgamations in the metropolitan areas in the vicinity of the state 
capital, Perth, was so passionate that the WA State Premier, Colin Barnett, conceded: “I’ve 
failed. I’ve put up the white flag. If ratepayers want to stay the way they are, so be it.”42 
 
                                                       
41 For example, Australia's largest council by area is East Pilbara in WA. It covers an area of 371,696 square 
kilometres, has a population of 7,954 and 3,237 kilometres of roads (Australian Local Government Association, 2016). 
42 ABC Radio interview with Colin Barnett on 10 February 2015. 
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In the face vehement opposition, the NSW state government is continuing with its forced 
amalgamation programme, which is largely based on a controversial “cabinet-in-confidence” 
and hitherto unpublished report from private sector consultants KPMG (2015), a report from 
the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (2015), and a report from the NSW 
Independent Local Government Review Panel (2013), (Boxall, Jones, & Comrie, 2015; 
Sansom, Munro, & Inglis, 2013). 
 
This thesis is not concerned with the benefits or otherwise of council amalgamations. However, 
whether public or private, an organisation’s capacity and capability in the management of its 
assets is essential for the success of any merger, acquisition or amalgamation. Local 
government in Australia is deficient in both. 
 
The second major element of reform over the last ten years has been a continuation of the 
NPM doctrine of the 1990s. This is the introduction of IPR Frameworks by state governments, 
which formally require their local government sectors to prepare strategies and plans, and 
report to defined standards and guidelines. It is with the implementation of these requirements 
that this thesis is concerned. 
7.1.5.3 The Significance of Local Government in Australia 
The local government sector in Australia is particularly significant in terms of the extent of 
public and community services that are devolved to it under Australia’s federal system of 
government43. 
 
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, functions of local government were primarily 
concerned with physical infrastructure, the proverbial ‘roads, rubbish, and rates’. These 
responsibilities have since expanded to include community facilities; local road networks; 
planning approvals; child and health care and aged care facilities; waste disposal; economic 
development and tourism; recreation, sporting and cultural facilities; youth programmes; 
environmental management; and regional airports (Brunet-Jailly & Martin, 2010).  
 
This expansion in services has inevitably led to closer relationships with communities. This has 
led to wider community participation in the decision-making process, and higher service and 
transparency expectations from local government.  
 
In a period of some thirty years, local government has grown from ‘roads and rubbish’ to 
providing a wide range of specialist and sometimes complex services to sustain communities, 
and shape their future. They have become a major part of the service industry. 
 
This thesis will show that local government has been expected to implement this growth and 
change very much on its own, without the necessary support from either the federal or state 
governments in terms of resources and capacity and capability building. In reviewing Dollery 
and Lorenzo’s book, Giogio Brosio of the University of Turin wrote, “Structural reform has been 
one of the most important, and yet one of the most neglected, aspects of modern local 
government” (Dollery and Lorenzo, op. cit.). 
 
These services may not differ materially from local government in other jurisdictions, but it is 
the very size of the country, the concentration of its population on the eastern seaboard, 
principally in cities of Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne, the importance of agriculture and 
farming to the economy, and the share of total tax revenue that affects the ability of the 
majority of local governments to sustain not only the delivery of these services, but also their 
own financial viability, and the future of their communities. These issues primarily threaten 
                                                       
43 Local government as a tier of government is not recognised under the Australian Constitution. It is regulated by the 
state and territory governments, which recognise local government in their constitutions. 
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country local governments. However, metropolitan councils are not immune to threats against 
their sustainability. 
 
The following facts and figures relating to the Australian local government sector have been 
obtained from the Australian Local Government Association (Australian Local Government 
Association, 2016): 
 
§ Australia Population (2014): 23.425 million 
 
§ Number of Local Governments (2016): 561, of which 539 are regional or country local 
governments 
 
§ Number of Local Government Employees: 183,000 
 
§ Rates Collected (2012-13): $14 billion  
 
§ Total Expenditure 2012-13: $32.2 billion 
 
§ Total road length (2014): 670,000 kilometres  
  
§ Value of Local Roads (2014): $165 billion  
 
§ Value of Land and Fixed Assets (2012 -13): $333 billion 
 
§ Functions include: 
 
− Infrastructure and property services, including local roads, bridges, footpaths, 
drainage, waste collection and management; 
 
− Provision of recreation facilities, such as parks, sports fields and stadiums, golf 
courses, swimming pools, sport centres, halls, camping grounds and caravan 
parks; 
 
− Health services such as water and food inspection, immunisation services, toilet 
facilities, noise control and meat inspection and animal control; 
 
− Community services, such as child care, aged care and accommodation, 
community care and welfare services; 
 
− Building services, including inspections, licensing, certification and enforcement; 
 
− Planning and development approval; 
 
− Administration of facilities, such as airports and aerodromes, ports and marinas, 
cemeteries, parking facilities and street parking; 
 
− Cultural facilities and services, such as libraries, art galleries and museums; 
 
− Water and sewerage services; 
 
− Other services, such as abattoirs, sale-yards and group purchasing schemes. 
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7.1.5.4 Local Government’s Financial Context and Financial Sustainability 
7.1.5.4.1 Financial Context 
Individual councils have differing abilities to raise revenue, based on location, population size, 
rate base and the ability to levy user charges. There are three main sources of revenue:  
taxation (rates), user charges, and grants from federal and state and territory governments. 
Other sources of revenue are investment interest, dividend interest, income from public 
enterprises and fines. 
 
Rates account for about thirty-seven percent of total local government revenue. However, in 
2012-13, rates comprised a mere 3.3 percent (2012-2013) of tax raised by all levels of 
government.  
 
Out of 260 taxes raised by the Australian public sectors, a rate is the only tax levied by local 
government. Some state governments compound the inability of local governments to move 
towards self-sustainability through the imposition of ‘rate-capping’ policies. For example, NSW 
has restricted local government rate increases since 1978. 
 
Overall, grants and subsidies from the Australian and state and territory governments account 
for around ten percent of total revenue. For some rural and remote councils where own-source 
revenue raising capacity is limited, grants can account for more than fifty per cent of council 
revenue. 
 
The Federal Government provides financial assistance grants to local government. These are 
paid to state governments for distribution to local government via state grants commissions. 
 
Councils also receive funding under a range of Federal Government programs, such as the 
Roads to Recovery program, Road Safety Black Spot program, Bridges Renewal Program and 
the Building Stronger Regions Fund. 
 
In 2012-13 Local Government expenditure totalled $32.2 billion, with the major expenditure 
items being housing and community amenities (23.4 per cent) and transport and 
communications (22.5 per cent). 
 
The local government sector, therefore, has a very limited ability to raise substantial recurring 
revenues on its own behalf. It is highly dependent on grant and subsidy funding from the 
federal and state government.  
 
Since the burst of the mining investment bubble in 2014/15, the Australian economy and fiscal 
position has come under increasing pressure. This has reduced, and in some cases cut-off, 
the availability of federal and state grants and subsidies. WA has had its AAA rating 
downgraded by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s rating agencies, both of which are currently 
(December 2016) monitoring the Federal Government’s fiscal position. 
7.1.5.4.2 Financial Sustainability and Financial Capacity 
Since 2006, the preservation of the ‘financial sustainability’ of local governments in Australia 
has been the predominant driver of reform in the management of this sector’s assets (refer to 
Section 7.1.5.5). 
 
The term ‘financial sustainability’ has a unique meaning for local government. 
 
In its independent review of the financial sustainability of the NSW local government sector the 
New South Wales Treasury Corporation (NSW TCorp) developed its own definition of ‘financial 
sustainability’ as: “A local government will be financially sustainable over the long term when it 
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is able to generate sufficient funds to provide the levels of service and infrastructure agreed 
with its community” (New South Wales Treasury Corporation, 2013). 
 
This definition reflects the uniqueness of its meaning to local government. It recognises the 
importance of the long-term nature of local government’s service functions and responsibilities, 
and it links or integrates financial management with service and infrastructure requirements, 
service levels, and community aspirations. 
 
Financial sustainability can only be achieved if a council’s management has the ability to 
strategically manage the organisation, stakeholders, and community in the long-term. This 
relates to a council’s financial capacity, which consists of the organisational resources that 
enable it to recognise and take advantage of opportunities, and the agility to react to 
unexpected situations, whilst maintaining its business-as-usual administrative functions and 
services to the community (Sontag-Padilla, Staplefoote, & Gonzalez Morganti, 2012). 
 
Maintaining both financial sustainability and financial capacity over the long-term is critical for 
providing consistent and continually available services to the community, and expanding and 
improving those services. 
 
Given its financial context, particularly the limited capacity to raise revenue, ‘financial 
sustainability’ is somewhat of a catch-22 position for local government.  
 
In his research paper, ‘Australian Local Government Assets: a case for excellence in their 
management’, presented at the ACELG Research Showcase and Forum in 2014, the author 
identified three major threats to the financial sustainability of local government in Australia. 
These were: sources of revenue, local government assets and their management, and the 
unintended effects of IPR reform, which ironically is the tool that was intended to improve 
sustainability (Seymour-Jones, 2014a). 
 
In the two and half years since the presentation of this research at the ACELG forum, the 
author has concluded that the threats to local government extend beyond financial 
sustainability to the very survivability of some communities and their social, environmental, and 
economic fabric. 
7.1.5.5 Integrated Planning and Reporting: national consistency to “a complex web” 
Although state and territory governments in Australia would contend that ‘good’ governance 
and management in local government were enshrined in their various Local Government Acts, 
it was not until 2006 when the concept of ‘Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) 
Frameworks’ was formally recognised, and introduced as a local government practice 
requirement. 
 
From the mid-2000s, concerns had been raised at both state and national level over the 
financial sustainability of councils.  
 
In 2005, the Local Government Association of South Australia released an independent report 
that showed “councils had put community needs and demands for services ahead of their own 
financial sustainability” (Tan & Artist, 2013). 
 
In 2007, the Queensland Treasury Corporation carried out financial sustainability assessments 
for 105 councils. Forty per cent were assessed as ‘financially weak’, ‘financially very weak’ or 
‘financially distressed’ (Martin 2009 in Tan & Artist 2013, p. 21). 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) published a report in 2006 that stated “… a sizeable 
proportion of councils face long-term financial sustainability problems” 
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(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). It observed a tendency to reduce and defer expenditure on 
the maintenance and renewal of existing infrastructure and major community assets when 
councils encountered operating cash flow deficits. These deferrals have been the cause of 
large asset renewal and replacement backlogs. 
  
The PwC report concluded that local government unsustainability is a result of poor resource 
planning, which leads to long-term financial problems. 
 
In 2006, the Local Government and Planning Ministers Council (LGPMC) called for the 
development of nationally consistent financial sustainability frameworks for local government. 
Councils were to protect sustainability by managing infrastructure through effective asset 
management and financial planning (Local Government and Planning Ministers' Council, 
2007).  
 
All such planning was to be based on councils communicating with their communities to 
ascertain long-term community vision and aspirations, and service priorities. 
 
All states and territories, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have 
enacted legislation requiring councils to adopt strategic community, corporate, workforce, 
financial and asset management planning to varying degrees. The most rigorous and 
extensive of these are NSW, Victoria and WA, which have established comprehensive 
planning and reporting frameworks. 
 
Table 7.5, adapted and modified from Tan and Artist (op. cit.), summarises the planning and 
reporting frameworks adopted by the state and territory governments. This table shows that 
“nationally consistent frameworks”, as envisioned by the LGPMC, were far from achieved. Tan 
and Artist described the national picture as “one of a complex web of legislation with differing 
approaches, requirements and strength of hierarchies in terms of links between strategic 
(community and financial), corporate and resource planning” (ibid).  
 
The Northern Territory does not require Strategic, Asset Management, and Workforce Plans; 
Queensland does not require a Workforce Plan; South Australia does not require Strategic and 
Workforce Plans; and Tasmania does not require Financial, Asset Management, and 
Workforce Plans. 
 
 
Table 7.5: Local Government Integrated Planning and Reporting Frameworks 
 
Queensland’s framework originally required a ten-year Community Strategic Plan, but this 
requirement was repealed in 2012 “to cut unnecessary red tape and streamline provisions 
about the financial sustainability and accountability of local government” (Local Government 
and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012, Explanatory Notes in Tan & Artist 2013, pp. 21-
22). 
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It is interesting to note the length of time taken by some jurisdictions to introduce IPR, given 
that the LGPMC called for these frameworks in 2006. For example, WA did not publish any 
effective framework guidelines until 2011, it was not until 2012 that legislation was passed, and 
mid-2013 when IPR was implemented. 
 
It will be shown that, despite the early warning signs, the involvement of the LGPMC and 
legislation enacted by the states, financial unsustainability remains a major threat to local 
government across Australia. 
7.1.5.6 Management of Local Government Assets in the United Kingdom 
The management of local government assets outside of Australia was not originally intended to 
be a feature of research for this thesis. However, as the focus of the author’s examination of 
the Australian local government sector has increased, so too has the level of importance of the 
management of local government assets become more evident in the context of the public 
sector as a whole.  
 
This section provides a brief introduction to the importance of a strategic approach to the 
management of property and other assets by the UK local government sector. It also shows 
that the issues faced by UK councils bear strong similarities to those of the Australian local 
government sector.  
 
Additionally, the Lyons Report and the OGC’s Roadmap are shown to be relevant not just to 
Central Government, but they also have particular relevance in the local government context 
(Audit Commission, 2009a). 
 
It is hoped that this will also encourage further research, and reveal useful lessons for all levels 
of government in Australia. 
 
The performance of local governments in the United Kingdom in recent years has been under 
the scrutiny of the Central Government, which expects local authorities to ensure that all 
money spent on local authority assets contributes to the creation of sustainable communities 
and to the delivery of better public services.  
 
In the Forward to Building On Strong Foundations – A Framework for Local Authority Asset 
Management (Building on Strong Foundations), John Healey, Minister for Local Government in 
the UK, said: 
 
‘Over the past few years councils have greatly improved the way in which they manage their 
assets. Recent research shows that most local authorities started from a low base with some 
not even knowing what assets they owned. The challenge ahead of us is for all authorities to 
reach the level of the best and to ensure that they are thinking strategically about how they can 
get the most from their asset base.’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2008). 
 
“This document outlines the benefits of good asset management. For example, good local 
authority asset management can: 
 
§ Deliver exceptional services for citizens, aligned with locally agreed priorities, whilst 
focusing investment clearly on need; 
 
§ Empower communities and stimulate debate; 
 
§ Improve the economic well-being of an area; 
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§ Ensure that, once built, assets are correctly maintained; 
 
§ Introduce new working practices and trigger cultural organisational changes; 
 
§ Reduce carbon emissions and improve environmental sustainability; 
 
§ Increase co-location, partnership working and sharing of knowledge; 
 
§ Improve the accessibility of services; 
  
§ Generate efficiency gains, capital receipts, or an income stream; and 
 
§ Improve the quality of the public realm. 
 
“Achieving these outcomes is seen to be a corporate responsibility for all UK local authority 
members and officials.” 
 
Notwithstanding a noted improvement in capital and asset planning processes, the report 
concluded that there was still a long way to go before it could be said that most councils were 
making the most of capital resources and property assets. 
 
In 2009, the Audit Commission in the UK published a national report, Room for Improvement – 
Strategic asset management in local government (Room for Improvement) (Audit Commission, 
2009b).44 This is the third in a series of reports into the management of local authority assets, 
which include Local Government Property: A Management Overview (Audit Commission, 
1988) and Hot Property: getting the best from local authority assets (Audit Commission, 2000). 
 
In acknowledging the benefits set out in Building Strong Foundations, Room for Improvement 
reported the following key findings: 
 
§ Councils had made limited progress in good property management since its 2000 Hot 
Property report. The performance of some 46 of 111 councils was found to have 
deteriorated; 
 
§ Council property is “big business”. In 2007/08, councils in England owned property 
with a book value of £250 billion; invested net capital of over £10 billion in property; 
and invested £800 million in property acquisitions or refurbishments; 
 
§ Only twenty per cent of councils had sufficient asset data and information for the 
proper management of their property; 
 
§ Many councils lacked the necessary management capacity, with this being attributed 
to the effects of NPM; 
 
§ The timing of the report coincided with the UK’s recession following the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007/2008. It noted that councils were generally neither well placed 
to take advantage of opportunities that are presented in times of difficulty and 
adversity, nor were they able to take the opportunity to consider more efficient and 
effective ways of using their property;  
 
§ Over seventy-five per cent of councils surveyed by the Audit Commission claimed to 
have made savings by managing property more efficiently over the preceding five 
                                                       
44 The Audit Commission is an independent watchdog for local public services. 
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years. However, only forty per cent of these could provide figures to substantiate this 
for operating savings, and only ten per cent for capital savings; 
 
§ Only forty per cent of councils that had a property plan had targeted savings in capital 
and operating spending; and 
 
§ Ninety per cent of Finance Directors said that their councils managed assets 
strategically, and twenty-five per cent described their asset management as ‘very 
effective’. The report referred to evidence to the contrary contained in an earlier report 
in 2007 by the Department of Local Government and Communities, which, from a 
study carried out over a six-year period, concluded that most councils were “not yet in 
a position to generate outcomes to a significant degree” (Department of Communities 
and Local Government, 2007).  
 
In the context of the limited amount of research into the UK Local Government Sector 
undertaken for this thesis, the reports of the Department of Communities and Local 
Government, and the Audit Commission are considered to be significant documents, not only 
for the UK but also for drawing comparisons, and highlighting similarities with local government 
in Australia. 
 
Research undertaken in 2010 by Alan Phelps explored the link between rationale, practice and 
outcomes in municipal property asset management in UK councils (Phelps, 2010). Phelps 
found “a weak but discernable link between rationale and practice, but the link between 
practice and outcomes was unproven”. Like Kaganova and McKellar, Phelps found the lack of 
empirical evidence as case for further research, and reinforced the orthodox thinking that the 
“adoption of practice is used as a proxy for measuring outcomes”. 
 
Phelps described the search for a single methodology to assess asset management outcomes 
“as something of a holy grail” citing difficulties in constructing measures of efficiency and 
performance for property in contributing to service and corporate outcomes. Research that has 
been undertaken has tended to focus on measures for particular types of buildings. Phelps 
described the issue as “problematic’ because of the difficulty in identifying and quantifying 
asset management’s contribution to outcomes, and separating them from other contributing 
components. 
 
Much of this research into the UK experience mirrors the author’s findings for the Australian 
Local Government Sector. In terms of the search for Phelps’ ‘holy grail’, it is most unlikely that 
it will be uncovered before the adoption of good asset management practice, and a long-term 
acceptance and integration of that practice has been etched into local government 
management culture. 
 
However, there should not be any form of mutual exclusivity attached to making progress. One 
thing can be done without the other to the extent that progress in ‘one thing’ should encourage 
progress in ‘the other’.  
7.1.5.7 Strategic Asset Management in the Australian Local Government Sector 
“Asset management systems improve the financial sustainability of local governments if they 
result in a properly prioritised, managed, and manageable asset maintenance renewal and 
replacement program that is affordable and productive” (Trust, 2012).  
 
“Financial sustainability exists for local governments where a conservative realistic 
assessment of future own source and transfer income mean that asset operation, 
maintenance, replacement, renewal and creation can occur on a structured and planned basis 
over the longer term” (Ibid.). 
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“Asset management is at the heart of considerations of local government financial 
sustainability. The main requirement is asset data integrity and sector comparability” (Ibid.). 
 
“Community strategic plans set the context and priorities for corporate resourcing strategies, 
ensuring that local governments are better able to meet community needs, expectations and 
priorities” (Tan and Artist, 2013, op.cit. p.14). 
 
“It is therefore crucial that that local government be expert in financial and asset management” 
(Carter, 2013). 
 
The author contends that the management of public assets falls short in all these areas, which 
is why IPR has so far failed to improve the prospects of local government sustainability (not 
just in a financial sense), and in some cases, survivability, across the country. 
 
This sustained failure represents a breach of the contract that all levels of the public sector 
implicitly has with the community45. 
 
Central to these failures, are local government assets, which are rarely seen as strategic 
organisational resources necessary for all aspects of life, and that their management shapes 
the social, environmental, physical and financial fabric of communities.  
 
Even though land, buildings and infrastructure represent more than ninety per cent of local 
government’s fixed asset value, they seem to be taken for granted, and treated as a free good 
in the same manner as the federal and state governments. 
 
There can be no doubt that the continuing threats to sustainability and survivability are in a 
large part due to poor asset-related decisions, and the continuing tactical and operational 
approach to their management. The following are seen as the principal reasons for this: 
 
§ Notwithstanding that the principles of IPR have apparently been recognised by the 
Australian public sectors as a tested world’s leading practice, and that “it is crucial that 
local government be expert in financial and strategic asset management”, these 
principles have not been properly understood at state government level46.  
 
This has meant that the states have not appreciated either the magnitude or 
complexity of the task of implementing IPR across their local government sectors. For 
example, there are some 140 local governments in WA. The state government 
approached this as a single ‘one-size-fits-all’ project without regard to the individuality 
of each council, their cultures, size, location, diversity, priorities, environment, or 
whether they were metropolitan or country councils. In practice, there were 140 
change management projects to be managed, each with its own special set of 
circumstances. Implementation has therefore been far from a leading practice in 
communication and change management. 
 
There has been an apparent naïve assumption by federal and state governments that 
councils would simply accept what has been imposed over them, and somehow 
source the capacity and capability to implement the reforms. This has caused cultural 
and social gaps between state and local governments, which have often led to the 
mistrust between the two. 
 
                                                       
45 Refer to Section 5.1. 
46 IPR principles are explained in Section 7.1.5.8. 
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§ Like the federal and state governments, little is known about local government’s asset 
base. Asset registers are incomplete and inaccurate, and asset data is rarely collected, 
processed or analysed to provide reliable information for decision-making.  
 
There is strong evidence that local government’s lack of asset management 
understanding, capacity and capability has led to an over-reliance on systems and the 
readiness to accept modelling outputs as proxies for strategy. The population of these 
systems with unreliable and incomplete data compounds the risks of poor decision-
making and the long-term effects on sustainability and communities. 
 
This produces misleading asset financial ratios, which are the only indicators of asset 
management performance prescribed by state governments. These ratios, the Asset 
Consumption Ratio, Asset Sustainability Ratio, and Asset Renewal Funding Ratio 
indicate the aged condition of assets, the extent to which assets are replaced at the 
end of their useful lives, and the ability to fund asset renewals and replacements 
respectively. 
 
State governments use these ratios to assess local governments’ asset management 
performance and, together with other financial ratios, their financial sustainability.  
 
The ratios are reported publicly through state government websites and local 
government Annual Reports. Until they are based on good data, they will be erroneous 
and misleading. 
 
Given this focus on financial performance of assets, not enough is known about assets 
themselves, or how they are performing strategically and operationally in support of 
the provision of services. 
 
§ In working with councils in the management of their assets, and in an effort to 
benchmark asset costs and performance across the sector, the author has 
encountered a noticeable reluctance for councils to consider sharing information, 
systems and assets, and to communicate and co-operate with others in the same 
region.  
 
In the case of country councils, the reasons are very parochial, and are concerned with 
the fear of losing control and independence, and with inter-regional rivalry. 
       
       Metropolitan councils shy away from sharing and co-operation mostly because of the 
mistaken beliefs that their financial sustainability is immune to threat, and that they 
have adopted good asset management practices.  
 
Common to both country and metropolitan local governments is the fear of exposing 
deficiencies in practice and performance. 
 
§ The adoption of good IPR practices by local government is not helped by how few 
state governments have effectively implemented good management practices over 
their own finances and assets.  
 
Asset Management is not seen as a mainstream professional activity in any of the 
Australian public sectors. This is of critical importance to capacity and capability 
building, particularly given the scope and range of skills required for its proper 
implementation. 
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7.1.5.8 Integrated Planning and Reporting Frameworks 
NSW and WA have adopted the most comprehensive IPR Frameworks of the state and 
territory governments in that their frameworks include all of the planning and reporting 
elements envisaged by the LGPMC. Additionally, the frameworks are founded on community 
engagement. These frameworks are reproduced from their respective IPR frameworks and 
guidelines in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 (NSW Government, 2013; Western Australia Government, 
2010) 
 
     
        Figure 7.5: NSW IPR Framework                              Figure 7.6: WA IPR Framework 
 
With the exception of some subtle differences in structure and nomenclature, these 
frameworks are almost identical. WA modelled its framework on NSW. Both are based on 
developing their strategies and plans through community engagement; and both have the 
same monitoring and reporting process. 
 
However, a noticeable difference is the description of Asset and other strategies. NSW refers 
to them as “Resourcing Strategies”, whereas WA describes them as “Informing Strategies”. 
This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it indicates that NSW appreciates that money, 
people, and assets are ‘resources’; and secondly, that WA views them as sources of 
information. The author has found the latter to be misleading in WA as it is not the ‘strategies’ 
that inform, but the related resource data and information.  
 
The key word in this concept is “Integrated”. From a diagrammatic perspective, both 
frameworks give the impression that the “resourcing” and “informing” strategies occupy a 
lesser position in the frameworks, which downplays the very important linkages, and 
interdependencies that should integrate them into the organisation’s strategic and business 
planning process. However, in practice, this has mattered little, as neither set of local 
governments has made any material headway in integrating strategic community, corporate 
business, and resources planning on a whole-of-organisation basis. 
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7.1.5.8.1.1 IPR Compliance Requirements 
Using the WA IPR Framework as the common example, all councils are required to have 
implemented frameworks, and prepared strategies and plans that comply with the minimum 
basis requirements as shown in Table 7.6. 
 
Document / Element Minimum Standard 
Strategic Community 
Plan (SCP) 
§ Minimum period: 10 years 
§ Describes community values and aspirations 
§ Describes council’s community engagement policy or strategy 
§ Describes how the community has been consulted 
§ Identifies expectations for services, assets, and land-use 
§ Considers current and future resource capacity, demographic 
trends, and strategic performance management 
§ It is adopted by absolute majority of Council, of which public 
notice must be given 
§ A strategic review is scheduled after 2 years 
§ A full review is scheduled after 4 years 
Corporate Business 
Plan (CBP) 
§ Minimum period: 4 years 
§ Identifies and prioritises principal strategies and activities Council 
will undertake in response to the objectives stated in the SCP 
§ States services, operations, and projects to be delivered over the 
period of the plan, methods of delivery, and associated cost 
§ Assigns responsibilities 
§ Provides for measurement and reporting of the plan 
§ References resourcing implications from Asset Management 
Strategy, Long-Term Financial Plan (LTFP), and Workforce Plan 
§ Adopted by absolute majority of Council, of which public notice 
must be given 
§ Current year of the plan establishes the Annual Budget 
§ Reviewed annually 
§ Council has in place: 
− WFP that meets the Basic Standard 
− Asset Management Plans, with KPIs for significant / 
critical asset classes 
− AM Plans include adequately populated asset registers, and 
are able to calculate KPI data as set out in Asset 
Management Framework and Guidelines 
− A LTFP 
Annual Report § Contains an overview of the SCP and CBP, which together 
constitute a Plan for the Future 
§ Describes major initiatives planned to commence/continue in the 
next financial year 
§ Reports any changes to SCP 
§ Reports any significant changes to the CBP 
§ Reports Asset Management ratios 
Asset Management 
Framework 
The Framework must consist of the following: 
§ Asset Register 
§ Asset Management Policy 
§ Asset Management Strategy 
§ Asset Management Improvement Plan 
§ Asset Management Plans for each Asset Class 
§ Asset Plans for Individual Significant/Critical Assets/Components 
Table 7.6: IPR Compliance Requirements 
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Planning for the future was already a requirement under the Local Government legislation of 
both NSW and WA before the introduction of IPR. The IPR frameworks, elements of which 
have been formalised by amending legislation, serve to provide substance and guidance for 
that future planning. Strategic Asset Management and Planning should, therefore, have been 
the only new addition to local government’s planning and management functions. 
 
As shown in Table 7.6, Asset Management has its own framework. The minimum requirements 
of each of the asset management elements are described in Table 7.7. 
 
Document / Element Minimum Standard 
Asset Register § Assets divided into the following classes: 
−  Land 
− Buildings 
− Infrastructure 
− Plant and Equipment 
− Information, Communication, and Technology, 
 
These are further divided into sub-classes and components and 
linked to the Financial Asset Register 
Asset Management 
Policy 
§ Sets out strategic asset management objectives, targets and plans 
§ Provides for Asset Management within IPR 
§ Provides governance and management arrangements for Asset 
Management 
§ Sets Asset Management roles & responsibilities, including for 
Elected Members, Chief Executive Officer, Senior Executives, and 
‘Asset Owners’ 
§ Sets out process for asset investment decision-making 
§ Commits to a whole-of-organisation approach to Asset 
Management 
§ Commits to whole-of-life approach to managing assets 
§ Commits to continuous improvement and leading practice 
processes 
§ The policy is understood and approved by absolute majority of 
Council 
Asset Management 
Strategy 
§ A high-level strategy describing how assets will meet future 
community needs 
§ Integrates Asset Management into Council’s Plan for the Future 
§ Prioritises delivery and methods of delivery of community services 
for each asset class  
§ Provides an overview of the current state of assets  
§ Defines the desired future state of the asset base in accordance 
with SCP and CBP, and LTFP 
§ Identifies and analyses gaps (including financial) between current 
and desired future asset states 
§ Contains asset ratios 
§ Provides performance indicators, measures, and targets, and 
mechanism to evaluate and report strategy progress. 
 
 
 
135 
Table 7.7: Asset Management Framework Requirements 
7.1.5.8.1.2 Summary of Outcomes for WA and NSW 
The IPR requirements are comprehensive, for which both the NSW and WA state governments 
have not apparently demonstrated an appreciation for the need to provide sufficient and 
adequate long-term on-going support to councils in the development of their IPR and asset 
management capability and capacity. 
 
Appendix 3 contains an analysis of the implementation of IPR in WA and NSW. It also shows 
that the introduction of IPR following the LGPMC’s call in 2006 for nationally consistent 
frameworks has been a victim of the unintended consequences of NPM. Figure 7.7 illustrates 
this. 
 
Figure 7.7 NPM and Local Government Reform 
 
However, in the context of the enormous task of implementing IPR, it is worth noting here that 
there is much to suggest that the WA Government, despite citing reasons of financial 
sustainability, used its IPR programme, more for political purposes, as a pre-cursor to its 
higher-priority policy to amalgamate councils in both metropolitan and country areas.  
 
The implementation of WA’s IPR was concluded in mid-2013, by which time all local 
governments were required to have submitted a suite of planning documents to the DLGC for 
Asset Management 
Plans for each Asset 
Class 
§ Plans to implement Asset Strategy 
§ Provides links to Asset Register, SCP, CBP, LTFP & Annual 
Budget 
§ Defines agreed levels of service with ‘asset owners’ for each 
asset class and sub-class assessed against remaining useful life 
§ Provides appropriate indicators, measures, and targets, and a 
mechanism to evaluate and report performance, and identify 
improvements 
§ Assesses risk, and provides risk management plans developed 
with ‘asset owners’ 
§ Considers alternative delivery solutions 
§ Provides full financial information and data for each asset class 
Asset Plans for 
Individual Significant / 
Critical Assets and 
Asset Components 
§ Developed with ‘Asset Owners’ 
§ Accommodation needs 
§ Disposal strategies (sell, lease, share, demolish/redevelop, vest) 
§ Acquisition strategies (buy, develop, lease, share) 
§ Operations and maintenance plans 
§ Capital plans (renewal, replace, improve, renovate, refurbish) 
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assessment of compliance. This meant that the DLGC was to review some 1,300 – 1,500 
documents and provide feedback to councils on their compliance with IPR requirements. The 
DLGC had neither the capacity nor capability to do this. 
 
It became clear that, regardless of the quality of these documents, the WA Government 
considered that this part of its reform had been completed, and that it could move on to the 
amalgamation agenda, i.e. the government seemly displayed no appreciation for either the 
need to provide long-term on-going support to councils in the development of their IPR 
capability and capacity; or that such capability and capacity, particularly in asset and financial 
management, would be essential to the success of any future amalgamations. 
 
It was also clear that, because of the government’s approach to implementing its IPR reforms, 
and its confrontational attitude towards council amalgamations, many councils viewed the 
requirements for IPR compliance as ‘box-ticking’ exercises, and paid little more than ‘lip-
service’ to their preparation. As a consequence there has been minimal implementation of 
these strategies and plans, and little active management of assets in a strategic and service-
led sense since mid-2013.  
 
WA councils are required to carry out their four-yearly Major Strategic Reviews by mid-2017.  
 
There is an increasing apprehension within the WA local government sector that this will not be 
an easy task. Many councils are finding themselves having to start the IPR process and 
building relationships with their communities afresh. At the same time, local governments are 
experiencing new and mounting pressures from their communities for more information, more 
and improved services, higher standards of governance and management, and greater 
accountability and transparency. 
 
It is for these reasons, in WA at least, that the author is seeing growing evidence that councils 
are looking to understand the function of asset management, and make improvements in the 
management of their assets from the bottom up. 
 
Since the NSW state government introduced IPR requirements over local government in 2009, 
the financial sustainability of the local government sector has continued to deteriorate (NSW 
Treasury Corporation 2013, op.cit.) This deterioration is such that, in 2015, the NSW 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal described the system of local government in 
NSW as “broken” (Boxall, Jones & Comrie 2015, op. cit.). 
 
At the time of writing this thesis, the NSW Government is also seeking to impose 
amalgamations over councils in an aggressive and authoritarian manner, which has led to a 
number of councils contesting their amalgamation in court. However, the NSW Government 
has shown some signs that ‘good’ asset management is important to the amalgamation of 
councils but, at the same time, it seems not to understand the relationship between 
organisational strategic capacity and ‘good’ asset management, and that questionable financial 
ratios are not the sole indicators of how well councils manage their assets. 
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8 Statement and Evaluation of the Hypothesis for a 
‘Leading’ Practice Model for the Management of 
Government Property 
8.1  A ‘Leading’ Practice Model 
Research for this thesis supports the assertion that a ‘leading’ practice model for the strategic 
management of government property exists. This thesis has also shown that the introduction 
and adoption of reforms, changes and innovations in the way governments manage 
themselves are almost exclusively dependent on contextual and cultural influences, i.e. the 
political (small ‘p’) and social effects that may result. 
 
The author, therefore, firstly considers it important to link and provide for an appropriate and 
committed organisational environment and governance framework within the model almost as 
a pre-requisite for its successful implementation, and to nullify any potential NPM-like 
unintended consequences. The planning, management, and technical requirements within the 
model would be protected and ‘guaranteed’ by this framework. 
 
The essential elements of the model are: 
 
1. Management Context, Culture and Framework 
 
The model requires a management context, culture and framework that accounts for, and 
provides the following: 
 
§ Government property assets are treated and managed as a corporate whole-of-
government function, which is structured to integrate property asset management with 
the strategic planning and management of all other government assets and resources; 
 
§ Government property exists to support and enable the operation of government, and 
the provision of facilities and services. An over-arching property strategy, planning, 
and management framework must reflect this, and the unique nature of public sector 
culture; 
 
§ Leadership and commitment, governance, management and reporting hierarchies that 
cascade from the most senior level of government to ensure that a whole-of-
government approach is maintained to manage property to consistent policy, strategy 
and standards, and with defined roles and responsibilities and levels of authority that 
provide for accountability and transparency. Independent experts are included within 
this structure;  
 
§ Public Sector Strategic Property Asset Management must be considered as a discrete 
professional element of public administration that requires a range of capacity and 
capability to be fully communicated, built and maintained through and across central 
government, and government departments and agencies: and 
 
§ A Head of Profession for the management of government property with responsibility 
for innovation, standards, professional practice and development, training, and 
relationships with other jurisdictions, academia, professional bodies, and the private 
sector. 
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2. Asset Management Process and Planning Hierarchy 
 
The model provides for a clear and consistent property asset management process and 
planning hierarchy as depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.2.  
                                      
 
Figure 8.1: Asset Management Process 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Asset Management Hierarchy 
 
The process contains the core activities within the model. These are: 
 
a) Organisational Objectives 
 
The successful management of the property portfolio is dependent upon the 
development of an Asset Management Policy and Framework that is appropriate for 
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the organisation, and reflects the organisation’s vision, and business, financial, social, 
and environmental objectives. 
 
b) Whole-of-Organisation Asset Management Strategy 
 
This is a high-level strategy that implements Asset Management Policy, and defines 
the overall direction for the long-term management of the portfolio having regard to 
organisational strategic objectives, i.e. it provides strategies for each property type and 
tenure to move the asset base from its current state in terms of composition and 
condition, to a future state that supports organisational objectives. It also considers at 
a high-level the various strategic options available for asset solutions (including non-
asset or asset sharing opportunities), and the financial, business, social, environmental 
and service implications of the implementation of each option. 
  
c) Asset Planning and Programs 
 
Detailed operational Asset Plans are developed for each property together with asset 
implementation programs, directed by the overall Asset Management Strategy. 
Detailed financial planning and budgeting is carried out.  
 
d) Asset Delivery and Management 
 
The property technical and professional activity to implement strategies and plans 
includes property management (valuation and rating, disposals and acquisitions, 
leasing and lease management, financial management, repairs and maintenance) 
facility management, project management, construction management, and property 
and facility operations,  
 
e) Performance and Reporting 
 
The model places a heavy weighting on performance measurement and performance 
evaluation and reporting on all components of the asset management process and 
hierarchy. Importance is attached to the selection of performance indicators and 
criteria that are relevant to the reporting purpose. Areas for measurement include the 
following: 
 
§ Measuring the effectives of the system of management, including organisation 
and structure, governance and policy, processes and procedures, roles and 
responsibilities, and people;  
 
§ Data and Information Management Systems; 
 
§ The success of the Asset Strategy; 
 
§ Property performance and suitability (including remaining useful life) in relation 
to the services and the whole-of-government outcomes that it has been 
deployed to support; 
 
§ Financial performance against internal indicators, industry, inter- and intra-
government benchmarks; 
 
§ Performance against technical and compliance service levels and 
requirements; 
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§ Whole-of-portfolio performance; 
 
§ Performance of asset management strategies, plans, and operational 
management; 
 
§ Outcomes of asset management reform and change programmes measured 
against goals and objectives, and time. 
 
f) Change and Improvement 
 
Any changes required or desired from the evaluation of performance are collated into a 
formal Asset Management Improvement Plan, including actions and responsibilities for 
action. 
 
3. Data and Information 
 
Good decision-making is dependent upon good information, which is derived from good data. 
 
The collection, management, processing and analysis of data into good information are core to 
the model. Property data must be relevant, accurate, current and accessible, which means it 
must be appropriately systemised, and centrally and professionally managed and maintained 
to support the various budgetary, financial, service and property decisions it is required to 
inform. 
 
4. Interdependencies and Linkages 
 
Item 2 above describes the asset management process and planning hierarchy. Each part of 
the process affects and effects another, which in turn determines the ultimate success of the 
asset management function within a whole-of-organisation strategic planning framework. 
 
Figure 8.3 provides a one-dimensional process flow that depicts the interdependencies and 
linkages within the strategic Integrated Planning and Reporting regime for the Local 
Government sector47.  It also depicts the relations between the components of the model as a 
whole, and demonstrates the criticality of quality asset data, and its impact on financial and 
service outcomes. 
 
In the local government context, it is clear that without a direction for the future of a community, 
asset management will not be organisationally strategic; without asset management there 
cannot be a meaningful community strategy; and without asset management there cannot be a 
meaningful financial outlook and a pathway to sustainability. 
 
The principles of this process are equally applicable to the other tiers of government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
47 This process flow was constructed by the author, and has been introduced to local government in Western Australia.  
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Figure 8.3 Strategic Planning Links and Interdependencies 
 
5. Skills 
 
The model requires skills beyond, and in addition to the normal technical, property and facility 
management professional skills. 
 
The strategic management of property within an integrated business and service planning 
process requires a range of skills that comprise the following: 
 
§ Leadership; 
 
§ Communication; 
 
§ Management and business skills; 
 
§ Strategic planning; 
 
§ Financial management; 
 
§ Data and information management; 
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§ Analytical skills; and 
 
§ Performance management. 
 
6. Communication, and Reform and Change Management Strategies 
 
As with any enterprise, the adoption, on-going management, changes to, and/or reform of a 
whole-of-government strategic property asset management framework requires constant and 
consistent communication across, and at all levels of government.  
 
Any change in the way property is managed will affect how services are delivered, and impact 
upon all other resources categories, with which the management of assets is integrated. As 
such, and apart from operational management improvements, strategic reform or change is 
likely to be in response to machinery of government changes, or in support of changes to 
whole-of-government policy, goals and objectives. 
 
Leading practice in a whole-of-government function includes roles and responsibilities for a 
hierarchy of formal communication, reform and change management strategies that reflect the 
actual asset management arrangements that are in place, or to be changed. They must 
emanate from the most senior level of government, and cascade through departments and 
agencies to frontline service and business units, with relevant information for each type of 
audience. 
 
To assist and inform improvement, it is important that communication strategies include formal 
processes for bottom-up channels of communication to encourage ideas for innovation, new 
ways of doing things, adoption of new technologies, and feedback from those who are 
responsible for the implementation of policy, development of strategies and plans, and the 
operational management of property. 
8.2 The Model’s Application to the Australian Public Sector 
8.2.1 Summary of the Barriers to the Integrated Management of Government 
Property in Australia 
There are two aspects to the ‘integrated’ management of government property: 
 
§ The integration of a defined set of principles and practices into a whole-of-government 
strategic planning and reporting governance policy framework; and 
 
§ The implementation and management of those principles across government and 
within government agencies so that the shape of property portfolios and their 
management supports the conduct of government business, provision of public 
services, and achievement of strategic and operational outcomes in the best possible 
way. 
 
With regard to these, this thesis has shown that the Australian public sector as a whole has 
acknowledged the need for the management of its property assets to be based on a strategic 
approach that integrates their management with business, service, financial and workforce 
planning 48 . However, all tiers of government, federal, state, and local, have failed to 
understand, adopt and implement these principles with much enthusiasm beyond the 
production of guidelines and manuals. 
 
                                                       
48 The public sector prefers the term ‘best’ practice, which implies a finite definition of quality. 
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The barriers to the integrated management of government property are common across the 
Australian public sector, and have largely been imposed by and upon itself. The principal 
reasons for this relate not just to a lack of understanding of what needs to be done, or capacity 
to implement change (i.e. the paradox of NPM), but also to an in-bred organisational culture 
that prevails across the sector, which feels threatened by innovation, new ideas, and change. 
In many respects, the Australian public service lacks transparency in the way it conducts its 
business through red tape and obfuscation. It is often difficult to identify responsibility, which 
leads to little accountability for performance. The public sector’s appetite for ‘frank and 
fearless’ advice is considerably diminished. 
 
In addition, there is little by the way of ‘joined-up’ government in Australia, and communication 
between and across the three tiers of government, or between agencies of the same 
jurisdiction. Tensions exist within and between each level of government. 
 
In the context of the management of public property assets, these barriers have led to the 
following major problems for the integrated management of theses assets: 
 
§ Lack of actively managed whole-of-government property asset management 
frameworks, policies, standards, and strategies; 
 
§ Fragmented and inconsistent management of property portfolios by government 
agencies; 
 
§ Property portfolios that are not managed strategically to align with business, financial, 
and service objectives, and are operationally wasteful and ineffective; 
 
§ Employment of capital and operational expenditure in unnecessary property assets; 
 
§ Poor property information and data at agency and whole-of-government levels; 
 
§ Few and inappropriate performance measures;  
 
§ Enhanced risks; and 
 
§ Lack of knowledge, appropriate skills and professionalism in Strategic Property Asset 
Management. 
8.2.2 How the Model Addresses Australia’s Barriers and Problems 
The research for this thesis has covered the three tiers of government in Australia, all of which 
suffer from similar or common barriers and problems experienced by other jurisdictions, such 
as the UK and USA. 
 
The ‘leading’ practice model described in Section 8.1 is derived from those shared 
experiences, and also from the results of the reforms either attempted or implemented by 
these governments. 
 
It is clear that the model addresses the problems faced in Australia but, more importantly, 
there are four barriers that have so far prevented the Australian public sector from dealing with 
those problems. These barriers are: 
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§ A lack of leadership at both the political policy level, and from within the public 
service49; 
 
§ The lack of understanding and appreciation on behalf of policy-makers and senior 
public service managers that strategic property asset management is something more 
than an engineering or maintenance function, but that it has a direct impact on the 
effective and efficient functioning of government; 
 
§ Some twenty-five years of uninterrupted economic prosperity have bred a sense of 
fiscal and financial unawareness. A generation of public managers has had little 
reason for financial responsibility or prudence, or to regard property as anything more 
than an operating entity; and 
 
§ There has not been a base professional property discipline in Australia from which the 
strategic management of property as an organisational resource could grow. 
 
It is perhaps beyond the model to address these issues. However, it provides a foundation for 
building awareness and encouraging leadership that has been necessary since the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007 and beyond. The continuing policy and leadership void is assuming 
greater importance in the current fiscal and economic environment where there are high levels 
of public debt, increasing budget deficits, threats to government credit ratings, and rising 
infrastructure repair and replacement backlogs. This comes at a time of growing political 
cynicism and loss of confidence in Australia’s public sector to govern, but increasing 
expectations for public services. 
 
A strategic approach to the management of government property will assist the release of 
capital; reduce operating costs; and contribute to more efficient and effective public services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
49 The Chancellor of the Exchequer and President dealt with this issue in the UK and USA respectively by effectively 
acting as the sponsors of reform. 
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9 Further Findings and Observations 
The author has selected a number of findings and observations from his research that he 
believes are worthy of note, and offer potential areas for on-going research, and higher 
education courses and programmes.  
 
The author re-emphasises that these findings and observations are underpinned by 
professional detachment, and supported by the author’s extensive industry involvement. 
9.1 The Lyons Report 
Lyons widened his remit from the strategic management of government property by saying that 
the same principles are relevant and adaptable to all other government assets, both tangible 
and intangible.  
 
From the author’s experience in working with the public sector on the full range of assets, he 
considers that it is this holistic approach that Lyons brought to his study that makes an 
enduring contribution to the management of public sector assets, rather than his opinion that 
the UK Government’s immediate capital-raising objectives could be met. 
9.2 The ‘Holy Grail’ 
Alan Phelps’ paper, “Rationale, Practice and Outcomes in Municipal Property Asset 
Management” was reviewed in Section 7.1.5.6. Phelps described the search for a single 
methodology to assess asset management outcomes “as something of a holy grail” citing 
difficulties in constructing measures of efficiency and performance for property in contributing 
to service and corporate outcomes. Research that has been undertaken has tended to focus 
on measures for particular types of buildings. Phelps described the issue as “problematic’ 
because of the difficulty in identifying and quantifying asset management’s contribution to 
outcomes, and separating them from other contributing components. 
 
Perhaps the ‘holy grail’ of assessing asset management outcomes will be found, not by trying 
to separate asset management’s contribution from other contributing components, but by 
examining the effectiveness of the management of the combination of all resources employed 
towards achieving desired outcomes, and through a disaggregated model that takes into 
account contextual antecedents and constraints similar to that of the OECD.  
 
The search for this ‘holy grail’ must continue if the true performance and contribution of 
government property assets is to be measured. 
 
The author is currently testing a hypothesis for the ‘holy grail’ in Australia’s local government 
sector. 
9.3 The Australian Public Sector 
9.3.1 Sector Findings 
As far as this thesis has been able to ascertain, the total value of real property assets of the 
consolidated public sectors is in the region of $325 billion, which equates to some twenty-four 
per cent of the nation’s total asset value. An estimated $6.5 billion per annum is, or should be 
spent on maintaining these assets.50 The inability of the Australian public sector to properly 
account for the extent, value, and operating costs of its built asset base provides strong 
evidence of sub-optimal management. Such a situation would not be tolerated in the private 
sector. 
                                                       
50 Refer to Appendix 3.1. 
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No level of government, with the potential future exception of local government, manages 
these assets with any overarching hierarchy, policy, strategy, governance, or to consistent 
standards, processes and procedures. This means that some ninety per cent (by value) of the 
property assets applied to the health, education and social wellbeing of Australians are without 
strong whole-of-government asset management rigour or control.  
 
The consequences of this continue to be evidenced by regularly publically reported asset 
failures in schools and hospitals, and public utilities and infrastructure that have resulted in loss 
of life, personal injury, and financial wastage across the country.  
 
This lack of property maintenance, renewal and replacement means that many properties have 
become liabilities, but remain as ‘assets’ for accounting reasons. 
 
There is no evidence of inter-government co-operation. This means that the considerable 
potential for economies, and associated improvements to financial sustainability and 
government services is lost across all tiers of government: federal, state and local. 
9.3.2 New South Wales Government 
The author concludes that the property asset management principles so far adopted by the 
NSW Government reflect ‘good’ practice. As such, there is opportunity for on-going research 
into whether the reforms proposed by the NSW Commission of Audit and PAUT are 
implemented with any degree of success. 
9.3.3 Local Government 
There is no shortage of calls for solutions to improve local government sustainability. All point 
to the strategic management of assets. However, there is insufficient understanding and 
capacity and capability, within either the state or local governments, to plan and implement 
these solutions.  
 
As a result, little progress has been made in the ten years since the LGPMC called for a 
nationally consistent financial and asset management sustainability framework. 
 
There is still an emphasis on ‘inputs’ rather than on the resultant ‘outputs’ and service 
outcomes. There is little evidence of effort being applied to thinking about ‘the business’ of 
local government, and how to improve it beyond the incremental tweaking of methods and 
service. Similarly, little effort is applied to question why things are done, and what influences 
and happens in the process of transforming inputs to outcomes, and measuring their 
contribution to service provision and value for money. Associated with this, not enough 
attention is given to external influences outside the normal working environments of councils, 
such as regional, national, and international political, economic, and technological influences. 
 
The services provided by local governments are generally homogenous, as are most of their 
problems and issues. However, it is rare for councils to co-operate, share knowledge, 
information, experiences, procedures and systems, and assets. Experience, knowledge, and 
systems are developed and retained within local and independent environments. Many wheels 
are being re-invented. In addition, local governments are unwilling to co-operate in any 
meaningful way for fear of ‘exposing’ weaknesses, and re-igniting the amalgamation debate. 
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9.3.4 Potential for ‘Nationally Consistent’ Integrated Planning and Reporting 
Frameworks 
There can be little doubt that IPR frameworks are very good practice. There can also be little 
doubt that their application should not be restricted to the local government sector. IPR 
principles are entirely relevant to federal and state governments. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of progress made by local government in asset management, and 
also with strategic and corporate planning as a whole under the IPR model, the local 
government sector is possibly becoming the default de facto ‘leader’ in these practices.  
 
Because it has been ‘led by the blind’; has legislative obligations in respect of IPR practices; 
and, in a number of states, is currently obliged to undertake Major Strategic Reviews of its 
community and corporate direction, the local government sector is showing evidence that it is 
beginning, albeit haltingly, to build elements of asset management capacity and capability, and 
understand the need to ‘integrate’ the management of all resources into the corporate and 
service planning process51.  
 
With the involvement and co-operation of the public sector, perhaps supported and co-
ordinated through organisations such as the APCC, industry practitioners, and academia (see 
below), the author believes there is opportunity to take advantage of this fledgling capacity for 
the benefit of all tiers of government.  
9.3.5 Strategic Asset Management as a Public Sector Profession 
The author’s research has shown that there is an acute lack of strategic asset management 
knowledge and skills in all tiers of government in Australia. The research has also shown that 
the management of public sector assets (not just property) as strategic resources, as opposed 
to operations and maintenance, has been recognised internationally as an essential element of 
public administration. It has been formally adopted as a professional career path in the UK 
government, and included in training programmes for senior civil servants, including directors-
general and chief executive officers. 
 
The USA federal government has developed its property asset management capacity and 
capability based on the principles of Corporate Real Estate. CoreNet Global governs and 
promotes the professional practice of CRE worldwide. It is not dissimilar to the Royal Institution 
of Chartered Surveyors in that it has a code of professional ethics, courses for professional 
accreditation, undertakes research, and has minimum professional development requirements 
for its members52. 
 
There is a real need for similar post-graduate educational programmes in Australia. In section 
7.1.5.8, it was asserted that the key word in the resources management process is ‘integrated’. 
In the same manner, an asset management programme must be integrated into the 
undergraduate public sector administration curriculum as a whole, as well as being offered as 
a specialist post-graduate opportunity. 
9.4 The Significance of this Thesis and Direction for Further Research 
Chapter 1 of this thesis established how little research has taken place into the management of 
public sector property assets. This is particularly true for the Australian public sector. 
 
The little research that has been carried out is largely theoretically based or derived from 
governments’ self-assessments of their capacity and capability. 
                                                       
51 The major Strategic Reviews involve the review of all IPR documentation, at the centre of which is Asset 
Management Strategy. 
52 The author served as Vice Chair of CoreNet Global’s Sydney Chapter in 2006/07. 
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In seeking to redress this gap in knowledge, the significance of this thesis is three-fold.   
 
Firstly, through direct experience and empirical evidence, it demonstrates how the strategic 
management of property has been practically introduced and applied to the public sector. This 
has led to the identification of a ‘leading’ practice model for the management of government 
property. This model provides a basis from which research into the improvement of property 
management practices in the public sector can continue. 
 
Secondly, this thesis has established a direct connection between the management of property 
and the efficient and effective functioning of government, and provision of public services. 
Although governments continue to measure their performance in quantitative output terms, this 
thesis provides a basis for research into the measurement of the qualitative outcomes of 
property use and management, which can then be related to quantitative value. (“The Holy 
Grail” as referred to in Section 9.2) 
 
Thirdly, this thesis has identified structural reasons behind the failure of the Australian public 
sector to effectively implement a ‘leading’ practice. These reasons are entirely consistent with 
the author’s research into public sector culture, psyche, and behaviour. The author does not 
believe that this research represents generalisations, but rather identifies very specific reasons 
for the public sector’s reluctance to embrace innovation or disturb the old-world status quo. 
 
These structural issues are the barriers to ‘leading’ practice, and the principal reasons why the 
public sector finds it so difficult to innovate and turn perceived threats into opportunity. This not 
only applies to the management of property, but also to public sector reform as a whole. 
 
The author hopes that the presentation of these barriers, insofar as they have affected the 
management of government property, will encourage wider research into public sector 
behaviour and its influence on service and business outcomes. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Case Study: United Kingdom Central Government 
1. Introduction 
 
This case study has been composed from a review of literature in the form of independent 
and academic studies and reports, professional standards and guidelines, government 
strategies, policies and procedures, government reports and audits, journal articles and 
conference proceedings. 
 
The study takes the form of a review of the literature, which chronologically traces the 
development of public sector asset management in the United Kingdom (UK) from the early 
2000s.  
 
Figure CS1.1 summarises the chronology of the development of public sector property asset 
management in the UK since 2004. 
Figure CS1.1: UK Government: Path to Strategic Property Asset Management 
 
 The following are the principal sources of literature from which this case study has 
been compiled: 
 
 Towards Better Management of Public Sector Assets: A Report to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Sir Michael Lyons, December 2004 (The Lyons Report (Lyons, 2004). 
 
 Improving Asset Management in Government Departments: A report on improving the 
capability and capacity of managing property assets in the central civil government, 
Office of Government Commerce, Andrew Howarth, National School of Government, 
March 2006 (Howarth, 2006) 
 
 Improving Property Asset Management in the Central Civil Government Estate, 
Professor David Male, University of Leeds, April 2006 (Male, 2006). 
 
 High Performing Property: Routemap to asset management excellence, Office of 
Government Commerce, 2006 (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2006). 
 
 Improving the efficiency of central government’s office property: Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, November 2007 (Comptroller 
and Auditor General National Audit Office, 2007). 
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 Operational Efficiency Programme: Final Report, HM Treasury, Sir Michael Bichard, 
Lord Carter of Coles, et al, April 2009 (Bichard, Carter (Lord), Grimstone, Jay, & 
Read, 2009). 
 
 Room for improvement: Strategic asset management in local government, National 
Audit Report, Audit Commission, June 2009 (UK Audit Commission, 2009). 
 
 The State of The Estate (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013a) 
2. The Lyons Report 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This case study shows that The Lyons Report has become accepted as the foremost 
authority for the development of public sector asset management in the United Kingdom 
(Howarth, 2006; Jones & White, 2008; Male, 2006; UK Office of Government Commerce, 
2006; White, 2011). Its recommendations are the foundations upon which all subsequent 
asset management principles have been developed. 
 
In 2004, the Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned Sir Michael Lyons to conduct a study 
into the management of public sector assets. Specifically, Sir Michael was asked how asset 
management might be improved to contribute to the Government’s objectives of: 
 
 Securing asset sales of £30 billion; and 
 
 Achieving further efficiency savings. 
 
The report was commissioned at a time, which, as stated by Lyons, was when public services 
were “evolving in a new context of public expectation”. He described this change as having 
the following characteristics and drivers: 
 
 The way in which public services were delivered was changing in response to rising 
public expectations in the scope, efficiency and quality of services; an increasing 
focus on improving efficiency and value for money; and the never-ending 
development of new technologies. 
 
Lyons noted that the public sector asset base, which had a value of £658 billion, was 
the foundation upon which public services depends. The asset base, therefore, 
should continually develop to reflect and support the evolution of the public service. 
 
 The policy of the government of the day was to redress what it saw as a past under-
investment in infrastructure. Lyons saw asset management as having an integral role 
in this by identifying alternative sources of capital through identification and sale of 
surplus assets; involving the private sector in asset ownership; managing assets to 
realise their real, underlying and hidden value; and the proper and full utilisation of 
retained assets. 
 
 The clustering of public services, technology and new ways of their delivery was 
forcing change in the association of services with particular types of buildings, when 
and how services are delivered, and when they are available.  
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To Lyons, these trends represented a need and opportunity to re-consider what constituted a 
public service, how it delivers public value, and how the management of public assets should 
respond to support public service delivery models. 
 
Drawing from the experience of the private sector, Lyons described asset management as an 
integral part of the public sector’s resource management and business planning, which 
should form a platform for good investment decision-making. He distilled the benefits of good 
asset management down to three simple benefits: 
 
 Identification, exploitation and disposal of assets (tangible and intangible) to release 
capital for reinvestment or generation of revenue; 
 
 Involvement of the private sector in asset ownership and management to spread risk, 
improve management and release asset values; 
 
 Improved efficient and effective use of assets to deliver service improvements and 
efficiency savings. 
 
Consequently, Lyons concluded that improving asset management would play a large part in 
Government’s efficiency programme objectives and the generation of £30 billion in asset 
sales by 2010. 
2.2. Scope and Methodology 
 
Lyons was asked to work with the OGC Efficiency Team in HM Treasury to assess current 
asset management practice and make recommendations for improvement. Given that this 
was a short-life study, Lyons’ scope was limited to providing direction towards Government 
achieving its asset sales and efficiency objectives. 
 
In order to establish the government’s existing asset management practices, Lyons consulted 
a wide range of organisations in both the public and private sectors. These included: 
 
 The principal government departments on their asset holdings, their      management, 
and any plans for asset disposals; 
 
 The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Local Government Association and a 
number of local authorities; 
 
 The property management industry and investment banks with an interest in property; 
 
 Specialist government bodies; 
 
 The Regional Development Agencies; and 
 
 The National Audit Office and Audit Commission 
 
To ensure as wide as possible contribution to greater efficiency, Lyons took a very broad 
approach to his study. Although primarily focusing on the management of land and property 
assets, he also considered intangible assets such as intellectual property, the radio spectrum 
and government shareholdings. The extent of the review covered the general government 
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sector, Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPB)1, local authorities, public corporations, and 
private assets supported by public funds. 
 
By casting a wide net, Lyons sought to: 
 
 Contextualise the £30 billion disposal target in terms of what it meant, its importance, 
how it related to Government’s aims and objectives, and whether it related to any 
wider economic and social objectives, e.g. social housing; 
 
 Quantify the efficiency gain by looking at the scale of the existing asset base and the 
potential for disposals; the potential for efficiency gains from improved management 
of retained assets; and how further benefits might accrue from more private sector 
participation; 
 
 Assess whether existing incentives encourage good asset management; 
 
 Determine whether the public sector has the right skills, systems, practices and 
capacity, and whether they are effectively deployed; 
 
 Assess whether the public sector co-ordinates and co-operates across jurisdictional 
and administrative boundaries. 
2.3. Good Asset Management 
 
Lyons identified a number of developments that were both creating and driving the need for 
better management of public assets.  Key amongst these were: 
 
 Government’s stated objective to increase investment in public infrastructure; 
 
 The adoption by central government of resource accounting and budgeting and the 
National Asset Register; 
 
 The expanding relevance of asset planning to local governments; and 
 
 An increasing body of professional and technical knowledge defining good asset 
management practice in both the public and private sectors. 
 
Lyons noted that these drivers were providing impetus to an already growing realisation of the 
potential improvements that better asset management would bring to the delivery of public 
services and the achievement of government goals and objectives.  
 
He concluded that ‘the key message seems to be that good asset management planning 
must complement an organisation’s strategic or business planning’. He went further by saying 
that it was no longer ‘tenable’ for the management and delivery of public services to be done 
without the inclusion of asset management in core business planning; and that successful 
outcomes will increasingly depend on how well an organisation manages its assets (Lyons, 
op. cit., p.27). In relation to the latter, Lyons proposed four essential requirements for an 
organisation to put good asset management into practice:  
 
 Understanding the existing asset base;  
                                                     
1
 NDPBs are equivalent to GUANGOs (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations). They are not part of any 
government department and operate at arms length from Ministers. There are four types of NDPBs: Advisory, 
Executive, Tribunal, and Independent Monitoring Boards. 
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 Profiling an asset portfolio to support current and future needs; 
 
 Translating this into future acquisitions, disposals and maintenance implications, i.e. 
developing an asset strategy; and 
 
 A system of governance overseen by the highest levels of government. 
2.3.1. Understanding the Existing Asset Base 
Lyons saw that assets are essential to the efficient operation of all organisations. It is 
therefore imperative to know and understand the individual assets that make up the asset 
base, and to be able to assess their value in an alternative use. 
 
‘The starting point must be the systematic collation and gathering of raw data on the 
organisation’s asset base and the attachment of appropriate valuations’ (Ibid., p. 23). 
 
A significant finding of the Lyons study was that, whilst the UK Government was maintaining 
reasonable records of its assets, there was little to demonstrate that any strategic use was 
being made of the information in the government’s business planning. 
2.3.2. Asset Portfolio Profiling to Support Current and Future Needs 
Having assessed the existing asset base, the second organisational requirement is to define 
the asset needs of the organisation over the medium to long term that will support the 
organisation’s forward business strategy.  
 
This involves an evaluation of services that are to be delivered, and the service model(s) 
adopted for their delivery; and the alignment of an appropriate fit-for-purpose asset portfolio 
with the current and future organisational business and service directions. 
 
Lyons connected technological advancements in information and communications to the 
impact that they were having, and would continue to have, on asset location, size, type and 
functionality, particularly in respect of buildings.  From this, he noted the potential for asset 
sharing with other organisations, including with the private sector. 
2.3.3. Asset Management Strategy 
Lyons set broad guidance for the development of asset management strategies for the future 
core asset base and those assets of the existing portfolio that are surplus or are no longer 
appropriate for their use. Lyons proposed that these strategies include should include the 
following: 
 
 A statement setting out the reasoning behind the proposed asset base showing how it 
aligns or responds to the organisation’s business planning objectives. This to be in 
the form of business case that quantifies the costs and benefits of the proposed 
portfolio of assets which should take account of any implications that changes to the 
existing asset base may have on other government departments, and if there may be 
any wider economic consequences; 
 
 A strategy for the disposal of surplus assets, including the potential for alternatives 
uses; the disposal methodology; and the application of disposal proceeds to the on-
going provision of public services; 
 
 A strategy for the efficient and effective use and management of retained assets, 
together with benchmarking the use and performance of assets, and alternative 
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management and asset service delivery models, e.g. outsourcing and the 
involvement of the private sector in asset provision and ownership; 
 
 Consideration of the potential commercialisation of under-utilised strategic assets; 
and 
 
 A strategy for the acquisition of new assets, i.e. by lease or purchase having regard 
to strategic need, length of tenure, flexibility and financial analysis. 
2.3.4. Governance 
Lyons called for mechanisms that formally assign responsibility and accountability for the 
organisation’s planning and management of its assets. He stated that ultimate responsibility 
must rest at the most senior level, with finance directors having direct responsibility for 
producing asset strategy, and that senior management at board level should actively involved 
in ‘evaluating and approving that strategy.’ 
2.4. Related Government Reforms 
 
Lyons noted a number of inter-related reforms that had been introduced by the Government 
since the 1990s. These were designed to improve the management of assets and to improve 
the implementation of new capital plans and proposals. 
 
The reforms included the introduction of resource accounting and budgeting, the National 
Asset Register (NAR), Departmental Investment Strategies (DISs), the ability for departments 
to retain the proceeds from asset sales and the use of asset disposal targets. 
 
It is clear that Lyons considers these reforms to have exercised positive influences over the 
management of public assets as he saw these representing a ‘framework for departments’ 
(ibid., p. 25.).   
2.4.1. National Asset Register 
The NAR was first introduced in 1997. It records details of all assets owned by each central 
government departmental group. It is intended to provide clear reasoning for the holding of 
assets, and that those assets are employed in the most efficient manner. 
 
Lyons noted that the NAR, together with accrual accounting, provides information to enhance 
decision-making in relation to the asset base. 
2.4.2. Departmental Investment Strategies 
These were introduced in 1998 as an attempt to correct the lack of a government-wide 
approach to the management of investment programmes and to demonstrate that new 
investment would effectively contribute to the delivery of public services.  
 
DISs are departmental plans in the form of public statements as to how capital budgets are 
allocated and how new investments will achieve value for money.  
 
These strategies also include information on the existing asset base and how departments 
plan to make the optimum use of their portfolios, including the disposal of assets and the use 
of targets to improve asset efficiency2. 
                                                     
2
 The DIS was subsequently refined to fully reflect the recommendations of the Lyons Report. 
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2.4.3. Accounting Principles 
In 2000, Government departments were required to prepare their accounts consistent with the 
UK generally accepted accounting practice. Lyons noted the significance of this in that the UK 
Government became one of the few jurisdictions to fully report its assets, liabilities and 
financial information on a standard comparable to the private sector. 
 
In addition, departments were subsequently required to incorporate the cost of service 
delivery into their budgets and to account for the costs of holding and using their assets 
through depreciation and a capital cost charge. (The latter being the opportunity cost of 
investing in an asset.) 
 
Lyons saw the benefits of reporting these costs in departmental budgets as the ability to 
make more informed decisions on asset use, service delivery models and the disposal of 
surplus assets. 
 
Although not part of his scope, it is perhaps surprising that Lyons made no comment that 
these changes might have on increased transparency and accountability in the management 
of public assets. 
2.5. Conclusions of the Lyons Report 
 
It is not so much the concern of this case study that The Lyons Report concluded that the 
Government’s asset sales and efficiency targets could be met, but rather the asset 
management conditions necessary to achieve them. 
 
Lyons identified and defined two degrees of asset management: 
 
 Good Asset Management, which improves the delivery of services by aligning the 
asset base with an organisation’s goals and objectives; and 
 
 Better Asset Management, which releases resources, generates revenue and 
improves value-for money.  
 
With regard to real tangible assets, Lyons concluded that, to estimate realistic quantifiable 
benefits of improved asset management, entails the analysis of: 
 
 The characteristics of the asset base and the likely potential for future asset 
disposals; and 
 
 The likelihood of further efficiency savings and economic benefits through better 
asset management of retained assets.  
 
In addition to these quantitative benefits, Lyons also describes potential qualitative benefits in 
the form service improvements and the transfer of risk from better asset management. 
 
The report further concluded that readily attainable gains would be achieved through: 
 
 A co-ordinated approach to asset management planning across government, 
especially when departments are rationalising their asset bases as part of efficiency 
or locational reviews; 
 
 Mandatory recording of vacant space and accommodation needs in a centralised 
database; and 
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 Government standards in areas such as space use and design. 
 
In addition to concluding that it would be possible for the Government to achieve its target of 
£30 billion in asset sales, Lyons concluded that better asset management over the Civil 
Estate could result in reduced space utilisation of 1.69 million square meters within six to 
seven years. This would produce total savings of £760 million per annum.  
3. Office of Government Commerce Research Project 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Consistent with the recommendations of the Lyons Report, the role of the OGC was extended 
to include the integrated management of the Central Civil Government Estate (CCGE).  
 
The OGC subsequently commissioned a research project into the management of the CCGE, 
the principal elements of which were the Leeds Report and the Howarth Report (Howarth, 
2006; Male, 2006).  
 
These studies were inter-related and carried out in parallel. The Leeds study, led by 
Professor Steven Male, was to inform the development of the OGC programme for improving 
the management of CCGE’s assets, whilst Howarth considered the necessary professional 
skills required for the strategic management of government’s property assets. These studies 
are considered in the following sections. 
3.2. The University of Leeds: Improving Property Asset Management in the 
Central Civil Government Estate (the Leeds Report or Leeds) 
3.2.1. Scope and Purpose of the Leeds Report 
The Leeds Report is a central product of the OGC’s research project into improving the 
management of the CCGE. It was commissioned to provide a framework for improving 
property asset management across the CCGE. Its terms of reference were:  
 
 To provide a baseline assessment of the current status and practice of property asset 
management in central civil government, and the development of a blueprint for 
excellence in managing the estate; 
 
 To suggest a central governance structure, including the Office of Prime Minister, the 
Cabinet Office and Treasury, that sets a property asset management policy 
framework across the civil estate; and 
 
 To provide an estimate of the potential efficiency gains achievable if the report’s 
recommendations were to be adopted.  
 
The scope of the Leeds Report was almost exclusively determined by the findings and 
recommendations of the Lyons Report in that it proposes a programme and methodology for 
the implementation of the Lyons recommendations; and provides a second opinion or 
validation to the view expressed by Lyons that the Government’s capital and savings targets 
could be met if its recommendations were followed. 
 
Leeds noted, “Implementation of the Lyons recommendations rely on a coordinated 
programme of action between various key stakeholders, led by HM Treasury, assisted by the 
OGC and other sector specific change agents. As part of the programme of activity OGC’s 
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role is to embed enhanced property asset management in central civil government.” (Ibid., p. 
25.). 
3.2.2. Strategic Resource Management, Strategic Asset Management and Property 
Asset Management 
The Leeds Report positioned ‘Property Asset Management’ within a hierarchy of strategic and 
operational management functions, headed by Strategic Resource Management (SRM) (Ibid., 
p. 25.). This hierarchy and its definitions are illustrated in figure CS1.2. 
 
 
Figure CS1.2: Resource Management Hierarchy  
 
Leeds defines Property Asset Management as “a structured, holistic and integrating approach 
for aligning and managing over time service delivery requirements and the performance of 
property assets to meet business objectives and drivers within a central government 
organisation.” (Ibid) 
 
Property assets are defined as land and built assets including buildings and infrastructure 
used by an organisation regardless of tenure. They exist to enable and support service 
delivery. 
 
Leeds describes ‘Property Asset Management’ as involving the whole life management of 
property assets from ‘cradle to grave’, which encompasses two interacting components: 
 
 A strategic component, focusing on the medium to longer term and involving 
decisions on appropriate investment in property assets to meet customers/end-user 
needs and service delivery requirements.  
 
 An operational component, focusing on the ongoing short-term management of 
property assets.  
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Leeds divided government property assets into: 
 
 Operational: property that supports and enables service delivery; and 
 
 Administrative: property that supports the machinery of government, such as 
commercial office accommodation. 
 
The report emphasised the importance of property as a strategic resource, both as assets 
and in the production of public services. As such, Government property portfolios should be 
strategically managed such that they are integrated with organisational and machinery of 
government changes, human resources management, information and communications 
technology, finance, workplace and procurement strategies.  
3.2.3. Property Assets in the Context of the UK Public Sector 
3.2.3.1. The Structure and Complexity of Government 
Leeds addressed property asset management in two areas of the Central Government 
Estate: the central government sector and public corporations. The study did not cover local 
government assets as they relate to specific localities and are controlled by their respective 
local authorities. 
 
Within central government and the public corporations, Leeds identified nine organisational 
models that delivered government outcomes, which comprised 910 public bodies under the 
sponsorship or control of 23 Government Departments. All require property assets from which 
to operate and deliver services. The nine organisational models were: 
 
 Directorates within departments; 
 
 Departments managed on agency models; 
 
 Executive agencies; 
 
 Public/private partnerships; 
 
 Offices ‘independent’ of the parent; 
 
 Departments; 
 
 Executive non-departmental bodies; 
 
 Government-owned companies; and 
 
 Contracted-out services. 
 
The 910 public bodies were made up of 21 public corporations; the Bank of England; 26 
National Health Service bodies; and 862 NDPBs (211 Executive Bodies, 458 Advisory 
Bodies, 42 Tribunal bodies, and 151 Independent Monitoring Boards). 
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Leeds noted the decentralised and diverse nature of the Government’s structure, which 
included a large number of Arms-Length Bodies (ALB) responsible for important government 
functions3. 
3.2.3.2. The CCG Property Asset Base 
Using the Lyons Report as a source, Leeds provided the following analysis of UK Public 
Sector fixed assets: 
 
Asset Category 
 
Value: £ billion 
Civil Engineering Works:                                            
Plant & Machinery: 
Vehicles: 
Spectrum: 
Other: 
Intangible Assets: 
Residential Buildings: 
Commercial, Industrial & Other Buildings: 
Total 
312.2 
20.5 
8.1 
21.9 
8.3 
5.1 
104.4 
177.2 
657.8 
 
Of this, £220 billion was held by the CCG, including NDPBs. 
 
Table CS1.1 is reproduced from the Leeds report. It shows the limits of the Civil Estate within 
the whole property asset base; it covers administrative and operational property owned and 
used by the CCG; and establishes the strategic context for their management. 
 
Leeds found that a significant proportion of the CCGE to be outside the control of 
Government departments, but within the control of executive agencies and other public 
bodies. This meant that any efficiency gains would need to be achieved from “within a diverse 
decentralised and also fragmented government structure for property asset management.” 
(Ibid., p. 33.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 For a definition of ALBs and discussion on their current (2014) role in government, governance and accountability, 
see (Institute for Government, 2014) http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/our-work/new-models-
governance-and-public-services/arms-length-bodies.  
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Central Government Non-
Specialised Property 
Central Government 
Specialised Property 
Wider Public Sector & Other 
Bodies 
Included in the Civil Estate Included in the Civil Estate Included in the Civil Estate 
 Central Departments’ owned, 
leased and occupied 
property, including Private 
Finance Initiative procured / 
managed accommodation.  
 Agencies’ owned, leased and 
occupied property. 
 Executive Non-Departmental 
Public Bodies owned, leased 
and occupied property. 
 Special Health Authorities. 
 Government-owned offices. 
 Dept. of Work & Pensions 
Job Centres, Benefits 
  Offices. 
 FCO UK estate. 
 English Heritage (EH) 
administrative estate. 
 Defence administrative   
accommodation. 
 
 
 
 HMCS Courts 
 Departmental and 
sponsored bodies’ specialist 
facilities e.g. laboratories, 
museums, power stations, 
port facilities  
 Departmental and 
sponsored bodies’ civil 
engineering infrastructure 
e.g. flood defences, roads, 
canals, railways  
 EH heritage estate 
 Historic Royal Palaces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Included in the Civil Estate Not Included in the Civil Estate 
 Defence military 
establishments.  
 Prison Estate.  
 NHS Estate e.g. Hospitals. 
 DEFRA rural estate, e.g. 
farms. 
 FCO overseas estate.  
 Doctor’s surgeries and 
clinics.  
 Schools. 
 Higher Education Funding 
Council for England facilities. 
 Police & fire stations. 
 All local government.  
 Crown Estate. 
 Parliamentary estate.  
Table CS1.1: The Central Civil Government Estate 
3.2.4. The Leeds Report Research Methodology 
The OGC’s objectives for the Leeds study were: 
 
 To provide an assessment of the existing asset base and ‘Property Asset 
Management’ practices in the CCGE; 
 
 To provide a vision for excellence in ‘Property Asset Management’; 
 
 To construct a maturity matrix of ‘good practice’ in Property Asset Management; 
 
 To estimate potential efficiency gains from better management of the property 
portfolio; and 
 
 To provide options for intervention strategies by Government. 
 
The research methodology comprised: 
 
 Interviews (32) and questionnaires; 
 
 Reviews of literature and Government reports, including international comparisons;  
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 A workshop with the OGC and representatives from Government departments, 
executive agencies and Non-Departmental Public Bodies; 
 
 Interaction and sharing of information with other OGC projects; 
 
 Industry consultation and expert advice; and 
 
 Experience and knowledge of the research team. 
3.2.5. Excellence in Property Asset Management 
3.2.5.1. Defining Excellence 
In defining excellence in ‘Property Asset Management’, Leeds examined a number of 
frameworks and models, which included, inter alia, work undertaken in the USA and Australia. 
These were used by Leeds in the development of a strategic property asset management 
framework for the UK CCGE. 
 
Although the US and Australian models had been developed from different drivers, the Leeds 
Report identified a number of similarities as well as differences in the two models that were 
considered in formulating a model of excellence for the UK. These are summarised as: 
 
 Both countries recognise the strategic importance of managing property as national, 
regional and local government resources; 
 
 Both models integrate the property asset management planning process into 
budgetary cycles;  
 
 Both the US and Australia have developed similar ‘best’ practice policy and guidance 
through central government, with Australian State Governments having developed 
individual approaches and frameworks; 
 
 The US Government requires each agency to nominate one individual holding 
responsibility for the strategic management of the agency’s property assets; and 
 
 By conducting a number of formal audits, the Australian National Audit Office 
acknowledged property asset management as an essential activity for government 
departments and agencies. 
 
From these studies, Leeds developed frameworks for, and defined the characteristics of the 
practice and process of property asset management. These include the setting of two 
standards of management: basic and advanced; a template for a property asset management 
plan; and a matrix for assessing the property asset management maturity of an organisation. 
 
Excellence in strategic property asset management is not described as a single statement or 
definition, but is presented by Leeds as a series of criteria and processes within a top-down 
policy framework and bottom-up needs approach (Ibid. p. 36.). See figure CS1.3. 
 
Top-down sets the governance arrangements and policy framework, which govern how 
property asset management strategies are formulated and decisions made. 
 
Bottom-up provides feedback and information through reporting protocols on portfolio 
performance and whether it meets service delivery criteria and requirements. 
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Figure CS1.3: Strategic Property Asset Management: Criteria & Processes 
 
Leeds noted that the purpose of a property asset strategy is to provide a portfolio that most 
appropriately meets the organisation’s service delivery needs. This strategy, which will 
include a vision for the future state of the portfolio and the associated investment and 
divestment needs, must be driven by, and relate directly to the organisation’s business 
strategy. The property asset strategy must then be implemented and managed, which Leeds 
proposed should involve a ‘holistic’ approach to the portfolio and managing the cost of assets 
on a whole-of-life basis4. 
 
Using the Total Asset Management Manual of the New South Wales Government as its 
authority5, Leeds presented a typical composition of property asset whole-of-life costs as: 
 
 Capital Procurement: 20%;  
 
 Maintenance: 35%; 
 
 Operating: 40%; and 
 
 Disposal: 5% 
 
Figure CS1.3, reproduced from the Leeds report (Ibid., p. 38.), sets out the elements for 
considering a property asset management framework. 
                                                     
4
 Whole-of-life costs include capital procurement costs; maintenance costs over the asset’s life; operating, 
management and administration costs over the asset’s life; and disposal costs. 
5
 DPWS (2001), Total Asset Management Manual, NSW Department of Public Works and Services: Sydney. 2001. 
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Figure CS1.4: Property Asset Management Framework 
 
To apparently support this framework, Leeds returned to the Lyons premise that property 
assets exist to enable and support service delivery; good asset management must 
complement an organisation’s business planning; and that property asset management 
comprises the following key elements: 
 
 The sustainable use of property assets as corporate resources; 
 
 Adopting a cradle to grave life cycle approach; 
 
 Defining and providing agreed levels of service; 
 
 Performance measurement; 
 
 Managing risk associated with property failures; and 
 
 Continuous improvement in practices. 
3.2.5.2. Strategic Property Asset Management Outcomes, Principles and Benefits 
Leeds replied upon three principal authorities to describe the desired outcomes of good 
property asset management, the principles for its integration into Central Government 
planning and the benefits that it would be expected to provide. 
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3.2.5.2.1 Outcomes6 
 Improved customer and stakeholder satisfaction through more and better informed 
decision-making capacity; 
 
 Clear financial and non-financial methodologies for assessing asset affordability and 
sustainability; 
 
 Certainty in statutory and regulatory compliance; 
 
 Improved corporate management and governance arrangements that connect 
property asset management with corporate goals and objectives; and 
 
 Environmental sustainability. 
3.2.5.2.2 Integration Principles7 
The Leeds report put forward the following key principles that need to be in place and/or 
accepted for strategic property asset management to be integrated into mainstream 
Government planning 
 
 Acceptance of property strategic planning as an essential corporate activity within 
resource planning alongside human resources and information technology; 
 
 Central Government departmental budgets to include the full cost of operating and 
maintaining property; 
 
 Consistency with whole-of-government policy frameworks; 
 
 Consideration of non-asset solutions, full life costing, risk analysis and improved use 
of existing assets; 
                           
 Property asset management decisions that meet present needs, but do not 
compromise the needs of the future; and 
 
 Preservation of heritage, cultural and environmental values. 
3.2.5.2.3 Benefits 8 
The benefits relate to accountability, service management, risk management and financial 
efficiency from: 
 
 Improved management of, and accountability for property assets; 
 
 Publication of performance and financial measures; 
 
 Benchmarking against other departments, jurisdictions and organisations; 
 
 Improved communications and relationships with business units; 
 
 Assessing the likelihood and consequence of property failure and impact on business 
continuity; and 
 
                                                     
6
 Asset Management in Local Authorities, Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors: London. 2005. 
7
 Asset Management. Australian Procurement & Construction Council: Deakin. 2001. 
8
 International Infrastructure Management Manual, Institute of Asset Management: London 2002 
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 Improved financial efficiency. 
 
Drawing further on the Australian Procurement & Construction Council (APCC), the Leeds 
report notes that the scale of investment in public property assets exposes Government to 
considerable, political, managerial and financial risks, which the APCC concluded would be 
better managed through a strategic approach to the management of property. 
3.2.5.3. A ‘Best Practice’ for Property Asset Management 
Based on its research undertaken into local government in the UK, and the Australian and 
USA Governments, the Leeds Report presented a property asset management ‘best practice’ 
through two frameworks; a notion, of two standards of strategic property asset management, 
‘basic’ and ‘advanced’9; and a Property Asset Management process. 
3.2.5.3.1 Property Asset Management Frameworks 
The first framework identifies Asset Management in the corporate planning process, which 
comprised three levels of planning activity: strategic, tactical and operational.  
 
This framework, reproduced from the Leeds Report, is illustrated in figure CS1.5. It places the 
Asset Management Plan at the tactical level together with the Human Resources, Marketing, 
Financial, Information Technology and Customer Service Plans. These are developed from 
the organisation’s business strategy and objectives and service level strategies. 
 
The implementation of Asset Management Solutions in the form of asset delivery and 
property and facility management are developed as operational plans within this framework. 
 
The framework incorporates informing and compliance criteria and a top-down, bottom-up 
review and reporting process. 
Figure CS1.5: Property Asset Management Strategic, Tactical & Operational Planning 
 
                                                     
9
 Ibid. 
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In assessing the existing status of the CCGE, Leeds adopted the following criteria, which it 
had identified as the characteristics for property asset management organisational excellence 
through the literature review research process. These criteria are broadly categorised into 
three groups: knowledge, organisational capability, and the corporate objectives for property 
asset management, each at the strategic and tactical levels: 
 
 Asset Knowledge 
 
 Asset inventory; 
 
 Asset condition; 
 
 Levels of service required; 
 
 Asset performance and reliability; 
 
 Asset utilisation and capacity; and 
 
 Asset values. 
 
 Property Asset Management Organisational Capabilities 
 
 Predictive ability for future service demand; 
 
 Failure prediction ability, including likelihood and consequences; 
 
 Alternative options analysis; 
 
 Prioritisation of options based on risk; 
 
 Optimisation of maintenance and operational activities; and 
 
 Preparation of Asset Management Plans 
 
 Property Asset Management Corporate Objectives 
 
 Appointment of a Property Asset Management leader and team; 
 
 Completion of a needs analysis and development of improvement plans; 
 
 Performing service level reviews; 
 
 Preparation of Property Asset Management Plans; 
 
 Good asset management information systems, data, analysis and processes; 
 
 Reviews and audits of the Property Asset Management system and process; and 
 
 Use of performance measures and progress monitoring. 
 
The second framework defines the elements of Strategic Property Asset Management, and 
governs the development of strategy and the delivery and management of assets through the 
three levels of planning (strategic, tactical and operational). It is derived from the asset 
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knowledge, organisational capability and corporate objectives criteria outlined above. This 
framework is shown in figure CS1.6. 
 Figure CS1.6. Asset Management Framework 
3.2.5.3.2 ‘Basic’ and ‘Advanced’ Standards for Strategic Property Asset Management 
Property asset portfolios are not homogenous. Each will have different levels of value, size, 
complexity and risk. Leeds saw these as key issues when considering the needs and 
designing the extent of an organisation’s Property Asset Management function. It put forward 
the following as a guide for determining the appropriate level or standard of property asset 
management, i.e. ‘basic’ or ‘advanced’: 
 
 The extent to which the organisation and/or the property portfolio is subject to legal 
and regulatory requirements; 
 
 The size of any gap between customer satisfaction and the level of service being 
provided by the organisation through the property portfolio; 
 
 The nature of the property assets, e.g. value, size and number, age and condition, 
and variety of type, use and location; 
 
 The consequences of exposure to risk; 
 
 The level of resources and skills required for the management of the portfolio. 
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In generic terms, the Leeds Report summarised the characteristics of the ‘basic’ and 
‘advanced’ standards: 
 
 Basic Standard 
 
 Taking a life cycle approach to the management of property assets; and 
 
 Developing basic property asset plans that are based on best current 
information and random condition and performance reviews; knowledge of 
existing service levels; critiquing strategies and methodologies for 
improvement opportunities; developing long-term financial plans from the 
identification of maintenance and replacement needs; and developing asset 
management improvement plans. 
 
 Advanced Standard 
 
 Use of predictive modelling, risk management and well-informed decision-
making capacity; 
 
 Well-defined and agreed levels of service; 
 
 Accurate and detailed asset data; 
 
 Relating the impact of other organisational tactical plans on the corporate 
Property Asset Management Plan; and 
 
 Reviewing all aspects of the asset management process to ensure 
community and stakeholder needs and strategic objectives are being met. 
3.2.5.3.3 The Property Asset Management Process 
The Leeds Report drew upon the Total Asset Management Manual of the New South Wales 
Government10 to describe ‘a series of structured and defined steps’ for the property asset 
management process (Male, op.cit., p. 47.). These steps are illustrated in figure CS1.7. 
 
 
                                                     
10
 DPWS (2001), op. cit. 
Figure CS1.7 Property Asset Management Process 
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3.2.6. Towards Property Asset Management Excellence in the UK Government 
In determining a PAM baseline and a way forward for PAM excellence in the UK, Leeds 
examined and considered the role of the ’centre of government’; governance arrangements 
for property asset management within government departments; and the management of 
property assets by Arms-Length Bodies. 
3.2.6.1. Central Government and the Role of the Centre (Prime Minister’s Office, 
Cabinet Office and Treasury) 
Citing the Modernising Government White Paper (HMSO, 1999), Leeds noted that ‘joined up’ 
government was one of its central elements (Leeds, op. cit., p. 56.). The White Paper 
stressed the importance of developing a framework to effectively co-ordinate government 
activity. A common view had been developing that good policy-making and efficient service 
delivery had been compromised by ‘institutional fragmentation’.11  
 
Leeds also referred to a number subsequent initiatives introduced to achieve co-ordination 
across the centre of government and within departments, to deliver government policies: 
 
 Civil Service reform, which introduced departmental capability reviews; 
 
 Re-organisations (1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006) of the Cabinet Office as a separate 
Government department; 
 
 Re-organisation of the Prime Minister’s Office (post-2001) to enhance policy 
capability, including the establishment of a Delivery Unit and Forward Strategy Unit; 
 
 Treasury’s adoption of three-year spending planning cycles, and the introduction of 
Public Service Agreements (PSA). The latter have clear property asset targets and 
new reporting mechanisms. (The PSA targets are highlighted in departmental annual 
reports and are subject to inquiry by departmental select committees); 
 
Leeds analysed the PSA targets, and found that 17 of 102 targets had clear property 
asset, sustainability and sustainable development implications associated with them. 
Leeds stated that this percentage would improve once the contribution that property 
as a strategic resource makes to service delivery is more widely understood and 
accepted through property asset management; 
 
 Expansion of the role of the OGC as an independent office of the Treasury as part of 
the Efficiency Programme introduced by Government to, inter alia, deliver £21.5 
billion annual efficiency gains by 2007/08; 
 
 From 2002, departments were required to prepare their budgets on a Resource 
Accounting basis to reflect the full economic cost of Government activity. This 
included provisions for depreciation charges and the cost of capital on assets.  
 
Following the introduction of Resource Accounting, the 2005 House of Commons 
report HC 181 to the Committee of Public Accounts noted that under Cash 
Accounting, assets such as buildings acquired in previous financial years were 
usually treated as free goods by departments. It also noted that Resource Accounting 
requires departments to produce annual balance sheets that set out the value of their 
assets and the costs associated with the reduction of their useful life, together with 
                                                     
11
 Although, not making a direct reference to the New Public Sector Paradigm, Leeds seems to be describing the 
New Public Sector Paradox. 
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recognising the cost of capital. HC 181 reported that the effect of Resource 
Accounting had provided strong incentives for departments to make more effective 
and efficient use of their assets. The report cited the example of the Court Service 
where capital charges of £175 million on a property portfolio valued at £2.7 billion 
encouraged the agency to review the use of courts, release spare capacity and 
improve the utilisation of property (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2005); 
 
 In 2005, the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit introduced a programme of ‘capability 
reviews’ designed to assess the performance of Government Departments. The three 
key areas of assessment were leadership, strategy and delivery. The form and 
substance of these reviews were prepared with advice and input from the National 
Audit Office and Audit Commission. 
3.2.6.2. Departmental Property Asset Management Governance 
In considering the governance of property asset management at the department level, the 
Leeds Report considered the impact of Resource Accounting; and the extent to which the 
existing Treasury Code of Practice on Corporate Governance was applicable to property 
assets. 
3.2.6.2.1 Resource Accounting 
With regard to the impact of Resource Accounting, Leeds, referred to the National Audit 
Office (NAO) report in 2003 (NAO, 2003), which reported that departments needed to: 
 
 Concentrate on a more strategic approach to resource management; 
 
 Have a well-developed capability to convert resources into services that meet 
community needs; and 
 
 Permit innovation and use management information to improve the use of resources 
and efficiency. 
 
The NAO report noted that resource management requires a long-term view to be taken of 
investments, and good information on the performance of resources employed in the delivery 
of services.  
 
The NAO identified a number of key performance indicators of efficiency by which department 
Management Boards should regularly monitor the use of their resources. These included 
reviews of the utilisation of assets to assess their contribution to core activities, identify spare 
capacity, and dispose of surplus assets; assessment of the resource costing of asset 
programmes to justify those costs in terms of the level and quality services and outputs; 
monitoring the delivery of services through the use of benchmarks; and managing cash flow 
to identify and re-allocate potential under-expenditure to other priorities. 
 
Both the NAO and Leeds Reports concluded that, although departments and agencies would 
have differing capability profiles for implementing property asset management, Resource 
Accounting provides the financial basis and framework to enable them to undertake this 
responsibility. 
3.2.6.2.2 Treasury Code of Practice on Corporate Governance 
Leeds noted that property is often the second largest organisational cost behind human 
resources. Leeds cited the Bootle report (Bootle & Kaylan, 2002) that it is surprising that 
many businesses do not have an accurate assessment of their property costs and that 
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management of property is often conducted at the operational rather than strategic level. 
Lyons noted the same issue in his report (ref. section 2.3.1. above). 
 
Looking at the property asset cost base of the central civil government, Leeds concluded that 
property assets should be managed strategically at department level. 
 
Leeds examined Treasury’s Code of Practice on Corporate Governance (the Code) in some 
detail (HMT, 2005a). The Code states that corporate governance is concerned with the 
manner in which organisations are directed, controlled and led. It defines the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among the different stakeholders, determines the rules and 
procedures for corporate decision-making and includes the process through which 
organisational objectives are set, how they are achieved, monitored and measured. 
 
Although the Code does not make direct mention of property, as it does human resources 
and information technology, Leeds identified a number of the Code’s principles that it 
considered key to the governing the management of property assets. These were:  
 
 Ministerial responsibility, i.e. the minister in charge of a department is answerable and 
accountable to parliament for the exercise of powers upon which the administration of 
that department depends; 
 
 The Head of Department, as its Accounting Officer, is personally responsible and 
accountable to parliament for the departmental management and organisation, 
including the use of public money and the stewardship of its assets; 
 
 Departmental Management Boards to advise, inter alia, on the department’s financial 
operations, strategic aims and objectives, the management of departmental 
resources, monitor performance, assessment and management of risk, and the 
maintenance of the required capacity and capability to provide and manage services 
within a culture of excellence and innovation; 
 
 The effective management of risk, governance and internal controls by the 
Management Board; and 
 
 Robust governance arrangements set by the Management Board for the 
management of ALBs that are monitored by departments, with intervention if 
necessary. 
 
Given the nature, characteristics, value and whole-of-life cost of property assets, Leeds 
concluded that property asset management must occupy a significant position within the 
public sector corporate governance framework. 
 
As a large proportion of these assets fall under ALBs, appropriate governance mechanisms 
are required for departments to oversee and monitor the management of ALB property 
assets, with the requisite powers of intervention. 
3.2.6.3. Arms-Length Bodies 
These bodies were given particular attention in the Leeds report.  
 
The report noted that executive agencies are tasked with performing government executive 
functions, with emphasis being placed on a clear concentration on delivering services within 
accountability frameworks to Ministers (Framework Document).  
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A 2002 Agency Policy Review (UK Government, 2002) concluded that, whilst ALBs had had 
success in achieving significant cultural change in central government to the benefit of the 
provision of services, their work had often become disconnected from ministerial policies. 
This review made recommendations for improvement as a guide to departmental 
relationships with their agencies. These recommendations included: 
 
 The integration of policy development with service delivery and support services; 
 
 Business reviews to be part of the parent department’s business planning process; 
 
 The introduction of formal and focused strategic performance monitoring within 
standards, targets and performance frameworks; and 
 
 Agency business planning to be integrated with parent department’s business 
planning on three-year planning cycles; and 
 
In reviewing Cabinet Office guidance notes for Framework Documents, Leeds noted that 
agencies should have clear procedures within their Framework Documents for overseeing 
strategic direction and monitoring of performance and performance review. 
 
Leeds found no specific reference in the guidance notes to either asset management in a 
whole-of-government sense, or to property asset management in particular. Similarly, the 
Government’s Business and Corporate Planning framework also made no such references. 
 
However, Leeds found that there is a requirement for government entities to include 
observations in their annual reports on the financing implications of, inter alia, significant 
changes in objectives and activities, investment strategies and long-term liabilities. 
Additionally, Leeds found that Treasury’s Financial Reporting Manual (HMT, 2005b) indicates 
that government entities should distinguish between owned and leased assets and analyse 
their tangible fixed assets under the following headings: 
 
 Land and buildings, e.g. offices, warehouses, hospitals, barracks, hangers, runways, 
farms and multi-storey car parks, and land associated with these uses; 
 
 Dwellings, i.e. buildings entirely/primary used as residences, associated structures 
and underlying land; 
 
 Infrastructure assets, e.g. roads, rail and associated land; 
 
 Payments on account and assets under construction; 
 
 Furniture and fittings; and 
 
 Operational and non-operational heritage assets. 
3.2.7. Realising the PAM Potential in the CCGE 
In looking to achieve the potential in PAM for the CCGE, Leeds considered five aspects that 
would be prerequisites for excellence, a PAM process; a maturity matrix for the measurement 
of excellence in PAM; the necessary skills; a generic PAM plan; and the organisational and 
governance characteristics necessary to underpin good asset management. 
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3.2.7.1. The PAM Process 
Having examined and reviewed aspects of the machinery of government, frameworks, 
published guidance material, the role of the OGC and the overarching influence of the Lyons 
report, Leeds returned to the US and Australian models for the development of a PAM 
process. 
 
Leeds identified common threads between the US and Australian models that link with the 
development of PAM in the UK CCGE. These are: 
 
 PAM is part of the strategic agenda in the USA and Australia; 
 
 The Australian model recognises the importance of property asset strategy by 
holistically linking strategic objectives and service delivery with capital, maintenance 
and disposal strategies. Property asset strategy is composed of four related strategic 
plans: 
 
 Capital Investment Plan 
 Maintenance Plan 
 Asset Disposal Plan 
 Office Accommodation Plan; 
 
 The USA and Australia both link PAM planning to the budgetary process; and 
 
 Both models advocate the need for a strategic role at executive level to champion 
and be accountable for the process.  
 
The Leeds research indicated a clear relationship between property assets, business 
strategy, service delivery, finance, information technology and organisational change. The 
Treasury guidance document nominates the executive strategic role as the Head of 
Department or Accounting Officer. Lyons positioned this responsibility with the Finance 
Director. However, an important finding of the Leeds report is that the property function has 
different reporting structures to Management Boards, with reporting arrangements also 
through Finance and Corporate Services. 
 
Leeds also concluded that, although the Finance Director position strengthens the financial 
aspects of property, it tends to give less emphasis to property’s wider strategic role. The clear 
conclusion of Leeds is that it is not sufficient for property assets to be represented only at 
Management Board level. Because of the level of investment in property assets, their costs 
and associated business risk, they must be an integral part of the strategic decision-making 
process. 
 
Leeds saw the Australian model as having particular relevance to the UK CCGE through its 
historical development and recognition of the importance of strategic asset management, for 
which the PAM process operates through the Commonwealth and State Government 
Treasury structures. 
3.2.7.2. A Model for Excellence: the PAM Maturity Matrix 
Leeds developed a property asset management maturity matrix to enable Government 
organisations to establish their PAM capacity and capability. The matrix also stipulates the 
requirements for PAM excellence. It comprises a set of enablers against which an 
organisation can be measured. These are: 
 
 Property Asset Management Policy; 
 
26 
 
 Roles and Responsibilities; 
 
 Communication; 
 
 Asset Management Planning; 
 
 Acquisition and Disposal; 
 
 Operation and Maintenance; 
 
 Performance Review and Accounting and Audit and Review. 
 
The matrix provides five levels of transition towards excellence for each of the enablers: 
Unawareness, Awareness, Knowledge, Competence, and Excellence. The levels of transition 
are provided with descriptors for each enabler. These are summarised in table CS1.2. 
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3.2.7.3. PAM Skills 
In determining the necessary skills required to undertake property asset management, Leeds 
relied to a great extent on Howarth’s 2006 report on Improving the Capability and Capacity of 
managing Property Assets in Central Civil Government  (Howarth, op. cit.). 
 
Leeds noted that, as a strategic-based skill, property asset management connects with the  
‘strategic thinking’ and ‘financial management’ core skills expected of senior managers. These are 
the core skills required by every civil servant under the Professional Skills in Government 
framework. 
 
The following particular skills and competencies were identified as being necessary for PAM: 
 
 Strategic Business Planning: business drivers and strategic thinking; corporate property 
asset strategy; PAM planning; risk management; project and programme management; 
and business, financial and service sustainability; 
 
 Leadership: capacity and capability  building; management of strategic change and 
strategic performance; responsibility for professional resources; and communication and 
relationship management skills; 
 
 Property Performance Management: benchmarking of KPIs; contract management and 
performance monitoring; and customer/stakeholder management; 
 
 Financial Management: resource accounting; capital and revenue budgets; whole-life 
costing; and business cases and option appraisals; and 
 
 Data management: effective compilation and management of property asset registers 
and the use of information and reports; ensuring validity of data; scope, storage and 
retrieval and analysis of data. 
 
Leeds noted that, notwithstanding that these skills and capabilities might be in place, their 
direction and application for good asset management relies on the integration of: 
 
 A knowledge, understanding and experience of how property assets can contribute to 
business planning; 
 
 Experience in developing business strategies, which meet the delivery requirements of 
the organisation taking into account all resource impacts: human (staffing), the asset base 
(property) and economics (funding) and 
 
 A thorough understanding of the economic tools for ensuring that the right financial 
decisions are taken, such as business case preparation and option appraisal, whole life 
costing and performance measurement.  
3.2.7.4. The Leeds Generic PAM Plan 
Leeds put forward a generic template for a PAM Plan, which contains eight principal sections: 
Introduction, Aims and Objectives, Roles and Responsibilities, Service Delivery Objectives, 
Current Assets, Options Appraisal, Programming, and Review and Challenge. This template is 
illustrated at Table CS1.3.  
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Plan Sections Content 
1. Introduction A description of the context within which the plan is prepared and 
how it links with corporate business and strategy. 
2. Aims & Objectives A description of the organisation’s mission and the strategic 
property asset management goals. 
3. Roles & Responsibilities PAM’s organisational and governance arrangements. 
 
4. Service Delivery 
Objectives 
The organisation’s service delivery needs together with forecasts 
for future property needs to meet service demand. 
5. Current Assets An assessment of the existing property portfolio and its 
performance. 
6. Options Appraisal Identification of priorities with a summary of financial implications 
of future property needs, including options for non-property asset 
solutions. 
7. Programming Plans for the implementation of acquisitions, disposals and 
maintenance strategies, which take project management, 
procurement and supply chain considerations into account.  
8. Review & Challenge Review and evaluation of the performance of the entire property 
asset management process and system. 
Table CS1.3: PAM Plan Template 
3.2.7.5. Organisational & Governance Characteristics 
Given the numerous structural implications involving the management of property in the CCGE, 
Leeds cautioned that the successful implementation of PAM would require a concerted and co-
ordinated effort across any organisation. This may involve significant organisational change, and 
would require the establishment of a dedicated cross-functional management team led by a senior 
executive with sufficient authority at a strategic and policy level to champion, develop and 
implement PAM. 
 
Leeds located PAM as an activity that sits between business strategy and planning in the 
organisational framework, which, because of the federal structure within departments, presents 
unique challenges to establish and implement Government-wide across the civil estate. Leeds 
proposed the establishment of Property Asset Management Boards within each department to 
overcome these challenges. 
 
The purpose of these Boards is to bring together the strategic and operational aspects of PAM 
under a single organisational unit within a department. It would sit immediately below the 
executive Management Board (See figure CS1.8 below). The Boards would have a policy function 
for managing property assets strategically and integrating the Management Board property asset 
policy decisions with the operational management of those assets. 
 
Figure CS1.8: PAM Governance 
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Leeds set out detailed roles and responsibilities for these Boards, which included: 
 
 The establishment of a PAM policy framework that is relevant to departmental business 
strategy and reflects service delivery requirements; 
 
 Having a position of real authority within the department as part of its corporate 
governance structure; 
 
 Acting as a think tank on PAM policy issues; 
 
 Considering the location strategies of the department and monitoring property disposals; 
 
 Being responsible and accountable for efficiency challenges; 
 
 Sustainability, workspace and design policy and standards.  
 
 Governance over compliance for PAM decisions across the department. 
 
 Review of investment decisions; prioritisation and allocation of capital expenditure; 
allocation of operating expenditure; 
 
 Oversight of risk management; 
 
 Submit investment recommendations to the Executive Management Board for subsequent 
submission to Treasury; 
 
 Respond to Parliamentary questions; 
 
 Challenge property asset strategies management processes; 
 
 Consolidate departmental PAM plans for acquisitions, operations and disposals; and 
 
 Approve property expenditure that exceeds set financial limits. 
 
Leeds envisaged that these Boards would report to Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and the 
Treasury and OGC on property and related fiscal matters through the departmental Executive 
Management Boards. 
 
A typical PAM Board would be chaired by a representative of the departmental Executive 
Management Board, and comprise representatives of major business units with significant 
property portfolios, the heads of any consortium service providers, and IT, HR and Operational 
Directors. The Board should also be equipped with property and estate management skills and 
expertise. 
3.2.8. Potential Efficiency Gains from Strategic Property Asset Management        
The identification and assessment of efficiencies was the second part of the Leeds commission. 
This was carried out post-Lyons, who had identified potential efficiency gains of £760 million per 
Hidden somewhat surprisingly in a body of text on page 106 of the Leeds report is a statement 
that “for best results in implementing and embedding PAM as part of normal business in a 
federally structured department, engagement with the department CEO and Permanent Secretary 
is seen as essential”. This would appear to be a fundamental conclusion deserving of full 
prominence in the report. 
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annum through office relocation strategies, and after a review carried out by P. Gershon, 
“Releasing Resources to the Frontline”, on behalf of Treasury in 2004. (Gershon, 2004) 
 
The efficiency gains identified by Gershon and Lyons are set out below. 
3.2.8.1. The Gershon Efficiency Gains 
Gershon defined ‘efficiencies’ as those reforms to delivery processes and resource (including 
human resources) utilisation that achieve: 
 
 Reduced numbers of resource inputs, whilst maintaining the same level of service 
provision; 
 
 Lower prices of resources required to produce public services; 
 
 Additional outputs for the same level of inputs; 
 
 Improved ratios of output per unit cost of input; and 
 
 Changing the balance between different outputs for the delivery of a similar overall 
objective in a way that achieves a greater overall level of output for the same level of 
inputs. Gershon termed this as “allocative efficiency”.  
 
Gershon saw these as producing savings of £20 billion within 4 – 5 years. 
3.2.8.2. The Lyons Efficiency Gains 
The efficiency gains identified by Lyons through good property asset management were: 
 
 Relocation strategies: £625 million per annum by 2010/11; 
 
 Reduction of office space utilisation by 250,000 square metres: £135 million by 2010/11; 
and 
 
 Strategic whole-of-government management of existing leases: £150 million per annum 
by 2010. 
3.2.8.3. Potential Additional Gains Identified by Leeds 
In addition to the £760 million per annum suggested by Lyons, Leeds identified three additional 
areas that could potentially yield a further £410 million to a possible £660 million annual savings: 
Facility Management, Lease Management and Workspace Management. 
 
 Facilities Management: Leeds projected a potential for 10 per cent savings (£27 million 
per annum) across the CCGE through outsourcing; 
 
 Lease Management: Balancing current and future office accommodation requirements 
with opportunities for more flexible leasing arrangements: £129 – 174 million per annum; 
and 
 
 New Working Practices and Workspace Management: Reduction of workspace by 1 
square metre per person: £254 - £383 million per annum. 
 
Leeds stressed that the potential to realise these gains was subject to a proviso that an integrated 
strategic property asset management policy be adopted across the CCGE.  
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3.2.8.4. Total Potential Gains 
The aggregate of the gains identified by Lyons and Leeds is £1.17 - £1.42 billion per annum, with 
Leeds saying that the mid-range figure of £1.35 billion per annum would seem a reasonable target 
for the CCGE. 
 
Additionally, Leeds suggested savings in the order of 10 per cent could be achievable on annual 
capital expenditure, based on experience in the utilities sector where risk-based approaches to 
investment planning are adopted. 
3.2.9. Implementation: A Routemap to Excellence 
Leeds summarised the context in which it considered an implementation routemap for PAM as 
being: 
 
 There are two components of PAM: 
 
 Strategic: at the Management Board and Property Asset Management Board levels; 
and 
 
 Operational: at the Estates (professional) level and below. 
 
 PAM requires organisational capability centred on the Executive Management and PAM 
Boards, which involve the integration between property assets, human resources, finance 
and information technology; 
 
 PAM requires individual capability through the skills of the person assigned responsibility 
and accountability for it at Executive Management Board level; and 
 
 Much of the CCGE is managed through a decentralised structure of government and a 
fragmented departmental system. 
 
A summary of the key elements of a possible routemap and action plan put forward by Leeds for 
implementing PAM across the Civil Estate is provided in table CS1.4. 
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Leeds made the following qualifications or barriers to implementation of the programme:  
 
 A period of gearing-up, transition and reflection would be required; 
 
 Evidence from the Local Government sector suggested that a period of three to four years 
might be required before PAM practices are fully accepted and PAM plans produced; 
 
 This period could possibly extend to five to seven years in a Central Government 
department depending upon the starting point. (The Leeds research indicated that only 
some 17 per cent to 25 per cent of departments, agencies and ALBs would have an 
existing capability profile above Competence on the maturity matrix); 
 
Leeds noted that an inter-locking regime of developmental processes, capability assessments, 
and audits and reviews would be required to progress the competency of departments; and 
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 Evidence from a House of Commons report and work undertaken by the Australian 
National Audit Office in Australia indicated that the time lag might be as long as eight 
years before strategic thinking in PAM becomes part of government’s daily routine. 
 
In view of the above, Leeds felt that the 2010 target for efficiency gains suggested by both Lyons 
and within the Leeds report itself would be very ambitious.  
3.3. Office of Government Commerce: Improving Asset Management in 
Government Departments – A report on improving the capability and 
capacity of managing property assets in central civil government. (Howarth) 
3.3.1. Purpose and Scope of the Report 
This report, conducted by Andrew Howarth, is the second key element of the OGC’s research 
programme (Howarth, op. cit.). 
 
The Howarth and Leeds reports were published within one month of each other in March and April 
2006 respectively. Both rely on the other to a considerable extent, which exemplifies the co-
ordinated and committed nature of the OGC research project. 
 
Howarth’s role in the OGC’s research project was to investigate the existing level of asset 
management skill and capability within the central civil government, and to propose a strategy for 
sustainable improvement, particularly with regard to property assets. 
3.3.2. Howarth’s Findings 
There are three categories of findings to the Howarth report, Organisational Change, Skills and 
Capabilities, and Property Management in Government. 
3.3.2.1. Organisational Change 
It is clear that Howarth agreed with both Lyons and Leeds in that strategic asset management 
(real property in this case) “is a structured, holistic and integrating approach for aligning and 
managing over time service delivery requirements and the performance of property assets to meet 
business objectives and drivers” (Ibid, p.3.). 
 
From an implementation perspective, Howarth went further by suggesting that asset management 
is about how organisational change affects and effects property assets and how the assets also 
provide opportunities for organisational change. Figure CS1.9, reproduced from Howarth, shows 
Howarth’s suggestion that the role of property is becoming less reactive and moving towards a 
strategic role. 
 
Figure CS1.9: Current and Emerging Practice in PAM 
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3.3.2.2. Skills and Capabilities 
Concentrating upon property and facility management in the CCGE, Howarth found: 
 
 Good quality and experience in property teams to manage property at a tactical level, but 
the numbers of suitable property management staff were found to be considerably less 
than a decade previously; 
 
 A diversity of estate management models and management structures, with more 
qualified and experienced staff in the larger departments and agencies. Some areas of 
government were found to have minimal property management experience and skills; 
 
 Many estate managers understood property management as a strategic function, but 
rarely as a means of optimising the use and performance of assets to improve services; 
 
 Estate managers were rarely asked to question established practice or offered to 
contribute to strategic business thought; 
 
 There was a discernible feeling amongst estate managers that property strategies did not 
need to be more integrated with corporate planning, either because it was felt there was 
already sufficient access to senior management, or that there was no corporate asset 
management strategy in place; 
 
 The gap between existing practice and the ideal was largely due to a lack of awareness 
on the part of senior management of the value that the strategic management of assets 
would bring; 
 
 It would be incorrect to assume that property professionals naturally see a role to 
influence business at a strategic level. In the same way senior business managers, who 
are in positions of influence, often have little or no concept of the strategic importance of 
property assets. Property is viewed as a reactor to business needs, rather than looking 
forward to future needs; 
 
Howarth explained this polarisation of property asset management by citing Professor 
Meziane Lasfer of the Cass Business School: 
 
“It is ironic that in Business Schools the management of property is rarely covered. 
Managers may think that since property management was not covered in their MBA 
course, there is no need to treat it as a cost asset and should not be discussed in the 
boardroom.” (Ibid, p.5.). 
3.3.2.3. Property Management in Government 
Howarth noted that the OGC research project and integration programme concentrated 
specifically on property assets in the central government sector. In so doing, Howarth believed 
that by restricting the activity to property, there would be a potential for asset management to 
become mistakenly synonymous with the traditional prejudices with which property management 
had become associated. 
 
Similarly, Facilities Management, which has developed into an accepted, discernable and 
associated discipline to property management, also suffers from the same misconceptions. 
Support services and their management are not seen by senior managers as sufficiently important 
to be considered in decision-making for future business needs, despite being the second highest 
item of expenditure behind human resources.  
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Within this context, Howarth found unwillingness amongst property professionals to seek senior 
management positions outside of their specialist technical comfort zones.  
 
Howarth summed-up the management of property in government with, “There are therefore 
differences between the property management view of assets and the asset management view of 
property.” (Ibid, p.12).  
 
These differences are illustrated in Table CS1.5, which is summarised from the Howarth report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Table CS1.5: Asset Management and Property Management 
3.3.3. Recommendations of the Howarth Report 
Howarth’s recommendations are based on the integration of asset management skills into the 
training and development of all staff with particular concentration on senior management and 
professionally qualified and/or experienced property managers.  
 
These recommendations were presented within two themes, namely recognition that assets are 
strategic resources, which their management must reflect; and the development of asset 
management skills and competencies. 
3.3.3.1. Property Assets as Strategic Resources 
To promote the management of property assets as strategic resources, Howarth made three key 
proposals: 
 
 The awareness of assets be raised among senior civil service management through their 
development programmes;  
 
 Asset management to be recognised as a professional competency and a key element of 
strategic thinking and financial skills within the Core Skills of the existing Professional 
Skills in Government Framework (See Figure CS1.10 below); and 
 
 The appointment of a Head of Asset Management as champion for asset management in 
the same way as existing Heads of Profession are appointed for other disciplines. 
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Figure CS1.10: Professional Skills in Government Framework 
3.3.3.2. Development of Asset Management Skills and Competencies 
Howarth recommended that asset management should become a professional skill with both 
management competencies and technical skills – “good asset management means challenging 
the status quo in order to seek better ways of doing things.” (Ibid, p.10.). 
 
In addition to promoting strategic property asset management at senior levels across government, 
Howarth defined a role for the OGC to formally identify strategic asset management skills and 
competencies, and design training and development programmes to support the implementation 
process. Howarth envisaged developmental outcomes in terms of the award of a formally 
recognised qualification; a recognised period of development; and/or the demonstration of 
significant relevant experience. 
 
Howarth set out the following skills and competencies, which should encompass the following 
broad areas: 
 
 Data management & analysis of data; 
 
 Property performance management; 
 
 Strategic business planning, including strategy development and risk management; 
 
 Financial management, including whole-of-life costing, business cases and options 
analysis; and 
 
 Leadership to build capacity & capability, manage change, manage strategic 
performance, and to take responsibility for professional resources; 
 
With regard estate and facilities management staff, Howarth proposed that their on-going 
professional training include the wider strategic and business aims of asset management. 
 
The OGC would be responsible for Quality Assurance in the development of asset management 
skills and competencies towards ensuring the application of best practice and standards. 
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3.4. The Office of Government Commerce: High Performing Property – Routemap 
to asset management excellence 
 
The OGC launched ‘High Performing Property’ in late 2006. This set out the government’s 
framework and direction for improving strategic property asset management in central government 
over a period of some six to seven years. (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2006). This 
routemap was developed from the recommendations of the Leeds and Howarth Reports to 
provide a framework for action by central government to achieve asset management excellence. 
 
To summarise, Lyons identified the following challenges to be addressed by government: 
 
 To generate efficiencies from assets to improve service delivery; 
 
 Development of asset management strategies that reflect service need and are driven by 
business plans; 
 
 Assign responsibility to departments for assets controlled by their agencies and public 
bodies; 
 
 To ensure clear and defined managerial responsibilities for the asset management 
function; and 
 
 Asset management to be accepted as an integral part of resource management and 
business planning. 
 
Leeds, supported by Howarth, set out four principal areas for action: 
 
 Leadership and Integration; 
 
 Benchmarking and Standards; 
 
 Skills and Capability; and 
 
 Review and Challenge. 
 
The targets set for ‘High Performing Property’ to be achieved by 2012/2013 were: 
 
 To dispose of between £6 billion and £7 billion of surplus properties; and 
 
 Produce annual efficiency savings of between £1 billion to £1.5 billion from an estate that 
cost £6 billion a year to operate and manage. This would be a reduction in expenditure of 
16.7 per cent to 25 per cent.  
 
Table CS1.6 describes the principal objectives and target outcomes for each action area. 
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3.5. Government-Wide Property Database: e-PIMS 
3.5.1. e-PIMS Mandate 
One of the principal actions within the High Performing Property Programme was the 
establishment of a government-wide property database. 
 
In response to Gershon’s efficiency and the Lyon’s reviews, the UK Treasury issued DAO (Gen) 
08/05 in 2005. This mandated the use of the electronic Property Information Mapping Service (e-
PIMS) for all Central Civil Departments to provide an accurate central register of all property 
occupations and land interests. 
 
e-PIMS displays the location and outline of departments’ properties, holdings and occupations on 
computerised maps and allows departments to access and amend their own details online. It 
provides a searching facility of all civil occupations.  
 
e-PIMS provides digital pictures of occupations, and is able to support other information about an 
occupation as needs emerge. 
 
Through OGC’s co-ordination, e-PIMS enables individual departments to access relevant event 
and scheme information, together with details of departmental vacant space and demand records. 
These can be updated on-line and allows cross-departmental searching for vacant space and 
demand over the whole of the CCGE.  
 
In 2009, following a Ministerial decision for the mandatory recording of central government 
property information on e-PIMS, operated by the OGC, government departments within the CCGE 
were required, through a Mandatory OGC Guidance, to record this information on e-PIMS for all 
properties central government bodies, own, use, control, occupy, or plan to occupy (UK 
Government, 2009). This Mandatory Guidance replaced DAO (Gen) 08/05. 
3.5.2. e-PIMS Function 
3.5.2.1. Government Departments 
e-PIMS is a central electronic register of all central government property holdings, including 
information about future demands or requirements for new accommodation, and vacant and 
surplus properties. 
 
The system allows departments to manage their own estates and property transactions more 
effectively.  
3.5.2.2. OGC and Treasury 
e-PIMS gives an overview of the entire central government estate, which enables OGC and the 
Treasury to monitor implementation of the Government’s commitment to better estate 
management in line. The Treasury also uses e-PIMS to support efficient and sustainable asset 
management in central government as a whole. 
3.5.2.3. Core Data 
e-PIMS holds full property details and costs-in-use to high degree of detail. It records all historic 
and current information, including in relation to its location, occupation, ownership, tenure, use, 
performance, fit out, maintenance and refurbishment, values, potential remaining life and future 
use. These details are held for: 
 
 All office properties occupied or controlled by user bodies, both freehold and leasehold, 
and irrespective of whether the a department is actually using or occupying a property;  
 
 Any properties occupied or run under PFI contracts; 
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 All other owned and/or used properties, for example, hostels, laboratories and depots;  
 
 Surplus, sublet or vacant properties;  
 
 Undeveloped land;  
 
 Serviced or temporary offices where contractual or actual occupation exceeds three 
months; and  
 
 All forward commitments such as agreements for lease.  
 
(UK Government, Unknown) 
3.5.2.4. e-PIMS Classifications 
e-PIMS classifies property on the structure shown in Figure CS1.11. 
 
 
The OGC has mapped departments and their ‘families’ with mandated estates with an area of 
over 10,000 m². This is reproduced as Figure CS1.12 (UK Office of Government Commerce, 
2013b) . 
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Figure CS1.12: Departmental Families with Mandated Estates over 10,000 m² 
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3.6. Results Achieved by the UK Government in the CCGE 2004-2012 
3.6.1. Reporting Requirements: The State of the Estate 
The annual The State of the Estate report to Parliament, required under the Climate Change Act 
2008, reports upon progress made in improving the efficiency and environmental sustainability of 
the CCGE. 
 
The report covers four priority areas: 
 
 The reduction of the overall size of the estate; 
 
 Increased efficiency in the use of administrative offices; 
 
 The improvement of environmental sustainability of buildings; and 
 
 Ensuring building acquisitions are with the top quartile of energy performance. 
3.6.2. Property Asset Management 
Government departments and their ALBs are accountable for the property they own and/or 
occupy. They are particularly responsible for: 
 
 The resources employed in providing accommodation and its environmental impact; 
 
 The establishment of departmental governance and accountability; and 
 
 Managing property assets as a strategic resource, which includes the quality of data used 
in decision-making. 
 
The State of the Estate report for 2012 records that, although operating models differ across the 
diverse nature and size of government departments, “the importance of effective property asset 
management in this varied landscape is now well established with board-level property champions 
in departments accountable to permanent secretaries for PAM across the department and its 
arm’s-length bodies. PAM boards (or their equivalent) have responsibility for leading integrated 
strategic management across the total property portfolio in a department.” (UK Office of 
Government Commerce, 2013a). 
3.6.3. Benchmarking 
The Government Property Unit’s (GPU) Benchmarking Service measures the performance of the 
office portfolio against private sector benchmarks and against government targets and standards, 
which provides a standardised basis for reporting. 
 
Using e-PIMS as the data collection source enables performance to be independently validated, 
and produces consistent data that can be compared against KPIs for performance challenge and 
improvement. 
3.6.4. Performance Measurement 
The performance of the CCGE is compared across government organisations and with the private 
sector. The principal Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are: 
 
 Reductions in the area of the estate measured in square metres; 
 
 Reductions in the total cost of the estate; 
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 Improvements in the cost of office space per full-time equivalent employee (FTE), 
calculated by: 
 
Cost of Space ÷ Number of FTEs; 
 
 The use of occupied space per FTE, calculated by: 
 
Total Space in Use ÷ Total Number of Accommodated FTEs; 
 
 Compliance with the requirement to procure buildings in the top quartile of energy 
performance; and 
 
 Sustainability performance for greenhouse gas emissions, waste, and water consumption. 
 
The datasets used to measure performance are: 
 
 Size and distribution of departmental estates derived from e-PIMS; 
 
 Cost derived from departmental financial accounts; 
 
 Efficiency, which relates to the cost of property occupation rather than ownership; and 
 
 Sustainability, data for which is drawn from performance against government’s Greening 
Commitment targets. 
3.6.5. Performance Outcomes 
The UK Government has reported annually to parliament on the performance of High Performing 
Property since 2008 through its report series, The State of the Estate. These reports have been 
used as sources for Table CS1.7, which summarises the key government-wide achievements 
from the routemap implementation programme (UK Office of Government Commerce, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013a). 
3.6.5.1. Size 
The size of the estate has been reduced by 2.83 million m² (23.5 per cent). 
3.6.5.2. Property Holdings 
The number of property holdings has reduced by 2,353 properties (29.7 per cent). 
3.6.5.3. Cost 
The operating cost of the estate has reduced by £1.61 billion per annum since 2004 (38.2 per 
cent), which exceeds the savings target shown in table CS1.6. 
3.6.5.4. Efficiency 
 
 The vacancy factor across the estate rose to a peak of 3.1 per cent in 2011 due to 
rationalisation movements within the portfolio. It has since settled at around 3 per cent, 
which compares to a national average for all sectors of 10.1 per cent; 
 
 Cost per FTE has risen by 17.3 per cent on account of rising property costs, and lag times 
between staff reductions, the effect of new workspace standards and the disposal of 
vacant space; 
 
 Savings of £200 million through disposals and lease breaks were generated from the 
reduction in size of the estate over 2011/12. 
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From 2012, the GPU and Government Procurement Service have partnered to develop a 
standard method for procuring facility management across government, generate better quality 
cost data and management information, and integrate facility management into the building design 
process. 
3.6.5.5. Sustainability 
 
 Greenhouse gas emissions have been reduced by 12 per cent across the estate from a 
2009/10 baseline, which has produced over £40 million in energy and fuel cost savings; 
 
 Reduction in the amount of waste has produced £4.7 million in savings since 2009/2010; 
 
 Water consumption has reduced by 3 per cent over the 2010/2011 baseline, which has 
produced £4.2 million in savings; 
 
 In 2012, 44% (four out of nine) administrative buildings added to the estate were procured 
from within the top quartile range of energy performance. This compares with 44% in 
2009, 65% in 2010 and 63% in 2011. 
3.7. Current PAM Governance Arrangements 
3.7.1. Responsibility 
In mid-2010, responsibility for the OGC and the public procurement agency, Buying Solutions, 
moved to the Cabinet Office as part of the government’s Efficiency and Reform Group (ERG). 
 
The ERG has a strong centre-of-government mandate to ensure departments co-operate in the 
reduction of waste and improvement in accountability. 
 
The ERG is overseen by an Efficiency Board, which is co-chaired by the Minister for the Cabinet 
Office and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. The Boards members include senior business 
leaders experienced in procurement, information technology, and workforce issues. 
 
Property functions were combined into one unit, the Government Property Unit, which is 
responsible for property efficiency. The GPU reports directly to the Minister and Chief Secretary 
as part of the ERG. 
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3.7.2. Government Property Profession (GPP) 
In 2010, the UK Government appointed a head of the Property Asset Management profession 
(now the GPP) in Government to strengthen property asset management capability in the wider 
public sector. 
 
The GPP is formally recognised as part of the Civil Service. Its aim is to ensure “that property 
assets are managed efficiently and effectively on a day-to-day basis, either directly or by industry 
partners.” (Gov.UK, 2015). 
 
The GPP has developed a competency framework from the Property Asset Management 
Capability Assessment Model that represents the four process areas of life cycle of property asset 
management: 
 
 Strategy and business; 
 
 Delivery planning; 
 
 Implementation of change; and 
 
 Asset operation and maintenance. (Ibid). 
 
The RICS and British Institute of Facilities Management support the framework. 
3.7.3. Government Property Unit 
The GPU has central oversight over policy and strategy for all government land and property. Its 
role is to work in collaboration with “across the Civil Service to: 
 
 Create an effective and efficient government estate; 
 
 Provide value for money for the taxpayer; 
 
 Dispose of surplus property in a way that maximises financial return; and 
 
 Boost growth and create new homes.” (ibid). 
 
The GPU assists departments to rationalise their portfolios through place-based strategies and 
enforcement of National Property Controls; the One Public Estate Programme, which encourages 
the sharing of data and management of property across departments with common characteristics 
such as location; the accelerated disposal of surplus property; the management and use of vacant 
space; and workplace practices. 
 
The GPU also operates Government’s Property Benchmarking Service from data obtained 
through the e-PIMS system.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Case Study: United States of America Federal Government 
– the path to Property Asset Management Reform (2003-
2015) 
1. Introduction 
 
This case study has been composed from a review of literature in the form of independent 
and academic studies and reports, professional standards and guidelines, government 
strategies, policies and procedures, reports and audits, journal articles, conference 
proceedings and discussions with staff of the U.S. Government General Services 
Administration’s (GSA) Office of Government-Wide Policy, and the GSA’s Public Buildings 
Service Division. 
 
Figure CS2.1 summarises the chronology of the development of the management of US 
federal government property since 2003. 
 
 
Figure CS2.1: Management of US Federal Government Property Since 2003 
2. U.S. Government Accountability Office 
2.1.  “High-Risk List” 
 
In January 2003, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) added Federal Real 
Property to its series of High-Risk areas to Government. 
 
Known as “the congressional watchdog”, the GAO is an independent authority that works for 
the United States Congress (Congress) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015a). 
 
The GAO supports Congress in the improvement of performance and accountability of the 
federal government. It does this by, inter alia, determining the efficient and effective 
expenditure of public funds through the audit of agency operations; reporting on how well 
government programs and policies meet their objectives; and the analysis of policy and policy 
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options. The function of the GAO is to “advise the heads of executive agencies about ways to 
make government more efficient, effective, ethical, equitable and responsive.” (Ibid). 
 
Every two years at the start of a new Congress, the GAO identifies areas of government that 
are high-risk due to the possibility of “fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, and are 
most in need of transformation.” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015b). 
2.2. Criteria for Assessing Performance and Accountability and High Risks 
 
Table CS2.1 outlines the GAO’s assessment criteria and methodology for five key areas of 
department and agency performance, accountability and risk, and whole-of-government high 
risks (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000). 
 
Assessment Area Assessment Criteria Methodology 
1. Identification & 
Assessment of Major 
Program & Mission 
Areas 
 The area: 
 Is central to congressional & 
executive branch attention; 
 Has high-level public interest 
or large expenditure; 
 Is prominent in agency’s 
strategic plans and reports;  
 Has known performance/ 
accountability issues 
 Agency consultation 
 Review of agency’s: 
 Strategic plans; 
 Annual performance plans & 
reports; 
 Accountability reports; 
 Audited financial statements; 
and 
 Supplemental information & 
reports 
2. Management & 
Program Performance 
 Major management functions and 
their internal control: 
 Strategic planning; 
 Budget process and 
management; 
 Organisational alignment and 
control; 
 Performance measurement; 
 Human capital strategies; 
 Financial management; 
 Information technology; and 
 Acquisition 
 Agency consultation 
 Review of: 
 GAO audits & testimonies; 
 Inspectors general reports 
 As per 1 above; 
 Program performance 
reviews; 
 Government-wide 
performance plans & 
objectives; and 
 Congressional reports 
3. Classification of High-
Risk Area 
 The program/ function is: 
 Nationally significant; or 
 Key to performance & 
accountability. 
 A risk is inherent to the program. 
 A risk is a systemic problem. 
 Nature & potential results of risks. 
 Qualitative and quantitative risk 
analysis 
4. Assessment of Agency 
Corrective Measures 
for Removal of High- 
Risk Designation 
 Demonstrated leadership 
commitment to problem 
resolution; 
 Progress in strengthening 
controls; 
 Appropriateness of corrective 
action plans; 
 Completion of solutions in near 
term (2 years); 
 Whether solutions address root 
causes. 
 Agency demonstration of results. 
5. Government-wide High 
Risks 
 
 Common multiple agency risk; 
 Significant impact on 
budget/resources. 
 
Table CS2.1: GAO High-Risk Assessment Criteria 
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2.3. The GAO and Federal Real Property 
2.3.1. Federal Real Property – A High-Risk Area 
In January 2003, the GAO presented its High-Risk Series Report on Federal Real Property to 
Congress (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003). This was followed by testimony before the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, given by the Comptroller 
General of the United States on 1 October 2003 (Federal Real Property - Actions Needed to 
Address Long-standing and Complex Problems, 2003). 
 
In designating federal real property as a high-risk area, the Comptroller General wrote in his 
letter to The President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives:  
 
“Long-standing problems in the federal real property area include excess and underutilised 
property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, and costly space. These factors 
have multi-billion dollar cost implications and can seriously jeopardise the ability of federal 
agencies to accomplish their missions. Federal agencies also face many challenges securing 
real property due to the threat of terrorism. Given the persistence of these problems and 
various obstacles that have impeded progress in resolving them, GAO is designating federal 
real property as a high-risk area.” (Comptroller General of the United States, 2003). 
 
The GAO recognised that resolving the problems and clearing the obstacles would require 
“high-level attention and effective leadership by both Congress and the administration” (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, op.cit., pp. 2-3).  
 
The GAO also recognised that the existing structures and processes may not be capable of 
addressing these problems, and that there should be a comprehensive and integrated 
government-wide real property transformation strategy put in place. Such a strategy might 
need to be developed by an independent commission or government-wide task force in 
consultation with agencies, the private sector, and other interested groups (see section 
2.2.7.). 
 
One of the principal recommendations for this strategy was that it should reflect “the lessons 
learned and leading practices of public and private organisations that have attempted to 
reform their real property practices.” In particular, real property should be viewed as a 
valuable resource in the same way as capital, people, information and technology are treated 
and managed to support business objectives. 
 
The GAO report called for “a new way of thinking” about the workplace and government’s 
property needs. This was seen as necessary to respond to changes in the way government 
services were being delivered, advances in technology, e-government initiatives, changing 
public needs and expectations, resource sharing, and security concerns. 
 
In the federal financial context, the shortcomings in the management of real property meant 
that, for five consecutive years, 1997-2001 (and beyond), the GAO was unable “to express an 
opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements.” (Ibid., p.27.).  
 
“Material weaknesses” in financial systems, record-keeping, financial reporting, and poor 
documentation were seen as being responsible for severely limiting the ability to report on a 
large proportion of government assets, liabilities and costs; restricting the ability to measure 
full costs and the financial performance of government programs; and impacting upon 
government’s ability to protect its position in significant assets and property transactions. 
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Because of this lack of information, the GAO was unable to “satisfactorily determine” that all 
assets were included in the financial statements, verify the actual existence of certain assets, 
or substantiate their valuations (see section 2.2.4.). 
 
To demonstrate the diverse composition and use of federal real property, and the wide range 
of stakeholders that it involves, the GAO presented an analysis of the portfolio in its report on 
Federal Real Property in January 2003 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003).  
 
The GAO defined real property as “facilities; land; and anything constructed on, growing on, 
or attached to the land” (Ibid., p.4.). It based its analysis on data obtained from the GSA, 
which, it noted, “have been unreliable and of limited usefulness”, but which represented the 
only available source for federal real property data (Ibid.). 
 
Table CS2.2 shows the make-up of the worldwide portfolio in 2003. 
 
Government Agency Owned Space %
1 
Leased Space %
2 
Interior 2 - 
Energy 4 - 
Veterans Affairs 5 - 
GSA 6 39 
US Postal Service 7 30 
Dept. of Defence 66 6 
Department of State - 8 
Others 9 17 
1 
Estimated total owned space: 300 million m
2
. Totals rounded. 
2 
Estimated total leased space: 33 million m
2  
Table CS2.2: Federal Real Property Portfolio (2003) 
 
The use of the portfolio included military bases, office buildings, embassies, prisons, 
courthouses, hospitals, schools, stores, housing, border stations, laboratories, and park 
facilities. 
 
The GAO estimated that the federal government owned approximately 636 million acres of 
land, which represents some 25 per cent of the total acreage of the United States (Ibid., p.5.). 
 
The report noted three principal reasons for the “complex and dynamic environment” in which 
the portfolio is managed: 
 
 The need for agencies to comply with numerous laws and regulations governing 
acquisition, disposal and management of federal property assets; 
 
 The diverse and extended nature of stakeholders and other parties with interests in 
property decision-making and property decisions, including individual members of 
Congress; state and local governments; business and community interests; unions; 
private sector property firms; heritage preservation and conservation groups; and the 
general public; and 
 
 The high profile of government property when management practices are scrutinised 
for waste or poor management. 
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The operation of these often militates against the proper, efficient and business-like 
management of federal property. 
 
The GAO report identified six key areas of concern: the excess of government property; the 
condition of the portfolio; the lack of reliable property data; the predominance of high-cost 
leased property; and persistent real property problems. The report also considered lessons 
learned, and leading property practices. 
 
The findings of the GAO report and testimony are summarised in the following sections 
(Federal Real Property - Actions Needed to Address Long-standing and Complex Problems, 
2003; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003). 
2.3.2. Excess Property 
The GAO described the management of the federal property as reflecting “the business 
model and technological environment of the 1950s” (Ibid., p.8.). By this it meant that, despite 
considerable changes in the size and objectives of the federal government; the technological 
changes affecting all working environments; the development of e-government, changes in 
service delivery models, and the way government inter-acts with the public; and the post-
2001 security environment, the property portfolio had failed to respond to, and address those 
changes.  
 
The consequences of this failure were an excess of property beyond the needs of 
government; inappropriately located property; property that no longer met the technical and 
functional needs of government; and unnecessary expenditure on holding and maintaining 
surplus and under-utilised assets. 
 
The GAO estimated some of the financial and political effects of this as being: 
 
 The Department of Defence was spending between $3 billion to $4 billion per annum 
maintaining more than 8 million m
2
 of surplus facilities; 
 
 Veterans Affairs was spending $35 million per annum to maintain and operate 61 
buildings that were either surplus or vacant; 
 
 The Department of Energy was holding 1,200 excess properties totalling 1.5 million 
m
2
 and costing over $70 million annually to maintain and secure. Disposal programs 
had not been prioritised and considered against on-going business plans, the 
reduction of risk, and minimising life-cycle costs, which put disposals in conflict with 
new facility requirements; 
 
 The State Department had 92 surplus properties with an estimated sale value of $180 
million; 
 
 The projection of a public image of waste and inefficiency, which erodes confidence 
in government; and 
 
 Negative effects on local economies by stifling development, the highest and best use 
of property, and the realisation of underlying property values. 
2.3.3. Portfolio Condition 
The GAO found “alarming” backlogs in the restoration, repair and maintenance of federal 
property.  These backlogs were “significant”, requiring tens of billions of dollars to restore 
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assets to functionality; and reflected the federal government’s “ineffective stewardship” over 
its property portfolio. 
 
This situation prevailed across government departments and agencies. The GAO singled-out 
the following examples: 
 
 Although the Department of Defence was no longer reporting data on these backlogs, 
it had estimated in 2001 that the cost of bringing its facilities to fully meet its 
requirements was in the region of $164 billion. Much of the backlog was attributed to 
lack of funding, and poor property data and information, which created difficulties in 
the direction of funds to where they were most needed; 
 
 The Department of the Interior had deferred maintenance to the value of some $11 
billion. This was affecting heritage assets of national importance and significance, 
such as Mount Rushmore and Yellowstone National Park; 
 
 The backlog in the GSA’s portfolio was estimated at $5.7 billion across nearly 2,000 
buildings; and 
 
 The State Department had an estimated backlog of $736 million, with more than fifty 
per cent of its facilities failing to meet health and safety standards. 
 
The GAO summarised the effects of the deteriorating portfolio as increased operational costs; 
health and safety risks; added costs of rectifying delayed maintenance and repair; the 
maintenance and repair of retained surplus property; the effect on employee recruitment, 
retention, and productivity; and the negative image presented by a dilapidated stock of public 
buildings, facilities, infrastructure, and national treasures. 
2.3.4. Real Property Asset Data 
The GAO identified the lack of “reliable and useful real property data” for strategic decision-
making as compounding the problems of excess property and a deteriorating asset stock. 
 
The GSA’s worldwide inventory database and property reports provided the only central 
source of descriptive property data. This database was considered by the GAO to be 
“unreliable and of limited usefulness” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002). 
 
The lack of data and information to support asset holdings meant that the government was 
unable to accurately determine that all assets were included in financial reports, confirm the 
existence of reported assets, and verify the amounts to which they were valued. 
2.3.5. The Cost of Leased Property 
The GAO noted that it is generally more favourable financially to meet long-term property 
needs through the construction or acquisition of property rather than leasing property on 
operational lease terms. 
 
However, because of the lack of funds available for the ownership option, and the 
government’s budget accounting requirements for owned property, which make the operating 
leasing option appear much cheaper, the government’s leasing agent (the GSA) had favoured 
satisfying long-term property requirements by means of shorter-term operating leases. 
 
The GAO showed that construction would have been the least cost option by some $126 
million in eight out of nine instances where operational leases were adopted. 
 
 
 
7 
The GAO was explicit in its view that this “does not reflect a sensible or economically rational 
approach to capital asset management” (Federal Real Property - Actions Needed to Address 
Long-standing and Complex Problems, 2003). 
2.3.6. Persistent Real Property Problems 
Despite previous attempts to initiate reform and improve the management of federal real 
property, including incentives to dispose of excess assets, and engage in public-private 
partnerships, the fundamental problems continued to persist. These were compounded by a 
number of factors, which the GAO identified as requiring “high-level attention by Congress 
and the administration” (Ibid., pp. 14-16). In particular, these comprise competing stakeholder 
interests; legal and budgetary disincentives; a need for improved capital planning; and the 
lack of a strategic, government-wide focus on real property issues. 
2.3.6.1. Competing Stakeholder Interests 
Real property decisions often do not reflect the most effective or efficient solution that is in the 
best interests of the agency or whole-of-government, but rather the priorities of other parties. 
2.3.6.2. Legal and Budgetary Disincentives 
The legal and budgetary environment is complex, and has a far-reaching effect on property 
decision-making and the ability to achieve effective and efficient outcomes. 
 
With limited funds available for capital investment, priorities for new facilities must be weighed 
against the need for the renovation, maintenance and disposal of existing assets. 
2.3.6.3. Improved Capital Planning 
Despite guidelines issued by the GAO and OMB for making capital investment decisions, 
agencies generally have not developed capital investment strategies. In addition, the federal 
government does not generally carry out long-term planning or budgeting for capital assets. 
2.3.6.4. Lack of a Strategic Government-Wide Focus on Real Property Issues 
Real Property has not traditionally attracted the attention of government-wide strategists and 
planners. The GAO identified the lack of such an approach as a principal reason for the 
continued and persistent real property problems, which will continue unless a centralised and 
concerted effort is made to address them from the highest of levels of government under the 
leadership of Congress and the administration. 
 
The GAO set down the following basic tenets for a strategic focus: 
 
 Appropriate incentives for agencies to strategically manage real property as 
organisational resources; 
 
 Ensuring transparency; 
 
 Ensuring high-level accountability for the management and performance of assets; 
 
 Effective systems to measure results; and 
 
 High-quality property information and data. 
2.3.7. Transformation Strategy 
The GAO put forward the need for a transformation strategy to be developed by a 
“government-wide task force” in consultation with agencies, the private sector, and other 
interested groups to comprehensively address the long-standing problems and suggest 
proposals for the re-alignment of federal infrastructure and disposal of surplus property; 
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managing the repair and restoration backlog in the portfolio; ensuring the provision of 
accurate and reliable government-wide and agency-specific property data; and reducing the 
reliance on expensive leasing. 
 
Furthermore, the transformation strategy should consider: 
 
 Ways of minimising the negative effects of competing stakeholder interest in property 
decisions; 
 
 Providing agencies with capacity and incentives for good property decision-making; 
 
 The effect of real property and the workplace on attracting and retaining high-
performing staff; 
 
 Improving federal government long-term capital planning for real property through 
business-like practices, investment analysis, and performance evaluation; 
 
 Long-term budget planning for property sustainability, renewal, or replacement; 
 
 The incorporation of lessons learned and leading practices in the private sector and 
other public jurisdictions
1
; and 
 
 Raising the profile and importance of property in government and to achieving service 
and business objectives. 
3. The President’s Management Agenda 
 
Following the designation of the management of federal real property by the GAO as a high-
risk area, and the Comptroller General’s testimony to Congress, the issue was added to ‘The 
President’s Management Agenda’ (PMA) in January 2004. 
 
The PMA was established in 2001 under the Office of Federal Financial Management within 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a “Framework for Improving Financial 
Performance” (Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget, 2008). 
The purpose of this framework is “to provide direction and clarity on how the President’s 
improvement goals will be met” (Ibid.). 
 
The PMA has seven key areas of reform activity: 
 
 “Eliminating improper payments, 
 
 “Rightsizing the government’s real property, 
 
 “Improving intra-governmental reporting, 
 
 “Implementing the financial management line of business, 
 
 “Strengthening internal controls, 
 
 
                                                     
1
 A number of examples were included in the Appendix, “Lessons Learned and Leading Practices in Real Property”, 
to the GAO High-Risk report (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003). 
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 “Modernizing grants management, and 
 
 “Improving fiscal sustainability reporting.” (Ibid.). 
 
The PMA recognised six “core activities” necessary for the effective management of the 
federal government’s resources. These being: improving financial reporting, financial 
systems, asset management
2
, grants management and audit requirements; and 
strengthening internal controls. 
 
Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the management of federal real 
property was placed at the highest level of the President’s Management Agenda. It has 
retained this importance and significance throughout the administration of President Barack 
Obama. 
4. Executive Order 13327 – Federal Real Property Asset Management 
 
Within three months of the elevation of the management of federal real property into the PMA, 
President George W. Bush signed Executive Order (EO) 13327, “Federal Real Property Asset 
Management”, in March 2004.  
 
This provides the policy mandate and background against which Federal real property is 
managed. 
4.1. Policy Setting 
 
EO 13327 set the policy for “the United States to promote the efficient and economical use of 
America’s real property assets and to assure management accountability for implementing 
federal real property management reforms.” ("EO 13327," 2004) (p. 5897). 
 
Further to this policy, EO 13327 (the Order) required executive branch departments and 
agencies “to recognise the importance of real property resources through increased 
management attention, the establishment of clear goals and objectives, improved policies and 
levels of accountability, and other appropriate action.” (Ibid., p. 5897). 
 
Section 3 of the Order provided a definition of federal real property that would fall within the 
scope of the Order. Subject to a number of special exclusions, the scope of property to which 
the Order applies is wide-ranging, and includes “any real property owned, leased, or 
otherwise managed by the Federal Government, both within and outside the United States, 
and improvements on Federal lands.” (Ibid.). 
4.2. Governance and Management Direction 
 
The Order gave very specific direction to the management of federal real property by 
establishing the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC), establishing and defining 
responsibilities for the position of Agency Senior Real Property Officer (SRPO), and defining 
the role of the GSA in supporting the FRPC. 
4.2.1. Federal Real Property Council 
The FRPC was established as part of the OMB to develop guidance for, and facilitate the 
success of each agency’s asset management plan.  
                                                     
2
 Bold emphasis added by the author. 
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4.2.1.1. FRPC Composition 
The Council is composed of: 
 
Chair: Deputy Director of the OMB 
Members: Controller of the OMB 
Administrator of the GSA 
All agency SRPOs (see section 4.2.2 following) 
Any other Federal officers deemed appropriate by the Chair of the Council.  
4.2.1.2. FRPC Functions 
The Order assigned the following functions to the FPRC: 
 
 Provision of a venue for assisting SRPOs to develop and implement agency asset 
management plans; 
 
 Together with the GSA, establish performance measures to determine the 
effectiveness of federal real property management. The Order made specific 
provision for the following measures: 
 
 Life-cycle cost estimating; 
 Costs associated with the various means of acquisition; 
 Cost and time of property disposals; 
 Financial proceeds from disposals; 
 Operating, maintenance and security costs; 
 Environmental costs associated with federal property, including compliance and 
restoration; 
 Vacant space; 
 The realisation of equity value in federal real property assets; 
 Opportunities to co-operate with the commercial real estate industry; and 
 Enhancement of productivity through the improvement of workplace 
environments. 
 
 Act as a “clearing house” for executive agencies for best practices in the evaluation of 
actual progress in, and achievement of management innovation and real estate 
enhancements. 
 
 Work in conjunction with the President’s Management Council to assist SRPOs and 
the implementation of asset management plans. 
 
The Order mandated that the FRPC meet not less than quarterly in each financial year. 
4.2.2. Senior Real Property Officers 
The Order established the position of the SRPO for all executive branch departments and 
agencies. (This is a senior professional position with extensive experience, competency, 
skills, and training requirements set down by the GSA). 
 
The principal role of SPROs is the development and implementation of agency asset 
management plans, which must: 
 
 Identify and categorise all real property owned, leased, or managed by the agency; 
 
 Identify goals for real property and measure their progress; and 
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 Prioritise actions to improve operational and financial management of the agency’s 
real property portfolio, and consider life-cycle estimations associated with those 
priorities. 
 
SRPOs are required to submit these plans annually to the OMB. 
 
The SRPO is responsible for monitoring the agency’s property assets so that they support the 
agency’s strategic business goals and objectives; and to ensure they are managed in 
accordance with the real property asset management principles developed by the FRPC. 
 
All agencies are ‘encouraged’ to follow the requirements of EO 13227. However, the following 
departments and agencies are subject to the Order, and are required to designate SPROs for 
their agency (US General Services Administration, 2015): 
 
 Department of Agriculture 
 Department of Commerce 
 Department of Defence 
 Department of Education 
 Department of Energy 
 Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 Department of Homeland Security 
 Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 
 Department of the Interior 
 Department of Justice 
 Department of Labor 
 Department of Transportation 
 Department of State 
 Department of Treasury 
 Department of Veterans Affairs 
 Environmental Protection Agency 
 NASA 
 Agency for International 
Development 
 General Services Administration 
 National Science Foundation 
 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 Office of Personnel Management 
 Small Business Administration 
 Social Security Administration 
4.2.3. General Services Administration 
EO 13227 assigned responsibility to the GSA to support agencies across government in 
implementing the Order, and providing support to the FRPC by: 
 
 Providing oversight and guidance to departments and agencies on real property 
issues, including managing property, and providing leadership in the development 
and management of property management systems; 
 
 Publishing performance measures and standards; 
 
 Establishing and maintaining a database on real property owned and leased by the 
federal government; and 
 
 Establishing technology standards for the uniform reporting of real property 
information. 
5. Reform Implementation, Governance, Results and Outcomes 
5.1. Implementation Framework 
 
To enable it to fulfil its role under EO 13227, the FPRC established four committees: Asset 
Management Planning, Performance Measures, Property Inventory, and Systems. 
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In December 2004, the FRPC published “Guidance for Improved Asset Management” 
(Federal Real Property Council, 2004). This document set down the FRPC guiding principles, 
the required components for an agency Asset Management Plan, property inventory data 
elements, and government-wide performance measures. These broadly aligned with the 
responsibilities of the four FRPC Committees. 
5.1.1. FRPC “Integrated” Guiding Principles 
These are the FRPC’s strategic objectives for the improvement of real property asset 
management. Agencies are required to ensure that all real property is managed in 
accordance with the principles, which are: 
 
 Federal real property is to “support agency missions and strategic goals”; 
 
 Adoption of public and private sector benchmarks and practices; 
 
 Analyse assets on life cycle cost/benefit basis; 
 
 Make full utilisation of assets; 
 
 Dispose of surplus assets; 
 
 Provide appropriate levels of investment; 
 
 Maintain an accurate inventory and description of assets; 
 
 The use of appropriate performance measures; 
 
 Promote customer satisfaction; and 
 
 Provide safe, secure and healthy workplaces. 
5.1.2. Asset Management Plan Components 
The FPRC prescribed ten components that must be included in government agency Real 
Property Asset Management Plans: 
 
 Statements as to how the agency implements each of the Integrated Guiding 
Principles; 
 
 The agency’s business and service objectives; 
 
 Asset values, including a plan for their periodic valuation; 
 
 Operations and maintenance, and capital plans that reflect agency priorities; 
 
 Resource implications and requirements of the plan; 
 
 Whole-of-agency portfolio Asset Business Plan; 
 
 Processes for continuous performance monitoring and reporting; 
 
 Description and consideration of socio-economic and environmental responsibilities; 
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 Asset Management governance and organisational management structures and 
arrangements; and 
 
 Use of common government-wide terminology. 
5.1.3. Property Inventory Data Elements 
The initial property data elements required by the FRPC to be kept and maintained by 
agencies are shown in Table CS2.3. 
 
 Property Type 
 Property Use 
 Legal Interest 
 Status 
 Historical status 
 Reporting Agency 
 User 
 Size 
 Utilisation 
 Value 
 Condition  
 Mission Criticality 
 Location 
 Property Identifier 
 Annual Operating 
& Maintenance 
Costs 
 City 
 State 
 Country 
 County 
 Congressional 
District 
 ZIP Code 
 Installation & 
Sub-Installation 
Identifier 
 Restrictions 
Table CS2.3: FRPC Property Data Elements 
5.1.4. Government-Wide Performance Measures 
The base minimum or “First Tier” performance measures for federal agencies set by the 
FRPC were: 
 
 Utilisation; 
 
 Condition Index; 
 
 Mission Dependency; and 
 
 Annual Operating and Maintenance Costs 
5.2. Real Property Management and Services: General Services 
Administration 
 
The GSA has two roles - operational, and policy and regulatory: 
 
 It oversees the business of the US Federal Government; and 
 
 Is responsible for policy formulation and regulation in the areas personal and real 
property, travel and transportation, and information technology.  
 
The GSA describes its mission as “to deliver the best value in real estate, acquisition, and 
technology services to government and the American people.” (U.S. General Services 
Administration, 2015a) 
 
Section 4.2.3 above describes the role assigned to the GSA by EO 13227, which effectively 
gave it responsibility for the implementation and oversight of the federal real property reform 
principles and agenda. 
 
The GSA’s organisation structure is shown in Figure CS 2.2. Grey-shaded boxes represent 
the Federal Real Estate management functions, which are the Public Buildings Service, and 
the Office of Government-Wide Policy (OGP) for Asset Management and High-Performance 
Green Buildings. 
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Figure CS2.2: US General Services Administration 
5.2.1. Public Buildings Service 
The role of the PBS is “to provide superior workplaces for federal customer agencies at good 
economies to the American taxpayer.” (Ibid.). 
 
The PBS acts as landlord for the civilian federal government.  It acquires space on behalf of 
the federal government through leasing and new construction; and acts as manager of the 
national federal property portfolio. 
 
The PBS is responsible for some 12 per cent of the federal real property portfolio. It owns or 
leases nearly 10,000 assets, and maintains an inventory and database for over 41 million m
2 
of property that accommodates 1.1 million federal employees. It is also responsible for the 
preservation of more than 480 historic properties. Figure CS2.3 shows the sphere of influence 
of the PBS and area occupied by tenant agencies in 2013 (U.S. General Services 
Administration, 2014). 
 
In addition to the government-wide performance measures, the GSA set the following 
measures for the management of the PBS portfolio: 
 
 Funds generated from operations; 
 
 Net operating income; 
 
 Vacant space; 
 
 Operating costs in comparison to market levels; 
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  Figure CS2.3: GSA Tenant Agencies by Area (m2) 2015  
Others: Veterans Affairs, State, EPA, Education,  
Transportation, Labor, Archives & Records, Army,  
 Customer and stakeholder satisfaction; and 
 
 Asset value. (Coneeney, 2005; U.S. General Services Administration, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
The PBS is funded through a Federal Buildings Fund, and by rent from federal tenant 
agencies. 
 
Through its Office of Real Property Asset Management (ORPAM), the PBS is responsible for 
maximising the value of the owned and leased portfolio by developing short and long-term 
national strategies, and acting as consultant to the regions.  
 
ORPAM provides national guidance on asset-related pricing policy; provides valuation 
services; develops asset management strategies, which include asset business plans, 
performance measures and targets, improvement of asset performance, and portfolio and 
asset performance benchmarking; development of national capital investment strategies and 
criteria; and promotion of optimal investment, leasing, utilisation and disposal decision-
making. 
 
The PBS views asset management as a “continuous cycle” involving financial performance, 
asset occupancy and demand, asset condition and lifecycle, the market, operating costs, 
historic status, and asset value (Coneeney, op. cit.). 
 
The PBS’s portfolio strategy is based on “a balanced approach” to asset management 
decision-making that encompasses: 
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 Analysis of customer need; 
 
 Market dynamics; and 
 
 The financial performance of assets (Coneeney, op. cit.). 
 
The strategic goal is to maintain a “robust portfolio by investing in strong, income-producing 
properties that satisfy long-term customer needs, increasing the utilisation of the inventory, 
and disposing of excess properties that no longer serve a predominantly federal use.” (U.S. 
General Services Administration, op. cit. p. 7). Figure CS2.4 shows Coneeney’s illustration of 
the “balanced approach” in his forum presentation. 
 
 
5.2.2. Office of Government-Wide Policy 
5.2.2.1. Overview 
The strategic direction of the OGP “is to ensure that government-wide policies encourage 
agencies to develop and utilise the best and most cost effective management practices for 
the conduct of their specific programs.” (U.S. General Services Administration, 2015b). 
 
Guided by the principles of the PMA and OMB, the OGP builds policy frameworks by 
incorporating the requirements of federal laws, Executive Orders, and other regulatory 
measures into policies and guidelines; facilitating reform to provide agencies with the capacity 
and capability to manage their assets; and promoting best practices in efficiency and 
processes. 
 
The OGP collaborates with state and local governments, industry, professional organisations, 
and tertiary educational institutions, undertakes research, and participates in the works of 
boards and groups to identify and formulate best practice management practices. 
5.2.2.2. Real Property Policy 
The OGP’s policy role in real property is to provide direction for the management of property 
assets, policy oversight, and guidance for executive agencies. This involves assisting federal 
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agencies to comply with EO 13327; supporting the FRPC to promote good asset 
management; managing the Federal Real Property Profile, the government’s database for all 
owned and leased buildings, structures, and land; and providing property related laws, 
regulations and guidance that direct the management of the federal property portfolio. 
5.2.2.3. Federal High-Performance Green Buildings 
The OGP has a separate office to facilitate the federal government’s efforts in sustainability 
by minimising the government’s footprint on the built environment in the areas of energy, 
water, and resources, and the creation of healthy workplaces.  
 
In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act authorised the OGP to “enable and 
enhance” federal leadership in sustainable property portfolio management and operations 
("Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007," 2007). 
5.3. Results and Outcomes 
5.3.1. Portfolio Profile 
Table CS2.4 provides details of changes in the federal portfolio between 2005 and 2013. The 
table has been compiled from an analysis of the FRPC annual reports 2005 – 2013 (Federal 
Real Property Council, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
 
 
Over this period, the number of federal buildings and structures has reduced by nearly 
105,000, and the area occupied by the federal government has been reduced by 26 million 
m
2
 (seven per cent). The federal government has disposed of over 183,000 assets either 
through sale, lease termination, or demolition. The value of assets disposed through sale and 
lease termination approached US$6.7 billion.  
 
                                                     
3
 Costs for Structures not included/reported 
4
 By all methods of ‘disposal’ 
Overview 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Variance 
Nos. Federal 
Buildings & 
Structures 
976,000 1.014m 922,000 896,000 911,000 889,400 834,700 847,184 871,127 -104,873 
Area (m
2
) 
Buildings & 
Structures 
380m  390m  361m  355m  360m  366m  357m 356m 354m -26m 
Annual Operating 
Costs (US$) - - $47.3b $19.7b
3
 $29.3b $30.8b $32.2b $33.0b $33.8b 
+15.4% 
since 
2009 
Asset Disposals 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Nos. Disposed 
Assets
4
 
- 22,816 35,131 24,682 19,460 14,881 21,264 23,663 21,464 183,361 
Annual Operating 
Costs of Disposed 
Assets (US$) 
- $186m $420m $120m $149m $327m $224m $216m $411m $2.053b 
Value of Assets 
Disposed: Leases 
Terminated & 
Sales (US$) 
$1.5b $1.4b $1.5b $134m $50m $57.3m $43.5m $100m $1.9b $6.684b 
Table CS2.4: Changes in Federal Real Property Profile 2005 - 2013 
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These disposals have provided a total reduction of more than US$2.05 billion in annual 
operating costs between 2005 and 2013. Total annual operating costs throughout the portfolio 
have increased by 15.4 per cent between 2009 and 2013
5
. 
 
Notwithstanding these results, the federal government’s reform program has not yielded the 
desired or expected outcomes in terms of economic benefit, asset management practice or 
organisational efficiency. 
 
In April 2005, Clay Johnson, Deputy Director of the OMB, testified before Congress “… the 
government is disposing of US$15 billion in unneeded government real property and 
redirecting funds to higher priority asset management uses …”. It was expected that this level 
of disposal should be achieved by 2015. (Coneeney, op. cit.). 
 
Additionally, the reliability and veracity of the outcomes presented in Table CS.2.4 are subject 
to question (see section 5.3.2 below).  
5.3.2. GAO Reviews and Reports 
Successive GAO reviews of Federal Real Property since its designation as a high-risk area in 
2003 have highlighted a lack of progress and results in improving the management of the 
property portfolio (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005, 2007, 2014, 2015c). 
 
The GAO update delivered to the US Congress in February 2015 reported that, “since federal 
real property was placed on the High-Risk List in 2003, the government has given high-level 
attention to the issue and has made strides in real property management, but continues to 
face long-standing challenges in managing its real property.” (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2015c).  
 
Specifically, the GAO found that: 
 
 The federal government continues to hold and maintain significant amounts of excess 
and under-utilised property; 
 
 Leasing property in favour of the long-term cheaper ownership option is still the 
preferred property solution; and 
 
 Effective property asset management and reform are hindered and held back by 
unreliable property data, and the manipulation and interpretation of data by agencies.  
Despite leadership commitment in this area, the accuracy and consistency of the 
Federal Real Property Profile remains suspect, which leads to reporting inaccurate 
inventory and outcome information. 
 
Since 2003, the management of federal property has met only one of the criteria required for 
it to be removed from the GAO’s High-Risk List. The GAO’s 2015 report card assessed 
progress against the criteria as: 
 
 Leadership Commitment: Met 
 
 Capacity: Partially Met 
 
 Action Plan: Partially Met 
 
                                                     
5
 The 2009 operating cost has been used as the base figure for performance analysis as the lack of data and wide 
variations in the preceding years suggest lack of data accuracy and inconsistent reporting by agencies. 
 
 
19 
 Monitoring: Partially Met 
 
 Demonstrated Progress: Not Met  
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Appendix 3 
 
Case Study: The Australian Public Sectors 
1. Introduction 
 
This case study is based on a series of the author’s published and unpublished papers and research 
(Leifer & Seymour-Jones, 2009, 2010, 2012; Seymour-Jones, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2014a, 
2014b). These have been compiled from the author’s personal experience, a review of literature in the 
form of independent and academic studies and reports, professional standards and guidelines, 
government strategies, policies and procedures, reports and audits, journal articles, and conference 
proceedings. 
 
This case study traces the development of property asset management (and the management of 
other asset classes) between the early 1980s and 2016 for the federal, state and local levels of 
government in Australia.  
2. The Australian Commonwealth Government 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The Commonwealth Government offers the least amount of readily accessible information on the 
management of its property assets and other property holdings, such as leases. 
 
The results of searches for property asset management on the government’s website give directions 
to the Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance), and to the Total Asset Management 
section of the NSW Treasury website. 
 
The principal sources that have been used for this case study are: 
 
§ Performance audits undertaken by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) on 
Commonwealth Management of Leased Office Property (Audit Report No. 53 2000-2001) 
(Australian National Audit Office, 2001); and in the Department of Finance and Administration 
(now Deregulation), titled Commonwealth Estate Property Sales. (Audit Report No. 4 2001-
2002) (Australian National Audit Office, 2002); 
 
§ An audit into the Property Management functions of the Commonwealth Government 
undertaken by the Australian National Audit Office. (Audit Report No. 19 2003-2004) 
(Australian National Audit Office, 2003) 
 
§ Information from professional conferences, the Government Property Group, and meetings 
with senior Commonwealth Government executives and private sector service providers. 
 
§ The Commonwealth Property Management Framework (Australian Government, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c, 2010). 
 
The ANAO audits provide a detailed and authoritative commentary on the Commonwealth’s approach 
to the management of its property assets, and shed light on the government’s apparent disinterest in, 
or unwillingness to adopt a proven practice model for the management of its property portfolio. 
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2.2. Property Asset Policy, Ownership and Management 
 
It is estimated that the NFPS of the Commonwealth Government holds property with a value in the 
region of $21.5 billion, and an annual maintenance expenditure of some $430 million. Annual office 
lease costs are estimated at  $500 million. 
 
This portfolio is not subject to any discernable whole-of-government control, governance, 
management, reporting or accountability. 
 
The government's stated policy is that the ownership of property is not part of its core business unless 
particular circumstances apply. Property is viewed as an input to the government's core business. 
 
Subject to the requirements of the Australian Government Property Ownership Framework (see 
Section 2.3.7), and a number of reporting, procurement, land management and financial management 
statutes, guidelines and regulations, Commonwealth Government agencies generally have a free 
hand in the management of their property requirements. 
 
There are no further whole-of-government policies, procedures, standards or measures for the 
strategic management of property assets with which agencies are required to follow and comply. 
However, the Commonwealth Property Review Branch of Finance, at a budgeted cost of $10 million, 
was to review this over the following four years. In October 2009 the Commonwealth Property Review 
Branch issued the following (see Section 2.3.6): 
 
§ Commonwealth Property Management Guidelines – Financial Management Guidance No.16 
 
§ A Guide to the Australian Government Property Data Collection 
 
§ Data specifications Australian Government Property Data Collection 
 
Figure CS3.1 shows the distribution of commonwealth-owned property assets by value1. 
 
            
FigureCS3.1: Commonwealth Government: distribution of real property assets by value (excl. 
leases) 
                                                       
 
1 Extrapolated from Appendix 3.1 
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2.3. Policy and Governance Development 
2.3.1. Pre 1980: Shared Responsibilities 
Prior to 1980, the former Department of Administrative Services (DAS) managed multi-occupancy 
properties and those declared as surplus to the Commonwealth’s requirements. Single occupied 
premises were managed by the occupant agency, and agencies approached the market on their own 
behalf. 
2.3.2. 1981–1987: Centralised Model 
During the 1980s, DAS’s property management role was expanded. It was given control over the 
Commonwealth’s owned portfolio and properties leased by government agencies. It was also given 
responsibility for the management of the Commonwealth property budget. 
 
Within this expanded mandate, the DAS developed whole-of-government manuals, processes, 
procedures and guidelines to establish standard practices. It also developed and maintained a 
Property Management Information System that included detailed information for all government 
property. 
2.3.3. 1988–1996: Decentralisation and Commercialisation 
Reform during this period led to the dilution of the DAS mandate. Agencies were given increased 
ability to make their own property decisions, which were subject to a set of general principles to be 
applied in the provision of common services to government. These included a user-pay concept with 
the introduction of rental charging and payment for the provision of property services. Agencies were 
also given the authority to lease and fit out their offices outside the central business district of capital 
cities. 
 
The Australian Estate Management (AEM) was established to act as the nominal owner/landlord of 
the Commonwealth Estate. The Australian Property Group (APG) was also created to carry out a 
tenancy advocacy role on behalf of Commonwealth departments and agencies. Both these groups 
were in the Administrative Services Portfolio. 
2.3.4. 1996–1999: Property Divestment and Management Deregulation 
Further changes to the management of Commonwealth property were introduced between 1996 and 
1999 with the establishment of the Commonwealth Property Principles. These Principles stated that 
the Commonwealth should only own property where the assessed long-term yield exceeds a 
nominated rate (14 to 15 per cent at that time), or where it is otherwise in the public interest to do so. 
 
The Commonwealth Property Committee (CPC) was established to oversee a programme to dispose 
of government property. This involved sales of those properties that did not comply with the 
Principles. Additionally, a standard lease document, the Commonwealth Tenants’ Lease (CTL), used 
by Finance, was developed in consultation with industry, owners and tenants, and was endorsed by 
Government as part of the recommendations of the CPC. 
 
As a result, following the merging of DAS with the Department of Finance to form the Department of 
Finance and Administration (Finance), Finance managed the sale of 114 office properties over the 
financial years 1997–98 to 1999–2000, with proceeds totaling approximately $1.125 billion.  
 
In this period, the Government also reviewed the roles of AEM and the APG. This led to: 
 
§ Outsourcing of the building/property management function formerly carried out by AEM; 
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§ Sale of APG, with departments and agencies engaging private firms to carry out a similar role 
on their behalf; and 
 
§ Establishment of the Domestic Property Group (DPG), which was intended to be a strategic 
planning and co-ordination organisation. 
 
Since the mid-late 1980s, the governance and management of Commonwealth property has rotated 
almost 180º from a centralised system under the DAS, to a devolved system where agencies are 
responsible for their own property management.  
 
Finance’s involvement in property management has become limited to the management of much 
reduced domestic portfolio of owned property (excluding Defence-owned properties) on a commercial 
basis. This is reviewed in the following section. 
2.3.5. Early 2000s: Department of Finance and Deregulation (now Department of Finance) 
Finance, in various guises, has been involved with the management of commonwealth property 
assets in most stages of the policy development cycle. The Asset Management Group of the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation (formerly Administration) continues to be responsible for the 
management of the Australian Government´s Business and non-Defence property assets. It 
implements and manages the divestment of such assets, handles residual business issues and 
manages the special claims, insurance and risk management operations within the Finance portfolio. 
It is also responsible for developing and maintaining the Australian Government's procurement policy 
framework. 
 
The Property and Construction Division of the Asset Management Group manages major capital 
works projects on behalf of the Australian Government and individual government departments and 
agencies. 
 
The Division’s Property Branch manages a non-Defence portfolio of properties comprising offices, 
land and other properties, which are owned by the department. (Responsibility for management of 
overseas properties rests with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). The Department of 
Defence (Defence) portfolio accounts for some 63 per cent of the Commonwealth’s property assets. 
 
The Division also has a whole-of-government role to develop and implement a Commonwealth 
Property Management Framework. This is conducted through the Commonwealth Property Review 
Branch.  
 
The limited strategic asset management role of Finance, and therefore its lack of skills and expertise, 
as the landlord of a small government-owned office portfolio, does not stand it in good stead to 
perform its whole-of-government advisory and semi-regulatory functions. 
 
Given that the Property and Construction Division performs the de facto role of the Commonwealth’s 
chief property adviser, the overall findings and conclusions of this study in relation to the operation of 
this division are: 
 
§ It lacks the required leadership and professional property skills and experience, and systems 
to effectively perform the role; 
 
§ It follows, rather than advises the government on matters of property policy, and displays a 
reluctance to initiate policy or strategy advice and innovation; 
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§ It is not comfortable with and/or does not understand its whole-of-government review 
mandate; 
 
§ It has little contact or interaction with industry organisations and best practice development: 
its depth of knowledge is shallow. (It refuses to participate in the Government Property Group 
and rarely gives staff the opportunity to attend conferences or development courses): 
 
§ It manages its own portfolio in a caretaker fashion rather than from a proactive whole-of-
government perspective; it takes an accepting if not fatalistic view when government agencies 
elect to lease accommodation from the private sector rather than occupy vacant government-
owned premises; 
 
§ It has a questionable reputation partly because of its history, but largely resulting from the 
limited relationships and communications it holds with government agencies; there are no 
strategies in this regard. It takes a financial rather than a business approach to its role. As a 
result, other departments and agencies, particularly Defence, see their property asset 
management skills to be superior to those of Finance. 
2.3.5.1. Property Branch 
2.3.5.1.1 Portfolio  
The domestic non-Defence property portfolio includes commercial office buildings, law courts and 
other special purpose properties, public interest properties, heritage buildings, residential properties 
and vacant land within Australia. It is a small portfolio comprising just 5per cent of the value of the 
commonwealth’s property assets (See Figure CS3.1). 
2.3.5.1.2 Non-Exclusive Mandate 
The Property Branch operates in a competitive market as Australian Government agencies are not 
bound to lease their accommodation from it. However, if an agency needs to occupy a Government-
owned building, the Property Branch is required to provide premises on a commercial lease basis. 
2.3.5.1.3 Portfolio Performance Requirements 
The Property Branch is required to: 
 
§ Achieve a commercial rate of return on the portfolio; 
 
§ Maintain the condition of the portfolio to industry standards; 
 
§ Meet the future needs of tenant agencies as agreed by Government; 
 
§ Contain its management costs within market benchmarks; 
 
§ Pay dividends from operations; and 
 
§ Make equity repayments to the Australian Government from any divestment of property. 
2.3.5.1.4 Portfolio Management 
The non-Defence property portfolio has a history of being managed by an outsourced service provider 
for estate management, facilities management, valuation services, and management of capital works. 
2.3.5.1.5 Property Acquisition and Divestment 
The Property Branch implements Government policy to sell, transfer or divest surplus and under-
performing properties where there are no public interest reasons for their retention, in accordance 
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with the Australian Government Property Ownership Framework. (See Section 3.3.7), which outlines 
the basis for the continued ownership and development of Commonwealth property. The Asset 
Management Group administers the Property Ownership Framework. 
2.3.5.1.6 Operation of the Finance Non-Defence Commercial Office Portfolio 
The practical (and seemingly uncontrolled) operation of the non-exclusive mandate that applies to 
Finance’s role as a government landlord has been allowed to detract from any whole-of-government 
strategic reasons for the continued ownership of property, and results in government-owned space 
remaining vacant whilst agencies pay rental to private sector landlords. 
 
This implies that either the Finance property portfolio is not fulfilling its performance requirement to 
meet the future needs of tenant agencies, or agencies exercise an unsubstantiated preference not to 
occupy government property. Since this relates to simple office premises, the former is considered the 
least likely reason. Either way, Finance seems to take a fatalistic view towards this and shows a 
reluctance to promote the whole-of-government issues in relation to property ownership, allocation 
and occupation. 
2.3.6. Commonwealth Property Review Branch 
The Commonwealth Property Review Branch is responsible for developing a Commonwealth Property 
Management Framework, to improve the governance, planning and whole-of-government co-
ordination of property management across agencies. The Branch is also charged with the 
development of standards and benchmarks for measuring performance and to develop better practice 
property management guidance for agencies. 
 
This initiative was introduced during the first Rudd Government. A budget of $10.1 million over four 
years (2009/10-2012/13) was provided to implement a Commonwealth Property Management 
Framework. It was intended for the framework to outline whole-of-government policy and governance 
arrangements designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of property management across 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 agencies. 
2.3.7. Australian Government Property Ownership Framework 
In July 2005, the Australian Government Property Ownership Framework replaced the Australian 
Government Property Principles.  
 
This Framework applies to all departments and agencies that are subject to the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA agencies) and all general government sector 
Commonwealth authorities that are subject to the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997 (CAC bodies). It does not apply to Government Business Enterprises. 
 
The Framework applies to proposals by FMA agencies and CAC bodies in the general government 
sector for the Australian Government to either own or divest property. Proposals to own property (as 
opposed to leasing it) or to divest property must be justified in terms of the need to do so, taking into 
account specific government objectives. 
 
The government's stated policy is that the ownership of property is not part of its core business unless 
particular circumstances apply. Property is viewed as an input to the government's core business.  
 
This gives no credence to the underlying value and performance of the government’s property assets. 
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2.3.7.1. Framework Objectives 
Any decision to own or divest property must be driven by either the necessity for that decision to 
support specific government objectives, or ownership or divestment may be appropriate because it 
delivers the best value for money outcome. 
 
Such proposals must be presented to Finance as business cases that are prepared within prescribed 
guidelines, which include criteria for nominated Discount Rates under the Framework (See Section 
2.3.7.4).  
2.3.7.2. Addressing the Government's Objectives 
In addressing how a proposal meets the strategic aims and stated outputs of government, a case for 
ownership or divestment must be made on the basis of one or more of the following criteria:  
 
§ Ownership is necessary because of national symbolic status; 
 
§ Ownership is necessary because of national heritage status; 
 
§ Ownership is necessary to meet environmental requirements; 
 
§ Ownership is necessary because of the highly specialised nature of property; 
 
§ Ownership is necessary to comply with stated national security requirements; 
 
§ Ownership is necessary to meet other strategic interests of the government; or 
 
§ Ownership is appropriate because it delivers best value for money for the Australian 
Government on a whole-of-life basis when compared to leasing and taking into account the 
particular characteristics and long term risks of property ownership. 
2.3.7.3. Value for Money 
Value for money in the context of property is defined by an appraisal of associated risks over the long 
term including but not limited to:  
 
§ Planning, design, development and construction risks; 
 
§ Capital risk; 
 
§ Market risk; 
 
§ Environmental risk; 
 
§ Residual value risks; and 
 
§ Change of strategic requirement risk. 
 
It is the responsibility of the proposing agency to clearly demonstrate the characteristics of the 
property that warrant government ownership or divestment.  
2.3.7.4. Assessment of Proposals 
Departments and agencies are responsible for the implementation of the Framework, and guidance is 
available from Finance.  
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Proposals are assessed by Finance against the identified criteria, which include a rate of return 
nominated by Finance that it considers reflecting the exposure to risks associated with the property.  
 
Discount rates will vary according to the nature of the property and its assessed risk level (high, 
medium, low). The rates are calculated annually and published on Finance's website. Proposals by 
agencies are subject to Finance’s agreement to both the risk assessment of the proposal and the 
discount rate used prior to consideration by government.  
 
The discount rates for assessment of high, medium and low risk property proposals brought forward 
after 1 July 2007 will be twelve per cent, ten per cent and eight per cent respectively2.  
2.3.7.5. Management 
A commercial basis for property is to be retained such that:  
 
§ Landlords will operate on a commercial basis; and 
 
§ Market based leases are in place. 
2.3.7.6. Operation of the Property Ownership Framework 
Notwithstanding the objectives of the framework, which are essentially to ensure that the most 
appropriate decisions are made regarding the ownership of property, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that the framework is not being administered to either its letter or to its intent.  
 
The ANAO (See Section 2.4.1.2.1) makes particular comment on the current framework’s 
predecessor, the Australian Government Property Principles, in relation the disposal of large tranches 
of property in the 1990s by questioning the assessment criteria adopted for the retention or disposal 
of property. These criteria were heavily skewed towards supporting disposal outcomes, i.e. the policy 
of the government of the day. 
 
As the government’s stated preference remains not to own property, senior Finance officials continue 
to struggle to apply the best value for money objective when assessing property proposals, as these 
almost always point to ownership as being the preferred financial option. (The setting of inappropriate 
discount rates has been commented upon by the ANAO.) 
 
When reviewing and assessing government agency proposals, Finance also struggles with the 
concept of applying a weighting or value to the costs or benefits of the non-financial and less tangible 
aspects of a proposal. The dilemma is that agencies must receive Finance approval to their 
proposals, but Finance’s lack of understanding of their businesses, which is a direct consequence of 
poor governance and structure, and a lack of relationships and communications with the agencies 
means that decisions for the allocation of capital will be made against incomplete and perhaps 
misunderstood information. 
2.4. Effects of Policy and Governance Changes on the Management of the 
Commonwealth Estate 
 
Within the next few years it is possible that the Commonwealth Government’s approach to the 
management of its property assets will, over a period of three decades, have come close to full circle.  
 
                                                       
 
2 At the time of this research into the Commonwealth Government (2009/2010), there was no evidence of the rates having been 
updated since July 2007. 
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The changes in policy over this period will have been implemented without reference or regard to the 
importance of property assets and the wider development of asset management practices in both the 
public and private sectors. This is reflected by: 
 
§ The use and manipulation of the commonwealth’s property assets for short term ideological or 
political purposes; and 
 
§ The timidity, limited experience, parochial and protective nature of the Australian Public 
Service.  
 
With the possible exception of the reign of the Department of Administrative Services in the 1980s, 
the Commonwealth Government has lacked a strategic and transparent approach to the management 
of its property assets over the past thirty years. It appears to have deliberately avoided such an 
approach through its deregulation and decontrol policy, whilst other sectors were recognising the 
importance of the strategic management of property assets to the achievement of business goals and 
objectives, and were developing management systems and practices to improve the effective and 
efficient performance of these assets.  
 
Given the value and ongoing costs of the property portfolio, the legacy of this policy puts the 
Commonwealth Government at risk. These risks include:  
 
§ An unsubstantiated all-of-government policy towards property ownership, and a severely 
diluted base of strategic property holdings; 
 
§ Inflexible property holdings resulting in reduced business and service provision agility; 
 
§ An inappropriate reliance upon and exposure to property leasing markets: potential for 
landlords to cartel and manipulate markets; 
 
§ An uncoordinated approach to the market: self-competition; 
 
§ Loss of resources and skills, which has resulted in an over-reliance on the private sector for 
the management and provision of property services. There is evidence to suggest that, in 
some cases, this reliance is almost total; 
 
§ Ill-defined roles and responsibilities, and lack of accountability; 
 
§ A multiplicity and duplication of systems, processes and procedures, and varying standards of 
management; 
 
§ Loss of a centralised database and inaccurate asset registers; 
 
§ Asset registers that are not reconciled to financial systems; 
 
§ Non-transparent property dealings and financial loss; 
 
§ No formalisation and analysis of whole life costs in decision-making; 
 
§ No baseline cost and performance standards, nor monitoring outcomes; 
 
§ Inadequate financial management and asset management systems; 
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§ Minimal reporting; and 
 
§ Poor documentation on asset acquisitions and disposals. 
 
There is a widely held belief within the Commonwealth that, because so few non-Defence domestic 
assets remain in government ownership, there is little need for detailed asset management strategies. 
This seems to ignore the property assets that the Commonwealth holds in the form of leased 
property, and the level of exposure it has to the property markets. In its 2001 audit on Commonwealth 
Management of Leased Property, the ANAO concluded the following (Australian National Audit Office, 
2001): 
 
§ The Commonwealth is estimated to occupy up to ten per cent of available leased office space 
in metropolitan Australia, and may well be the single largest occupier of leased office 
accommodation nationally; 
 
§ In the 1999–2000 financial year, the cost to the Commonwealth was in excess of $485 million 
in rent and outgoings; and 
 
§ The amount of space leased is generally above the benchmark range of 15 to 25 square 
metres per person. This indicates that some responding FMA agencies may be renting space 
in excess of their needs and/or utilising existing space inefficiently. The effects of this can be 
higher than necessary payments of rent and outgoings. The ANAO has estimated that, during 
the 1999–2000 financial year, the responding agencies paid approximately $95.5 million in 
rent and outgoings for the above-benchmark space held. 
 
It is clear that the deregulation and decontrol of the management of the commonwealth’s property 
assets has had significant negative affects on the efficient and effective conduct of its financial affairs 
and business and, in consequence, the provision of public services.  
 
Notwithstanding any effort to address this, the government’s view of property and the skewed 
approach to its ownership displays an ignorance of the role that these assets and their effective 
management can play in contributing to the improvement of public services. 
2.4.1. Findings of the Australian National Audit Office 
The audits undertaken by the ANAO between 1999 and 2004 provide detailed and extensive 
evidence of the commonwealth government’s failure to acknowledge the need for a strategic and 
disciplined approach to the management of its property assets, and the consequential cost to the 
public purse (Australian National Audit Office, 2001, 2002, 2003). Despite the publication of its 
particular findings and the ANAO’s articulation of best practice asset management principles, the 
Commonwealth Government has taken little notice or action. 
 
The findings of these audits are summarised below:  
2.4.1.1. Commonwealth Management of Leased Office Property: Audit Report No 53 2000-
2001 Performance Audit 
2.4.1.1.1 Property Management Definition 
The ANAO defined Property Management as “the full range of services for the management of a 
portfolio of real estate assets” (ANAO, 2001 op.cit. p.28). Within the leased property scope of the 
audit, it divided Property Management into the following three tiers (Ibid): 
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§ “Asset Portfolio Management incorporates the strategic element of the management 
process. It guides the acquisition, use and disposal of assets (i.e. leases on office 
accommodation) to make the most of their service delivery potential, and to manage the 
related risks and costs over their entire life. 
 
§ “Agency Leased Property Management incorporates the managerial element of the 
process of managing current and future leased office accommodation requirements. 
Traditionally, the property manager has been responsible for the daily operations of the 
property incorporating lease management, operating costs management, budgeting, and 
contract administration. 
 
§ “Agency Leased Property Facilities Management incorporates the operational element of 
the management process. Facility management is the practice of co-ordinating the physical 
workplace with people and the work. 
2.4.1.1.2 Audit Context 
The audit noted that: 
 
§ The Commonwealth Government is a significant occupier of leased office accommodation 
nationally; 
 
§ Each Commonwealth agency, irrespective of its size or function, is responsible for managing 
its leased office property; 
 
§ Individual agencies are required to address the often complex issues associated with leased 
office property portfolios, including strategic planning, lease negotiations, and contract 
management; 
 
§ After labour costs, expenditure on property is often the next largest single item of agency 
expenditure;  
 
§ In addition to the nearly $500 million spent on rent and outgoings by the agencies that 
responded to the audit, they also spent more than $11 million on the management of their 
portfolios, either in-house or through outsourced property management service providers. 
Some 48 per cent of the agencies engaged outsourced property managers; 
 
§ If property management is outsourced, the emphasis on the required internal skills changes 
from property management to contract management to monitor the performance of 
contractors, and to ensure the conditions of the contract are fulfilled. 
2.4.1.1.3 Audit Objectives 
 
§ Develop a benchmark of the Financial Management and Accountability (FMA) Act agencies’ 
property management performance for current and future comparisons; and 
 
§ Form an opinion as to whether the FMA agencies reviewed: 
 
a) Manage leased office property in accordance with the requirements of the FMA Act 
and other official guidance; and 
 
b) Manage their leased office property effectively. 
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2.4.1.1.4 Audit Criteria 
The criteria used to assess whether FMA agencies were adequately equipped to manage their leased 
office property portfolios and their future property needs were: 
 
§ Agencies have clearly defined asset portfolio management frameworks in place; and 
 
§ If property management is outsourced, that a contract and contract management processes 
are in place, and appropriate performance indicators have been set and are being measured. 
 
Fifty-nine agencies were invited to respond to a survey that requested information relating to strategic 
planning; procurement and management; leased office accommodation profile; fit out; and property 
management systems. Case studies were undertaken in the Department of Health and Aged Care, 
Centrelink, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
 
Forty-four agencies (75per cent) responded to the survey, which collected data on 1,505 office 
leases. Of the larger agencies invited, it is interesting to note that the Department of Defence, which 
holds 63 per cent of the Commonwealth’s property assets by value (ref. Figure CS3.1), declined to 
participate, despite all agencies having been contacted by personalised letters and follow-up 
telephone calls. 
2.4.1.1.5 Key Audit Findings 
These are summarised in Table CS3.1 
 
Criteria Finding ANAO Comment 
1. Asset Portfolio 
Management Framework  
 
1.1. Strategic Property & 
Business Continuity 
Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Limited strategic property planning 
by agencies: 76 per cent of 
respondent agencies did not have 
strategic property plans in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 52 per cent of agencies did not 
have any form of Business 
Continuity Plan in place. 
 
 
 
§ This indicates a need for the 
majority of agencies to develop 
plans for effective property 
management.  
§ It is essential that agencies 
recognise the contribution 
property makes to the 
achievement of their objectives 
and give due consideration to this 
factor in their strategic planning. 
§ Lack of planning will inhibit the 
focus on longer-term needs of 
agencies and may result in 
operating inefficiencies, which 
could potentially be considerable. 
§ The level of planning should have 
regard to the importance property 
plays in the delivery of agency 
outputs and outcomes as well as 
the materiality of property 
expenditures. 
 
§ The availability of leased office 
property is a risk factor in 
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1.2. Commonwealth 
Agency Leases 
 
a. Portfolio Profile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Distribution of 
Leased Space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Expenditure on 
Leased Space 
 
 
§ DFAT did not have a strategic 
property plan in place and had not 
implemented the 
recommendations of its business 
continuity plan. 
 
§ Health had a strategic property 
plan for each state/territory office, 
but these were not integrated into 
a comprehensive strategic plan to 
bring together its management 
strategies at state/territory levels. 
 
§ Centrelink’s attention to strategic 
accommodation planning was 
considered adequate in relation to 
its portfolio. 
 
 
 
§ More than 70 per cent of the 1505 
leases in the survey were for 
terms of fewer than 5 years. 
§ Most of Centrelink and Health’s 
leases were for periods of less 
than 5 years. 
§ Most DFAT’s leases were for 
more than 10 years. 
§ Agencies (60per cent) have a 
preference for net rent leases. 
§ The majority of DFAT’s and 
§ Health’s leases were gross rent 
leases. 
§ Centrelink’s property management 
system did not distinguish 
between net or gross rental terms. 
 
 
§ Respondent agencies leased 
more than 1.7 million square 
metres of office accommodation 
across Australia, 85per cent of 
which was in city/metropolitan 
areas. 
§ Centrelink was the largest holder 
of leased space. 
 
§ Agencies were paying above-
benchmark rentals in 
maintaining business continuity. 
 
§ As the continued effective 
operation of DFAT’s main office is 
crucial to international relations, 
DFAT’s preparation and 
implementation of a business 
continuity plan is critical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Many agencies forego the 
potentially lower rentals available 
with longer-term leases, for the 
flexibility of short lease terms. 
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d. Leased Space 
Density 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. Review of Case 
Study Agency 
Leases 
 
city/metropolitan areas. 
§ The Commonwealth is the largest 
influence on the market in the 
ACT, where departments and 
agencies were paying more than 
10 per cent above the 
benchmarks. 
 
§ Densities were above the 
benchmark range of 15 to 25 
square metres per person. 
§ Agencies were paying 
approximately $89 million per 
annum for above-benchmark 
space and an additional $6.5 
million in outgoings at 30 June 
2000. This represents 20per cent 
of the Commonwealth’s total 
expenditure ($474.335m) on lease 
rentals and outgoings. Some 
79per cent of this related to leases 
in city/metropolitan areas. 
 
§ Energy Efficiency 
The lease for the RG Casey 
Building, for which DFAT is the 
lessee, was found not to comply 
with the Government’s energy 
efficiency policy. 
An independent assessment 
concluded that the lease terms 
have restricted DFAT’s access to 
detailed energy consumption 
costs that could assist it to reduce 
energy costs. 
 
§ Rent Review Provisions and 
Ratchet Clauses 
Of 43 leases reviewed, 34 
contained provision for rent 
review. 32 of these contained 
provisions precluding a downward 
review. 
Finance considered that the 
inclusion of ratchet clauses is 
standard commercial practice and 
therefore used in other leases that 
will generally allow rents not to 
fall. 
Of the 43 leases examined, 16 
were for properties that were 
previously owned by the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Agencies may be renting space in 
excess of their needs and/or 
utilising existing space 
inefficiently. The effects of this can 
be higher than necessary lease 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Agencies should seek advice from 
the Australian Greenhouse Office 
(AGO) on leasing provisions that 
affect the recovery of energy costs 
for building central services during 
working hours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Agencies should seek to avoid 
ratchet clauses in their future 
lease arrangements, to ensure 
that they are only exposed to 
normal market rentals. If agencies 
are paying in excess of market 
rentals due to the existence of 
ratchet clauses, this may indicate 
inefficient use of Commonwealth 
funds. 
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Commonwealth. All 16 of these 
leases contained ratchet clauses. 
Finance negotiated these leases, 
referred to as Commonwealth 
sale/leaseback properties. 
2. Procurement & 
Management of Contracted 
Property Managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Within the government’s 
procurement guidelines, agencies 
are free to choose procurement 
methods. 
§ Only 12 per cent of contracts were 
awarded through open tender. 
58% were awarded through either 
direct appointment or select 
appointment. 
§ Performance monitoring and 
contract management by agencies 
were mixed, varying from 
“adequate” to an absence of 
processes and procedures. 
 
 
 
 
§ Better practice would be to test 
the market through an open 
tender process. 
 
 
§ Set meaningful and measurable 
performance indicators. 
§ Regularly review performance and 
document outcomes. 
 
 Table CS3.1: Commonwealth Management of Leased Office Property: Audit Report No 53 2000-2001 
Performance Audit – Key Findings 
 
2.4.1.2. Commonwealth Estate Property Sales: Audit Report No.4 2001-2002 Performance 
Audit 
2.4.1.2.1 Audit Background 
This audit examined the sale of Commonwealth domestic property assets in the late 1990s under a 
large-scale property divestment programme (Australian National Audit Office, 2002). 
 
Prior to disposal, the domestic estate comprised 790 properties valued at $2.333 billion as follows: 
 
§ Office accommodation: $1.254 billion; 
 
§ Special purposes and industrial properties: $694 million; and 
 
§ Miscellaneous non-office properties: $385 million. 
 
The Government’s decision to divest these properties was based on the premise that their retention 
would mean that they would not comply with the criteria for ownership under the Commonwealth 
Property Principles (ref. section 2.3.4); principally the hurdle rate of return used for assessing sell or 
retain decisions for individual properties. 
 
The ANAO noted that the hurdle rate of 14 to 15 per cent “overwhelmingly favoured the divestment of 
property over retention” (Ibid. p.12). 
 
The Government was advised that the sale of the properties would increase net budget outlays in the 
longer term as future rental payments to the private sector increased. 
 
The aggregate book value of the properties to be disposed was $1.05 billion as at 30 June 1996. 
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The Department of Finance, which managed the sales process, relied “extensively” on advice from 
the private sector. This included advice on property sales, marketing, and legal matters. 
2.4.1.2.2 Audit Objective 
The audit concentrated on properties sold with long-term leaseback arrangements, and reviewed 
properties that represented 43 per cent of the total value of the properties proposed for sale. Total 
sales realised nearly $1 billion. 
 
The objective of the audit was to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of the 
sales process by Finance. In particular, the audit considered the following: 
 
§ The extent to which Government’s sales objectives were achieved; 
 
§ The long-term sale and leaseback arrangements for selected properties, and whether they 
protected the Commonwealth’s interests; and 
 
§ Identification of sound principles and practice to improve the management of future property 
sales. 
2.4.1.2.3 Audit Findings and Conclusions 
The following are principal findings and conclusions of the ANAO: 
 
§ The sales programme was successful in that total proceeds exceeded targets by 15 per cent; 
 
§ Most material properties were sold at, or above, market valuations; 
 
§ Although Finance advised the ANAO that its role of implementing the sales programme did 
not include protecting the overall interest of the Commonwealth, the ANAO considered that it 
was the only government agency with the responsibility and accountability to judge whether 
the sale and leaseback transactions represented the optimum property and financial solutions 
for the Commonwealth; 
 
§ It was found that Finance had not conducted the necessary level of systematic evaluation of 
the sale and leaseback transactions, as required under the Financial Management and 
Accountability Regulations and the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines, prior to 
executing the sales and leasing agreements: 
 
§ Strong evidence was provided by an independent consultant that suggested adopted the 
hurdle rate of return was unrealistically high, with 11 per cent being the upper level. 
 
The use of a rate of return that is too high would result in lower investment income and 
financial loss when combined with long-term leaseback arrangements. 
 
The ANAO’s analysis concluded that, at a hurdle rate of ten per cent, only eight of the 59 
properties would have qualified for divestment; 
 
§ The book values of the properties were amended to reflect market prevailing market 
conditions and potential leasing profiles. These adjustments reduced the total value of the 
properties by approximately $200 million (20 per cent). These changes would have produced 
higher rates of return, which would have supported retention of ownership. The rates of return 
were not, however, re-calculated; 
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§ Finance did not obtain tax advice for the whole-of-government implications of tax depreciation 
for the sale and leaseback arrangements; 
 
§ Initial rentals paid under a number of the sale and leaseback arrangements were found to 
exceed market values used in the valuations for sale by between seven and seventeen per 
cent; 
 
§ The purchaser of the building occupied and leased back to the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade notified the Department that the net lettable area had been re-measured, and was 
seeking a 38 per cent increase in rent equivalent to $6.3 million over the period of the initial 
rental term; and 
 
§ Whole-of-lease-term costs for sale and long-term leaseback property could result in a 
negative financial return to the Commonwealth within the lease periods. The ANAO analysed 
the terms of the transaction for the Australian Geological Survey Office Headquarters 
property. It estimated that this transaction could result in a negative Net Present Value (NPV) 
of $95 million over the 20 years lease term. The calculations presented to the Minister by 
Finance indicated a positive NPV of $43 million. 
 
The ANAO made seven recommendations for improvement, all of which it noted with concern were 
disagreed by Finance without offering any explanations or reasons. 
2.4.1.3. Property Management: Audit Report N0. 19 2003-04 Business Support Processes 
Audit 
2.4.1.3.1 Property Management Definition 
This audit defined Property Management as “those functions necessary for the effective conduct and 
coordination of an organisation’s workplace and infrastructure with its business/services, employees 
and other people involved in the delivery of its services. The range of property management services 
in each organisation will depend on its individual circumstances and policies, but will generally 
encompass some or all of the following; lease management, energy management, cleaning, and 
repairs and maintenance tasks.” (Australian National Audit Office, 2003). 
2.4.1.3.2 Audit Objectives and Scope 
The objective of the audit was to assess whether the property management function was being 
performed efficiently, and providing the required level of support for the delivery of government 
services. 
 
The scope of the audit was to evaluate property management policies and practices for planning and 
control; business processes and practices; and information and performance management. 
2.4.1.3.3 Audit Findings 
2.4.1.3.3.1 Planning and Control 
The processes were found to be in place for short-term planning and control, but were considered to 
be inadequate to identify longer-term property needs, and the broader property objectives and 
priorities.  
 
Specifically, the audit found that there was minimal property-related risk identification and mitigation 
strategies; and a lack of formal property management policy and procedural documentation. 
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2.4.1.3.3.2  Business Processes and Practices 
All organisations outsourced some element of their property management function under contract to 
third parties. However, most did not actively manage their service providers, and did not have 
processes to monitor, measure or assess performance. Exception-based reporting was found to be 
the norm. 
2.4.1.3.3.3 Information and Performance Management 
The audit identified the following information and performance management issues: 
 
§ Deficiencies in maintaining property data and information, particularly non-financial 
information, and the ability to assess non-financial performance issues; 
 
§ The effectiveness of property, and whether it meets user requirements was not assessed; 
 
§ There were no established and regularly used key performance indicators in place; and  
 
§ There was no process for comparison or benchmarking with other organisations. 
2.5. Post-Research Note 
With regard to Section 2.3.6, Finance implemented a Commonwealth Property Management 
Framework in September 2015 (Australian Government, 2015).  
 
The framework comprises a number of policies with accompanying guidance material, which apply to 
property leased and owned by non-corporate Commonwealth entities, including Defence. The 
framework is comprised of the following: 
 
§ RMG 500 Overview of the Commonwealth Property Management Framework 
 
§ RMG 501 Property Management Planning Guidance 
 
§ RMG 502 Guidance for the Two Stage Capital Works Approval Process for Australian 
Government Construction Projects 
 
§ RMG 503 Whole-of-Life Costing for Commonwealth Property Management 
 
§ RMG 504 Commonwealth Property management framework Lease Endorsement Process 
 
§ RMG 505 Funding Arrangements for Commonwealth Property 
 
§ RMG 506 The Flexible and Effective Workplace Guidance 
 
§ The Australian Government Data Collection. 
 
Figure CS3.3, which has been extracted from the overview of the framework, portrays the property 
management processes of the Commonwealth Government (Australian Government, 2016). 
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Figure CS3.3: Commonwealth Property Management Framework 
 
This framework has not been examined in detail for this study. However, it is initially concluded that 
the framework would appear to mostly represent a consolidation of earlier policies and arrangements. 
It is not apparent that the Government has put any over-arching governance and accountability 
arrangements in place for the management of Commonwealth property. 
3. New South Wales Government 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This study estimated that, in 2011, the NFPS of the New South Wales (NSW) Government held 
property with a value of some $80 billion, and annual maintenance expenditure of some $1.6 billion. 
Annual office lease costs were estimated at  $400 million. 
 
This portfolio was not subject to any discernible whole-of-government control, governance, 
management, reporting or accountability. 
 
Only the generic element of his portfolio, comprising offices, warehouses, depots, car parks and 
certain categories of land, was subject to any whole-of-government policy, governance and 
management. 
 
This case study seeks to provide an insight into the NSW public sector environment and culture, and 
how these have affected and are likely to continue to affect the management of its assets. The study 
identifies and critically examines these and other influences over how property assets are managed, 
the structures governing their management, and the implications that those influences have for the 
on-going management of the state’s real estate portfolio.  
 
The study traces the management of the NSW Government property assets from the early 1990s. In 
this context, the extent of the study is limited in that government has limited its attempts to impose 
specific property asset management policies, guidelines and management practices to generic 
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property. The management of all other real property (defined as specialist assets), which are the vast 
majority of the government estate, is not subject to any similar identifiable specific policies or 
strategies, other than the requirements of government’s Total Asset Management (TAM) programme, 
and is left in the hands of individual agencies. The TAM programme is reviewed in Section 3.2 
 
Within the study’s scope, it is concluded that the NSW Government has only one internal agency that 
specialises in the management of property assets: Property New South Wales, formerly the State 
Property Authority. The mandate of this Authority is restricted to the generic portfolio, which 
represents a mere 0.64 per cent of the total value of the state’s Non-Financial Public Sector property 
assets ($78.6 billion).  
 
Table CS3.2 in section 3.3.1 illustrates the lack of cohesion in the management of the NSW 
Government’s property estate, which is a result of an ad hoc approach to the governance of these 
assets.  
3.2. Total Asset Management Framework 
3.2.1. TAM Policy 
Since 2002, policy for the management of the NSW Government’s assets has been controlled and 
managed by the NSW Treasury. Considerable space on Treasury’s website is dedicated to this policy. 
The introduction of the policy reads as follows: 
 
“Total Asset Management Policy was introduced to achieve better planning and management of the 
State’s physical assets, both existing and planned. Physical assets are items such as land, buildings, 
information technology, infrastructure, collections, equipment or fleet, owned or controlled by an 
agency as a result of past transactions or events, providing future economic benefits and having a 
definite business function or supporting the delivery of services. 
 
“TAM is a strategic approach to physical asset planning and management, including major 
infrastructure. It provides a structured and systematic approach by which an agency can align its 
asset planning and management practices with its service delivery priorities and strategies, within the 
limits of resources available. This is essential if services are to be delivered efficiently and effectively 
over the long term. 
 
“TAM is an integral part of NSW Treasury’s Budget process, which focuses on agencies’ results and 
service delivery performance. An agency’s asset response to its service delivery needs as reflected in 
its Results and Services Plan (RSP), Statement of Corporate Intent or Statement of Business Intent, 
is defined in its TAM submission.  An agency’s TAM submission is also used in the development of 
the State 10 year Infrastructure Strategy. 
 
 “TAM Policy applies to all government departments, statutory authorities, trusts and other 
government entities.”  
 
Treasury introduced a TAM Manual in 2006 containing guidelines to assist agencies with developing 
their asset plans (NSW Government, 2006). This manual contains the following: 
 
§ Guidelines for: 
 
- Asset Strategy 
- Capital Investment Strategic plan 
- Asset Maintenance Strategic Plan 
- Asset Disposal Strategic Plan 
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- Office Accommodation Strategy 
 
§ Assessment & Decision Tools for: 
 
- Sustainable development 
- Heritage Asset Management 
- Demand Management 
- Life-Cycle Costing  
- Economic/Financial Appraisal 
- Value Management 
- Risk Management 
- Post Implementation Review 
- Asset Information/Registers 
- Private Sector Information 
 
This section also contains a TAM Capability Assessment Tool, which is designed for 
Government agencies to assess their level of capability or readiness to implement TAM. 
There is also a 26-page guide on how to conduct a capability review. 
 
Some 650 pages of the TAM section of Treasury’s website were given over to these Guidelines and 
Tools, a large proportion of which is very academic and technical in nature. 
 
The NSW TAM policy represents a leading practice approach to asset management. However, NSW 
Treasury regularly bemoans the poor quality of government agencies’ TAM plans; and the State 
Property Authority is often critical of the quality of the Office Accommodation Strategy element of 
these plans.  
 
Despite this and the daunting volume of the process guidelines, no formal Total Asset Management 
training programmes for NSW public sector staff are thought to have been conducted. Additionally, 
Treasury Analysts are allocated to each agency or group of agencies within the NSW Treasury, but 
there is little formal communication between agencies, Treasury, GAMC (see Section 7.2) and SPA in 
the TAM process, the evaluation and on-going management of TAM plans.  
 
Agencies often regard TAM as an annual reporting evil that needs to be completed to satisfy 
Treasury, rather than as a valuable management tool to improve the provision of public services. 
3.3. Property Policy and Governance Development 
3.3.1. 1992 – 2002 
Governance in the way the state’s property assets have been managed over the last 20 years has 
almost entirely been under the influence of the NSW Treasury. 
 
Between 1992 and 2002 all reform of any significance has been driven from Treasury’s TAM policy, 
which was an attempt to shift the management of all state assets, not just real property, from an input 
to an output focus. 
 
Until late 2006/early 2007, responsibility for the management of government property has rested with: 
 
§ Individual government agencies; and  
 
§ The Department of Public Works and Services (DPWS), and via State Property in the NSW 
Department of Commerce, DPWS had historically been responsible for the management of 
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the Crown Property Portfolio (CPP) which, until 2007/08 was under the ownership and control 
of Treasury. Until 1992, the DPWS role was limited to the provision of building management 
services to office accommodation owned by the government, and which was occupied by 
more than one agency. The ownership and management of all other property, and any asset 
or portfolio strategy was left to individual government agencies. Agencies were, and to a large 
extent still are, solely responsible for the internal facility management of their property, 
including fit out and CHURN3. See Table CS3.2. 
 
Role and Responsibility NSW 
Treasury 
DPWS Agencies 
Asset Management Policy ü     
Policy Enforcement ü     
Policy  & Strategy Advice    
Asset Acquisition & Ownership ü    ü   
Asset Strategies, Implementation & 
Management   ü   
Building Management  ü  * ü   
Facilities Management  ü  + ü   
Project Management & Engineering Services  ü  + ü   
Procurement of Services   ü   
*Crown Property Portfolio 
+ As service provider 
Table CS3.2: NSW Government Property Roles & Responsibilities until 1992 
 
As part of the TAM initiative in 1992, Treasury introduced the following: 
 
§ Agencies were required to include strategies for office accommodation, capital expenditure 
(including property acquisition and development), property disposal programmes, and 
maintenance. These were to form part of the annual TAM submission and be related to the 
business objectives of the agency. 
 
§ A requirement for agencies to refer proposals for all new office leases and lease renewals to 
the Property Services Group (DPWS) for approval. This was the first attempt to control space 
utilisation 
 
Treasury introduced further reforms in 1997, which were aimed at introducing best practice into the 
management of office accommodation; achieving savings; promoting a whole of government 
approach to office accommodation planning and property disposal; and concentrating agencies on the 
amount of space being used. These included: 
 
§ Setting an office space utilisation target of 18 m2 per person; 
 
§ Submission of facility plans for all new office leases to DPWS for approval; 
 
§ All disposals over $3 million to be handled by DPWS; and 
 
§ Submission of annual Office Accommodation Strategies to DPWS for review. (Note: not 
approval). 
                                                       
 
3 Reconfiguration of office space. 
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§ Between 1999 and 2002, Treasury made further attempts to strengthen central control over 
the management of government’s office portfolio by: 
 
§ Requiring agencies to carry out lease vs. own analysis for investment proposals; 
 
§ Nominating locations for agencies that needed to be in the Sydney Metropolitan area; 
 
§ Co-locating agencies to enable lease rationalisation; 
 
§ Testing the viability for agencies to relocate to regional NSW; and 
 
§ Requiring agencies to submit business cases for core CBD locations to the Government 
Asset Management Committee for approval. 
3.3.1.1. Government Asset Management Committee 
The establishment of the Government Asset Management Committee (GAMC) in 1998 represented a 
move towards a strategic whole-of-government approach to the management of property. It was an 
attempt to ensure the effective management of Government’s investment in office accommodation. 
The committee’s role was to act as a watchdog and controller over the use of government property. 
Its terms of reference were to provide advice to the Budget Sub-Committee of Cabinet on:  
§ The alignment of office accommodation with Government’s service delivery priorities; 
 
§ The appropriateness of agency asset management strategies; 
 
§ Strategic asset and accommodation issues involving more than one agency;  
 
§ Office accommodation strategies for metropolitan and regional areas;  
 
§ Major investment strategies for acquisition, major refurbishments, lease pre-commitments, 
leasehold, and asset and property disposals; and 
 
§ Benchmarks and performance standards for asset and property portfolios.  
The Director-General Premier’s and Cabinet Department chaired the Committee. Members included 
the Chief Executive Officers of The Treasury, Department of Commerce, Attorney General's 
Department, Roads and Traffic Authority, Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural 
Resources and Forests NSW.  
The Committee generally met quarterly.  
A Senior Officer Sub-Committee was established under GAMC to consider matters prior to their 
referral to it. A Treasury official chaired this sub-committee. Its membership comprised 
representatives of the members of GAMC. This Sub-Committee also generally met quarterly. 
 
Treasury provided the Secretariat for the Committee. 
 
In practice, GAMC rarely considered matters other than those brought before it by the sub-committee, 
which is managed by Treasury. GAMC had no permanent, independent or professional executive 
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officers that were expert in the management of assets; and took few policy initiatives of its own. In 
effect, GAMC performed little more than a review and rubber-stamping role, and showed a reluctance 
to enforce policy over government agencies. 
3.3.1.2. Government Leasing Service  
The Government Leasing Service (GLS) was formed in 2002 as a unit within State Property following 
a review of the negotiation and management of office leases. The GLS was mandated to manage the 
risks in this area by carrying out lease negotiations in the markets of most exposure. 
 
At the same time, it was mandated that the CPP would manage multiple tenancies in the same 
building within these markets. 
3.3.2. 2002 – 2006  
Between 2002 and 2006, Treasury continued to tighten its hold over the management of property 
assets. 
  
Agencies were required to support their bids for budget funding through the TAM process, and the 
submission of annual Results and Services Plans. 
 
It was also at about this time that the Department of Commerce was established with the DPWS as 
one of its business units. 
 
DPWS consisted of a number of divisions, which included Projects, Facility Management, and State 
Property. 
 
The Projects and Facility Management divisions were service providers to government agencies 
intended to provide an internal government alternative to the private sector. 
 
These three divisions were run as businesses, and expected to contribute profit to the Department of 
Commerce. 
3.3.2.1. State Property 
State Property comprised three operating units: Project Management, Ministerial Projects, and 
Corporate Real Estate. Their areas of responsibility are shown in Figure CS3.3. 
 
This divisional organisation and its allocation of functional responsibilities is a good example of the 
public sector’s thought process: 
 
§ Two divisions were created to perform an identical project management function; and 
 
§ The functions of Disposals and Acquisitions were assigned to the Project Management 
division.  These were unrelated to each other and required their own specialist skills.  
 
There may have been political reasons for this but, whatever the reason, the effect was an 
organisational hierarchy that blurred and limited concentration of authority; and pitted divisional heads 
against each other.  
 
There was minimal internal communication or cooperation, which led to the divisions to be managed 
as separate entities, rather than as integrated units of a single entity. This culture was carried forward 
into the State Property Authority. 
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Figure CS3.3: State Property 
 
This factionalism was mirrored in State Property’s relationship with the NSW Treasury, which was a 
key factor in prejudicing and minimising the effective implementation of potentially the most significant 
and radical change in the way the state’s property assets were to be managed: the formation of the 
State Property Authority (SPA) in 2006. 
3.3.2.2. State Property Authority 
3.3.2.2.1 Formation 
Although the governance of property asset management had been firmly within the grasp of Treasury, 
it is important to note that the concept of a separate authority did not originate from Treasury. The 
concept originated from within State Property. The original concept was for all state property assets to 
be transferred into an independent authority and managed on the lines of a property trust. 
 
This met with Treasury’s opposition on a number of fronts, not least of which were the personal 
concerns of Treasury officials, who saw their roles as policy makers and property strategists coming 
under threat. 
 
Following the departure of State Property’s CEO from government at the end of 2005, a patch war 
ensued between Treasury and the Department of Commerce as to what the Authority’s objectives and 
functions would be, which aspects of property asset management would be transferred to the new 
Authority, what would remain within Commerce, and where the control of the Authority would 
ultimately lie.  
 
This resulted in a hiatus of one year during which no decisions regarding either the on-going or future 
needs of the management of government’s property assets were made. The effectiveness of the 
existing portfolio management function (which was limited, in any case), and the progress that had 
been made in the preceding two years suffered considerable setbacks over this period. 
 
Nevertheless, Act of Parliament eventually established the State Property Authority (SPA) in 
December 2006 ("State Property Act,," 2006). In essence, all corporate real estate functions were 
simply transferred from the Department of Commerce to SPA without regard to their suitability, the 
Authority’s operating environment, and its objectives and functions.  Furthermore, Treasury and the 
Treasurer expected that the Authority would immediately start producing results. 
• Portfolio & Property Management 
• Capital Works 
• Government Leasing Service 
• Strategic Asset Management 
Corporate Real Estate 
• Project & Construction  Management 
• Disposals 
• Acquisitions 
Project  Management 
• Projects of  state significance 
• Development Management Ministerial Projects 
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3.3.2.2.2 Legislated Objectives and Functions of the State Property Authority 
3.3.2.2.2.1 Objectives 
 
§ Improve operational efficiencies in the use of properties of government agencies, particularly 
generic properties (such as offices, warehouses, depots and car parks); 
 
§ Manage properties of government agencies in a way that supports the service delivery 
functions of those agencies;  
 
§ Provide advice and support within government on property matters; and  
 
§ Operate at least as efficiently as any comparable business, consistently with the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development and social responsibility for the community (including 
the indigenous community).  
3.3.2.2.2.2 Functions 
 
§ Hold, dispose, acquire property; 
 
§ Manage, maintain, improve & develop property; 
 
§ Arrange sharing of facilities; 
 
§ Advise the Treasurer on efficient use of property; 
 
§ Advice to the Treasurer on transfer of property to SPA and on budgeting measures; and 
 
§ Advise the Treasurer as directed. 
3.3.2.2.2.3 Mandate 
Despite its passage through parliament in December 2006, SPA was not ready to commence 
operations until sometime after the eventual appointment of a CEO in September 2007. The reasons 
for this were: 
 
§ SPA lacked a structure and the appropriate skills and experience beyond those inherited from 
the Department of Commerce to enable it to carry out its legislated functions. These functions 
were far in excess of those performed under the Department of Commerce, and required 
business, strategic and analytical skills beyond a mere operational property management 
capacity; 
 
§ No Business Plan had been put in place for SPA; neither did it have a Statement of Business 
Intent; 
 
§ Despite the enabling legislation, SPA’s operating policies, principles and mandate had not 
been agreed with Treasury for the necessary presentation to cabinet for approval; and 
 
§ SPA had four Interim CEOs (including a senior Treasury official) between January 2006 and 
September 2007, none of whom addressed these issues, but preferred to await the 
appointment of a permanent CEO. 
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SPA’s mandate was finally settled in April 2008 through the issuance of Premier’s Memorandum 
M2008-06 State Property Authority and Government Property Principles (NSW Government, 2008).  
 
This mandate and operating principles are summarised as follows: 
 
§ Sphere of operations: General Government Sector agencies and Public Trading Enterprises, 
excluding State Owned Corporations; 
 
§ The mandate was limited to generic property: offices, warehouses, depots, car parks and 
some land; 
 
§ The ownership and management of all government owned office accommodation was to be 
vested into SPA; 
 
§ The ownership and management of all leased office accommodation was to be vested in 
SPA; SPA becomes head lessee; 
 
§ Implementation of commercial rental charges payable to SPA by government tenant agencies 
under Memoranda of Understanding and Service Level Agreements; 
 
§ SPA to undertake the negotiation and management of all lease transactions/events for 
generic property in Greater Sydney Metropolitan Area; 
 
§ SPA to undertake reviews of agency property portfolios and develop Property Strategy 
Implementation Plans; 
 
§ SPA to maintain a whole-of-government database for generic property; and 
 
§ All acquisitions and disposals of generic property to be endorsed by SPA, which is also to be 
considered as the preferred agency to conduct and manage acquisitions and disposals.  
 
Significantly, responsibility and accountability for generic property, its utilisation and strategy 
remained with agencies. Agencies also retained ownership and control over specialised assets, which 
represent the vast majority of the State’s property asset value and expenditure. 
3.3.2.2.3 Operational Priorities and Objectives 
Within its mandate, the original priorities and objectives of SPA (all in relation to generic property) 
were: 
3.3.2.2.3.1 Savings and Economic Benefits 
SPA was to provide $540 million in real and measurable savings and economic benefit between 2006 
and 2011. This is broken down as follows: 
 
Area of Saving/Benefit Saving/Benefit 
($m) 
Portfolio Management & Maintenance 15 
Fit out  & CHURN 25 
Leasing & Lease Management 50 
Accelerated Property Disposal Programme 150 
Property Disposals 300 
Total $540 
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There was little substance or basis to support these numbers, as they were prepared at Treasury’s 
request, prior to the settlement of SPA’s mandate, and with a limited knowledge of assets outside the 
Crown Property Portfolio.  Despite SPA attaching comprehensive assumptions and riders to these 
assessments, the NSW Treasurer presented these savings/benefits to Parliament. 
3.3.2.2.3.2 Property Vesting & Portfolio Management: Property Data 
SPA’s Advisory Board and Treasury approved a plan in late 2007 for the implementation and 
integration of the vesting of ownership and management of the balance of generic property into the 
Authority. In terms of offices alone, it was thought that this would expand SPA’s portfolio by some 
800,000 square metres of owned and leased property, of which it was estimated that some 140,000 
square metres was owned by government. 
 
State Property had previously looked at the potential for expansion of the portfolio, and the 
implications for integrating the management of this property with the Crown Property Portfolio. 
This was a complex issue for a number of reasons: 
 
§ Management philosophy (and resources) would require change from an investment approach 
to a corporate real estate model for whole-of-government. The difference in these approaches 
was not readily understood. 
 
§ Little was known about the inventory, use, holding, or management and maintenance history 
of these assets. (There was good reason to seriously doubt the accuracy and reliability of 
government agency records, as there was minimal reporting accountability placed upon them. 
For example, State Property had carried out a review of the Department of Commerce 
portfolio in 2004/05, which revealed owned assets that were not included on the register, and 
expenses continuing to be paid on properties no longer occupied by the department). 
 
§ SPA became responsible for the maintenance of a whole-of-government property database, 
the principal source for which was the Office Accommodation Strategies required to be 
submitted to Treasury by agencies under their Total Asset Management Plans. This was the 
sole central record of property data for the NSW Government. 
 
The accuracy of this data was tested when the Government Leasing Service examined lease 
details for the portfolio. Some 60 per cent of these records were found to be incorrect, and 
contained records of leases for properties no longer held by government. 
3.3.2.2.3.3 Agency Review Programme 
SPA was committed to have reviewed the portfolio of every government agency by 2011. These 
reviews were to include confirmation of inventories; asset condition and compliance; asset use, 
suitability and appropriateness; lease profile and analysis; data cleanse and information management; 
management history and current arrangements; financial management and reporting; and 
identification of surplus assets. 
 
The outcome of these reviews was to be a Portfolio Strategy Implementation Plan, which was to have 
been jointly prepared by the agency and SPA. Each agency was to be responsible and accountable 
for the implementation and management of its plan, which would be monitored by SPA. SPA had the 
authority to recommend to the Government Asset Management Committee that it take over the 
management of these plans should it felt they were not being properly implemented by government 
agencies. 
 
This process did not take place. 
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3.3.3. 2007 - 2012 
3.3.3.1. Conflicting Roles of the State Property Authority 
In addition to performing the function of government’s corporate real estate department, SPA was a 
separate government authority vested with the ownership of property.  
 
As a government Authority, SPA was a business that had dividend targets, which it was required to 
return to Treasury. Furthermore, Treasury was the maker of real estate policy and the rules and 
regulations to which agencies were expected to be bound and conform. SPA was the vehicle used to 
implement and police those policies, rules and regulations. 
 
These varied roles of property owner and landlord; property investor; property manager and service 
provider; policy adviser, monitor and enforcer; and asset strategy adviser to both central government 
and individual government agencies, had the potential for considerable confusion and conflict. 
 
The position with regard to roles and responsibilities for government property during this period is 
shown in Table CS3.3. 
 
Figure CS3.4, reproduced from the author’s 2009 research paper for the University of Sydney, shows 
the complex myriad and diverse responsibility for the government’s property assets, which blurred 
transparency, responsibility and accountability (Seymour-Jones, 2009b). 
 
Role and Responsibility Treasury Government 
Asset 
Management 
Committee 
State 
Property 
Authority¹ 
Agencies Dept. of 
Commerce 
NSW 
Business 
Link² 
Asset Management Policy ü        
Asset Management Policy & 
Strategy Advice 
 ü   ü      
Policy Implementation & 
Enforcement 
ü   ü   ü      
Asset Acquisition 
&Ownership 
  ü   ü     
Asset Strategies   ü   ü     
Strategy Implementation & 
Asset Management 
  ü   ü     
Facilities Management & 
Building Services 
  ü   ü   ü  ³ ü  ³ 
Project Management & 
Engineering Services 
  ü   ü   ü    
Procurement of Services   ü   ü   ü  * ü  ³ 
¹Generic Property only ² See section 6 ³As service provider *As service provider and government’s central authority for 
procurement of goods & services 
Table CS3.3:  NSW Government: Current (2009) Property Asset Management Roles and Responsibilities  
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Figure CS3.4: Property Asset Management Roles and Responsibilities in the NSW Government 
– 2009 
3.3.3.2. Governance and Organisation: The Land and Property Management Authority 
Organisationally, SPA came under the Ministry of Finance, with the CEO reporting directly to the 
Minister. However, in reality, and until the reorganisation of government into 13 mega departments in 
June 2009, very little could be done without the say-so of Treasury and, in some instances, without 
the approval of the Treasurer. 
 
As part of this reorganisation, SPA was absorbed into the Department of Services, Technology & 
Administration (DSTA), which appeared to be an expanded Department of Commerce.  
 
Within the DSTA, the Department of Lands, SPA, and a number of other related agencies, authorities 
and corporations, were incorporated into a separate and independent authority: the Land and 
Property Management Authority, under the management and direction of the Director General of 
Lands.  
 
SPA had an advisory board chaired by the Treasury Secretary, with the Directors General of the 
Departments of Premier and Cabinet, and Education and Training as members. This was a very 
active board, which showed a keen interest in SPA’s activities. The Treasurer at the time had high 
expectations of SPA, and required regular reports to be submitted to Budget Committee of Cabinet.  
 
Notwithstanding SPA’s new roles and responsibilities, its organisational structure differed little from 
that of its predecessor, State Property. (See Figure CS3.5) 
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Figure CS3.5: State Property Authority Organisation 
 
SPA’s mandate extended to generic property only. This covered offices, car parks, depots, 
warehouses, and associated land.  
 
The ownership of the Crown Property Portfolio, which comprised some 360,000 m2 of owned and 
leased offices, was transferred to SPA from the NSW Treasury. 
 
The ownership and management of the balance of government’s office portfolio (800,000 m2), 
including budget allocations, was removed from individual agencies and vested into SPA. Some 1,000 
leases were also transferred into SPA.  
 
Agencies continued to occupy their previously owned property, but under Memoranda of 
Understanding with SPA, as landlord. As per the Crown Property Portfolio model, agencies paid rental 
to SPA, which was determined by independent valuer. They also paid management fees to SPA, 
which were determined by Treasury.  
 
Agencies were budget funded for these costs by Treasury to the extent that the amount and type of 
space occupied was considered by SPA to be warranted for an agency’s operation. Treasury would 
not fund any space that it and SPA considered excessive, inappropriately located or under-utilised, 
unless the agency had an active strategy in place to address the situation. 
 
Management standards of the portfolio previously owned by government agencies were varied and 
inconsistent. Very little was known of its composition, tenure, condition, cost, or management history.  
 
There was no central government inventory or database of property assets; and there were 
considerable gaps and inaccuracies in the data and information that did exist. 
 
In total, the estimated value of the owned portion of this portfolio was in the region of $500 million, 
versus a total government property asset value of approximately $66 billion. 
 
Total annual office rental paid to third party landlords was approximately $320 million. 
 
Responsibility for the management of NSW Police property portfolio rested with the Ministry of Police. 
This comprised approximately 500,000 m2 with an annual budget of over $80 million.  
• Policy Advice & Enforcement 
• Agency Portfolio Reviews, Strategies & 
Reporting (TAM) 
•  Whole of Govt. Database 
•  Town & Regional Studies 
•  Research & Analysis 
Strategic Asset 
Management 
• Portfolio & Property Services 
• Portfolio & Property Planning 
• Portfolio Administration, Risk & Finance 
• Contract Management 
• Capital Works, Benchmarking & Sustainability 
• Leasing 
Portfolio 
Management 
• Project and Development Management 
• Disposals 
• Acquistions 
Projects, 
Disposals & 
Acquisitions 
32 
 
The management of the NSW Police portfolio was subject to tension between the Police Ministry, the 
Police Force, Treasury, and SPA. As a consequence, portfolio performance was poor.  
 
Government spent nearly $4 billion per annum on ‘maintenance’. This figure cannot be analysed by 
individual agency or by maintenance category, but it was estimated that approximately $1.26 billion of 
this relates to land and buildings (see Appendix 3.1). 
 
Maintenance expenditure under the management and control of SPA was less than $20 million per 
annum. 
 
There were no meaningful measures of performance, nor any requirement upon agencies to account 
for their property portfolios. Treasury did not rigorously manage its Total Asset Management policy. 
3.3.3.3. Key Factors Affecting SPA’s Performance 
3.3.3.3.1 Resources: Government Policy 
The Government lacked appropriate resources in terms of experience, skills, systems, and 
relationship management within central government, the State Property Authority and departments 
and agencies, i.e. across government as a whole.  
 
Government appeared not to appreciate and acknowledge that the need for skilled corporate real 
estate strategists and managers, both within SPA and the agencies would increase rather than 
decrease. There was a shortage of the necessary talent, experience and expertise, which was 
compounded by the effects of the policy at the time of a moratorium on recruitment, and the quotas   
imposed upon agencies to reduce the numbers of the Senior Executive Service. Some examples of 
the effects of these on SPA were: 
 
§ A significant proportion of SPA’s professional staff was composed of short-term contract 
personnel. SPA had to turn to NSW Business Link, a separate government authority that 
provided property and business services to government agencies (see section 6 below), for 
assistance in the management of its portfolio. 
 
§ Agencies such as the Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care had to postpone or 
scrap asset management improvement programmes. This department held property assets 
with a value approaching $700 million. 
 
§ As part of the reduction in numbers of SES staff, the employment contract of the General 
Manager responsible for property at the Department of Education and Training was either 
terminated or not renewed. This department held property assets to the value of $16.3 billion. 
3.3.3.3.2 SPA’s Internal Management and Value Proposition 
SPA’s capacity to provide property services to agencies, which were to be subject to Service Level 
Agreements between the Authority and individual agencies, was dependent upon its own skills and 
capacity, the performance of outsourced service providers, and SPA’s management of those 
providers and the respective contracts.  
 
The Authority had not critically reviewed its value proposition since its establishment. (It remained as 
it was under the original State Property, despite performing a vastly different role). It therefore made 
no progress in its own strategic management; capability sourcing, control and management; and 
organisational shape and development. 
 
Despite having shown that it was far from capable of managing and performing the functions of 
property asset management strategy and the management of data, SPA maintained that it should 
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retain the ownership of these functions and the key capabilities necessary to perform them. In terms 
of the operational management of property, it retained resources that effectively duplicate the 
structures of its principal outsource property management service providers. This was deemed 
necessary to oversee and check the work of these organisations. 
 
This rigid thinking meant that SPA (and government as the wider organisation) had sacrificed the 
organisational agility and flexibility, which would enable it to control and make the most of critical 
capabilities, whether located inside or outside the Authority. This hamstrung SPA’s development, and 
its ability to service government in any capacity beyond its original offering.  
3.3.3.3.3 Agency Reviews 
The review of property held by government agencies revealed properties (in the hundreds) of 
considerably different type and quality than had originally been anticipated. This would have 
implications for occupancy; cost; condition; compliance; on-going management; and the production of 
Portfolio Strategy Implementation Plans. 
3.3.3.3.4 Financial 
The foregoing put further pressure on SPA’s savings and economic benefit targets. 
 
The level of dividend to be returned to Treasury by the Authority was entirely dependent upon its 
revenue from rental and management fees. SPA’s financial performance was to be significantly 
impacted by a reduced vesting programme in terms of both ownership and management, and by the 
apparent lesser quality of the portfolio generally. 
3.3.3.4. Other Government Property Service Providers: NSW Businesslink Pty Ltd 
NSW Businesslink Pty Ltd was the shared corporate services provider to the NSW Department of 
Ageing, Disability and Home Care (DADHC), the NSW Department of Community Services (DoCS) 
and Housing NSW (Housing). 
 
It was established in 2002 as a joint venture between these departments to provide corporate 
services to its stakeholder organisations. This was also part of a policy across the public sector to 
improve the delivery of corporate services, to leverage technology and to reduce costs.  
Businesslink provided payroll, accounts receivable, accounts payable, finance, recruitment, industrial 
relations, human resources, fleet, records management, procurement, distribution, building 
management, as well as information technology and communications services. 
 
Property services provided by Businesslink included Property Management and Leasing, and 
Facilities Management. 
 
Businesslink managed a large number of commercial and residential leases on behalf of these 
agencies. A detailed review of NSW Businesslink is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is 
believed that its stakeholders had reason to be concerned over Businesslink’s systems, procedures 
and service quality. For example, in 2007 Businesslink managed approximately 180 leases on behalf 
of DADHC. Nearly 45 per cent of these had been allowed to expire without any action being taken. 
 
At the end of 2008, Businesslink was considering a strategy to expand the offering of its property 
services to agency clients throughout government in competition to SPA. SPA then turned to 
Businesslink for assistance. 
3.3.3.5. Reports by the NSW Auditor-General 
The NSW Auditor-General published two reports dealing with the management of the state’s assets. 
In comparing the findings of these two reports, is clear that little action was taken, or progress made 
to improve the TAM process over the five years between the two reports, 2005 – 2010.  
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The findings and conclusions of these audits concur with those of this study, and are summarised 
below. 
3.3.3.5.1 Auditor-General’s Report: Performance Audit: Implementing Asset Management 
Reforms (October 2005) (NSW Government, 2005) 
This audit examined NSW Treasury’s efforts to improve asset management practices in the public 
sector, and the progress made by three sample agencies (the Department of Corrective Services, 
NSW Fire Brigades, and the Powerhouse Museum) towards the better management of their asset 
portfolios. 
 
The audit reviewed the policy framework for asset management in general, and the asset 
management practices in the three agencies to identify: 
 
§ Factors contributing to effective asset management, including how agencies have built 
capacity and capability; 
 
§ Key issues affecting the integration of asset management with other business plans and 
processes; and 
 
§ Barriers and impediments to ‘best’ practice. 
 
Table CS3.4 summarises the findings and recommendations of this audit. 
 
Criteria Finding/Area Recommendation 
1.  Compliance with TAM   
requirements 
§ Not all plans had an asset strategy 
§ Asset plans were not linked to 
corporate strategy or service 
standards 
§ Asset performance standards had 
not been developed 
§ Agencies had not adequately 
addressed risks affecting asset 
performance in plans 
§ Asset management systems were 
not always adequate 
§ Plans did not cover all assets 
essential to service delivery 
§ Plans did not assess the impact of 
maintenance on performance 
§ Plans did not assess the impact on 
services if funding was not 
received 
§ Treasury to provide guidance to 
agencies on developing service 
standards and performance 
measures for assets 
§ Treasury to provide additional 
guidance to agencies on what assets 
should be covered in TAM plans in 
terms of contribution to service 
delivery. 
§  NSW Treasury require agencies to 
include in TAM plans: 
- The impact on services if proposals 
to acquire assets or maintenance 
costs are not funded 
- Deferred maintenance that is 
consistent with asset age, condition 
and service requirement 
- Maintenance strategies to address 
this deferred maintenance and a 
funding plan 
- Implications if maintenance is not 
undertaken in terms of effect on 
service delivery, rectification costs 
and other risks. 
2. Improving Asset 
Management 
§ Improvements to plan quality 
 
 
§ TAM plan content to be reviewed 
annually to confirm priorities remain 
unchanged and that it continues to 
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§ Improve feedback from NSW 
Treasury on plan quality and 
compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Improve the timeliness of TAM 
plans. Treasury does not monitor 
the receipt of plans or report on 
timeliness. Audit analysis showed 
that most agencies failed to meet 
deadlines. 
 
§ TAM needs to be adapted for small 
portfolios 
meet the requirements of the   
corporate plan and Results & 
Services Plan.  
§ Three yearly TAM reviews in line 
with a review of corporate strategy 
and to address any shift in demand 
for services. 
 
§ Treasury to improve feedback to 
agencies on the quality of TAM 
plans, and compliance with policy by 
implementing quality assurance 
procedures to ensure Treasury 
analysts provides consistent, 
accurate and timely feedback to 
agencies. 
§ Treasury to review a sample of 
agency TAM plans annually to 
monitor compliance with TAM policy 
and promote best practice in asset 
management. 
 
§ Treasury to monitor the submission 
of TAM plans and reports on agency 
performance, either as part of the 
annual review of TAM plans or in its 
annual report. 
 
 
§ Treasury develops TAM plan 
requirements more suited to 
agencies holding small asset 
portfolios. 
Table CS3.4: Auditor-General’s Report: Performance Audit: Implementing Asset Management   
Reforms (October 2005) Summary of Findings & Recommendations 
3.3.3.5.2 Compliance Review Report – Total Asset Management: Auditor-General’s Report to 
Parliament 2009 Volume Twelve (NSW Government, 2009) 
Twelve major NSW government agencies were reviewed in relation to their compliance with the 
requirements of TAM.  
 
None of the agencies fully complied with the Government’s TAM requirements. Material exceptions 
were identified, which resulted in qualification of the compliance review report for each agency.  
 
The following is an extract from the report, with emphasis and bold type inserted by the author. 
 
“Action by agencies and central agencies, including Treasury, is needed to improve TAM submission 
processes. 
 
“Treasury’s ability to make informed decisions to plan the funding of statewide asset 
expenditures for the next ten years was significantly diminished by late, incomplete, poor quality 
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and unreliable submissions. We understand Treasury had to adopt alternative, time-consuming 
measures to collect the required information from key agencies. 
 
“The volume of qualification matters indicates widespread non-compliance. In addition to these key 
issues, a further 61 matters of lesser significance will be communicated in management letters to the 
agencies responsible. 
 
“The following material non-compliance matters were identified: 
 
“1. Deficiencies in the development and submission of Asset Strategies, including: 
 
§ Failure to submit the asset strategy as part of the proposed TAM. 
 
§ Failure to document how the agency identified and aligned investment strategies with relevant 
regional and sub regional strategies. 
 
§ Failure to document agency consultations with local governments. 
 
    Seven agencies did not comply. 
 
“2. Deficiencies in submitting strategic gateway reports and final business cases, including: 
 
§ Late submission of required business cases and strategic gateway reports. 
 
§ Failure to submit required business cases and strategic gateway reports for projects 
exceeding designated thresholds. 
 
§ Estimating capital requirements by grouping broad expenditure categories rather than 
estimating expenditure on planned projects. 
 
    Six agencies did not comply. 
 
“3. Failure to provide all required TAM data because some agencies: 
 
§ Incorrectly used the previous year’s table format, which meant important information, such as 
work in progress, location of capital projects and maintenance measures, was not provided. 
 
§ Had difficulty extracting, collating and supplying information so they did not complete the 
tables or supply the required data, nor did they seek formal exemptions from complying with 
the reporting requirements. 
 
§ Felt they did not need to comply with the reporting requirements as information had been 
supplied elsewhere, or they felt the information requested was unimportant, not useful, or 
could be misconstrued. They did not confirm this by seeking formal exemptions from 
complying with the reporting requirements. 
 
§ Overlooked providing required information, such as property disposal information. 
 
    Eleven agencies did not comply. 
 
“4. Failure to meet deadlines occurred because: 
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§ Submission dates were considered as targets rather than hard deadlines. 
 
§ Internal restructures, difficulties in securing Board approvals, onerous workloads or external 
pressures, such as the mini budget, delayed collation of the information. No agencies sought 
formal exemptions from complying with the reporting requirements. 
 
§ ‘Draft’ or unsigned TAM submissions were thought to comply with the reporting requirements 
even when these submissions were made after the due date. These agencies did not formally 
confirm this view with Treasury. 
 
§ Agencies believed discussions with Treasury analysts constituted agreement that agreed or 
proposed TAMs could be submitted after the due date. 
 
    Ten agencies did not comply. 
 
“5. Failure to obtain both Ministerial and CEO sign offs prior to submitting TAMs occurred 
because: 
 
§ The requirement to sign the TAM submission was overlooked or considered unnecessary 
because CEO approval was minuted in agency records. 
 
§ Ministerial sign-off was obtained after the ‘draft’ TAM was submitted. Some agencies believed 
that because the Minister did not require any changes to the submission it was unnecessary 
for the submission to be signed by the Minister. 
 
§ An agency did not believe proposed TAMs needed to be signed. 
 
§ An agency submitted a ‘draft’ TAM because it was unable to secure the Minister’s agreement 
or sign-off for the capital investment strategy. 
 
§ CEO and Ministerial sign off was only obtained after the ‘draft’ unsigned TAM was submitted. 
The signed version was only submitted with the Statement of Business Intent, much later in 
the year. 
 
    Eight agencies did not comply. 
 
“6. Failure to submit proposed TAM and asset strategies in the required format thereby omitting 
important information. 
    One agency did not comply.” 
Other deficiencies noted by the Auditor-General included: 
 
§ Not linking project priorities to identified risks, service delivery outcomes and asset gaps or 
identifying the risk to service delivery if major projects are not funded. 
 
§ Not prioritising proposed expenditure between asset expansion, asset renewal and 
maintenance of existing assets. 
 
§ Not referencing measures of existing and future asset use to support proposed disposals. 
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§ Not considering cross-agency projects. Agencies incorrectly assumed other parties to multi-
agency projects had included the project in their submissions. 
 
§ General, non-specific narratives were substituted where hard factual data was required. 
 
§ Uncertainty about reporting obligations resulting in under provision of information. 
 
The Auditor-General made the following recommendations: 
 
“1. Review and simplify TAM requirements.  
(Central agencies (SPA and GAMC) were unable to confirm, unequivocally, whether all 
information requested in the TAM template had a material impact on strategic decision 
making.) 
 
§ The need for the information required in TAM submissions be reviewed.  
 
§ Treasury and other central agencies (State Property Authority and the Government Asset 
Management Committee (GAMC)) should review and confirm the strategic value of the 
information requested. 
 
§ It is undesirable to make the process overly bureaucratic or prescriptive, but the mandatory 
requirements should be clearly and unambiguously defined in the reporting templates.  
 
§ The reporting requirements and format should be simplified, with mandatory fields clearly 
marked, and error messages that appear if a mandatory field is left blank. 
 
“2. Improve administration of the TAM submission process.  
(Treasury, at times, found it difficult to confirm facts and retrieve details of communications 
with agencies.) 
 
§ Treasury to train its analysts to provide consistent advice and directions to agencies. 
 
§ ‘Draft’, unsigned and clearly deficient submissions should be promptly returned to the 
responsible agency for rectification. Lodgement should only be recorded when a compliant 
submission is received. 
 
§ Communications to be confirmed in writing and filed in a central easily accessible repository.  
 
§ Treasury to maintain and monitor milestones for key submission dates and send reminders to 
agencies where they have failed to achieve a milestone or have not been granted a formal 
exemption or an extension of time. 
 
§ Treasury should ensure its website only includes the latest and most current information and 
guidance about TAM requirements. 
 
“3. Formalise the exemptions process.  
(There was considerable misunderstanding by all agencies reviewed as to whether 
compliance with all elements of the TAM strategy was required.) 
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§ Agency requests for exemptions from TAM requirements be initiated by the Chief Executive 
Officer or Director General. Approval of such requests should be restricted to senior Treasury 
staff responsible for TAM submissions.  
 
“4. Obtain Ministerial and CEO sign-offs.  
(Sign-offs confirm the commitment of the two parties to be bound by and honour an 
agency’s asset strategy.) 
 
§ All agencies and Ministers agree on proposed asset strategies before the required due date. 
 
§ Treasury to define what constitutes ‘significant’ changes to a proposed TAM submission. If 
Treasury determines changes are significant, the agreed TAM should be returned to the 
agency indicating Ministerial approval is required. 
 
“5. Develop Better Asset Strategies and TAM submissions.  
(Because Asset Strategies were generally not well developed, the information provided to 
Treasury was not as valuable as it could have been, and confidence in its use for State wide 
strategic asset planning was diminished.) 
 
§ Agencies review and strengthen internal controls that ensure compliance with TAM policy. 
 
§ Agency staff should be trained in TAM requirements. 
  
§ Treasury Policy Pronouncements should provide guidance to agencies on appropriate internal 
controls to ensure compliance with TAM submission requirements such as review by Audit 
and Risk Committees. 
 
“6. Co-ordinate activities with other agencies and layers of government.  
(Agencies are responsible for ensuring they do not duplicate or conflict with the activities 
of other Government agencies and local governments. Very few agencies documented 
consultations with local governments, or how they considered the Department of 
Planning’s regional and sub-regional strategies when developing their asset strategies.) 
 
§ TAM templates to highlight requirements for consultations with local governments, and 
consider the Department of Planning’s regional and sub regional strategies. 
 
§ Such processes should be integrated with the development of business cases and strategic 
gateway reports.” 
3.3.3.6. The Internal Government Red Tape Review 
In February 2006, the NSW Government announced an internal review to reduce red tape.  
 
This review was to examine red tape that NSW Government agencies create that affects other 
agencies.  
 
In December 2006, Budget Committee of Cabinet endorsed the Stage 1 recommendations of the 
Review. Those relevant to this study are:  
 
Recommendation 5.1 That Treasury establishes clearer communication with agencies concerning 
Results and Services Plan (RSP) aims and requirements. 
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Recommendation 7.1 That Treasury communicate more clearly to agencies the aims and possible 
formats of Total Asset Management (TAM) plans, including that: 
 
§ TAM plans need not be lengthy; and  
 
§ TAM plans need not change substantially from year to year. 
 
Recommendation 18.1 That the Government Office Accommodation Database generally continue to 
operate as previously. 
 
Recommendation 18.2 That agencies with fewer than 200 staff only be required to update the 
Government Office Accommodation Database every three years, or when there are major changes in 
the data. 
 
The information for this review has been obtained from a Department of Premier and Cabinet Circular 
C2007-26 Internal Government Red Tape Review Update, which was issued by the Department’s 
Director General on 15 June 2007 (NSW Government, 2007). At the time of this study (September 
2009), the Department’s website still listed this update as current, and shows that the page was last 
updated on 30 March 20094. 
3.3.3.7. Better Services and Value Plan 
In his 2009/10 NSW Budget speech, the Treasurer announced that the Government would “… 
embark on a strong programme of efficiency improvement through our Better Services and Value 
Plan. This plan includes the creation of a Better Services and Value Taskforce, led by an independent 
external chair to: 
 
§ Critically examine government agency spending line-by-line; 
 
§ Strategically review all state-owned corporations; and 
 
§ Rationalise whole-of-government spending in areas such as IT and legal services. 
 
“Our plan will also see a comprehensive reform of the public sector amalgamating 160 government 
agencies and offices to just 13 departments – the biggest overhaul in 30 years.” 
 
It was the Government’s aim to deliver efficiency dividends by cutting the spending throughout 
government by 1 per cent a year for the following two years, and by 1.5 per cent a year for the two 
years thereafter.  
 
The Treasurer further announced that: 
 
“The Government will implement a five point Better Services and Value Plan to constrain expense 
growth within these sustainable levels including: 
 
§ Maintaining the Government’s wages policy, which requires productivity offsets for increases 
above 2.5 per cent, and extending the public sector staffing freeze; 
 
§ Amalgamating 160 government agencies and offices into 13 to improve service delivery and 
achieve economies of scale; 
                                                       
 
4 The website was visited on 26 September 2016. The next review date was recorded as 31 December 2014. 
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§ Establishing a Better Services and Value Taskforce to initiate a series of  
whole-of-government expenditure reviews, commencing with a review of ICT expenditures; 
 
§ Performing line-by-line expenditure audits of agency activities by embedding review teams 
within agencies, overseen by the Better Services and Value Taskforce; and 
 
§ Conducting performance reviews of all state owned corporations, including reviewing Board 
performance, overseen by the Better Services and Value Taskforce.” 
 
The Better Services and Value Taskforce was to focus on three areas: 
  
§ Critically examine all areas of spending in government agencies; 
 
§ Strategically review the performance of all state-owned corporations and ensure they are 
performing to commercial standards; and 
 
§ Rationalise whole-of-government spending in areas such as Information Technology and 
legal services. 
 
The Department of Education was chosen as the first department for examination. 
 
In August 2009, the Government appointed economist, Stephen Sedgwick as the independent 
chairperson of the Taskforce. Members of the Taskforce comprised the Secretary of NSW Treasury, 
and the Director General of the Department of Premier and Cabinet.  
The Taskforce was to meet on a monthly basis, and to be supported by a new Expenditure Review 
Directorate in NSW Treasury.  
This study notes the following: 
§ The enormity of the task assigned to the Taskforce, and the extent of the resourcing, 
administrative and management issues that would necessarily ensue. 
 
§ The absences of a reporting plan or schedule. 
 
§ The limited membership of the Taskforce. 
 
§ This was a review on spending. Government had specifically identified areas such as 
Information Technology and legal services where it was intended to rationalise whole-of-
government spending. Although it was intended to critically examine all areas of spending in 
government agencies line-by-line, no specific reference was made to the efficiency, 
effectiveness and performance of the state’s real property assets. 
 
§ The amalgamation of 160 government agencies and offices into 13 clusters should in itself 
have created almost limitless opportunities for improved productivity, efficiency, value and 
services. Such a reorganisation would be akin to a major corporate merger or acquisition. In 
property terms, this should have resulted in a review to realign assets to the affects and 
needs of the new organisation; develop disposal strategies; and achieve considerable 
operational savings. 
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3.3.4. 2012 – Present (2013) 
3.3.4.1. NSW Commission of Audit – Public Sector Management (the Schott Report) 
With the return to government of the NSW Liberal Party in 2011, the new government established a 
Commission of Audit to develop a framework for the future of the NSW public sector. Dr. Kerry Schott, 
a former Executive Director of the NSW Treasury and former Chief Executive of Sydney Water, led 
the Commission of Audit. 
 
The Commission’s Interim Report, published in January 2012, and covered management of the NSW 
public sector. Chapter 5 dealt with the management of public assets (NSW Government, 2012). 
 
Although this case study is limited to the examination of the Schott report’s review of Asset 
Management in the NSW public sector, this cannot be done in complete isolation to the report as a 
whole. The report found that poor systems, management, and capacity are systemic across all areas 
of the NSW public sector. Much of this is shown to be a result of poor governance and management 
structures and a lack of accountability, poor strategic planning, and a lack of policy. This case study 
therefore considers the Schott report’s findings and recommendations in these areas, and their effect 
on the management of assets. 
3.3.4.1.1 Overview of the Schott Report 
The tenor of the report is established in the third paragraph of its Introduction (p.5), where it states, 
 
“In this Interim Report, the Commission of Audit examines public sector management. It is not good 
news. The Commission has seen pockets of good practice in the NSW public sector, but generally 
managerial performance is far from excellent. This will hinder the achievement of the Government’s 
strategies. Capabilities need improving and the Commission is surprised at the low importance that 
has been attached to financial, people and asset management.” 
 
The report noted that, whilst there are some issues that can be addressed as ‘low-hanging fruit’, there 
were others of a “cultural or more complicated” nature that would take years to correct. 
 
There are a number of very basic and fundamental points relating to the raison d’être and functions of 
government that the report felt necessary to highlight: 
 
§ There is an “indispensable” role for government in providing help and services to those in 
need, i.e. providing access to education, health care, and housing; 
 
§ Government must be efficient. It has a “duty of care” to ensure that taxes paid by the 
community are not wasted. If a third party can provide services more efficiently, then that it 
how they should be sourced; 
 
§ A number of public services, such as transport, directly contribute to the NSW economy. More 
efficient transportation of people and freight would improve productivity; and 
 
§ All aspects of government require accountability. The report found “poor systems, poor clarity 
about roles, insufficient coordination and limited strategic foundations. All this hinders 
achievement of policy and inability to keep pace with societal change.” (p. 6). 
3.3.4.1.2 Machinery of Government and Accountability 
In considering the structure of government, the report noted that the NSW Government has over 
4,400 entities employing some 322,000 people, 22 Ministers, nine Directors General, and a multitude 
of Chief Executives and senior personnel running into the hundreds. The report emphasised needs 
for: 
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§ Clear roles and responsibilities and relationships at all levels within the executive and 
administration;  
 
§ Regular performance checks; 
 
§ A flexible structure to cope with societal change; and 
 
§ New entities to be easily created, and for redundant ones dispensed with. 
 
The Schott Report analysed the development of the structure of the NSW Government. It concluded 
that, with growing public expectation for integrated services, government agencies operating as 
independent organisations was no longer appropriate as it promoted duplication, confusion, lack of 
clarity, and an erosion of public confidence in government.  
 
Multiple independent government agencies also result in fragmentation and inefficiencies in terms of 
deployment and use of resources, terms of employment, and financial and legal accountabilities. 
 
The report examined the recently implemented structure of government grouped into nine clusters, 
with similar groups of government services co-ordinated (more effectively) within the broad policy 
area of a single cluster. The nine clusters are: 
 
§ Premier and Cabinet 
 
§ Treasury 
 
§ Finance and Services 
 
§ Education and Communities 
 
§ Health 
 
§ Transport 
 
§ Family and Community Services 
 
§ Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services 
 
§ Attorney General and Justice. 
3.3.4.1.3 Governance  
The report attached particular importance to the governance and reporting challenges to government, 
and examined the experience of other government jurisdictions and large private sector corporate 
organisations. It concluded that government clusters could learn valuable lessons from the 
governance and reporting arrangements of the private sector. 
 
The report recommended that each cluster establish a strategic leadership group under its Director 
General, comprising the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Human Resources Manager, and operational 
cluster Chief Executive Officers. 
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3.3.4.1.4 Accountability and Reporting within Clusters 
Given the noted absence of clear articulation of accountability arrangements within clusters, and that 
such uncertainty can often lead to tensions and conflict, the report set out a proposed delineation of 
roles. Figure CS3.6, reproduced from the Schott report (p.23), illustrates this. 
 
 
Figure CS3.6: Proposed Delineation of Roles 
 
Of particular relevance is the highlighted inclusion of assets in the Chief Executive Officer’s role to 
“develop service planning and integration strategies within the entity (including assets)”. 
3.3.4.1.5 The Role of Central Agencies 
Of the nine clusters, three are central government agencies, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, 
NSW Treasury, and the Department of Finance and Services. The Schott report identified six key 
roles that are typical to central agencies: 
 
§ Advisory – the provision of “frank and fearless advice” on policy and strategy; 
 
§ Allocating – advice to Cabinet on resource trade-offs within fiscal limitations; 
 
§ Appointments – managing public sector human resources as a single corporate entity; 
 
§ Co-ordination – co-ordinating government business that crosses departmental boundaries; 
 
§ Monitoring – measuring and reporting whole-of-government performance; and 
 
§ Regulation – enabling the functions of government. 
 
Notably, the Commission pointed out that the central agencies should avoid any temptation to micro-
manage the activities of individual departments and agencies. The Principal Cluster Departments 
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should in effect become the de facto central agencies for their clusters, and must retain financial and 
budgetary responsibility, and responsibility for staff and asset management. 
 
The Commission envisaged the central agencies providing a “hub” to improve learning and capacity 
by bring key professional groups together to facilitate exchange of leading practices, identifying 
trends, and developing solutions to emerging issues. 
 
The report identified monitoring and reporting on sector-wide performance as a key role for central 
agencies to ensure the consistency and accuracy of data and information that is common to the 
needs across clusters. This would require an overall information model so that requests for data and 
information are available and known by clusters and agencies. In turn and in time, such an integrated 
Management Information and Reporting Framework would enable benchmarking between clusters. 
 
Figure CS3.7 is reproduced from the Schott Report (p.31). It shows the various requirements for 
information and reporting relating to service performance, human resources management and 
financial management, and the enablers of ICT, Fleet management, procurement, asset 
management, and corporate services. 
 
Figure CS3.7: Integrated Management Information Framework 
 
The report identified “natural custodians” of government-wide information, which, it said, “ should be 
seen as the ‘single source of truth’ for each category of information”. The report nominated the 
Department of Finance and Services as being responsible for managing the delivery of the asset 
management corporate enabler. 
 
The report’s recommendations included the review of central reporting requirements with a view to 
developing an integrated reporting framework and specifying minimum data sets in association with 
clusters, and reducing the compliance burden. 
3.3.4.1.6 Asset Management: Findings and Recommendations of the Schott Report 
3.3.4.1.6.1 Asset Management Principles 
At the outset of its chapter (pp. 101 -140) dealing with the management of the State’s assets, the 
Schott report outlined the following principles for the management of public sector assets, which, it 
noted, have been adopted within the asset management frameworks of other jurisdictions: 
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§ Physical assets generally “exist to support service delivery”; 
 
§ Good asset planning in the public sector should be based on determining which assets are 
required to best meet current and future service delivery needs, and whether these needs can 
be met through alternative methods; 
 
§ Asset planning evaluates alternatives, and assesses costs and benefits, considers risks and 
value for money on the whole life-cycle of an asset; 
 
§ Asset management and asset decision-making (including asset maintenance, acquisition and 
disposal should be integrated into a cluster’s and agency’s strategic and organisational 
planning; and 
 
§ There should be effective governance structures over the management of assets, together 
with accountability for risk management, asset condition, utilisation and performance.  
3.3.4.1.6.2 Asset-related Frameworks 
It was the Commission’s view that the NSW Government asset-related frameworks, such as TAM 
Plans (refer to section 4.2) and Statements of Business Intent, are “conceptually sound but 
implementation is far from assured” (p.103). 
 
The Commission concurred with the Lambert Review “that rigorous and holistic asset planning in New 
South Wales is sometimes absent and tends to follow, rather than lead, the commitment to an 
infrastructure investment.”5 The Schott report cited a number of the findings of the Lambert Review: 
 
§ Projects have been implemented “for their own sake” with little consideration to objectives or 
outcomes; 
 
§ Anecdotal evidence has been used to support the adoption of asset projects; 
 
§ New assets are provided in favour of improving the utilisation or maintaining existing assets; 
and 
 
§ Project evaluations are often treated as compliance box-ticking exercises, rather than 
assessing optimal service delivery models. 
3.3.4.1.6.3 Asset Management Governance and Administration 
The Commission found the governance and administration of the planning and management 
framework for assets to be fragmented and spread across a number of central government agencies. 
For example, Treasury, which administers TAM policies and guidelines; and the Department of 
Finance and Services (DFS), which administers procurement policies and guidelines, and includes 
the Government Asset Management Committee and the State Property Authority within its cluster 
(refer to sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1). 
 
Other departments or agencies involved with the governance and administration of assets include 
Public Works and management of social housing under the DFS, the management of Crown Lands 
under Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and Services, and Infrastructure NSW. 
 
                                                       
 
5 Lambert, M, 2011, NSW Financial Audit 2011, Sydney, unpublished, Cabinet-in-confidence.  
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The Commission found these arrangements to be confusing, and felt that the roles of central 
agencies; agencies and clusters need to be clearly expressed. 
3.3.4.1.6.4 Asset Management Policy 
Similar to Governance and Administration, the Commission found that there is no over-arching policy 
statement that establishes asset management objectives. 
 
The Commission recommended the release of such a policy, which it considered should include: 
§ Clarification of roles and responsibilities across the various tiers of government; 
 
§ Descriptions and explanations of the various asset planning and procurement frameworks 
and their linkages; 
 
§ A commitment to the existence of assets to facilitate service delivery outcomes; 
 
§ Asset planning and investment to be an integral part of an agency’s strategic, corporate and 
financial planning; 
 
§ Non-asset solutions and extending the use and/or utilisation of existing assets to be 
considered as options for service delivery in addition to the provision of new assets; 
 
§ Assessments of risk and adopting a life-cycle approach to managing assets to be included in 
the asset planning process; 
 
§ A requirement for transparency in and accountability for all asset-related investment 
decisions; and 
 
§ A requirement for continuing improvement in asset management. 
3.3.4.1.6.5 The ‘Free Good’ Perception and Capital Charging 
The report noted that, because of the reliance on central funding for most of their asset needs, 
general government agencies often considered them as ‘free goods’. Agencies are not required to 
fund their own capital asset needs and, in many cases, receive funding for the upkeep and operation 
of their assets. This has led to the creation and acquisition of new assets as the preferred solutions to 
service demand in favour of considering improvement or greater use of the existing asset base. 
 
The Commission recommended that Treasury explore the implementation of a capital charging 
scheme to encourage more efficient use and deployment of capital. 
3.3.4.1.6.6 Asset Planning and Management in Government Clusters and Agencies 
The Commission recommended that, inter alia, the following be adopted to improve and promote 
“disciplined and effective cluster asset management”: 
 
§ Co-ordinating Ministers and Directors General be required to sign-off on capital budget 
submissions as the agreed priorities of their clusters; 
 
§ Clusters are required to investigate opportunities to rationalise and consolidate asset 
management functions across cluster agencies; and 
 
§ Benchmarking data on the asset management of agencies be improved and expanded from 
the current limited practices, and increased attention given to benchmarking the asset 
management practices of agencies, in addition to the performance of their physical assets. 
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3.3.4.1.6.7 Total Asset Management Planning 
The report listed the merits of Treasury’s TAM policy, which includes how an agency’s Asset Strategy 
“integrates to support a cohesive service delivery strategy, within expected spending levels, to 
achieve efficient, effective use of all assets”. The Asset Strategy includes strategy for office 
accommodation, maintenance requirements and performance indicators. 
 
The Commission concluded that the quality of TAM plans and compliance with the TAM policy had 
become “inconsistent”, and of limited value in compiling the State’s Budget. 
 
The report included the 2009 Auditor-General’s Review of TAM Compliance as a case study. (This 
Review has been considered in detail in section 3.3.3.5.2 of this Case Study into the Australian Public 
Sector). 
 
The Commission found that, through the streamlining of data and modifications to the submission 
process, Treasury had taken steps to improve the TAM process since the Auditor-General’s report in 
2009. However, the Commission noted that Treasury’s statement that 100 per cent of nominated 
agencies comply with TAM policy does not translate into good quality TAM submissions. Many 
agencies still regard the process as an exercise in compliance. 
 
The Commission recommended that the “efficacy” of TAM be increased by: 
 
§ Ensuring TAM submissions are timely, complete, and of good quality; and 
 
§ Treasury having sufficient resources and training across its staff to support quality and 
meaningful feedback on all TAM submissions. 
 
The Schott report addressed the limited information that the TAM process provides on the quality of 
an agency’s asset management practices. It recommended that regular rolling evaluations be 
undertaken at a strategic level concentrating on: 
 
§ An agency’s method and capability for identifying, evaluating and prioritising asset needs; 
 
§ Assessment of performance and risk, maintenance, service and asset alignment, and asset 
utilisation and rationalisation; 
 
§ Strategic Asset Management governance, systems and processes, and approach to 
continuous performance; 
 
§ Benchmarking and ways to improve through the facilitation of knowledge and skills transfer 
across agencies. 
 
The report highlighted that these evaluations should be undertaken in conjunction with external 
experts, and be used to “identify ‘good practice’ in public sector asset management for a wider 
knowledge and skills sharing across the NSW public sector”. 
3.3.4.1.6.8 Asset Maintenance 
The Commission noted that the maintenance of assets has a direct relationship to their performance 
and, in turn, to the quality of service delivered through them. The Commission also noted that 
evidence that maintenance is of a lesser priority in the general government and non-commercial 
Public Trading Enterprise (PTE) sectors than investment in new assets or service delivery 
programmes. Within these findings, the report emphasised the importance of asset maintenance in 
relation to the following principles: 
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§ Maintenance is essential to ensure that asset continue to support service delivery and the 
business operations of government; 
 
§ Deferred maintenance will increase asset degradation, which decreases the ability to provide 
services at the required level and at a reasonable cost, and results in maintenance backlogs, 
which transfer greater capital and operational financial burdens to future expenditure budgets. 
 
The Commission did not attempt to estimate the value of maintenance backlogs in the general 
government and PTE sectors. It found that there are too many variations in maintenance standards, 
approaches to performance and risk management monitoring and measurement, and asset 
management practices and capability within agencies (including systems, expertise, processes and 
data quality). However, it did comment that NSW Health, Housing NSW, NSW Police, and Education 
and Communities, which have large physical and property asset bases, are known to have significant 
maintenance backlogs. In 2008 the value of backlogs in schools was estimated at $400 million. 
 
The Commission commented that the significant capital investment in schools and social housing 
from the Commonwealth Government’s Economic Stimulus programme would create additional 
unfunded maintenance liabilities for the NSW Government. 
 
The report concluded that agencies should accord greater priority to asset maintenance, and that the 
existing policy requirements should be more rigorously applied. The report contained the following 
recommendations in relation to asset maintenance: 
 
§ The significance of investing in asset maintenance should be more visible and better 
communicated; 
 
§ Treasury should engage with agencies to establish maintenance-related Key Performance 
Indicators to be include in the annual TAM submissions; 
 
§ Performance levels should relate to the role that assets play in service delivery and agency 
business operations. This will require maintenance needs and KPIs to be established 
(including the condition of the asset base and its capacity to support levels of service 
delivery), the effectiveness of maintenance practices in maintaining the required condition of 
assets, and maintenance efficiency in terms of cost benchmarks; 
 
§ Treasury’s assessment of an agency’s TAM compliance should consider the quality of the 
Asset Maintenance Strategic Plan; 
 
§ Reviews of capital submissions and business cases should more thoroughly examine whole-
of-life costs and how they will be funded; 
 
§ Clusters and agencies should have robust and transparent corporate asset management 
governance that is supported by proper systems and processes. This would be intended to: 
 
- Ensure clear lines of responsibility and accountability for strategic maintenance 
planning and achievement of results; 
- Enhance the link between maintenance and service delivery and business operations; 
- Provide links between maintenance objectives and asset performance; 
- Prioritise maintenance in relation of other asset investment; and 
- Define maintenance programmes appropriate to remaining useful life of assets. 
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3.3.4.1.6.9 Asset Utilisation and Rationalisation 
The Commission commented that the extent of utilisation of existing assets should be considered in, 
and influence asset investment decisions. Where assets are under-utilised, decisions on investing in 
new assets may be postponed if the utilisation of existing assets can be improved without adversely 
affecting service delivery. 
 
The report referred to “various reviews” that had previously concluded that better use of under-utilised 
assets reduces waste, improves service efficiency and quality, and can release capital for investment 
in other areas. 
 
The report also referred to the future establishment of a Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce to review 
property asset holdings at a whole-of-government level for the development of property disposal 
strategies. 
 
Of particular concern to the Commission in regard to the ability of agencies to make meaningful and 
informed asset decisions was the lack of understanding of asset bases through inaccurate asset 
registers and the lack of processes for identifying and recording assets and asset-related information 
and data. In this respect, the Commission referred to, and agreed with the Auditor-General’s 
recommendation that the “Government needs to address its process for identifying, valuing and 
recording land and related assets it controls as a matter of priority so it can effectively manage the full 
extent of its land and infrastructure holdings” (Audit Office of New South Wales, 2011). 
 
The Commission recommended that the Department of Finance and Services should implement the 
Auditor General’s recommendations. 
3.3.4.1.6.10 Priority Actions 
Chapter 6 of the Schott Report sets out its recommendations for priority action. A selection of these 
that relate to and/or affect and effect the management of assets in particular include: 
 
The Structure of Government 
 
§ Clarification of accountabilities and reporting lines; 
 
§ Leadership groups to be established in each cluster; 
 
§ Improve management information systems within clusters and central agencies to lead the 
development of minimum data sets and data sharing across government; 
 
§ Central agencies to establish key professional groups; and 
 
§ Central agencies to develop an Integrated Reporting Framework to link cluster and central 
data systems. 
 
Managing Finances 
 
§ Investigate those government-owned assets and businesses that could generate capital 
through their disposal or long-term lease. 
 
Managing People 
 
§ All position descriptions to be reviewed and updated; 
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§ Increase focus on the performance management of staff; 
 
§ Increase skills of the professional corporate support groups – finance, human resources and 
asset management – throughout government. 
 
Managing Assets 
 
§ Release a whole-of-government asset management policy statement to communicate 
objectives, explain the asset planning and maintenance framework linkages, and clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of central agencies, clusters and agencies; 
 
§ All clusters to have transparent governance arrangements for asset management that are 
supported by proper systems and processes; and 
 
§ All clusters to ensure the accuracy and completeness of their asset registers.  
4. Australian Local Government Sector 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The author’s work in this sector forms the basis of his hypothesis for a ‘leading’ or ‘good’ practice in 
public sector asset management, and for further on-going research and experimentation in the area. 
 
The Commonwealth Government originally championed good asset management practice in the 
Local Government sector in 2006 when the Local Government and Planning Ministers Council 
(LGPMC) called for the development of “nationally consistent financial sustainability frameworks”. 
Councils were to protect sustainability by managing assets and infrastructure through effective asset 
management and financial planning. 
 
This case study is presented in the form of the following author’s publications, articles and 
presentation of conference papers: 
 
§ Australian Local Government Assets: a case for excellence in their management prepared for 
the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government (ACELG), and presented at 
ACELG’s Local Government Research Showcase and Forum held in Melbourne on 30 April 
2014. 
 
§ Asset Management in Integrated Planning and Reporting Frameworks: some war stories 
presented on 17 November 2015 at the Local Government Financial Sustainability – 
Preparing for the future conference, 17 & 18 November 2015, Sydney Boulevard Hotel, 
Sydney. Conference organiser: Criterion Conferences. 
 
§ Has Integrated Planning and Reporting Encouraged Poor Asset Management Practices? A 
Practitioner’s Perspective for Good Practice presented on 29 June 2016 at the Local 
Government Asset Management – Improving asset strategy, planning and maintenance 
conference, 29 & 30 June 2016, Radisson Blu Plaza Hotel, Sydney. Conference organiser: 
Criterion Conferences. 
 
This case study also records the work of the author’s professional practice in local government, 
which, combined with his formal research, exposes one of the flaws of a federal system of 
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government, namely, a lack of co-operation, communication and knowledge-sharing between the 
three tiers of government, particularly between the State and Local Government sectors.  
 
It is for these reasons that the LGPMC’s call for consistent financial sustainability frameworks did not 
materialise and, as a result of this the Local Government sector has made such little progress in 
improving financial sustainability in the ten years since 2006. 
 
This flaw also extends between government agencies of the same state government jurisdiction. It is 
common for local governments, which have Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) requirements 
imposed upon them by their state governments through legislation and regulation, to cynically criticise 
their state governments for ‘not practicing what they preach’. This is especially noticeable in Western 
Australia and New South Wales, where IPR has been introduced as the first part of a two-part local 
government reform programme; council amalgamations being the second part. 
 
This has led to considerable ill feeling and long-term relationship damage between the two tiers of 
government and local communities, and the expenditure of much political capital by the state 
governments of Western Australia and New South Wales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
4.2. Australian Local Government Assets: a case for excellence in their management 
 
The author prepared the following paper for the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government 
(ACELG). The author presented the paper at ACELG’s Local Government Research Showcase and 
Forum held in Melbourne on 30 April 2014 (Seymour-Jones, 2014a). 
 
Australian Local Government Assets: a 
case for excellence in their management 
Trevor Seymour-Jones 
May 2014  
Abstract 
 
Local governments have an absolute dependence upon assets to manage themselves and to 
provide services to their communities. Growing concern over the financial sustainability of 
local governments in Australia over the last decade has seen the federal and state 
governments embark on a policy of local government reform in the area of Integrated 
Planning and Reporting. This is an attempt to improve financial and service sustainability 
through community consultation and a series of frameworks that seek to promote long-term 
corporate and financial planning, including the effective long-term strategic management of 
assets. However, these reforms have rarely been implemented with any degree of 
effectiveness. This paper examines Asset Management as a professional discipline; analyses 
the need for it to be recognised as a strategic resource management function; its role in local 
government sustainability; the reasons behind the lack of an integrated strategic approach to 
asset management; the clear and present dangers of maintaining the status quo; and the case 
for promoting excellence in their management through awareness, education, further research 
and practical experimentation. 
Key Words: Integrated planning and reporting, strategy, asset management, financial 
sustainability 
Introduction 
 
‘Strategy’ and ‘Planning’ are often concepts associated with more modern management 
principles and skills. However, their definition and application can be found in one of the 
earliest ‘management manuals’, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, 6th century BC. 
 
“Strategy is the means by which all actions are coordinated and all resources allocated.” (Sun 
Tzu 2001, p. 104); and 
 
“Because all things are interconnected, you must know each one, and how each one affects 
and effects every other. Only then can you plan effectively.” (Sun Tzu 2001, p. 66). 
 
54 
 
The management of Australian local government assets is almost exclusively governed by 
state and territory regulation over the conduct of local government business through 
Integrated Planning and Reporting requirements (Tan & Artist 2013, p. 5). 
 
Tan and Artist (Tan & Artist 2013 p. 7) conclude that more work is required to understand 
whether the various IPR legislation is resulting in better strategic management in local 
government. This paper seeks to fill that gap in understanding. 
 
This paper demonstrates that Asset Management may well be the most important local 
government corporate activity. It is local government’s business fulcrum that connects 
community aspirations, corporate objectives, financial imperatives and service levels. It 
determines business, financial and service sustainability. It deals with the current state of 
local governments and shapes their future state (Audit Commission 2000 pp. 4-10).  
 
Apart from being the strategic and planning tool that brings community and corporate 
strategies to reality, good asset management challenges the status quo and questions service 
levels, service models and service delivery (Howarth 2006, p. 25). 
 
Notwithstanding efforts by federal, state and territory governments to reform and improve the 
management of public assets, this paper shows how and why the Australian public sector has 
not been successful in adopting a strategic approach to their management; and that this failure 
poses very real threats to local government financial and service sustainability.  
 
This paper concludes that there is an overwhelming and urgent case for a national standard of 
excellence for the management of local government assets as strategic business, corporate 
and community resources, that goes beyond the national technical manuals and frameworks 
that have so far been developed for the management of built and infrastructure assets, and the 
assessment of asset management maturity. 
Assets and Asset Management in the Public Sector 
 
Local Government Assets 
 
Although responsible for the delivery of common services to their communities, no local 
government is the same. Councils vary significantly in size and composition of their asset 
base (Audit Commission 2000, p.7). However, all governments face similar challenges in 
service delivery, changes in community expectations, the influence of technology, and getting 
the best out of their assets to deliver services in the most effective and cost efficient manner 
(Jones & White 2008). 
 
All councils will have common obligations and compliance requirements; common categories 
of assets to manage, pay for, operate, maintain and repair; and to plan for. Infrastructure and 
built assets will account for some 80% - 90% of the total asset value of most councils.   
 
Local governments are absolutely dependent upon assets to manage themselves and to 
provide services to their communities.  
 
These assets include roads, cycle and footpaths, bridges, community centres, recreation, sport 
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and entertainment facilities, parks and gardens, sewerage, water and drainage systems, 
accommodation, libraries, galleries and museums, heritage assets, plant and equipment, 
information and communication technology (ICT), and major infrastructure such as airports. 
 
Local governments will therefore always be “asset rich…” (Carter 2013, p.3). 
Assets represent a government’s value and wealth, but they can quickly become liabilities 
physically, financially, legally and politically if they are poorly maintained, obsolescent, 
inappropriate, in the wrong place, ineffective or inefficient.  
 
Asset Management and its Recognition as a Professional Discipline in Public 
Administration 
 
There are a growing number of governments across the developed world, including the USA, 
Mexico, Canada, the Scandinavian nations, Germany and New Zealand that have 
implemented far-reaching reforms in the management of their assets. However, this paper 
uses the experience of the UK as the benchmark for good asset management practice, as the 
author’s current doctoral research (currently unpublished) has shown it to represent the 
closest parallel to Australia’s reform journey. 
 
Asset Management Awareness and Common Misconceptions 
 
It is the corporate and whole-of-organisation context with which the strategic management of 
assets is concerned (Lyons 2004). This is neither properly understood, nor does it receive the 
necessary recognition and attention (Howarth 2006).  
 
Asset Management is an issue of strategic importance to all levels of government. In relation 
to the management of government property assets, Kaganova and McKellar wrote in the 
preface to their edited book: 
 
“This is a topic that, surprisingly, has not attracted sufficient attention of scholars and 
researchers, despite the importance of deploying the full range of government real property 
assets, in both mature and emerging economies, to achieve strategic public policy objectives. 
 
“Given the enormity of the challenge in addressing the topic of public property asset 
management from an international perspective, further investigation, research and practical 
experimentation are much needed.” (Kaganova & McKellar 2006, p. ix). 
 
There is a common misconception and belief in government that Asset Management is 
engineering, maintenance, property or facility management. It is not. These are technical and 
operational subsets of Asset Management that implement an organisation’s Asset 
Management Strategy (Male 2006, p. 25).  
 
Howarth put the distinction very succinctly when he wrote “There are therefore differences 
between the property management view of assets and the asset management view of 
property.” (Howarth 2006, p. 12). 
 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, successive governments in the UK had under-invested in 
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infrastructure, particularly in the national road network. In seeking alternative and new 
sources of capital, the Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned Sir Michael Lyons in 2004 
to assess the possibility of achieving £30 billion from asset disposals and £760 million per 
annum in savings by 2013 through better asset management. Lyons concluded that these 
targets were achievable (Lyons 2004)6. 
 
Lyons said that “…. good asset management planning must complement an organisation’s 
strategic or business planning.” (Lyons 2004, p. 23). He also positioned responsibility for 
Asset Management with the Finance Director and for it to be regularly reported at board level 
(Lyons 2004, p. 7). Significantly, this has formed the basis for the subsequent reform of asset 
management throughout the UK public sector and the development of a routemap to asset 
management excellence (UK Office of Government Commerce 2006). 
 
Asset Management Definitions 
 
Lyons defined Asset Management, as “a key part of business planning, which connects, at a 
strategic level, decisions about an organisation’s business needs, the deployment of its assets, 
and its future financial needs.” (Lyons 2004, p. 34) 
 
Professor Stephen Male of Leeds University expanded on the Lyons definition of Asset 
Management by describing it as:  
 
“A subset of Resource Management and is the effective and efficient direction and utilisation 
of assets, both tangible and intangible, to sustain the business.  This definition covers all asset 
classes including production, facilities, fleet assets and IT infrastructure, for example. This 
definition encapsulates the processes of: 
 
▪ Planning 
 
▪ Prioritisation 
 
▪ Deployment 
 
▪ Performance targets and KPIs 
 
▪ The management of strategic risks to the asset base” (Male 2006, p. 24). 
 
In summary, Asset Management is: 
 
▪ An activity that sees assets as key strategic resources; 
 
▪ Involved with business, corporate and organisational objectives; 
 
▪ Concerned with both non-financial as well as financial matters; 
                                                       
 
6 The UK government reports annually to parliament on the performance of the management of its 
assets through the report series, The State of the Estate (UK Office of Government Commerce 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Analysis of these reports reveals reductions in annual operating costs 
of £1.61 billion over the years 2007 – 2012. 
57 
 
 
▪ Connected with the operational management of individual assets and asset categories; 
 
▪ Concerned with service delivery and whole-of-asset life; 
 
▪ Involved with planning on a medium and long term basis; and 
 
▪ A corporate activity and not solely the province of property, engineering, construction 
and facilities professionals 
 
Skills 
 
In concurring with the views of Lyons and Male, Howarth (Howarth 2006, p. 24) identified 
and recommended the following necessary skills for asset management: 
 
▪ Data Management (asset registers; data accuracy; type, scope and analysis of data); 
 
▪ Performance Management (KPIs, performance measurement and benchmarking; 
contract management; stakeholder management); 
 
▪ Strategic Business Planning (business and service drivers and strategic thinking; 
asset strategy and management plans; risk management and project and programme 
management; sustainability); 
 
▪ Financial Management (resource accounting; operating and capital budgets; whole-
of-life costing; business case preparation and options analysis); and 
 
▪ Leadership (capacity and capability building; change management; management of 
professional staff, contractors and consultants) 
 
Howarth’s recommendations were made against the need to embed “asset management 
awareness and associated skills across government” focusing “on ensuring that asset 
management becomes an intrinsic component of mainstream strategic thinking and financial 
management” (Howarth 2006, pp. 4-5). 
 
Howarth’s report included research into the professional skills already existing in government 
that were related to asset management, for example property management, facility 
management and finance.  He found that these existed to a degree of experience and 
competence at a “tactical level” with managers seeing property as a “strategic function”, but 
few understanding it as a means of “optimising the use of assets to benefit the service”. He 
also identified a noticeable lack of awareness of the strategic value of property assets at 
senior management level (Howarth 2006, pp. 3-4). 
 
It will be seen that Australia’s lack of progress in developing asset management capacity and 
capability closely resembles the lack of asset management awareness experienced by the UK 
government in the 2000s. 
 
Professional Development  
 
Although largely concerned with property assets, Lyons (Lyons 2004) applied his thinking to 
58 
 
all categories of assets, roads, infrastructure and intangible, as did Male (Male 2006, p. 24). 
Lyons, Male, Howarth and the Office of Government Commerce consulted the property 
profession and the finance sector widely in their research and for the development of a 
routemap towards excellence.  
 
In addition to calling for a robust asset management and planning framework, Lyons (Lyons 
2004, p. 7) recommended that asset management skills and expertise be expanded and 
improved within the public sector. The property profession was used a base for the 
development and improvement of these skills.  
 
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) had already been involved with local 
government in the management of property assets and was seen to represent a practice 
benchmark for other major asset categories.  
 
The RICS has published RICS Public Sector Property Asset Management Guidelines: A 
guide to best practice for its professional members (Jones & White 2008).  (The author of 
this paper was consulted on these guidelines and represented the RICS at their official launch 
in Australia).  
  
As an offshoot to these guidelines, the RICS has also published a series of best practice 
guidelines for use in the management of local government assets (Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors 2009). 
 
Howarth in particular, called for asset management to be recognised and treated as a 
profession in the public sector by recommending that it be developed through the 
government’s Professional Skills in Government programme and be included in the training 
and development for “all” staff (Howarth 2006, p. 4). 
 
The objective was to widen the awareness of asset management as a strategic corporate 
resource among senior managers, and to encourage strategic thinking amongst existing 
professional staff. One result of this has been the appointment of a whole-of-government 
‘Head of Asset Management’ profession at a very senior level of government. 
 
Integrated Planning and Reporting in Local Government 
 
New Public Management Paradigm 
 
The introduction of Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) frameworks and regimes over 
local government in Australia can be traced to the New Public Management Paradigm 
(NPM), which became a dominant principle of government administration in the 1980s and 
1990s. The key objectives of NPM were: 
 
▪ Improved financial efficiency and cost effectiveness; 
 
▪ Performance monitoring and incentives; 
 
▪ Application of private sector management approaches; 
 
▪ Decentralisation and reduced bureaucracy; and 
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▪ Greater accountability and transparency. 
 
In terms of local government, this meant an increased requirement for longer-term 
community and corporate strategic planning.  (Tan & Artist 2013, p. 9) 
 
Tan and Artist, in their University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) and Australian Centre of 
Excellence for Local Government (ACELG) research report, Strategic Planning in Australian 
Local Government: A comparative analysis of state frameworks (Tan & Artist 2013, pp. 9-
14), trace the development of integrated planning and reporting in local government.  This, 
together with findings of the author’s research, is summarised in the following paragraphs. 
 
Corporate Planning 
 
Corporate planning as a means of the effective and efficient deployment of resources was 
first introduced as public policy in New South Wales (NSW) in 1972. Its subsequent 
development mirrors the transformations of government characterised by the NPM in the 
1990s. 
 
Local Government Legislation 
 
In response to a number of local government association reports expressing concern over the 
approach to resource planning and the associated difficulties arising from limited sources of 
revenue, state governments enacted legislation requiring councils to adopt resource strategies 
and planning. 
 
All states and territories, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have 
enacted legislation requiring councils to adopt strategic community, corporate, workforce, 
financial and asset management planning to varying degrees. The most rigorous and 
extensive of these are NSW, Victoria and Western Australia (WA), which have set 
comprehensive planning and reporting frameworks covering: 
 
▪ Strategic Community Plans; 
 
▪ Corporate Business Plans; 
 
▪ Annual Plans; 
 
▪ Long-term Financial Plans (LTFP); 
 
▪ Asset Management Plans; and 
 
▪ Workforce Plans 
 
Table 1, adapted from Tan and Artist (Tan & Artist 2013, p. 6), summarises the planning and 
reporting frameworks adopted by the state and Northern Territory governments.  
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Table 1. Strategic and Corporate Planning Frameworks 
It is interesting to note the different interpretation and planning emphasis taken by each 
jurisdiction. 
 
Queensland’s framework originally required a ten-year Community Plan, but this 
requirement was repealed in 2012 “to cut unnecessary red tape and streamline provisions 
about the financial sustainability and accountability of local government” (Local Government 
and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012, Explanatory Notes in Tan & Artist 2013, pp. 
21-22). 
 
Financial Sustainability Concerns 
 
From the mid-2000s, concerns have been raised at both state and national level over the 
financial sustainability of councils.  
 
In 2005 the Local Government Association of South Australia released an independent report 
that showed “councils had put community needs and demands for services ahead of their own 
financial sustainability” (Tan & Artist 2013, p. 10). 
 
In 2007, the Queensland Treasury Corporation carried out financial sustainability 
assessments for 105 councils. Forty per cent were assessed as ‘financially weak’, ‘financially 
very weak’ or ‘financially distressed’ (Martin 2009 in Tan & Artist 2013, p. 21). 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) published a report in 2006 that stated “… that a sizeable 
proportion of councils face long-term financial sustainability problems” 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006, p. 6). It observed a tendency to reduce and defer expenditure 
on the maintenance and renewal of existing infrastructure and major community assets when 
councils encountered operating cash flow deficits. These deferrals have been the cause of 
large asset renewal and replacement backlogs. 
  
Current examples, which show that this situation continues, will be described later in this 
paper. 
 
The PwC report concluded that local government unsustainability is a result of poor resource 
planning, which leads to long-term financial problems. 
 
In 2006, the Local Government and Planning Ministers Council (LGPMC) called for the 
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development of nationally consistent financial sustainability frameworks. Councils were to 
protect sustainability by managing infrastructure through effective asset management and 
financial planning. 
 
State and territory governments accepted the LGPMC’s determinations for a national 
approach to these frameworks, which led the states to require councils to undertake long-term 
planning in financial and asset management. Notwithstanding this, table 1 above shows that 
Tasmania undertakes neither, and the Northern Territory does not plan for the management of 
its assets.  
 
This paper will show that, despite the warning signs, the involvement of the LGPMC and 
legislation enacted by the states, financial unsustainability remains a major threat to local 
government. 
Clear and Present Threats to Local Government Financial Sustainability 
 
The threats to the financial sustainability of local government are very real, and not dissimilar 
to those faced by the UK public sector. 
 
This paper identifies three principal dangers and threats to the on-going financial 
sustainability of local government and its continuing capacity to provide community services: 
 
▪ Local government revenue sources; 
 
▪ Local government assets and their management; and 
 
▪ IPR reform – the very thing designed to improve sustainability. 
 
Threat: Local Government Revenues  
 
There is growing evidence that local government is becoming less self-sufficient. 
 
Fiscal and budgetary pressures are being felt at all levels of government with ‘AAA’ credit 
ratings coming under threat and downgrading imposed. Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services 
downgraded Western Australia’s credit rating in September 2013 to AA+ on account of 
declining revenues and increases in the state’s debt (Standard and Poor’s 2013). 
 
Federal and State Treasurers are calling for efficiency dividends from their departments and 
agencies, including from Departments of Local Government. 
 
As seen from the 2006 PwC report, it is often the management, maintenance, renewal or 
replacement of the existing asset base, which is essential to service provision, that is forfeit to 
provide the efficiency returns. This results in maintenance backlogs and funding gaps, 
reduces the capacity to deliver services at the desired levels, and threatens the very future of 
some councils. 
 
Local government, having a large dependence on federal and state funding, bears a 
significant share of the consequences of the inefficiencies of its more senior counterparts. 
These consequences are the withdrawal of direct federal or state funding, making access to 
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funds more difficult, and withdrawing support to assist councils to improve their capacity and 
capability.  
 
At the same time, councils must continue to manage their affairs and provide services in 
compliance with their legislative and other obligations. 
 
The net effect is to put the sustainability, financial viability, and physical fabric of councils, 
essential services and their ability to meet the expectations of their communities under severe 
pressure. 
 
In short, councils have to find ways to become more self-sufficient and increase their 
productivity.  
 
In his briefing paper to ACELG, Mervyn Carter (Carter 2013, p. 3) examined local 
government funding and expenditure. Further analysis of these statistics (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2013 in Carter, 2013 p. 3) is set out below. Table 2 summarises the sources of 
local government revenues between 2002-03 and 2011-12. Figure 1 shows the changes in the 
proportion of total revenue for each revenue source over the same period. 
 
 2002-03	
$	Billion	
%	Total	
Revenue	
2011-12	
$	Billion	
%	Total	Revenue	
Tax Revenue 7.2 38.5 13.2 35.8 
Other Revenue 3.0 16.0 9.2 24.9 
Sales of Goods & 
Services 
6.0 32.1 9.0 24.4 
Current Grants & 
Subsidies 
2.1 11.2 4.3 11.6 
Interest 0.4 2.2 1.2 3.3 
Total 18.7  36.9  
Table 2: Local Government Revenue 2002/03-2011/12 
	
Figure 1: Local Government Revenue Profile 2002/03 – 2011/12 
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Total revenue in 2011-12 was $37 billion, of which $13.2 billion (only 36%) was raised 
through recurrent tax revenue. 
 
Although an element of revenue was raised through infrastructure levies for new or upgraded 
assets in the Other Revenue category, the balance of revenue was provided through capital 
grants, sales, subsidies and interest income, i.e. non-operational recurrent sources. 
 
Significantly, over this period: 
 
▪ Revenue from taxes increased by some 83%, but its proportion of total revenue 
declined by 8%; 
 
▪ Revenue from sales of goods and services increased by 50%, but its proportion of 
total revenue fell by 31%;  
 
▪ Other revenue increased threefold and represents 25% of total revenue, an increase of 
38%; and 
 
▪ The proportion of grants and subsidies rose by 3%, but more than doubled to $4.3 
billion. 
 
The significance of these trends is that they indicate an increasing dependency on other 
revenue and grants and subsidies, and a declining capacity on behalf of councils to sustain 
their own self-sufficiency through the sale of goods and services and collection of tax 
revenue. 
 
Completing the earlier citation (Carter 2013, p. 3), “Local Government is asset rich and 
income poor.” 
 
Given the current pressures faced by state governments, the level and availability of grants 
and subsidies as a funding source is being reduced. This will have considerable impact and 
further test sustainability.  
As an example, the Western Australian Local Government Association (WALGA) reported 
in its August 2013 Economic Briefing (Western Australian Government Association 2013) 
that the level of the Country Local Government Fund (CLGF) in the 2013-14 state budget 
was to be reduced by nearly 55% from an estimated $76.4 million in 2012-13 to $34.5 
million.  
 
The 2012-13 contribution by the CLGF towards Local Infrastructure Asset Renewal and New 
Assets was $28.3 million. This was reduced to zero in the 2013-14 state budget. 
 
Threat: Local Government Assets and Asset Management 
 
The Western Australian Regional Development Trust’s (WARDT) 2012 Review of the 
Royalties for Regions Country Local Government Fund stated: 
 
“Asset management systems improve the financial sustainability of CLGs if they result in a 
properly prioritised, managed, and manageable asset maintenance renewal and replacement 
program that is affordable and productive.  
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“Financial sustainability exists for CLGs where a conservative realistic assessment of future 
own source and transfer income mean that asset operation, maintenance, replacement, 
renewal and creation can occur on a structured and planned basis over the longer term” 
(Western Australian Regional Development Trust, 2012 p. 14); and 
 
“Asset management is at the heart of considerations of CLG financial sustainability. The 
main requirement is asset data integrity and sector comparability” (Western Australian 
Regional Development Trust 2012, p. 23). 
 
Notwithstanding this, anecdotal evidence suggests that funding cuts are also affecting the 
WA Department of Local Government and Communities. Anticipated funding to assist 
councils to develop IPR capacity and capability has not been budgeted.  
 
Additionally, although the state government’s 2014-15 programme to assist Country Local 
Governments (CLGs) to self-assess their levels of asset management maturity under the 
National Assessment Framework is open to participation by all 110 CLGs, funding 
availability limits participation to 75 CLGs. 
 
In 2011-12 local government expenditure totalled $37 billion. (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2013). Although reported by expenditure category, no meaningful data is provided 
on asset related operating, maintenance, and repair and management expenditure. However, a 
gross investment in infrastructure of $10.6 billion was recorded for 2011-2012. 
 
In 2009-10, local councils owned $302 billion in land and fixed assets, comprising: 
 
§ Land: $88 billion; 
 
§ Major Assets (buildings, roads, infrastructure etc.): $213 billion 
 
(Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government 2013 in Carter 2013, p. 4). 
 
There is good reason to believe that these values are understated due to an acute lack of asset 
data, asset knowledge and poor asset systems that are not linked to financial systems. Many 
councils lack accurate asset inventories and data.  
 
However, using an average of 2.5% of asset replacement cost for annual routine maintenance 
expenditure and assuming the value of major assets represents replacement cost and had 
grown to $235 billion by 2011-12, some $5.9 billion would have been required to maintain 
local government assets in 2011-12. 
 
This represents 16% of total expenditure and 45% of recurrent tax revenue. 
 
If investment in infrastructure continues to increase by $10 billion per annum over the next 
ten years, an additional $13.75 billion, at an average of some $1.4 billion per annum, will be 
required for its maintenance. 
 
The continuation of these trends could result in the annual expenditure on asset maintenance 
outstripping recurrent tax revenue in five to ten years. (Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
recurrent tax revenue of some local governments is already insufficient to cover salary costs.) 
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With assets not having been managed at a strategic level, it is most likely that expenditure on 
maintenance has been well below the benchmark standard for many years.  
 
This will have resulted in the build-up of significant maintenance backlogs giving rise to the 
premature need for asset renewals and replacement. This represents a threat to asset values 
and balance sheets, financial ratios, and puts avoidable and unnecessary pressure on long-
term financial requirements.  
 
Figure 2, drawn from the author’s consulting experience, is an example of the Asset Renewal 
and Replacement Gap calculated for a council in 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Asset Renewal and Replacement Gap 
In this case, the ten-year renewal and replacement gap of $163.2 million was built from an 
incomplete asset inventory and limited and unreliable asset data, which was recorded on 
separate and unrelated spreadsheets maintained by different parts of the organisation.  
This sum has been accepted by council as a ten-year financial requirement and included in 
council’s Long-Term Financial Plan, from which major funding and investment decisions 
will be made. 
 
Threat: Integrated Planning and Reporting Reform 
 
It was noted earlier that in 2006 the LGPMC called for nationally consistent financial 
sustainability frameworks and effective asset management and financial planning. 
 
The conclusions of Tan and Artist (Tan & Artist 2013, p. 14) show that this has not been 
achieved.  
 
“The national picture is one of a complex web of legislation with differing approaches, 
requirements and strength of hierarchies in terms of links between strategic (community), 
corporate and resource planning”; and 
 
“Community strategic plans set the context and priorities for corporate resourcing strategies, 
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ensuring that local governments are better able to meet community needs, expectations and 
priorities.”  
 
Given that community engagement is the dominant principle of IPR, it is surprising to note 
that three jurisdictions do not require these from their local governments. 
 
The “complex web” and “differing approaches” are set out in Table 1. 
 
Carter said, “It is therefore crucial that local government be expert in financial and asset 
management.” (Carter 2013, p. 4). 
 
There is strong evidence showing that “better strategic management” (Tan & Artist 2013) is 
not being achieved and that local government is not “expert in financial and asset 
management” (Carter 2013).  
 
This is illustrated by the 2013 New South Wales Treasury Corporation (NSW TCorp) 
independent review of the financial sustainability of the NSW local government sector (New 
South Wales Treasury Corporation, 2013).  
 
NSW TCorp (New South Wales Treasury Corporation 2013, p. 5) defined financial 
sustainability for a local government over the long-term as “when it is able to generate 
sufficient funds to provide the levels of service and infrastructure agreed with its 
community”.  
 
The NSW TCorp key findings and recommendations (New South Wales Treasury 
Corporation 2013, pp.7-9) are consistent with the overall national position. They also reflect 
the author’s professional experience and doctoral research into the wider public sector. The 
NSW TCorp findings and recommendations are summarised below. 
 
NSW TCorp Findings 
 
▪ The operating deficits of NSW councils are unsustainable. Most councils are in deficit 
with only 50 councils (33%) recording operating surpluses. The cumulative deficit for 
NSW local governments totalled $1.0 billion between 2009 and 2012. 
 
▪ The federal government pre-paid half of the 2013 Financial Assistance Grants in 
2012. Many councils accounted for these pre-payments as revenue, which resulted in 
the level of the 2012 cumulative operating deficit being understated by $181 million, 
the true operating deficit being $469 million.  
 
▪ Analysis of Long-Term Financial Plans showed that the sustainability situation is 
forecast to deteriorate for nearly half of NSW councils. Forty-six per cent (70 
councils) of all councils are in danger of being rated ‘Weak’ or lower by 2016. Figure 
3 is reproduced from the NSW TCorp Report (New South Wales Treasury 
Corporation 2013, p. 11). 
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Figure 3: NSW Local Government Financial Sustainability Ratings with Outlook 
 
▪ Councils will need to consult widely with their communities to redress current 
unsustainability or prevent further deterioration through a combination of balanced 
financial, fiscal and service level measures. 
 
▪ Breakeven operating positions are essential to stem further financial deterioration. 
TCorp estimated that this would generate sufficient funds to meet on-going asset 
maintenance and service requirements. However, this would not be sufficient to deal 
with the current infrastructure maintenance backlog of $7.2 billion. The shortfall in 
asset maintenance spending has grown by $1.6 billion since 2008. 
 
▪ Not all NSW councils have completed their initial implementation of IPR. TCorp 
noted that this should be done urgently to provide reliable information on their true 
financial positions and on-going financial demands. 
 
▪ The levels of certainty of Asset Management Plan outputs will not improve until a 
higher degree of asset management planning expertise is achieved. 
 
▪ The proportion of councils rated as ‘Weak’ and ‘Very Weak’ is higher in the regional 
areas of NSW, particularly the north coast and far west of the state where population 
density is lower than other regions. This means a lower number of ratepayers to meet 
the demand of asset maintenance and renewal. 
 
The financial sustainability of NSW Local Government continues to deteriorate 
notwithstanding that comprehensive IPR legislation has been in place since 2009.  
 
NSW TCorp Recommendations 
 
▪ Councils must achieve at least breakeven operating positions on an on-going basis. 
Sustainability is dependent upon councils becoming operationally self-sufficient to 
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halt expenditure deferral, undertake asset maintenance and renewal and deliver 
services. Surpluses should be used to deal with infrastructure backlogs. 
 
▪ All future increases in rates and council charges for services should be based on the 
underlying costs of providing those services, i.e. a zero budgeting approach. 
 
▪ Asset Management Planning must be a priority of councils to provide a reliable, 
certain and accurate picture of the status of their assets, future service demand and, 
hence, funding requirements. 
 
▪ Awareness of, and capacity in the IPR process of linking long-term strategies, asset 
management planning and long-term financial plans must be promoted, and 
developed within council elected members and at all levels of council management. 
 
WA is the last of the states to introduce IPR legislation, which it enacted in August 2011. 
 
The Department of Local Government and Communities (DLGC) developed the WA IPR 
Framework in 2010 (Department of Local Government and Communities 2010), under which 
all Councils were required to develop a suite of strategies and plans for submission to the 
DLGC by 30 June 2013. These comprise: 
 
▪ Strategic Community Plan (following community consultation); 
 
▪ Corporate Business Plan; 
 
▪ Workforce plan; 
 
▪ Long-Term Financial Plan; and for 
 
▪ Asset Management 
 
- Asset Management Policy; 
 
- Asset Management Strategy; 
 
- Asset Management Plan; and 
 
- Asset Management Improvement Plan. 
 
The DLGC allowed less than two years for councils to comply with the IPR requirements. 
 
This indicates a lack of appreciation and awareness on behalf of the WA Government of the 
enormity and complexity of IPR reform and the very considerable organisational, skills and 
cultural changes that councils would be expected to understand, embrace and implement.  
 
The level of support and training offered and provided by the state government and other 
agencies and institutions for councils to cope with and manage this change reflects that lack 
of awareness and understanding. 
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Anecdotal evidence shows that funding restrictions have limited the DLGC’s review of the 
submitted documentation to a random selection of councils, with the key performance 
indicator being the number of councils that have prepared strategies and plans, rather than 
their quality and capacity to improve financial sustainability. Nevertheless, the DLGC’s 
review of the IPR documentation of 22 (out of 140) councils has revealed serious concerns in 
data knowledge and management, staff capacity and plan integration (Daniels 2014).  
 
In particular, gaps have been identified in all essential elements of Asset Management 
(Daniels 2014), namely: non-compliance with IPR requirements; lack of cross-organisational 
responsibility; performance measurement; Asset Management Policy: Asset Management 
Strategy: data management; knowledge of asset condition and useful life; service levels; and 
operation and maintenance, renewal and replacement strategies. 
 
Although ultimately the responsibility of individual councils, the state government appears to 
have cast local government adrift on the IPR journey in favour of concentrating its efforts on 
the amalgamation of Perth metropolitan councils, believing that IPR and amalgamation are 
two separate and unrelated pieces of reform.  
 
This is likely to have negative consequences for sustainability in both the metropolitan and 
country councils. 
 
Barriers to Excellence in Asset Management 
 
This paper has sought to demonstrate the benefits of, and the real need for IPR, and Asset 
Management in particular, to support the sustainability of local government throughout 
Australia.  
 
This paper has also sought to show that the implementation of IPR has been deficient in a 
number of areas, which have resulted in the objectives of the LGPMC not being achieved and 
it not making a significant difference to-date to local government sustainability. 
 
The reasons for these failures in the context of the Asset Management Framework stem from 
as a lack of understanding and awareness on the part of the federal, state and territory 
jurisdictions that asset management is a professional discipline in its own right; the 
continuing belief in its traditional engineering place in local government; a lack of leadership 
and experience in asset management; limited research; and a lack of engagement with 
professional practitioners outside the engineering and technical spheres of expertise. 
In addition to these, the unintended effects of IPR reform can be attributed to the adoption 
and implementation of the New Public Management Paradigm turning to paradox.  
 
New Public Management Paradox 
 
It was established earlier in this paper that the development of IPR reform, or at least its 
characteristics, is linked to the concepts and principles of the New Public 
Management Paradigm.  
 
Hood and Peters (Hood & Peters 2004) support evidence that the paradigm has turned to 
paradox in that reform can result in “cultural clashes or blind spots” (Hood & Peters 2004, p. 
272), which “include paradoxes of organisational resistance to pressures for second-order 
change, variants on institutional self-reproduction paradoxes, and related ‘triumph of hope 
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over experience’ paradoxes in which learning from error is somehow suppressed.”  
 
As observed through many studies of implementation, Hood and Peters identify a tendency 
“…. for one culture’s broad vision for change to be translated into something quite different 
when it passes to another level of organisation or a different cultural environment. Cases of 
this type that relate to the ambitions of NPM include measures intended to produce broader 
strategic thinking by public servants that turn into yet another middle-level bureaucratic paper 
chase….” (Hood & Peters 2004, p. 273). This is a “two-level cultural and social paradox.” 
 
The federal, state and territory governments are largely responsible for both the IPR paradigm 
and its paradox. They saw the need for improved planning and reporting, but implementation 
shows that they had not the foresight to consider the Pandora’s box that it might be.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the Local Government IPR Asset Management Paradox. 
 
 
Figure 4: Local Government IPR Asset Management Paradox 
A two-level paradox is observed between federal and state governments (level 1) and local 
government (level 2). This is attributed to unrealistic expectations for the outcome of reform; 
ad hoc and inconsistent implementation nationally; adoption of frameworks by some states 
largely based on an assumed ‘best practice’ from other states, rather than from good research 
and learning from wider experiences; the mandating of reform with apparent insufficient 
planning and consultation with grass-roots local government in terms of how councils might 
build capacity and capability; and a lack of incentives, expert and financial support. 
 
The unintended consequences of this have been observed as: 
 
▪ Councils are not much the wiser following the implementation of reform, which 
means that capacity and capability has been difficult to build and improve; 
 
▪ A real and cynical resistance to change on behalf of councils to the imposed reform, 
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which, in some instances, has strained relations between councils and state 
government; 
 
▪ Councils have often been overwhelmed by the extent and complexity of reform, 
which has led them to be driven by box-ticking compliance rather than improving 
financial sustainability. In the case of calculating and meeting the requirements of the 
asset management financial ratios, this has resulted in an over-reliance on systems and 
an unquestioning acceptance of modelling outputs. Systems are leading reform in 
many councils in the belief that it is they that develop asset management strategy; 
 
▪ It is difficult to conclude that good value for money has been received from the 
investments made to-date in IPR reform; and, most significantly, 
 
▪ ‘Nationally consistent financial sustainability frameworks and effective asset 
management and financial planning’, the 2006 LGMPC objectives, are no closer to 
being achieved. $302 billion of public assets are still mostly not subject to effective 
asset management and strategic planning. 
Conclusion 
 
Despite calls from a number of learned individuals, institutions and organisations,    
Asset Management, the skills that it requires and its critical role in local government financial 
sustainability have not been sufficiently understood across the public sector.  
 
As a consequence, the approaches taken by state and territory governments towards the 
adoption and implementation of good practices through IPR have not met the objectives set 
by the LGMPC in 2006; nor have they appreciated the complex cultural, capacity, capability 
and organisational challenges that would be posed to local governments. 
 
The financial sustainability of local governments across the country shows a worrying trend 
of continuing deterioration and growing infrastructure renewal backlogs. The proportion of 
revenue derived from taxes is decreasing and federal and state government grants and 
subsidies are being withdrawn or reduced.  Financial self-sufficiency may prove to be ‘a 
bridge too far’ for some local governments. 
 
Developing excellence in local government asset (and financial) management within the 
framework of IPR is therefore a clear priority for the public sector.  
 
For an enduring and effective outcome, this will require all levels of government to regroup 
and jointly commit to nationally consistent frameworks under a common understanding, 
minimum standards and common principles for legislation.  
 
This should be undertaken as a national three-tier government project, perhaps under the 
direction of ACELG, with clear terms of reference, defined outcomes, milestones, progress 
and performance reviews.  
 
The project should include the involvement of industry experts, professional practitioners and 
academia. A major focus should be to build a body of knowledge in asset management, and 
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on-going learning and education programmes to improve capacity and capability throughout 
the public sector as a professional management skill. 
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4.3. Asset Management in Integrated Planning and Reporting Frameworks: some war 
stories; and 
Asset Management in Local Government: more than ever a people business, and 
business for people. 
 
The author prepared the following paper, which was presented on 17 November 2015 at the Local 
Government Financial Sustainability – Preparing for the future conference, 17 & 18 November 2015, 
Sydney Boulevard Hotel, Sydney. Conference organiser: Criterion Conferences. 
 
The paper was revised in March 2016, and presented by the author on 9 March 2016 at the Institute 
of Public Works Engineering Australasia 2016 Western Australia State Conference (9 – 11 March 
2016) held at the Esplanade Hotel, Fremantle, under the title, Asset Management in Local 
Government: more than ever a people business, and business for people. 
 
The images in the paper are extracted from the author’s visual conference presentations. 
 
Asset Management in Integrated Planning and Reporting Frameworks: 
some war stories; and 
Asset Management in Local Government: more than ever a people 
business, and business for people. 
 
Trevor Seymour-Jones 
November 2015 
Revised March 2016  
 
Abstract 
This paper has been prepared for presentation at the Local Government Financial Sustainability – 
Preparing for the future conference, 17 & 18 November 2015, Sydney Boulevard Hotel, Sydney. 
 
The reform of local government through efforts to improve its administration by the introduction of 
Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) has been a hot topic throughout Australia for over a decade. 
This reform has been driven by the ever-present threat to the financial sustainability of the sector as a 
whole.  
 
Despite local governments having an absolute dependence upon assets to manage themselves, and 
to provide services to their communities, IPR has rarely been implemented with any degree of 
effectiveness.  
 
Drawing upon the author’s doctoral research, case studies, and direct experience with the National 
Assessment Framework, this paper identifies a principal reason for this as the treatment and 
implementation of IPR and Asset Management as little more than a set of business practices, 
processes and procedures, rather than recognising how they would affect individual councils with their 
own identities and cultures, and limitations in terms of capacity and capability.  
 
This paper will also show asset management is dependent upon a wide range of skills; organisational 
and inter-government communications, relationships and collaboration; and a sound academic and 
professional base 
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Introduction 
The theme of this paper is how the management of assets affects sustainability, and what it takes for 
a local government to be Asset Management fit-for-the future. 
 
The author has specialised in the management government assets for more than ten years. He now 
concentrates on the role of assets in Local Government.  
 
Over the last 15 to 20 years, Asset Management around the world has evolved into a core 
organisational business management function. It is no longer the technical activities of engineering 
and maintenance. 
 
However, the Australian public sector is still struggling to come to terms with what asset management 
is, and how to make the leap from managing assets as operational and technical components, to 
managing them as strategic organisational resources. 
 
In 2006, the Local Government and Planning Ministers Council called for the states and territories to 
develop and adopt nationally consistent financial sustainability frameworks. Councils were to protect 
sustainability by managing infrastructure through effective asset management and financial planning. 
 
These frameworks were to improve financial and service sustainability through community 
consultation and business management processes to promote long-term corporate and financial 
planning, including the effective strategic management of assets. The call was for the adoption of a 
consistent regime by the local government sector nationwide.  
 
This is what has happened across the country. It is an important lesson from recent history. 
 
 
 
Research by the Australian Centre of Excellence in Local Government (ACELG) in 2013 described 
the outcome of this as a complex web of legislation.  
 
South Australia and the Northern Territory did not require strategic community planning; and 
Queensland dispensed with it in 2012 on the grounds that it generated too much red tape. 
 
New South Wales and Victoria introduced full Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) frameworks, 
which Western Australia belatedly followed some seven years later. 
 
Underlying Problems and Solutions 
The problems of Local Government sustainability are clear. The solutions seem to be understood. But 
the more things change, the more they stay the same. Why? 
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Two solutions have generally been offered by state governments: IPR for all councils, and 
amalgamations for some.  
 
Much of the answer lies in not having the capacity and capability to plan and implement the solutions. 
The theme of this conference would therefore seem vital to addressing this. 
 
Some of the author’s observed characteristics of local governments are that they rarely intellectualise 
what they do, and why they do it; they rarely co-operate in learning, and solving common problems; 
and, perhaps most importantly, they often fail to provide leadership and generate a culture of ‘serving 
their communities’. 
 
Too little effort is applied to thinking about the business of local government, and how to improve it 
beyond the incremental tweaking of methods and service. Insufficient attention is given to the larger 
threats and dangers outside the normal working environment. 
 
Generally, all local government problems and issues are common; yet it is rare for councils to co-
operate, share knowledge, information, experiences, procedures and systems, and assets. 
 
Many would say that what they do, and the services they provide are for the benefit and betterment of 
their communities. But, is this really the case? 
 
Does local government really have the political, moral, and business leadership and culture to make a 
difference? 
 
The author contends that the management of public assets falls short in all these areas, which is why 
IPR has so far failed to improve the prospects of local government sustainability, and in some cases, 
survivability, across the country. 
 
This sustained failure represents a breach of contract that all levels of the public sector implicitly has 
with the community. 
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Managing Assets and Integrated Planning and Reporting: lessons from the last ten years 
Central to these questions is the management of assets.  
 
Assets are strategic organisational resources. In local government, communities depend upon them 
for all aspects of life. Their management shapes the social, environmental, physical and financial 
fabric of our communities.  
 
Even though land, buildings and infrastructure represent more than ninety per cent of local 
government’s fixed asset value, they seem to be taken for granted, and treated as a free good. 
 
There can be no doubt that the continuing threats to financial sustainability and, in some cases, 
survivability, are in a large part due to poor asset-related decisions, and the continuing tactical and 
operational approach to their management. 
 
Poor asset management has a domino effect throughout local government. It leads to poor 
information, which leads to poor investment decisions, which lead to poor allocation of capital, high 
operating costs, and maintenance backlogs, which lead to financial instability, which leads to fewer 
public services of a lesser quality, which leads to the degradation of the environment, public buildings, 
amenity, and infrastructure, economic prosperity and, hence, community.  
 
 
 
Revitalising local government will be a long and complex task, and it is imperative that we learn from 
the lessons of the last ten years. 
 
The first lesson is a lack of appreciation for the task and its implementation complexity by the federal 
and state governments, which have generally offered two solutions: IPR for all councils, and 
amalgamations for some.  
 
IPR is tested world’s leading practice, but the jury is still out on amalgamations.  
 
However, to successfully amalgamate two or more communities will require the councils to be expert 
at financial and asset management. This expertise is not represented by asset ratios that ‘tick the 
box’. 
 
The merging of systems, business architecture, processes and procedures and asset portfolios to 
provide services to the new single community will be a gargantuan effort.  
 
Asset knowledge in terms of value, cost-in-use, condition, use, utilisation, and performance is 
indispensable. Those that have this will have an influential position in the amalgamation process. 
 
Without this expertise, any economic and financial benefits will be limited, which is why the 
amalgamation jury is still out. 
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However, so far, the implementation of both aspects of reform has been far from a leading practice in 
change management.  
 
The figure above shows the diagrammatic representations used by the New South Wales and 
Western Australia State Governments to depict their IPR frameworks. Both understate the position 
and importance of assets. The perception is that the management of assets occupies almost a 
secondary position in the IPR hierarchy. However, Western Australia shows stronger links with 
strategic and operational planning. 
 
There appears to have been an expectation by federal and state governments that local governments 
will simply accept what has been imposed over them, and somehow source the capacity and 
capability to implement the reforms, which, themselves have a ‘one size fits all’ look about them, and 
show minimal regard for the individuality of councils, their identity, culture, size, type and location.  
 
Because of this, cultural and social gaps have opened between state and local governments. These 
have often led to mistrust between the two. 
 
The second lesson, therefore, is the lack of ongoing commitment, resources and expertise on behalf 
of state governments to support and continue reform beyond a short-term policy initiative. 
 
Thirdly, very little is known about the public sector asset base. We have poor data, poor information, 
an over-reliance on systems and modeling outputs, and a fascination with asset ratios as 
performance measures.  
 
There is strong evidence in Western Australia that this over-reliance on systems and the readiness to 
accept the outputs from modeling exercises produces misleading asset ratios, which are the only 
prescribed asset management performance indicators. 
 
Simply, not enough is known about local government assets, or how they are performing operationally 
and strategically. 
 
Fourthly, there is reluctance for councils, particularly in regional areas, to consult, communicate, and 
collaborate between themselves. Many opportunities for sharing, and improved efficiency are missed. 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there is a dearth of Asset Management capacity and capability. 
This is largely because Asset Management is not seen by the public sector as a mainstream 
professional activity.  
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There is a strong case for academia to take a proactive role to develop this in conjunction with the 
public sector, professional institutions, state Local Government Associations, Local Government 
Professionals Australia, and professional practitioners. 
 
Lack of Leadership from Federal and State Governments 
The author’s research into the management of assets by the federal and state governments shows 
that the adoption of good IPR practice in local government is not helped by how few of these 
governments have effectively implemented good management practices over their own finances and 
assets.  
 
Western Australia lost its AAA credit rating on the back of poor financial and asset management, a 
consequence that the author identified to the government some 18 months before the event, as a 
potential danger, on the back of the size of its maintenance backlog (see below). 
 
The following is an analysis of the Western Australia Government’s position relating to its property 
assets in 2011/12. 
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA GOVERNMENT PROPERTY ASSETS 
 
Current Replacement Cost: $25 billion 
 
§ $12,500 per WA capita 
§ 13% Gross State Product (GSP) 
§ 23% Non-Financial Public Sector Net Asset Value (NAV) 
 
Annual Maintenance Costs: $300 million 
 
§ $136 per WA capita 
§ 0.15% GSP 
§ 1.2% Current Replacement Cost (CRC) 
 
Maintenance Backlog: $1.2 billion 
 
§ $600 per WA capita 
§ 1% GSP 
§ 5% CRC 
§ 1.2% NAV (NFPS) 
 
These metrics tell the story of poor asset condition, consumption, and sustainability of the state’s 
property portfolio: 
 
§ Commitment to maintenance at 1.2% of replacement cost is far too low; 
§ The maintenance backlog at 5% of replacement cost reflects this, and should be particularly 
concerning; and 
§ At the time these figures were prepared, backlog was estimated to be increasing by some 
$110 million pa. 
 
A wider analysis of the metrics shows the significance of the impact of asset management on the 
state’s financial position as a whole, with the backlog being equivalent to 1% of GSP, and more than 
1% of the state’s non-financial net asset value. 
 
It should be remembered that these figures only relate to property: buildings, bricks and mortar, police 
and fire stations, offices, hospitals and schools. 
 
(Post conference note: At the Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia 2016 Western 
Australia State Conference (9 – 11 March 2016), the Minister for Local Government and 
Communities, Hon. Tony Simpson MLA, announced that the value of the maintenance backlog for all 
asset classes in the Western Australia Local Government sector was estimated at $1.8 billion. This is 
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equivalent to 4.5 per cent of local government’s non-financial asset value; 0.73 per cent of the 
Western Australia 2014/15 Gross State Product; and $692 per capita of the state’s population. 
 
This means that the Western Australia public sector has an aggregated asset maintenance backlog of 
at least $3 billion (and growing). For the State Government, this only includes real property assets in 
the general government sector. State infrastructure and other asset classes, and the assets of Public 
Trading Enterprises have not been estimated). 
 
The risk profile would be interesting. It is often not understood that maintenance is a risk management 
function. 
 
However, there are some signs that the lessons may have at least been recognised by the New South 
Wales Government. 
 
Local Government Revitalisation: the role of Asset Management 
The author’s research shows clear evidence that councils in New South Wales have made little 
progress in implementing IPR since its introduction in 2009. This is based, in the main, on: 
 
§ The NSW Treasury Corporation’s (NSW TCorp) 2013 report on the financial sustainability of 
the state’s local government sector; 
 
§ The 2013 report of the Independent Local Government Review Panel, which made far-
reaching and leading practice recommendations for the revitalisation of local government in 
New South Wales, many of which concerned the proper implementation of IPR and 
management of assets within the IPR framework; and 
 
§ The report in 2015 of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) on each 
council’s ‘fitness for the future’. 
 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of any of the conclusions and recommendations of these reports, the 
real test will be how they are implemented as long-term integrated projects. Great care and attention 
must be given to the implementation process, which must be expected to continue well into the next 
decade.  
 
The objective must be to ingrain the principles of good management across both state and local 
government. 
 
It must be enthusiastically sponsored and managed at the very highest level of government. It will 
require sustained political will and administrative effort and support across at least two electoral 
cycles. 
 
It will also require strong policy and governance; a wide range of professional know-how; and a 
judicious allocation of financial commitment towards capacity and capability building, for both the local 
and state government sectors. 
 
Good asset management is vital and core to all aspects of the revitalisation of local government 
across Australia.  
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Asset Management is here to stay as a strategic business function. Not considering it as such is a 
fundamental business and governance error.  
 
Asset Management shapes the future by linking current and future asset requirements with business 
needs; it supports services through appropriate asset deployment and efficient utilisation; it 
challenges the status quo by questioning services levels and models, and methods of delivery; it 
projects long-term investment needs; it is central to the identification and mitigation of all categories of 
strategic risk (financial, business, service, legal, physical, environmental and political); it contributes to 
organisational performance, and provides information for good decision-making; it serves internal and 
external clients, and requires open and formal communication and reporting across the organisation; 
and it deals with all categories of fixed assets, such as land, buildings, infrastructure, plant and 
machinery, and information and communication technology.  
 
The executive responsible for Asset Management must know the business; be a strong leader; 
understand the technical and operational aspects of managing assets; be able to interpret economic 
indicators; and be skilled in data and information management, strategic planning, and performance 
and financial management.  
 
He should have authority and accountability, and a seat at management’s top table. 
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Asset Management has its own framework.  
 
It is a framework within the IPR framework, which requires a greater effort to get to grips with than the 
IPR concept as a whole. 
 
Firstly, governance.  
 
There must be a formal policy that commits the organisation to leading practice; recognises its 
strategic position; assigns roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities; and commits to ongoing 
evaluation and improvement. 
 
Asset Management Strategy is often confused with Asset Management Plans. 
 
The strategy is a high-level description of the direction the asset portfolio will take over the long-term, 
ten years. It should be no longer than say, 15 to 20 pages. 
 
It is the why, how, where and when of moving from the current state to the future state. It is 
inextricably linked with the Strategic Community Plan, Corporate Business Plan, and Long-Term 
Financial Plan. 
 
The strategy should at least: 
 
§ Contain a description of the strategy’s purpose and expectations; 
 
§ Refer to organisational goals, objectives, business drivers, and financial context; 
 
§ Describe the current portfolio; 
 
§ Identify critical assets, and what assets and organisational resources will be needed over the 
next ten years; 
 
§ Show the gap between the current and future state; and the implications for the portfolio; 
 
§ Define critical success factors of the strategy, and how they will be measured; 
 
§ Define the required governance and management arrangements; and 
 
§ Contain an action plan. 
 
Asset Management Plans should enable good decision-making by translating strategy into 
implementation activity. They will contain asset reviews, asset programmes, business cases, and 
financial needs.  
 
Plans for individual assets will cover the shorter-term tactical and operational delivery of assets and 
asset services. 
 
Here are some numbers that show why there are threats to local government financial sustainability. 
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In 2014 the author presented a paper outlining the case for excellence in asset management at the 
ACELG research forum. 
  
Research for ACELG by Mervyn Carter cited figures provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
which showed that the national value of local government fixed assets in 2009/10 was over $300 
billion. This represents approximately one third of the value of the total public sector fixed assets. 
 
Investment in infrastructure was shown at about $10 billion per annum. 
 
Because of the lack of asset data across the local government sector, the fixed asset value is likely to 
be severely understated. Although no doubt quality of data will improve with more rigorous valuation 
and accounting standards, there is strong evidence that these values will remain suspect for some 
time yet. 
 
Quite simply, councils do not know enough about their assets. Inventories are often incomplete and 
inaccurate; and data is often inappropriate and not kept at all levels and categories of an asset 
hierarchy, or in sufficient detail. A minimal number of councils have asset consumption, sustainability, 
and renewal funding ratios that have been calculated on good and reliable data. 
 
The author’s research and experience shows that all tiers of government have: 
 
§ Incomplete and inaccurate inventories; 
 
§ Poor asset data, not least of which relates to asset condition; 
 
§ Inaccurate financial information on their assets, including open market values, written down 
values, replacement and maintenance costs; and 
 
§ Depreciated values that do not reflect asset condition, lifecycles, and major asset 
components. 
 
(In 2010, the author consulted to one major Sydney metropolitan council that did not have a basic 
inventory of assets. Unsurprisingly, it was trying to sell a piece of land that it did not own. It is noted 
that the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal’s (IPART) report has rated 
this particular council, which has been identified as part of a proposed major metropolitan 
amalgamation, as ‘not fit’ by reason of its scale and capacity. But, it was rated ‘fit’ in the area of 
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infrastructure and service management. This apparent anomaly is considered in the following 
section).  
 
The maintenance issue is having a significant impact on revenue. Through extrapolation and a 
number of ‘educated’ assumptions, the author estimates that maintenance costs in 2011/12 may have 
accounted for about 45 per cent of local government tax revenue.  
 
If the level of investment in assets continues, this could increase to 100 per cent by 2017/18.  
Because there is insufficient information on the asset base, it is difficult to appreciate the full extent of 
the problem. However, one thing is certain; it is a ticking sustainability time bomb that must be 
defused very quickly. 
 
 
 
IPART concluded that “the system of local government in New South Wales is broken”.  
 
The author has examined the IPART report, particularly its assessment of how assets are managed, 
and how that relates to scale and capacity.  
 
This is of interest because, in Western Australia, there is a direct relationship between scale and 
capacity and the asset financial ratios. As might be expected, lower capacity ratings result in ratios 
that either do not meet the performance criteria for asset replacement and sustainability, or they 
provide distorted and questionable results. Additionally, councils in Western Australia are relying on 
the ratios as the sole indicators of performance, without looking at how assets are performing in terms 
of affecting service provision, cost-in-use, utilisation, adequacy, functionality, location, and so on. 
These are the true indicators of performance, which, if managed properly will result in healthy 
financial ratios. 
 
On the face of IPART’s report, 93 per cent of all New South Wales councils are “fit” in relation to the 
management of infrastructure and services. They have either satisfied the ratio criteria, or have 
shown that they have improvement plans to meet them. 
 
However, nearly half were deemed “not fit” because they lack sufficient “strategic capacity” in the 
following areas: 
 
§ The ability to undertake new functions & major projects; 
 
§ The ability to employ skilled staff; 
 
§ Sufficient knowledge, creativity, and ability to innovate; 
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§ Advanced strategic planning & policy development skills; 
 
§ Effective regional collaboration; 
 
§ Resources to cope with change; and 
 
§ Political & managerial leadership. 
 
This does not seem to be consistent with the New South Wales Treasury Corporation and other 
reports that have identified a lack of asset and financial management expertise, i.e. strategic capacity, 
as a cause of ongoing deterioration of local government sustainability. 
 
Councils, particularly those in amalgamation situations, should be encouraged to take a long look at 
their asset management capacity, and consider wider performance criteria for their assets. 
 
On a related issue, there is also evidence of many councils believing that, having an asset 
management software system with a modeling capability, provides answers to all their asset 
management issues. Without applying asset management expertise and experience in the use of 
these systems, their outputs can produce some very dangerous outcomes. 
 
The following are examples of the author’s experience to illustrate some of the foregoing. 
All councils in Western Australia were required to submit IPR strategies and plans to the state 
government’s Department of Local Government and Communities by 30 June 2013, demonstrating 
compliance with minimum core standards. 
 
The author assisted Council 1 to establish its Asset Management Framework under the government’s 
IPR requirements.  
 
 
 
The ten-year Renewal and Replacement Demand was calculated as $240.3m.  
 
This was done: 
 
§ On a hastily-built asset inventory consolidated from six unrelated spreadsheets; 
 
§ Cursory visual inspections of assets to determine condition; 
 
§ An arbitrary condition rating system; and 
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§ And back-of-the-envelope Current Replacement Cost calculations. 
 
In the absence of any renewal and replacement projections, Planned Renewal & Replacement 
Expenditure was extrapolated from a five-year maintenance plan, with the second five years simply 
being a repeat of the current year’s projected maintenance expenditure.  
 
This gave a projected expenditure of $77.1m 
 
Overlaying one with the other, an annual Renewal and Replacement Gap was prepared, which, when 
totaled, showed that the council required an additional $163.2m to fund the renewal and replacement 
of its asset base. 
 
Without questioning the validity of this, the entire amount of $163.2m was adopted by council in its 
Long-Term Financial Plan as required funding.  
 
Council 2 had reasonably good data and a working knowledge of its asset base in relation to service 
demand. 
 
 
 
Having initially calculated the renewal and replacement gap at $2.3 million, potential asset strategies 
were considered that would reduce the gap by 42%.  
 
The following table is a comparison of the asset management capacity and capability of the two 
councils.  
 
Council 1 had virtually no capacity and capability, including none of the strategic capacity criteria used 
by IPART. Council 2 was on the right path, and had a strategic direction. 
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The two councils’ ratios: 
 
 
 
Council 1’s ratios held little meaning because of the lack of quality data, and capacity and capability to 
strategise and plan the management of its assets. 
 
Council 2’s ratios conform to the prescribed basic standard. 
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The above table is an extract from the service levels matrix of a council that the author provided asset 
management advice to in 2015.  
 
This council was reasonably mature in community strategy and corporate business planning, but less 
so in asset management. 
 
It had constructed a matrix of service levels in relation to its strategic goals and desired outcomes. 
This was done to some level of detail, but it initially gave no consideration to the potential impact on 
assets, either current or future needs. 
 
A workshop was conducted with council, which added a column to the matrix linking assets to 
services.  
 
This formed a major element in the development of strategy, planning, and performance criteria. 
 
So, how can councils find out how they’re progressing, and whether they have reached core standard 
in asset management? 
 
The National Assessment Framework (NAF) is the only official tool available to local governments in 
Australia to assess how they are progressing towards a ‘core’ or ‘advanced’ standard of asset 
management maturity. This is a self-assessment model, which was developed on behalf of the 
LGPMC by the Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia (IPWEA) in association with ACELG. 
It was launched in mid-2012. 
 
The model is an online questionnaire to evaluate progress with implementing the elements of the 
LGPMC Financial Sustainability Frameworks. The outputs of the questionnaire are intended to enable 
a local council to measure its progress against the Sustainability Frameworks. The intended outcome 
was “for Federal, State and Territory Governments to see aggregated information on current status 
and trends with implementing the key elements of the LGPMC Financial Sustainability Frameworks”. 
 
The NAF model bears a striking similarity to the framework developed for the UK government in 
2006/07 for departments and agencies to self-assess their asset management capacity and 
capability.  
 
The UK model has nine elements, the maturity levels for which are: 
 
§ Excellence; 
 
§ Competence; 
 
§ Knowledge; 
 
§ Awareness; and  
 
§ Unawareness. 
 
Each of these is provided with simple and easy-to-understand performance descriptors. 
 
The UK model originally contained about 90 questions, which was soon reduced to 35. 
 
It should be pointed out that the UK government treats asset management as a mainstream public 
administration profession, which is governed and managed through the Office of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet. Annual performance is formally reported to parliament.  
 
NAF is not quite as friendly as its UK cousin. It comprises 72 questions to assess core standard, and 
a further 69 for advanced standard, across 11 elements. 
 
The language is technical, and has an academic flavour. 
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Even as a supposed expert, the author has found it complex and demanding. Councils are certainly 
intimidated by it, and find it difficult to understand and interpret without expert help. 
 
On average, it takes the author 2.5 days to guide a council through a NAF assessment. 
 
This demonstrates that expert professional practical advice and support, that reflect individual council 
circumstances, must be provided to local government as part of any revitalisation or reform 
programme. 
 
The Department of Local Government and Communities in Western Australia has established a panel 
of consultants, of which the author is a member, to undertake these assessments for Country Local 
Governments. These assessments are funded by the state government. The following is a 
consolidated graph of the councils in Western Australia assessed by the author, either as a member 
of the panel or through individual council appointments. 
 
 
 
All fall well below core standard in the essential asset management elements of capacity and 
capability, data, service levels, governance, policy, strategy, and plans. Very few measure their 
performance. 
 
The Western Australia state average is included on the graph. This information has been obtained 
from the ACELG NAF portal. 
 
The author is not aware of any other local government jurisdiction having participated in this self-
assessment. 
 
This paper has emphasised the importance of asset data, and its translation into meaningful 
information. 
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Simple data is certainly “squat”. It is the conversion of data into information that creates value.  
 
This requires strategic capacity. 
 
The above is a suggested list of the essential elements of data that are relevant for council assets.  
 
It is most important that all data is accurate, complete, and well maintained and managed. 
 
Whichever system is selected to store and manage data, it must be capable of being linked with the 
financial asset register. 
 
The following is a summary of the essentials that councils need to make their asset management ‘fit 
for the future’: 
 
§ Assets must be managed as whole-of-organisation strategic resources, which must be linked 
to financial management and service delivery; 
 
§ Councils must source the right capacity and capability. Not doing so is a false economy; 
 
§ Councils should use the IPR principles to create a framework that suits their individual 
circumstances. This should include: 
 
- Policy and governance arrangements that are formally adopted by council; 
- An Asset Management Strategy and Asset Management Plan that are also formally 
adopted by council; and 
- Shorter-term operational plans for individual assets. 
 
§ Nothing can be achieved without good, full, and accurate asset data; and an appropriate 
system to store and manage it; and 
 
§ There must be systems, processes and procedures to measure and evaluate the 
performance of assets and their management. 
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Much of this will be beyond the economic reach of many, particularly small regional councils. 
 
Administrative boundaries are merely marked by a sign. There are no physical boundaries; the roads 
continue; the landscape doesn’t change; and the air is still the same.  
 
All councils deliver the same services with the same types of assets.  
 
Individual survivability may well depend on inter-council collaboration, and sharing in asset ownership, 
common management systems and programmes, and service delivery models. 
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4.4. Has Integrated Planning and Reporting Encouraged Poor Asset Management 
Practices? A Practitioner’s Perspective for Good Practice 
 
The following is the text of the speech and visual aids of the presentation given by the author on 29 
June 2016 at the Local Government Asset Management – Improving asset strategy, planning and 
maintenance conference, 29 & 30 June 2016, Radisson Blu Plaza Hotel, Sydney. Conference 
organiser: Criterion Conferences. 
Has Integrated Planning and Reporting Encouraged Poor Asset Management 
Practices? 
A Practitioner’s Perspective for Good Practice 
 
I have been researching the management of public sector assets for over five years, and think this is 
a fair question to ask.  
Superficially, the answer is fairly simple, but getting there reveals a number of things that need to be 
addressed with some priority. 
I shall look at why so little progress has been made in developing systems of management; and 
suggest an approach to ‘good’ asset management practice.  
I stress systems of management because this is the area that is holding everything back. There is 
little wrong with local government’s technical and engineering capabilities. They simply need to be 
given direction. 
 
Albert Einstein said: 
“In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.” And, 
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“The measure of intelligence is the ability to change.”  
He also defined insanity as, “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different 
results.” 
Local Government is in a world of difficulty. For New South Wales and Western Australia, I think that 
the amalgamation debate, with its singular focus on financial efficiencies and fitness ratings, has 
distracted attention from some very pressing management issues. 
These are issues presenting a once-in-a-generation opportunity to change for the good.  
However, the opportunities are not widely recognised, or grasped. In addition, there is little evidence 
of ability to change, or a desire to look at doing things differently. 
The difficulties that local government faces come from a changing world, which means most are out of 
its control. This means it has to adapt, and change the way it does things.  
Councils have to be sharper and smarter, and more agile if they are to retain their independence and 
culture, and provide a future for their communities. 
The alternative is a threat to survivability, not just sustainability. 
The difficulties are financial, economic, social, political, and also relate to governance. 
§ Financial: 
- Achieving balanced operating positions in the face of declining recurrent revenues in 
real terms;  
- The decreased access to federal and state funding: and  
- The realisation that assets have to be funded over the whole of their life. Hence, the 
growing backlogs in the maintenance, renewal, and replacement of assets. 
Assets are becoming liabilities. 
§ The economic realities of our time.  
The national economy is experiencing major structural changes.  
Local governments must look beyond their boundaries, and consider external influences, e.g. 
the value of the dollar, price of iron ore, decline in manufacturing, the future of agriculture and 
our traditional primary industries, climate change, Brexit, China, federal, state and regional 
planning, and so on. 
§ The social aspect relates to local government’s relationships with their communities. 
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Across the developed world, it is becoming increasingly important to do more than just consult 
and hold satisfaction surveys. Councils must involve, inform, communicate, and inter-act with 
their communities, and include them as partners who share the accountability. To achieve 
this, councils must be open and transparent in providing information and advice to 
communities. 
§ The political issue of the day is amalgamations. I shall not going to go into the wisdom or 
otherwise of this policy, but the debate does highlight things that individual councils and 
groups of councils need to address for themselves. 
However, there is one thought that I would like to share with you. 
The leading article of the UK’s Spectator magazine on 18 June 2016 about Brexit said, 
“Alliances work when they are between nations with a shared agenda, with the ability and 
(crucially) the will to act.” 
Substitute the word ‘nations’ with ‘councils’…… 
§ By governance, I mean providing and managing services in accordance with a governance 
hierarchy, and decision-making protocols.  
This takes strong leadership and the ability for elected members to change in their outlook. 
IPR and Asset Management are opportunities to change for the good, and get the different results, by 
not “doing the same thing over and over again”. 
They are the leading practice, developed in UK Local Government in the 1990s, to protect 
sustainability. 
Asset Management is the biggest and perhaps the most important part of IPR. But not in the 
traditional way of thinking as things to be built and maintained. 
Assets are economic and business ‘resources’; but are often not recognised and managed as such. 
When they are, opportunities are presented to question the status quo, and look for different and 
better ways of doing things. 
Change in understanding assets, and their place as organisational resources is essential to the future 
of ALL councils. 
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I spoke at my first public sector asset management conference in 2004. The themes have barely 
changed.  
They have always been important, crucial, and key. They still are. 
In 2006, the Local Government and Planning Minister’s Council called for the development of 
“nationally consistent financial sustainability frameworks” to be adopted for local government. 
The idea was to protect sustainability by managing infrastructure through effective asset management 
and financial planning. 
All of this was to be based on community consultation. 
The federal and state governments did not deliver these ‘nationally consistent frameworks’.  
What we’ve ended up with is a hodgepodge of legislation, some of which does not require contact 
with communities. 
During the early 2000s, the Australian National Audit Office published a series of scathing audit 
reports about the Commonwealth’s management of its assets.  
The New South Wales Audit Office has published similar audits over the management of the state’s 
Total Asset Management Policy. 
So, for the States to oversee IPR in Local Government has been a case of the blind leading the blind. 
It still is according to the Schott Report of the NSW Commission of Audit into the management of the 
New South Wales public sector (2012), the reports of the NSW Property Asset Utilisation Taskforce 
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(2012), and Independent Local Government Review Panel (IPART) (2013), and what the Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (2015) has had to say. 
I wanted to know why so little progress has been made in ten years when all the evidence has been 
before us for so long. 
 
These are the systems of IPR currently in place in the New South Wales and Western Australia Local 
Government sectors. 
Their similarity is mostly because Western Australia effectively copied New South Wales. But New 
South Wales actually refers to ‘Resourcing Strategy’! 
They are both one part of two-part reforms: IPR and council amalgamations. 
The government lost the amalgamation debate in Western Australia amid much controversy and ill-
feeling. 
This cost it a great deal of political capital, and soured relationships throughout the local government 
community. 
The same is happening here (New South Wales).  
Both states struggle with building capacity and capability in IPR and asset management. 
Both are also required to undertake major reviews of their strategies and plans - this year for Western 
Australia; next year for New South Wales. 
New South Wales has had the IPART intervention. Similar to this, the Western Australia Department 
of Local Government and Communities (WADLGC) has recently opened a MyCouncil website, which 
effectively creates a league table of the financial health of councils.  
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This is already proving to be unpopular, misleading and divisive.  
In response to the potential to ‘misinterpret’ the information in MyCouncil, the Western Australian 
Local Government Association has launched ‘know your council.com’, which “gives clarity on 
residential rates”. 
And so, punches continue to be traded in Western Australia. 
 
I would like to introduce you to a friend of mine. Sun Tzu. 
Despite living about 2,500 years ago, he would be a management guru today, but without the 
annoying jargon. 
These three propositions are the very essence of IPR, and the principles of Asset Management.  
They are logical and uncomplicated. 
In the local government context, without a community vision or objective, and without knowing and 
understanding the factors that might influence its achievement, it is not possible to develop a proper 
and well laid out community strategy. 
Without such a strategy, it is not possible to determine a future direction for the community. 
Without this direction, services, how they are delivered, and to what level cannot be defined. 
If these are not defined, how does one know what combinations of resources are required – land, 
infrastructure, buildings, spaces and places, people, technology, and capital? 
And what will they cost over the period of their useful lives?  
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Without knowing this, and without knowing what we have got, how can we develop strategies and 
plans to co-ordinate, allocate, and manage resources? 
Please take a moment to consider your own councils. 
Do you have a long-term strategy that truly projects the vision for the future of your community?  
Does it actually consider internal and external influences, explain the assumptions, consider risks, 
and say how its success will be measured and reported? 
Is it supported by good resources frameworks to achieve the vision that are fully integrated with your 
corporate planning and reporting regimes? 
Or, can you hear an ever-increasing volume of noise? 
 
My answer to the question of whether IPR is to blame for the poor asset management practices, 
which are widespread from one side of the country to another, is that it is not simply because of IPR, 
but because of the way it has been implemented.  
IPR is not difficult. It follows Sun Tzu. The principles are logical and uncomplicated. 
However, I think it has become too bound-up with a need to be seen to be complying with some sort 
of unnecessarily complicated ‘best’ practice or standard.  
Similar to not having the latest smart phone. 
New South Wales has had a review and reporting merry-go-round into Local Government in recent 
years: 
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§ The Treasury Corporation Report, and the Independent Local Government Review Panel in 
2013; and 
§ IPART last year and this year. 
§ Also, throw in reports commissioned by the government from the private sector. 
Whatever one may think of them, I do not believe that there can be smoke without some fire.  
All expose defects in the management of assets, and stress the importance of their management as a 
critical strategic function.  
IPART concluded that “the system of local government in NSW is broken.”  
It may well be. 
The conclusion was based on two criteria: Scale and Capacity; and Financial Ratios to determine 
whether a council is ‘fit’ or ‘not fit’ for the future. 
Much of IPART’s assessment relates to amalgamations, which I believe to be a bit of a sideshow as 
far as long-term sustainability is concerned. Juries around the world are still out. There is simply not 
enough evidence to suggest that big is beautiful. 
IPART says that 48 per cent of New South Wales councils are ‘not fit’ by reason of insufficient 
Strategic Capacity. 
If this is so, nearly half of New South Wales councils: 
§ Are incapable of undertaking new functions and major projects; 
§ Do not have the ability to employ skilled staff; 
§ Have insufficient knowledge to be creative and to innovate; 
§ Cannot plan strategically, and develop policy; 
§ Cannot collaborate effectively with their neighbours; 
§ Cannot cope with change; and 
§ Lack political and managerial leadership. 
In fact, these issues are actually the root of poor asset management practices.  
However, I fail to understand how a mere 7 per cent of councils are ‘unfit’ because of poor 
infrastructure and service management (asset management), which is largely judged on questionable 
financial data. 
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If nearly half of councils lack this strategic capacity, how can 93 per cent be managing their assets 
properly? 
And how can they look to improve their asset management capacity and capability? 
This is misleading, and will have lulled many councils into a false sense of asset management 
security. 
Good IPR frameworks, and Asset Management capacity and capability are the real pathways to a 
well-managed and financially healthy council. With this, the ratios will look after themselves. 
Nevertheless, they are merely indicators of how much is being spent or not spent on assets. And they 
are easy to manipulate. They do not indicate whether or not good practices are being followed, how 
assets are performing, whether the right assets are in place, or whether assets are performing in 
support of service levels. 
This is all to do with strategic capacity and capability, which is, without doubt, within the reach of 
every council.  
All it needs is the right leadership and support. 
 
I would like to talk about the National Assessment Framework (NAF).  
The Western Australia Government knows that its local government sector has a real problem with 
IPR and Asset Management. 
What it doesn’t know, and never has known, is how to equip councils with the right capacity and 
capability.  
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Its approach has been fundamentality flawed in that it seemed to expect that it would just happen 
from a set of guidelines, and after a few master classes and workshops. 
The same applies to New South Wales. 
Councils in Western Australia had to show compliance with IPR requirements by 30 June 2013. Most 
did just enough to tick the boxes. 
Most have done very little about managing their assets since then. 
Over the last year or so, the WADLGC has funded a panel of specialist asset management 
consultants to assist 74 country local governments to self-assess their asset management maturity 
under the NAF assessment model. 
My firm is a member of this panel. 
I have assessed over 20 councils either through the panel, or by direct appointment. 
The NAF model is complex and demanding, and can take several days to properly complete an 
assessment.  
Also, it cannot be carried out unless the assessor is expert in IPR and Strategic Asset Management. 
Self-assessment is therefore beyond most councils. 
That said, I have grown to quite like NAF. It covers all the right things, asks all the right questions, and 
forces one to think about the management of a council as a whole. 
It provides an accurate baseline, and a firm basis for improvement. 
This chart shows that not one council in Western Australia is anywhere near to core standard in any 
of the elements.  
I have consolidated the ratings of my NAF and other assessments into the NAF scoring model.  
The green line is the Western Australia average obtained from the Australian Centre of Excellence for 
Local Government NAF portal. 
There is a long way to go, particularly in the areas of data, levels of service, governance, strategy and 
planning. 
This low level of asset management is one of the causes of the persistent budgetary and financial 
pressures, which threaten the future of many councils. 
Here is an example of the impact of where there is no system for managing assets.  
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The Pilbara region in WA is suffering from the legacy of poor asset-related decisions made during the 
mining investment boom. 
Port Hedland is the port through which much of the country’s iron ore is shipped.  
It still has an asset renewal/replacement backlog of $163 million, which I estimated for it four years 
ago. 
This is now compounded by a further $2.2 million annual funding gap directly related to just four 
assets, which were gifted to the Town in recent years. 
To paraphrase another classical character, the ancient Roman poet Virgil in The Aeneid, when he 
wrote about the Greeks at Troy, “I fear the mining companies, federal assistance grants, and royalties 
for regions, even those bearing gifts.” 
The Western Australia Minister for Local Government and Communities recently announced that the 
local government sector has an infrastructure backlog of about $1.8 billion. 
By my calculations, this equates to: 
§ 4.5 per cent of local government’s non-financial asset value; 
§ The best part of 1 per cent of WA’s Gross State Product; and 
§ Over $690 for each Western Australian. 
I spoke at the Institute of Public Works Engineers Australasia Western Australia state conference in 
March. 
 
104 
 
 
One of my fellow speakers received a lengthy email blaming engineers for the failings of IPR. I’ll read 
a few excerpts. 
“You are going to need to change the culture of the engineer.  
“Decision-makers are afraid to make decisions and implement change because they are afraid of 
screwing up. 
“Decision-makers no longer feel empowered to make change because of job insecurity.  
“99 per cent of all engineers that I have met are risk averse by their very own personal nature”.  
Lack of courage and fear for one’s job? Maybe, but not exclusive to engineers! 
Besides, this is not an issue for engineers. It is a corporate management issue. 
It is a legislated management standard for Elected Members and Chief Executives.  
This gives the empowerment! 
Ignoring it, or being afraid, is not an option. Doing so will bring costly consequences. Look at Port 
Hedland. 
But, it does raise three important things, culture, leadership, and change, which I prefer to associate 
with ‘improvement’. 
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These are the real reasons for so little good practice across Local Government in Australia. 
They stem from a “clash of cultures” caused by a lack of: 
§ Understanding 
§ Experience 
§ Capacity & Capability 
§ Knowledge 
§ Communication 
§ Co-operation & Collaboration. 
Please indulge my academic side for a moment to explain this cultural thing. 
In the 1980s and 1990s public sectors across the world sought to improve efficiency and 
accountability by adopting private sector-like approaches.  
The concept was that ideas used in the private sector must work in the public sector. 
This became known as the New Public Management Paradigm. 
IPR bears all the hallmarks of this. 
It has been shown that the paradigm has turned to paradox across all public sectors. 
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Eminent researchers have found that the broad vision of one culture translated into something quite 
different when passed down to another cultural environment. 
 
In the case of our IPR, this can be traced to a lack of understanding and poor implementation of 
ideas, stemming from a lack of communication and unrealistic expectations. 
IPR has the classic symptoms of the unintended consequences. 
I’ve listed some of them here. You might recognise them. 
The management of about $350 billion of the nation’s local government assets is mostly still not 
subject to effective governance, nor driven by community and corporate strategy. 
So, it is the NPM paradox that is to blame, not the engineers! 
This is what should have been communicated about a New Asset Management Paradigm. 
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§ Asset Management is not engineering or maintenance. These are activity-based sub-sets, 
which are given their direction by asset strategy. 
§ Asset Management is to do with integrating the planning and management of resources with 
community strategies, and corporate, service, and financial planning. 
§ It is about deploying the right assets in the right place, at the right time, at the right price. 
§ It determines and prioritises the operational and capital financial needs to provide services at 
desired or determined levels.  
This requires a combination of managerial, analytical and business skills. Not least of which is 
leadership. 
I find that local government has developed a fascination for two things. Best practice; and systems 
modelling, which I’ll get to later. 
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Certifications to a ‘best’ practice standard seem to be a growing fashion.  
My advice is, BEWARE! 
A year or so ago, an Asset Manager from a sizeable Perth metropolitan council asked me if his 
council should have ISO 55000. 
I asked him why, and what benefits he expected from it. End of conversation. 
Many councils have a long way to go before they should even contemplate something like this.  
Please don’t misunderstand me. ISO standards are excellent. I had an indirect involvement with the 
PAS 55 and the 55000 standards. 
Please understand that the ISO standard is really nothing new. It is a consolidation of pre-existing 
wisdom. 
It only specifies the system of management to support asset management. This is what the IPR 
frameworks do.   
My next slide will show this. 
ISO 55000 does not specify best practices for the discipline of asset management. 
Taken in isolation, it will not make an organisation more competitive or improve its practices. It should 
therefore be considered as part of the implementation of a comprehensive asset management 
function. 
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I say, “Do what works for you.” But first, decide what that should be, and test it. Above all, keep things 
simple. 
I have some experience with this.  
In a previous life, I put ISO 9000 into a mature professional asset management organisation.  
It took two years to do properly, including examining and re-writing most of our procedures. Then, we 
saw real and tangible benefits that we could put large monetary values to. 
I have also seen organisations become so absorbed by process that their ISO certifications become 
millstones, which soak-up time and resources, rather than be the means to quality assurance that 
they should be.  
The Institute of Asset Management (IAM) Assessment Manual warns not to attempt a self-
assessment unless you are expert in Asset Management.  
Its Asset Management Maturity Scale and Guidance, which is only an “introduction”, is 100 pages 
long. It took 12 years to develop. 
It has a maturity scale of 0 to 5; zero being innocent, and 5 excellent. Interestingly, if you are certified 
to ISO 55000, the IAM rates you at 3 as competent – the mid-maturity range. 
This is much the same as the NAF self-assessment model, which also requires an expert to carry out.  
So, a bit of a minefield shrouded in complexity, mystery and mystique.  
My view is that local governments should seek independent advice before diving headlong into the 
world of certification. Also, I query the benefit of these certifications to the public sector generally. 
This is how ISO portrays the hierarchy of managing assets as strategic resources.  
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The IPR Framework mirrors this, and should be considered as the organisational ‘good’ practice 
benchmark. 
ISO 55000 deals with the green area. 
As I have said, Asset Management is an integrated and co-ordinated activity to realise value from 
assets. 
This relates to planning the deployment of resources in the most economic and appropriate 
combination, to achieve community, service, and financial goals and objectives. 
A system of management is crucial to making this happen, and setting direction for the actual 
management of assets. 
Asset Management is a strategic business function, and must be integrated into the planning and 
reporting regime. 
It must be built on sound and proven principles, but it should also be intuitive – back to Einstein again 
– and based on the needs, context, and circumstances of an individual council. 
Very few of us would commit to something unless we understood it, and our intuition told us that it 
was right. 
So, develop a policy, governance arrangements, and processes; build the skills and resources, 
acquire or develop systems that suit and do the job for your council and your community.  
It should be kept as simple as possible and understood by all levels of the organisation. 
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Developing a system of management is a journey, can be a daunting venture into the unknown.   
It cannot be done overnight, and will likely take several years to fully embed throughout council. 
Given that the Major Strategic Reviews are just around the corner, many councils will be on catch-up. 
But, there should be no reason to panic just yet. 
I am currently assisting a council to build its asset management framework almost from scratch, and 
develop first-cut Asset Management Plans over the next 6 months, so that it is in a position to have at 
least a basic system of management to use in its Major Strategic Review, to start in February next 
year. 
These things are important: 
§ Having an IPR Asset Management Supremo at Directorate or senior executive level, who is 
empowered with the appropriate authority to manage the function across and throughout the 
organisation. 
Ideally, the position should report to the Chief Executive Officer. 
§ Get independent help and advice from an experienced professional, who can work with you to 
develop Asset Management frameworks and strategies that are relevant to you. 
Only too often have I seen the effects of what I call ‘conveyor belt consulting’ when councils 
have simply been delivered a glossy set of documents that they have had no involvement 
with.  
Also, I have rarely seen a council with either the expertise or spare capacity to do this for 
itself. 
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§ Look at your existing system of managing assets – establish a baseline, and compare it to 
‘good’ asset management principles. Find the gaps. 
§ Narrow the gaps by building your system, capacity and capability to a plan.  
Do it in bite-sized chunks.  
Do not rush to buy a software system because of what it can do. Choose a system because it 
can do what you need it to do. 
I mentioned earlier that I have seen over-reliance on the output of modelling from asset 
systems. The capacity of these systems is impressive, and they are fantastic when used 
properly. 
But, many councils, to their great cost, misinterpret these modelling outputs as proxies for an 
asset management strategy, which do not reflect community objectives, nor the reality of an 
asset’s use in providing services. 
§ A good knowledge of your assets is an absolute priority; and 
§ Write an Improvement Plan; formally communicate it, manage it, report upon it, and update it. 
If there is no clear organisational vision, strategy, goals and objectives; a ‘good’ asset management 
system won’t help. You will hear the “noise before defeat”. 
These are the elements of a ‘good’ practice asset management system. 
 
The community strategy informs the direction for asset management.  
It must be more than a document of feel-good motherhood statements and wish lists. 
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It sets the direction for the next ten years. It needs to be dynamic. 
This requires more than just consultation with communities.  
For them to have a vision for the future, their expectations need to be tempered by good 
communication.  
They should be given information and feedback on the influences that will affect them, and how 
council can or cannot meet their expectations – mostly to do with affordability. 
This is important if the Major Strategic Reviews are to be meaningful. 
The Corporate Business Plan can be considered as the meat in the sandwich between the Long-Term 
Strategy, and planning for all the resources required to achieve it, and the resource limitations on 
achieving that strategy. 
This should be a fairly detailed operational plan to implement the community strategy. 
It needs to identify, describe, and prioritise specific projects to be delivered over the following four 
years, how they will be delivered, how much they will cost, who is responsible for them, and how their 
success will be measured and reported. 
Because the first year of the Plan should be the Annual Budget, it must be reviewed every year. 
Having a formal system of management MUST be a non-negotiable and integral element of your 
management regime.  
Not having this will result in a deafening level of noise before the loss of the sustainability battle. 
 
There must be an Asset Management Policy that is understood by and committed to by the whole 
organisation. From Elected Members down. 
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This policy must, at the very least: 
§ State your asset management objectives; 
§ Integrate asset management into the organisation and its Plan for the Future; 
§ Set governance and management arrangements, including a decision-making process for 
investing in assets; 
§ Define and assign roles and responsibilities; and accountabilities; 
§ Commit council to a whole-of-organisation, and whole-of-life approach to managing assets. 
The Asset Management Strategy is often confused with Asset Management Plans.  
Plans implement strategy. 
But, the two can be combined. Hence, the confusion. 
The Asset Management Strategy provides strong linkages with the Asset Register, Strategic 
Community Plan, Corporate Business Plan, and Long-Term Financial Plan. 
It is a high-level description of how each asset class will meet future community needs over ten years. 
And how much it will cost. 
It is a broad statement of how the existing asset base and system of management need to respond to 
achieve the vision and objectives of the Strategic Community Plan. 
Effectively, it analyses gaps and provides strategies to narrow them. 
It should probably be no more than 15 - 20 pages in length. 
There should be detailed plans to implement strategy for each asset class based on service levels 
agreed with ‘asset owners’. 
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These plans are for the programming and delivery of assets, and their management and operation. 
They should consider risks, and the consequences of their occurrence; give full financial information; 
and provide for the measurement and reporting of performance. 
Dealing with risk is terribly important – categories of risk are numerous, and the consequences of 
occurrence can be catastrophic. And liability can extend to individuals.  
I shall soon be considering this with Local Government Insurance Service in Western Australia. 
It will also be necessary to develop individual asset plans for significant or critical assets, and major 
asset components. 
They should consider accommodation needs, disposal of surplus assets and acquisition of new 
assets, operation and maintenance programmes, and capital projects. 
These are the parts of the Asset Management System that enable everything to be done properly. 
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Levels of service are developed from the demand side of the equation, i.e. Community Strategy. They 
need to be considered for both within the organisation, and externally. 
They must also be developed for services provided to the community, as well as to satisfy technical 
and compliance requirements. 
A good practice is to develop a matrix listing all services by reference to the Strategic Community 
Plan, describing their priority, current levels, and future levels.  
I recently worked on a Major Strategic Review where I included a column on the matrix for the 
implications of service levels on assets - very useful for asset planning, and providing strong linkages 
all the way across the IPR framework. 
Everything that we do in managing assets is dependent upon reliable and accurate data; and the 
RIGHT AND RELEVANT data.  
Don’t get carried away. Only maintain the data that you need. 
Without this, and without the ability to translate data into good information, asset management cannot 
develop strategy, or support informed decision-making. 
All assets must be organised into classes, sub-classes and components, and your Asset 
Management Information System must link with your Financial Asset Register. 
I spoke earlier about getting the right skills, and putting good processes in place. 
But, it is paramount that the organisation understands what asset management is, and has the right 
leadership to make sure that that understanding is spread throughout. 
Evaluation and improvement is really about culture, and the leadership to promote that culture. 
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Very little survives without being kept under people’s noses. Information and communication 
strategies will help to keep your communities interested and engaged, and generate a sense of 
ownership and accountability. 
If you haven’t heard about the extraordinary things done at the Lambeth Council in London, I 
encourage you to look at its website. This is a great example of a troubled community coming back 
from the brink. 
 
Thank you. 
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Appendix 3.1 
 
Non-Financial Public Sector Property Asset Values and 
Maintenance Expenditure                                                                                                                      
§ Commonwealth and State Governments – Summary of Real Property Assets 
§ Commonwealth Government – Real Property Assets 
§ NSW Government – Real Property Assets 
§ Queensland Governments – Real Property Assets 
§ Victorian Governments – Real Property Assets 
§ Governments of South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory & 
Northern Territory – Real Property Assets  
§ Commonwealth and State Governments – Value of Real Property Assets : Total Asset Value
Commonwealth and State Governments1, and Local Government Sector2 – Summary of Real   
Property Assets (Non-Financial Public Sector) 
 
Government Value of Real 
Property Assets 
$000 
Notional Allocation of 
Maintenance 
Expenditure (2% of 
Value)3 
$000 
Commonwealth 21,516,943 430,000 
New South Wales  78,600,424 3,856,0004 
Queensland 56,937,905 1,138,758 
Victoria 53,640,000 1,072,800 
South Australia 19,781,000 395,620 
Western Australia 31,372,904 627,458 
Tasmania 5,235,000 104,700 
Australian Capital Territory 9,043,284 180,866 
Northern Territory 3,363,059 67,261 
Local Government Sector 45,300,000 906,000 
Total 324,790,519 6,495,810 
                                                       
 
1 Source: respective governments’ Budget Papers 2009-10, and Annual Reports 2007-08. 
2 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013) 
3 Analysis of NSW expenditure used as a basis.  
4 Actual budgeted expenditure. 
Commonwealth Government Real Property Assets (Non-Financial Public Sector)1 
 
Department Land & 
Buildings 
Value2  
$000 
Value of 
Additional Land 
& Buildings 
Administered on 
behalf of 
Government 
$000 
Total Value 
Land & 
Buildings 
$000 
%  of 
Commonwealth 
Total Value 
($21.517bn)3 
Notional 
Allocation of 
Maintenance 
Expenditure  
(2% of 
Value)4 $000 
General Government Sector      
Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry 55,158 - 55,158 0.3 1,103 
Attorney General 52,971 120,102 173,073 0.8 3,462 
Broadband, Communications & 
Digital Economy 
63,058 - 63,058 0.3 1,261 
Defence 13,503,000 - 13,503,000 62.8 270,060 
Education, Employment & 
Workplace Relations 
115,625 - 115,625 0.5 2,313 
Environment, Water, Heritage & 
Arts 
261,000 161,322 422,322 2.0 8,447 
Families, Housing, Community 
Services & Indigenous Affairs 
182,059 - 182,059 0.9 3,641 
Finance & Deregulation 
- Land & Buildings 
- Investment Property (non-
Defence) 
 
296,138 
851,676  
1,147,814 
 
 
 
5,858 
 
 
 
1,153,672 
 
 
 
5.4 
 
 
 
23,074 
Foreign Affairs & Trade 2,010,549 - 2,010,549 9.3 40,211 
Health & Ageing 91,184 27,869 119,053 0.6 2,380 
Human Services 52,659 - 52,659 0.3 1,053 
Immigration & Citizenship 578,713 - 578,713 3.0 11,574 
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development & Local Government 
34,354 61,892 96,246 0.5 1,925 
Innovation, Industry, Science & 
Research 
70,757 - 70,757 0.3 3,538 
Prime Minister & Cabinet - 41,196 41,196 0.2 824 
Resources, Energy & Tourism - 152,000 152,000 0.7 3,040 
Treasury 10,816 - 10,816 - 216 
Parliamentary Services - 1,626,627 1,626,627 8.0 32,533 
Total General Government 
Sector 
18,229,717 2,196,866 20,426,583 95.0 410,0005 
 
Public Non-Financial 
Corporations6 
     
Australian Government Solicitor - - -   
Australian Postal Corporation 777,000 - 777,000 3.6 15,540 
Australian River Co. Ltd No data available 
ASC Pty Ltd 104,669 - 104,669 0.5 2,093 
Australian Technology Group Ltd No data available 
Australian Hearing Services 5,750 - 5,750 - 115 
Health Services Australia Ltd 8,133 - 8,133 - 163 
Air Services Australia 177,604 - 177,604 0.8 3,552 
Australian Rail Track Corporation 
Ltd 
17,204 - 17,204 0.1 344 
Total PNFCs 1,090,360  1,090,360 5.0 21,807 
 
Total Non-Fin. Public Sector 19,320,077 - 21,516,943 100.0 430,0007 
                                                       
 
1 Source: Commonwealth Government Budget Papers 2009-10 
2 Only aggregate values provided. 
3 Extrapolation from Budget paper No. 1, Statement 9: Budget Statements, Tables 2 & 5 produces a total value for the NFPS of $35.560bn. 
(GGS: $27.795bn + Public Non-Financial Corporations: $7.765bn). Analysis of 2009-10 Budget papers and 2007-08 Annual Reports 
present a value of $21.517bn. 
4 No maintenance expenditure provided. Analysis of NSW expenditure (see Appendix 1.3) used as a basis. 
5 Difference due to rounding of figures. 
6 Source: Annual Reports 2007-08. 
7 Difference due to rounding of figures. 
